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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

BASED ON ORIGINAL SOURCES

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, Kt.-C.I.E.

Honorary Member, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain.

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Preface.

In preparing this second edition (April, 1952), many minute corrections have been made by using the new materials found during the 28 years that have passed since the first edition was published in 1924. The old references to the ms. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* have been replaced by citations of the edition of it printed in the Gaekwad Oriental Series, and full use has been made of Francois Martin's *Mémoires*, now available in three volumes in print, discarding Kaeppe-
lin's summary. Three new appendices (A, B, and C) have been added in order to embody fresh materials. The longest addition is the Chapter on the Empire, its resources and administration (Ch. 64), which was at first included in my *Short History* (1930), but has been now transferred to this volume, in order to give completeness to my survey of the reign. I am deeply indebted to Professor Tapan Kumar Ray Chaudhury, D. Phil., for assistance in reading the proofs.

Jadunath Sarkar.

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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

CHAPTER XLIX.

A SURVEY OF THE LAST EIGHTEEN YEARS.

§ 1. *The tragedy of Aurangzib's life, how developed.*

The life of Aurangzib was one long tragedy,—a story of man battling in vain against an invisible but inexorable Fate, a tale of how the strongest human endeavour was baffled by the forces of the age. A strenuous reign of fifty years ends in colossal failure. And yet this king was one of the greatest rulers of Asia in intelligence, character, and enterprise. He was, in an extraordinary degree hardworking, active, moral, and inspired by the sense of duty. He denied himself pleasure and repose, steeled his heart against the seductions of the senses and the appeals of pity and human weakness, and governed his people according to the best ideals of his age and creed. And yet the result of fifty years of strong and good administration by this Puritan in the purple was the hopeless breaking up of his empire. This tragedy in history was developed with all the regularity of a perfect drama.

The first forty years of his life were spent in steady and arduous self-training and preparation for the supreme office in the realm. This seed-time was followed by a year of sharp contest for the throne, which put all his powers to the test and rewarded his energy, courage and sagacity with the golden crown of Delhi. Then came twenty-three years of peaceful and prosperous reign and settled residence in the great capitals of Northern India. With every enemy

removed from his path, the whole empire of India obeying his command, and wealth and culture increasing from the peace and order that his firm and vigilant rule had ensured to the country,—Aurangzib seemed now to have attained to the summit of human happiness and glory. This was the third Act of his life, and after it began his decline. A pitiless Nemesis, like that of the Greek tragedy, raised against him an enemy in the very bosom of his family. The rebel son of Shāh Jahān cannot long enjoy his triumph because he is confronted by the rebellion of his own son Muhammad Akbar (1681.)

The flight of the defeated rebel to the Marātha king drew Aurangzib to Southern India, where he was destined to spend the last 26 years of his life in tents and to wear out the empire's revenue, army, and organised administration as well as his own health in an unending and fruitless struggle. But the irony of Fate at first veiled from his eyes and the eyes of his contemporaries the futility of his efforts and the tragic close of his career. In the fourth Act of his life, which is comprehended in the fourth volume of this History, all seemed to go well with him;—Bijāpur and Golkondā were annexed, the Berad chieftain of Sāgar was forced to submit, and the troublesome Marātha king was brought to the block and his capital and entire family captured (1689). In this result nothing seemed to be wanting to complete the triumph of Aurangzib. But a few thoughtful observers could already discern ominous signs of the coming doom, peeping out here and there, while others were still blinded as to the future by the brilliancy of the empire. The seeds that had been sown in the third stage of his life, unnoticed and in ignorance of their fruits, began to sprout up in the fourth, and he had to gather their baneful harvest in the fifth and closing period of his life.

Therefore, the tragedy of Aurangzib is concentrated in the last eighteen years of his life (1689-1707), which form the theme of the present volume. Not that any one could at its outset forecast the exact course of the future, nor that events moved steadily in one direction only. Slowly but pitilessly his Fate works itself out, finally defeating all his efforts, though the invisible cause of his failure lay in his character and past deeds. Slowly but with increasing clearness does the tragic plot unfold itself, till Aurangzib realises the true nature of the forces arrayed against him and the real trend of affairs. But he does not abandon the struggle; even when the hopelessness of the contest forces itself on him and his Court, his endeavour is as strenuous as before. He tries new remedies; he changes his tactics with changes in the political situation and in the distribution of the enemy forces. At first he sends out his generals, while himself occupying a central position for their control and guidance. His generals fail to achieve a decision; very well, then this old man of eighty-two must go out to conduct the war in person for six years (1699-1705); and he retires to Ahmadnagar only when the first summons of death reaches him. Then, and then only does he mournfully recognise Ahmadnagar as destined to be his "journey's end" (*khatam-us-safar*.)*

In this chapter I propose to take a general survey of Aurangzib's movements and policy during these last eighteen years,—how the situation developed at different times and in different theatres,—what steps he took to meet each of these new developments and with what results,—what leading actors arose at different stages of the contest and how they influenced the action,—and how slowly but surely the

* Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam*, § 56. K. K. (540) has *Ikhtitam-i-safar*.

moral decline of the empire passed into the actual dissolution of government and of social order at his death.

§ 2. *Aurangzib's movements during his last 20 years.*

When Golkondā fell to him (on 21st September 1687), a year after the conquest of Bijāpur, Aurangzib's work in the Deccan seemed to have been completed. The long dream of the Mughal Emperors ever since the days of Akbar seemed at last to have been fully realised. No rival Muslim Power was left in the Deccan, and all India now bowed beneath the sceptre of Delhi. True, there was a Hindu king still unsubdued; but he was an upstart of limited means and his soldiers no better than brigands; their suppression, so it seemed, was only a question of time, now that the Mughal army was set free and the Marāthas had no ally left to them anywhere in India.

After the capture of Golkondā, Aurangzib lay encamped near that fort till 25th January 1688, in order to settle the administration of the conquered country, and then he returned to Bijāpur (on 15th March) by way of Bidar and Kulbarga. At Bijāpur he lived for the next nine months, till driven out (on 14th December) by a terrible outbreak of the plague. By way of Akluj and Bahadur-garh (on the Bhimā) he reached Korégaon in the Punā district, where he encamped from 3rd March to 18th December 1689, and then returned to Bijāpur (on 11th Jan. 1690), this being his third visit to the Adil Shāhi capital. But he soon left it, and after spending February, March and April at different places south of that city, near the bank of the Krishnā, he finally encamped at Galgalā, on the southern side of that river and 34 miles south-west of Bijāpur, about 21st May 1690. The rest of this year and the first two months of the next year were passed by him here; and then he went

back to the environs of Bijāpur for fourteen months (March 1691—May 1692). Thereafter, Galgalā was again his residence, for nearly three years (May 1692—March 1695). Here the Venetian doctor Gemelli Careri visited him (21st March 1695) and has left a graphic account of his Court and personal habits.

Finally, after a fifth and last visit to Bijāpur for five weeks (April-May 1695), he settled at Brahmapuri on the southern bank of the Bhimā, (some 20 miles south-east of Pandhārpur), which his pious zeal renamed *Islāmpuri*. Here he lived for four years and a half (21 May 1695—19 Oct. 1699), travelling to Sholāpur every year in Ramzān in order to spend the holy month there in prayer, fasting and mediation. At Islāmpuri his encampment was walled round, and here he left his family in charge of his wazir when he set out on 19th October, 1699, on that endless campaign against the Maratha forts which was to wear out the years of his life, and from which he returned to Ahmadnagar (20 Jan. 1706), only to die a year later (20 Feb. 1707).

Such briefly were Aurangzib's movements during the last twenty years of his reign. We shall now survey the changes in the military situation during this time.

§ 3. *The Maratha recovery 1690-91.*

The years 1688 and 1689 were a period of unbroken triumph to the Emperor. His armies marched east and south to take possession of the forts and provinces of the annexed kingdoms of Bijāpur and Golkondā. Thus, Sāgar (the Berad capital), Raichur and Adoni (in the east), Serā and Bangālore (in Mysore), Wandiwāsh and Conjeveram (in the Madras Karnātak), Bankāpur and Belgaon (in the extreme south-west), were occupied; and to crown all, Shambhuji was captured and his capital with his entire

family seized. As the Marātha chronicle says of 1689, "This year the Mughals took all the forts." In Northern India, too, signal success attended his arms: the Jāt rising under Rājārām was put down and that leader was slain (on 4th July, 1688).

But at the end of 1689 the new Marātha king Rājārām was known to have reached the fort of Jinji in safety, and the Emperor's forces had henceforth to be directed south-eastwards into the Mysore plateau and the Madras Karnātak if he was to preserve his rightful gains from Bijāpur and Golkonda in those quarters and to check Marātha activity there. Thus, the brilliant success of Mughal arms since 1687 received a sharp set-back in 1690. Jinji became a centre of Mahātha enterprise in the East Coast, while their ministers left at home organised resistance to the Mughals in the west. The difficulties of Aurangzib were only multiplied by the disappearance of a common head and a central Government among the Marāthas, as every Marātha captain with his own retainers fought and raided in a different quarter and on his own account. It now became a people's war, and Aurangzib could not end it, because there was no Marātha Government or State-army for him to attack and destroy. The imperial forces could not be present everywhere in full strength; hence, they suffered reverses here and there. The enemy forts which the Mughals had captured or bought during the first panic following Shambhuji's downfall, now began to be recovered by the Marāthas. The tide first turned against Aurangzib in May 1690, when his general Rustam Khan was captured and his whole camp looted by the Marāthas.

Throughout 1690 and 1691 the Emperor's chief concern still was to take possession of the almost boundless expanse of fertile territory in the south and the east, which had

legally fallen to him as the heir-at-law of Adil Shah and Qutb Shah. At this stage, he evidently underrated the Marātha danger, as he hoped that with their capital and royal family in his hands and their new king invested in Jinji by the same general who had captured Sāhu and Rāigarh, the *State* of the Marāthas had been practically annihilated. He had yet to take a proper measure of the Maratha *people*.

§ 4. *The fighting during 1692 and 1693.*

In the autumn of 1691 the Mughal position before Jinji became so dangerously weak that the Emperor had to divert large forces to that quarter. In 1692 nothing was achieved by the imperialists in the western theatre, while in the east coast the year ended with crushing disasters to their arms,—the capture of two high Mughal generals, the abandonment of the siege lines before Jinji, and the arrest of Prince Kām Bakhsh by his colleagues (Dec. 1692—Jan. 1693). So, the first thing to be done in 1693 was to save the situation by pouring reinforcements and supplies into the Eastern Karnātak. In the western theatre, Prince Muizz-ud-din, who had laid siege to Panhālā in October 1692, toiled unsuccessfully throughout the next year, and was finally expelled by the Marathas in March 1694. In addition to this, there were the incessant raids of the Maratha partisan leaders,—Santā Ghorparé, Dhanā Jādvā, Nimā Sindhiā, Hanumant Rao and others,—diversified by occasional successes of the Mughal pursuing columns which had not the least decisive effect, but merely lightened the Maratha rovers of a part of their booty and some mares and arms, and sometimes cost them the lives of their rear-guard.

Meantime, nearer the imperial head-quarters, over the broad and strategically important tract from Bidar to

Bijapur and from Rāichur to Malkhed, the activities of the hardy aboriginal tribe of Berads led by the genius of their chief Pidiā Nāyak, had become so serious that a large army under a first-rate general had to be posted at Sāgar (72 miles east of Bijapur) from June 1691 to December 1692. Then the Berad chieftain made his submission, but he renewed his hostility three years later, when another large army had to be sent against him (1696).

During 1694 the war in Western Deccan continued to be of the same indecisive and straggling character. Only in the Madras Karnātak the reinforced Mughal general made many conquests and levied contribution from Tanjore, but without thereby hastening the capture of the new Maratha capital at Jinji.

§ 5. *Aurangzib realises his hopeless position, 1695.*

At last, by April 1695 Aurangzib came to realise that he had really gained nothing by the conquest of the Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi capitals and the extinction of their royal lines. He had formally annexed their dominions and his officers had taken legal possession of their chief forts and administrative centres; but these gains had not been secured, they had not been made into "settled" provinces like the old *subas* of the empire. For Aurangzib, then, there was no going back to Delhi; his work in the Deccan was still unfinished; indeed, it was only just beginning.

He now perceived that the Maratha problem was no longer what it had been in Shivāji's time, or even in Shambhuji's. They were no longer a tribe of banditti or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics, the only enemy left to the empire, and yet an enemy all-pervasive from Bombay to Madras across the Indian Peninsula, elusive as the wind, without any headman or

stronghold whose capture would naturally result in the extinction of their power. They had now assumed the alarming character of being the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, the Central Provinces and Bundelkhand. A nation was now up in arms, or more correctly all the various tribes residing in Southern and Central India were up in arms with Maratha aid and concert, against the officers of the Emperor and the cause of law and order in general. Aurangzib realised that he was a frail man buffeting a raging ocean with his bare arms.

His hope of returning to Delhi and ruling peacefully from that centre of the empire had at last to be given up as an empty dream. He must stay on the spot till death, if necessary.

§6. *The Emperor's stay at Islāmpuri, 1695-1699.*

Therefore, in May 1695 he sent his eldest son to govern the north-western portion of the empire (the Punjab, Sindh, and afterwards Afghanistan) and to guard the western gateway of India, while he himself settled at Islāmpuri in as much permanence of residence as the military situation and his age (now verging on eighty) allowed. This place was his last abode, because though he actually lived here for the next $4\frac{1}{2}$ years only, it remained ever after as his home and stronghold, the base (*bungāh*) at the back of his campaigns.

During the Islāmpuri period (1695-1699), the Maratha danger came nearer home and drove the Mughals into the defensive in the Marāthi and Kanārese districts of the present Bombay Presidency. The movements of the roving bands under Santā Ghorparé, Dhanā Jādav and their imita-

tors were bewilderingly rapid and unexpected. The Mughals could not defend every place; their pursuing columns panted helplessly behind the "robbers" and wore themselves out in vain. Local representatives of the Emperor, who had learnt by bitter experience that aid could not be expected from their master in time,—and sometimes ever at all,—made unauthorised terms with the Marathas by promising them an annual blackmail of one-fourth of the revenue (*chauth*.) They were still more urged to do it by the fact that if the Marathas looted a district the Emperor ordered his local governor to make the loss good to the victims! If a Mughal officer resisted the Marathas and was defeated and captured by them, he had to provide his own ransom, and the Emperor would often dismiss such unfortunate sufferers on the suspicion of cowardice. Hence, it was safer for a Mughal commander to bribe the Marathas than to fight them; certainly, it was cheaper. Worse than these, many imperialists made a concert with the enemy and enriched themselves by robbing the Emperor's own subjects and innocent traders, as these officers had been starving at getting no rent from their devastated fields. The Mughal administration had really dissolved, and only the presence of the Emperor with all his troops in the country held it together, but it was now a delusive phantom. Santa and Dhana were the heroes of this period; the initiative lay entirely with them, and they upset every plan and calculation formed by the imperialists.

The chief incidents of this Islāmpuri period were Sānta's destruction of two great Mughal generals, Qāsim Khān (Nov. 1695) and Himmat Khān (Jan. 1696), the murder of Sāntā in a domestic feud (June 1697), the Mughal capture of Jinji (7 Jan. 1698), and the return of Rājārām to Mahārāshtra.

§ 7. *Aurangzib's last campaigns, 1699-1705.*

This last event forced a change on Aurangzib's policy. Safe in the undisputed possession of the east coast, he could now concentrate all his resources in the western theatre of war. Such a change of objective had become necessary too, as the head and centre of the Maratha power had once more shifted to the west and he could destroy it only by seizing their king's forts and family in Mahārāshtra and thus repeating once again, but in a more decisive and final form, the success that had followed his capture of Shambhuji and his capital in 1689.

Now, therefore, began the last stage of Aurangzib's career,—the sieges of successive Maratha forts by the Emperor in person. The rest of his life (1699-1707) is a repetition of the same sickening tale: a hill-fort captured by him after a vast expenditure of time men and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak Mughal garrison after a few months, and its siege begun again by the Mughals a year or two later! His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable hardships in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads, and broken hilly tracks; porters disappeared; transport beasts died of hunger and overwork; scarcity of grain was ever present in his camp. His officers wearied of this labour of Sisyphus; but Aurangzib would burst into wrath at any suggestion of return to Northern India and taunt the unlucky counsellor with cowardice and love of ease [*Ahkām* §46.] One by one the old able and independent officers and courtiers of his earlier years had passed away, and he was now surrounded only by timid sycophants and upstart nobles of his own creation, who could never venture to contradict him in his errors, nor give him honest counsel. The mutual jealousies of his generals—

Nasrat Jang against Firuz Jang, Shujāet Khan against Muhammad Murād, Tarbiyat Khan against Fathullah Khan,—ruined his affairs as completely as the French cause in the Peninsular War was ruined by the private quarrels of Napoleon's marshals. Therefore, the Emperor must conduct every operation in person, or nothing would be done.

A bare list of his sieges is given below :—

Basant-garh (siege, 22nd—25th Nov. 1699).

Satārā (siege, 8 Dec. 1699—21 April 1700).

Parli-garh (siege, 30 April—9 June).

Halt at Khawaspur for the rainy season of 1700
(from 30 Aug.)

Panhālā (siege, 9 March—28 May, 1701).

Pavan-garh (do.)

Halt at Khatāu for the rainy season of 1701 (29 May
—7 Nov.)

Capture of Wardhan-garh (6 June)

Nandgir, Chandan and Wandan (6 Oct.) by Fath-
ullah Khan.

Khelnā (siege, 26 Dec. 1701—4 June 1702).

Halt at Bahādur-garh for the rainy season of 1702.

Kondānā (siege, 27 Dec. 1702—8 April 1703).

Halt at Punā for the rainy season of 1703 (1 May—
10 Nov.)

Rājgarh (siege, 2 Dec. 1703—16 Feb. 1704).

Tornā (siege, 23 Feb.—10 March).

Halt at Khed for the rainy season of 1704 (17 April
—22 Oct.)

Wāgingerā (siege, 8 Feb.—27 April 1705).

Halt at Devāpur for the rainy season of 1705 (May
—23 Oct.)

This was the last campaign of the old campaigner of eighty-eight, for here he received a warning of what was to come.

At Devāpur a severe illness seized him, which was aggravated by his insistence on transacting business as usual. The whole camp was thrown into despair and confusion. At length Aurangzib yielded to their entreaty and the warning of approaching death, and retreated to Ahmadnagar (20 January 1706), to die there a year afterwards.

§ 8. *Sorrow and misery of his last years.*

The last few years of his life were inexpressibly sad. On its public side there was the consciousness that his long reign of half a century had been a colossal failure. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury; the Government turned bankrupt; the soldiers starving from arrears of pay (usually three years overdue) mutinied; and during the closing years of his reign the revenue of Bengal, regularly sent by the honest and able *divān* Murshid Quli Khan, was the sole support of the Emperor's household and army, and its arrival was eagerly looked forward to. While in the Deccan the Marathas remained supreme to the end, lawlessness reigned in many places of Northern and Central India also. The old Emperor in the far South lost control over his officers in Hindustan, and the administration grew slack and corrupt; chiefs and zamindars defied the local authorities and asserted themselves, filling the country with tumult, and the great anarchy began in the empire of Delhi even before Aurangzib had closed his eyes.

In the Deccan, the Maratha captains, each acting on his own account, incessantly raided Mughal territory and did the greatest possible injury to the imperialists by their guerilla warfare. They seemed to be ubiquitous and elusive like the wind. The movable columns frequently sent out from the imperial head-quarters to "chastise the robbers", only marched and counter-marched, without being able to

crush the enemy. When the Mughal forces had gone back, the scattered Marathas, like water parted by the oar, closed again and resumed their attack as before. There was an exultant and menacing Maratha army always hanging three or four miles behind the Emperor's camp wherever it marched or halted.

The wastage of the Deccan war, which raged intensely for nearly 20 years, was one hundred thousand soldiers and followers and three times that number of horses, elephants, camels and oxen on the Mughal side every year (*Storia*, iv. 96). In the imperial camp pestilence was always present and the daily mortality was heavy from the immense numbers of men crowded together, the accumulation of filth and flies, and the unbearable stench. (*Ibid*, 116.) The economic exhaustion of the Deccan was complete; "the fields were left devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the bones of men and beasts. The country was so entirely desolated and depopulated that neither fire nor light could be found in the course of a three or four days' journey." (*Ibid*, 252.) Trade and revenue collection had long ceased, and incessant brigandage by both sides had at last left nothing to be looted.

§ 9. *The end of Aurangzib.*

In addition to the failure of his rule, Aurangzib's domestic life was loveless and dreary, and wanting in the benign peace and cheerfulness and the kindred warmth which throw a halo round old age. He was ever haunted by the fear that his sons would treat him as he had treated Shah Jahān. Lastly, there was the certainty of a deluge of blood when he would close his eyes and his three surviving sons, each supported by a provincial army and treasury, would fight for the throne to the bitter end. Death was busy at

work within his family circle for some years before his own end. In the midst of the darkness closing around him, he used to hum the pathetic verses:—

By the time you reach your 80th or 90th year,
You will have received many a hard blow from the hand
of Time;
And when from that point you reach the stage of a
hundred years,
Death will put on the garb of your life.

His last illness overtook him at Ahmadnagar, late in January 1707; then he rallied for five or six days, sent away his two sons Azam and Kām Bakhsh from his camp to their provincial governments, and resumed his daily prayers and official work. But that worn-out frame of 90 years had now been taxed beyond human endurance. A severe fever set in, and in the morning of Friday, 20th February, 1707,* he sank into eternal rest.

* *Maasir A*, 521, gives Friday 28 Zil Q. 1118, but that date was a Thursday. As this official history emphasises that the death took place on a Friday, we must correct the text into Friday the 29th Zil Q. = 21 Feb. 1707.

CHAPTER L.

OPERATIONS IN WESTERN DECCAN DURING 1688-1695.

§ 1. *The leading Maratha ministers and generals at the accession of Rajaram.*

When the great Shivaji's successor Shambhuji was killed by Aurangzib (March 1689) and his family was closely besieged in Rāigarh, it seemed very likely that the newly created Maratha kingdom and independent nationality would be destroyed very soon. The prospect became still more gloomy at the end of the year, when Shambhuji's sons were captured and his successor Rajaram driven into hopeless flight by the Mughals. In this terrible national crisis the genius of the Maratha *people* saved them and secured their liberty. It is, therefore, necessary to study the leaders of this almost kingless State during the period.

At the time of the downfall of Shambhuji and the hurried crowning of Rajaram (Feb. 1689), the leading persons in the Maratha State who had survived the havoc of Shambhuji's reign were three: Nilkantha Moreshwar Pinglé the *Peshwā*, Rāmchandra Nilkantha Bāvdékar the *Amātya*, and Shankarāji Malhār the *Sachiv*.* In addition to them there was an officer possessed of the highest cleverness and experience, namely, Prahlād, the son of the late Chief Justice and shrewd diplomatist, Nirāji Rāvji. This Prahlād had been Maratha ambassador at Golkondā, and had, in that capacity, done signal services to Shivāji and Shambhuji, and the influence and knowledge that he had thus acquired were so great that he became all in all in the council of Rajaram at Jinji.

* This distribution of offices is tentative, being based upon Chitnis, ii. 39-40. In the *Modern Review*, May 1924, p. 588, a writer gives reasons for doubting its correctness.

Three other men, who had hitherto filled only subordinate posts, now forced their way by their genius and enterprise to the front rank of State servants and popular leaders in this crisis of Maratha history. They were Dhana Singh Jādav and Santāji Ghorparé (the two rivals for the office of Senapati), and Parashurām Trimbak, who finally rose to the post of Regent in 1701.*

§ 2. *Rajaram's position and policy on his accession, 1689.*

In the last year of Shambhuji's reign (1688), the splendid State created by the genius and valour of Shivāji seemed about to break to pieces. Many vassal chiefs, notably the Sāvants of Vādi, had been in rebellion for some time past and could not be conquered. In November 1688, the Shirké family had risen in arms with the sympathy of the discontented ministers jealous of the foreign favourite Kavikalas and the good wishes of all who despaired of the safety of Shivāji's heritage in the hands of the drunken profligate Shambhu; but they had been defeated and driven out of the country, and the king had taken swift vengeance by throwing into prison Prahlād Nirāji, the chief *kārkuns* and many other prominent officers (December)—which had the effect of paralysing the administration [*Jedhe S.*]

Less than two months after this *coup* had come the crushing blow of the capture of Shambhu by the Mughals (about 3rd February, 1689). To many of the Marathas this disaster probably appeared as a blessing in disguise: the hateful North Indian favourite who had bewitched the king and the insolent and capricious Rajah himself, whom no patriot and no honourable man could serve, were both removed by one stroke of fate.

* Chit. ii. 71; *Bharatvarsha*, year 1, No. 3, pp. 31—40; *Kaifiyats*, p. 146.

Immediately after hearing of Shambhuji's capture, Chāngoji Kātkar, the qiladār of Rāigarh, with the support of Yesāji Kank, the old Māvlé captain and comrade of Shivāji's youth, took Rajaram out of prison and seated him on the throne (8th February). The State officers confined by the late king,—some in 1684 and others only two months ago—were all released. Shambhuji's heir Shāhu was a boy of six only, and therefore the dowager queen, Yesu Bāi, very wisely supported Rajaram instead of urging the claims of her own son. It was not a time for woman's rule or infant's rule. Even before the capture of Shambhuji, a Mughal army had been detached in December 1688 under the able general Zulfiqār Khan, against his capital, and now (February 1689) the fort was invested in right earnest. [*M. A.* 331, 327.] As the besiegers strengthened their posts, Rajaram wisely decided not to risk his all by shutting himself up in that fort, but to go out of it in time, raise forces from the country at large, and with them try to drive away the besiegers of Rāigarh.

So, he slipped out of the fort in the garb of a Hindu religious beggar (*yogi*) on 5th April, and by way of Pratāp-garh, Satārā and Parli took refuge in Panhālā, c. 30 June. Here with the help of Rāmchandra he began to levy fresh troops, but the Mughals were after him, and he found no real safety anywhere in the home country. True, all these forts were still in his possession; but how long would they withstand the captor of Bijāpur and Golkondā? Moreover, it would be a wise strategy to divide the enemy's forces by transferring a part of the Maratha activities to the far-off East Coast, while the Mughals were kept in play on the western side of the Peninsula by his other officers. So he decided to retire to the Madras Karnātak and there make a

stand with the help of his first cousin Shāhji II of Tanjore (the successor of Vyankoji).

The plan of operations for the future was thus arranged : Rajaram was to be conducted to Jinji by Prahlād Nirāji (as his chief counsellor) with a number of generals and high civil servants. The supreme control of affairs in the homeland was vested in Rāmchandra N. Bāvdékar, the *Amātya*, with his head-quarters first in Vishālgarh and latterly in Parli, assisted by Shankarāji Malhār (the *Sachiv*) and certain other officers. All officials and captains in the homeland were to take their orders from Rāmchandra and obey him like the king himself. The commands of this dictator of the West were not to be upset even by the king on appeal. The supreme authority thus conferred on Rāmchandra was designated by his new title of *Hakumat-panāh*. Rāmchandra had an inborn genius for command and organisation. He gathered round himself the ablest lieutenants, men like Parashurām Trimbak and Shankarāji Nārāyan, and managed to make the mutually jealous and contentious Maratha guerilla leaders act in concert, though his orders lacked the prestige and authority which the king's presence in Maharashtra could have given to them and though he was confronted by a tireless clever and powerful enemy like Aurangzib. Rāmchandra's masterly insight and consummate tact were proved by his exact adaptation of his policy and plan of operations to the genius of his countrymen and the actual situation in the midst of which he had to work.

Finding the Mughal pursuit dangerously close and persistent, Rajaram left Panhālā on 26th September, 1689, passed through many perilous adventures and a period of concealment in Bednur territory, and then by rapid marches reached Vellore on 28th October, and some four days later entered Jinji "in humble guise" like a poor private person.

There he took over the government from the unwilling hands of Harji Mahādik's widow and son, formed a full Court and began to reign like a king, though in extreme poverty.* The Peshwā Nilkantha M. Pinglé accompanied his master to Jinji, but there fell completely into the second place. He merely stamped his seal on the royal letters, while the king's leading counsellor and the supreme authority in the State was Prahlād Nirāji, whom Rajaram called his father and on whom the high title of Regent (*Pratinidhi*) was conferred thus placing him outside and above the cabinet of eight ministers (*Ashta-Pradhān*).

§ 3. *Aurangzib's successes and policy during 1689.*

At the time when Rajaram fled from Mahārāshtra (1689), Aurangzib had already won many of the Maratha forts and was rapidly winning others by money or force, as the enemy were paralysed by Shambhuji's misgovernment and subsequent downfall. In the extreme north, Sālhīr (21 Feb. 1687) and Trimbak (8 Jan. 1689) had been captured, and in the centre Singhgarh (Nov. 1684) and Rājgarh (May 1689), while in North Konkan his able agent Matabar Khan was on the high tide of success, taking fort after fort, as will be described in Chapter LIII. Only the capital Rāigarh and the three very important fortresses of Vishālgarh, Satārā and Panhālā still remained in Maratha possession. Of these Raigarh and Panhālā were to fall before the year was over.

The Mughals had been holding for some years past the plains of the Nāsik and Punā districts, but not the hill-

* For the dates *Jedhe Shakāvali*, and the details Keshav Pandit's Sanskrit poem and F. Martin's French *Mémoire*, summarised in Appendix A. Rajaram's life in Jinji, as described by Martin is given in an abridged translation in my *House of Shivaji*, 3rd edition.

forts within their limits. The first Mughal successes after Shambhuji's fall were the capture of the mountain strongholds in the extreme north-west (the Nāsik district) and the descent from them into the Thānā district of North Konkan, across the Western Ghāts. The inland parts of Central and Southern Konkan remained in Maratha possession, but the coast was mostly subject to Mughal sway, as the Siddi of Janjirā with his invincible fleet was now a Mughal admiral, and the Marathas were forced to lose the port of Chaul and even to evacuate the island-depot of Underi. Their navy had to transfer its head-quarters further south to Gheṛiā or Vijaydurg.

In the year 1689 many Maratha forts fell easily into Aurangzib's hands,* but it was then not worth his while to lay regular sieges to the numberless other forts in Mahārāshtra, as will become evident when we consider his position in that year with reference to the entire Deccan and not in respect of the Marathas alone. They were a minor factor at that time and he expected them to be subdued as the natural consequence of the fall of their king and the impending capture of their capital and royal family. The Mughal Emperor had yet to gain his knowledge of the character of the Maratha people and of the people's war. His one aim now was to occupy the rich and boundless dominions of the fallen Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi kingdoms, and he would take the Maratha forts only if they could be secured easily and cheaply. Therefore, during 1689, 1690 and 1691 Aurangzib was too busy in the plains of the south and the

* "The forts captured by the imperialists in 1689 were too many to be named." (*M. A.* 311.) "In the year 1689 the Mughals took all the forts. . . Out of these Pratapgarh and Rohira Rajgarh and Torna in the Wai subdivision were recovered by Ramchandra and Shankaraji in 1690." (*Jedhé Shakāvali*.)

east to divert his resources to the barren hill-forts of the west. Nor had he been yet seized with the obstinate folly of his old age, which made him dash his health, army, treasure and empire itself against the Maratha rock-fortresses,—only to win them after a prodigal waste of time, money and men, and then to lose them to the Marathas when his grand army marched away from the conquest.

At the beginning of February 1689 came the capture of Shambhuji. Aurangzib spent the next ten months (3 March—18th December 1689) at Korégaon, 12 miles north-east of Punā. During this period Zulfiqār Khan brought to a successful end his siege of Rāigarh by capturing it (19th October) with Shambhuji's entire family.

Lut the effect of the capture of the Maratha capital was nullified by the flight of Rajaram to Jinji, and the Emperor had to depute Zulfiqār Khan, immediately after his return from Rāigarh, to follow the Maratha king to the East Coast. The only other important operations of 1689 were the siege and capture of Rāichur (10 July—29 November) by Ruhullah Khan, the unsuccessful pursuit of Rajaram by some local Mughal officers in the Bijapur and Bellary districts, and the invasion of Bednur by Jān Nisār Khan to compel the surrender of the fugitive Maratha Rajah, which, however, was frustrated by Santā. [*M. A.* 329, 331, 333.]

§ 4. *Maratha recovery: capture of Rustam Khan,*
May, 1690.

But, in 1690, the Marathas began to show signs of recovery from the effects of the disastrous fall of their late king, which had stunned them for a year and a half. On 25th May 1690 they gained their first signal victory under their new popular chiefs.

Sharzā Khan (son of Sayyid Iliyās), a former Bijāpuri general, who had come over to the Emperor's side in 1686 and been created Rustam Khan, was roving in the neighbourhood of Satārā with his family and troops, planning how to capture that fort for the Emperor. The Maratha leaders,—Rāmchandra, Shankarāji, Santā, and Dhanā,—fell upon him in concert. The Khan sent his son Ghālīb to the front to oppose them. The youth was hopelessly outnumbered and outclassed in weapons.* Karnātaki foot-musketeers (probably Berads) formed the enemy's vanguard and fired their pieces with deadly accuracy, wounding the elephants in the Mughal front line, which turned and fled away trampling down their own men, Rustam Khan hurried up to the spot to restore the fight, but a charge of the enemy's elephants caused the Mughal horses to shy and stampede. Rustam, however, made a stand and fought for some time, and on being gradually rejoined by his runaway followers he delivered a counter-attack on the enemy's advanced reserve, then led by Santā and Dhanā. These two, following the usual Maratha tactics, pretended to give way and the Khan pressed impetuously on, driving his own elephant onwards accompanied by a few troopers. Just then the skirt of his dress was set ablaze by the enemy's fire. The Berad musketeers took advantage of the confusion by falling upon the imperialists' baggage and rear-guard and plundering them. The Mughal troops were distracted, and they dispersed, abandoning the fight.

* *Dil* (ii. 146*b*.) "The Deccani soldiers carry no weapon besides the sword and the spear, and the Bijapuris (excepting the Marathas) do not even carry the spear. . . Though, in imitation of the men of N. India, they have procured artillery, they can really do nothing with it."

Rustam himself, after receiving many wounds, fell down from his elephant and was carried off into captivity by Bābāji (? probably Mānāji) Moré. His right wing, under Ghālib, was hopelessly overpowered by the crowd of exultant Marathas, and that commander too was wounded and brought down from his elephant. Fifteen hundred of the Mughals fell on the field. The Maratha general in Satārā fort now sallied out with his 5,000 men, enveloped the family of Rustam Khan, and carried off his mother, wife and some children into the fort. In addition to the Mughal general and his family, the Marathas made prize of 4000 horses, eight elephants and the entire camp and baggage of Rustam's army.

After sixteen days, Rustam Khan ransomed himself by promising to pay one lakh of rupees, and leaving his mother and eldest son as security for the money. Two of his wives and two other sons had escaped during the plunder of his camp by putting on tattered old cloaks, veiling their faces, and giving themselves out to be the Khan's menial servants. A few followers guided them to a nook among the hills where they lay hidden for the day and afterwards made their way to the imperial *thāna* of Karargāon,* walking in the guise of beggars. [Ishwardas 141a—143a, *J.S.*, *M.A.* 336.]

The Emperor, on hearing of the disaster, immediately sent Firuz Jang with a large army to invest Satārā and secure the release of Rustam. Siddi Abdul Qādir, when going from his fief of Lakhisar to join this force, was attacked by Rupā Bhonslé and wounded, fifty of his troops being killed and all his property looted by the enemy. [Ishwar, 142b.] These two strokes were followed up by Rāmchandra and Shankarāji recovering the great forts of

* Either *Korégaon*, 10 m.e., or *Karar* 30 m.s. of Satara.

Pratāpgarh, Rohirā, Rājgarh and Tornā, in the course of the same year (1690). [*J.S.*, Chit. 53.] The Mughals, after their capture of Rājgarh (about July 1689) had placed it in charge of Abul Khair (son of Abdul Aziz, one of the slaves of the family of Bairam Khan), who had long been qiladār of Junnar. When the Marathas made a demonstration round it, Abul Khair lost heart and vacating the fort fled towards the Emperor's camp. For this desertion of duty he was banished to Mecca. [*K. K.* ii. 392.]*

§ 5. *Panhala won and lost by the Mughals.*

The famous stronghold of Panhālā was still in Maratha hands when Shambhuji fell (Feb. 1689).† A Mughal general, Shaikh Nizām, was at that time engaged in investing it, [*M.A.* 320] but nothing came of his efforts, as the capture of such a fort was quite beyond the resources of any single general. About the middle of the year, after Rājgarh had been closely invested and Rajaram was fleeing towards Jinji, Ruhullah Khan was sent to secure Panhālā by bribery, but the defenders refused his offer at the time. The fall of Rājgarh in October, however, took the heart out of them and they now sold Panhālā to the Emperor, about December 1689. [*Dil.* ii. 97*b*, 111*b*; Ishwardas 140*a*; Chitnis, ii. 32;

* The date of Abul Khair's appointment is given in *M.A.* 330 as July 1689. Khafi Khan is, therefore, wrong in saying that the fort was recovered by the Marathas shortly before Shambhuji's downfall.

† *M.A.* 435 says (but in recording the events of 1700) that Panhala had been captured by Prince Azam and recovered soon afterwards by *Shambhuji* (which means a date like 1686 or 1688). Here the name of the king is wrong, and consequently the date that follows from the name. Ishwardas and Chitnis, with their confused order of events and lack of dates, imply that Panhala was sold to the Mughals by its qiladar near about 1690.

[J.S. is silent.] But the Mughal garrison held it so negligently that the Marathas under Parashurām afterwards easily recovered it by surprise (about the middle of 1692).

§ 6. *Prince Muizz-ud-din's fruitless siege of
Panhala, 1692-94.*

Imperial prestige demanded that the fort should not be left in enemy hands. In October 1692, Prince Muizz-ud-din, the eldest son of Shah Alam, was sent from the Emperor's camp at Galgalā (32 miles south-west of Bijapur) to take it. He arrived before Panhālā near the end of the month, and with his officer Iftikhār Khan invested its two gates. The jagirdars of the district were ordered to supply provisions to his camp, and in the middle of December, he was reinforced by Lutfullah Khan, who became superintendent of his body-guard and in effect his lieutenant.

Sixty miles north-west of the Emperor's camp at Galgalā lay the fort of Miraj, and midway between Miraj and Panhālā, a distance of forty miles, an outpost was set up at Altā to guard the communications. Gradually the investment was tightened. Covered lanes were begun towards the walls, Mughal outposts were set up around it, and in January 1693 four large pieces of artillery were sent to the prince by the Emperor. Muizz-ud-din's position seemed so secure that in August his family was sent to his camp. [M.A. 360]

But, for a year the fort held out, and in October 1693 the scene entirely changed. A vast Maratha army,* under

* Ten thousand horse and foot, according to *Akhbarat* (27 Oct.). But Muizz-ud-din's despatch gives *eighty thousand* cavalry and *countless* infantry (*Insha-i-Madhuram*, p. 70). The account in my text is based on the Court-news-letters. I cannot accept Muiz's report of the result of the battle which runs thus:—"In the midst of the

Dhanā Jādav, Rāmchandra, and Shankarāji, arrived for its relief and encircled the small siege force. The battle began on the 20th and there were daily encounters for some days after. While this contest kept the besiegers engaged, the Marathas outside easily threw fresh troops and provisions into the fort, and in concert with the garrison raided the Mughal trenches with great success. Some guns and wheeled field-pieces (*rahkala*) were carried off from Saf Shikan Khan's position into the fort. Some imperial officers were slain, several others wounded, and one taken prisoner by the enemy.

Meantime, the Emperor had issued urgent orders to hurry up two heavy reinforcements to the prince under the command of Firuz Jang and Khānazād Khan.* The Maratha relieving force heard of their coming (at the end of October) and dispersed from the neighbourhood of Panhālā. Dhanā made his way north towards Satārā; but before reaching that fort he was sighted by Firuz Jang's army on its southward march to the prince's side. The Khan sent his vanguard under his son Chin Qalich Khan and Rustam Khan, who overtook the Marathas near Karad.†

fight, a musket-shot hit Parashuram, the chief of cavalry of Ramchandra, in the head, and sent him to hell. The enemy were shaken. Our men charged them with swords and daggers. After a long fight the enemy fled in confusion, many of them were drowned in the river [Krishna]. Numberless of their foot-soldiers were put to the sword. Hillocks of the slain were formed. All the enemy's artillery, 200 lances, the same number of muskets, and many mares and all other property of the Marathas were captured by us." (*Ibid.*)

* Khem Savant (the desai of Kudal and Banda) was also written to, by order of the Emperor, to keep his kinsmen and followers back from their design of coming to the help of the Marathas who were attacking Muizz-ud-din. [*Insha-i-Madhu*, p. 17.]

† The place where Dhana's force was sighted was *Belhen*, between Satara and Miraj.

A severe battle was fought. The Marathas were defeated and dispersed with heavy slaughter, leaving 30 prisoners and 600 horses in the hands of the victors. The Mughals, too, lost many men.

But Dhanā Jādav had effectively spoiled the work done by Muizz-ud-din in a year outside Panhālā. The fort had been reprovisioned, the siege-works had been destroyed and heavy losses inflicted on the Mughal army. Thereafter, though the prince continued there for four months longer, he could do nothing.

The siege was practically abandoned; the prince carried on his operations languidly, merely to deceive the Emperor, and opened negotiations with the garrison to secure the fort for a price. When four months had been thus wasted, Aurangzib, on 7th March, 1694, ordered a force of 6,000 men to strengthen the prince, as the siege had now come to a stop. At the same time Muizz-ud-din was authorised to use his own discretion; if the fort was surrendered peacefully he could grant terms, if not he must renew entrenching and lay siege to it a second time.

§ 7. *Bidār Bakht against Panhala, 1694-95.*

But it was of no use. Already, about 8th March, the prince availing himself of the Emperor's permission, had begun to march away from Panhālā, while Lutfullah Khan and many other officers, who had positive orders to stay below the fort, joined him in the retreat. The Emperor, on hearing of this (13th March), sent an officer to turn the prince back from Vadgāon (14 m. e. of Panhālā) and take him back to that fort to make a decision about it on the spot by either securing it for a price or renewing siege operations against it. Four days later the Emperor changed his mind and wrote to the prince to come to Court, while

his officers were to be forced to go back to Panhālā under Lutfullah's command, to continue the siege. Muizz-ud-din was received in audience by his grandfather on the 29th of the month. His cousin Bidār Bakht (the eldest son of Prince Md. Azam) had been selected to undertake the task from which he had returned unsuccessful. Bidār Bakht, with a nominal muster-roll of 25,000 men and artillery, was given formal leave on 27th March and began his journey from the Court at Galgalā on 5th April. "The officers who had come with Muiz to Court without orders, were now driven by force back to Panhālā."

But the Emperor seems to have changed his plan again, as we find Bidār Bakht campaigning in the Bombay Kanārā (Belgāon and Dhārwar) during the second half of 1694, and his siege of Panhālā began a year later, in April 1695. His first acts were marked by vigour. Opening his approaches and planting his artillery, he seized the village at the foot of the hill and demolished one bastion of the fort. [*Akhbarat*, 11 May, 1695.] But the promise of these opening operations was not fulfilled. A desultory siege was continued by him till the end of January 1696, when the disasters to Qāsim Khan and Himmat Khan further south induced the Emperor to send the prince to Bāsavapatan, and to entrust the siege of Panhālā to Firuz Jang, who, too, could effect nothing. In fact the capture of Panhālā was quite beyond the power of any divisional army, as Aurangzib was to realise during his own siege of it in 1701.*

§ 8. *Campaigns of Lutfullah near Satara, 1690.*

Having brought the story of Panhālā down to the end of the century, we shall now go back to the year 1690 and

* The entire narrative from Dhanā's attack on Muiz to this point has been reconstructed from the *Akhbarat* or daily news-letters of Aurangzib's camp preserved in MS. in London.

make a survey of the Mughal and Maratha activities in other parts of Western India.

After the disaster to Rustam Khan (May 1690), the Emperor found it necessary to occupy the North Satārā district in force. Lutfullah Khan was detached from the Court as thānadār of Khatāu (25 m. e. of Satārā), with orders to make that town his head-quarters and set up a chain of outposts in the surrounding country. After arriving at Khatāu on 6th July, the Mughal troopers dismounted and rested as best they could, but on account of the incessant rain they could not immediately form a regular camp and entrench it round. Towards the end of the night, Santā Ghorparé at the head of ten thousand horse and numberless infantry surprised them. The tired soldiers, awakened with difficulty, began to put on their armour and saddle their horses, while Lutfullah's son, Md. Khalil, gained time for them by hastening on foot to encounter the enemy with some musketeers of the guard and the armed menials of the general. Thus the camp was saved from plunder. By firing from a distance he turned the enemy out of the lanes and bazar, and then, being reinforced by troops who had arrived in the meantime, he took horse and attacked the enemy at close quarters. After a severe fight for three hours, Santā fled to Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w.), and his followers dispersed to their homes through the passes. The victorious Mughals returned to their camp, having lost 67 killed and 170 wounded. The Marathas were reported to have lost nearly 500 in killed alone. A hundred of them were captured alive and put to the sword. The spoils taken by the victors were 300 mares, 400 spears, 200 muskets, besides some kettledrums and flags. Thereafter Mughal outposts were easily set up in that district.

But the Marathas were only baffled and not crushed. They rallied their forces and reappeared in the East Satārā region in force. Lutfullah, urged by the Emperor, hastened to the scene. He halted at night in the village of Piliv (12 m.e. of Mhāsvad, and 15 m. s. of Akluj.) Next morning, a Maratha army reputed to be 20,000 cavalry and unnumbered infantry, led by Santā, Dhanā, Dāflé, Moré and other generals, enveloped the small imperial detachment on its march. Lutfullah, placing his baggage in the centre, faced on all sides and engaged the enemy. Daflé had 10,000 Karnātaki foot-musketeers, whose fire severely galled the Mughals. The battle raged from dawn to sunset, the imperialists beating back repeated attacks of the enemy. Finally, Santā and Dhanā, at the head of 5,000 picked horsemen, charged the division of Lutfullah himself, but were repulsed. At sunset the Marathas withdrew, leaving a thousand dead on the field, besides many wounded. The Mughals lost 200 killed and above 300 wounded.*

There was nothing further to note till the end of 1690, when some Maratha auxiliaries of the Mughals,—namely Nimā Sindhia, Mānkoji Pāndré and Nāgoji Mané,—went over to Rajaram at Jinji with their contingent of 2000 men (November.) But next month Sharzā Rao Jedhé, the *deshmukh* of Bhor, joined the imperialists and was given a

* *Insha-i-Madthuram*. The despatch is undated, but I conjecturally place the battle in 1690, as Santā and Dhanā were absent in Kanara during Lutfullah's second thanadari of Akluj (16 Oct.—15 Dec. 1692.)

If my conjecture be correct, and if we can take Lutfullah's two despatches as approximating to truth,—then we must conclude that the first Maratha attempt at revival was temporarily checked and Dhanā and Santā were driven into hiding and comparative inactivity for six months (Oct. 1690—April 1691), and the Mughals retained their mastery in Maharashtra during that brief period.

robe of honour and a conciliatory letter. [J. S.] The wazir Asad Khan was sent (November) to the Karnul and Kadāpā districts across the Krishnā, to wrest them from the officers of the late Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi Governments and thereby secure the rear of the Mughal army fighting in the Madras Karnātak. Here he conquered many forts, including Nandiyāl, the frontier-fortress between the Bijapuri and Haidarabadi Karnātaks.

§ 9. *Operations during 1691 and 1692.*

In April-May 1691 the Emperor had to detach some generals against the Maratha bands whose activity had again begun to be reported. But his chief anxiety now was about Sāgar, where the Berad chief Pidiā Nāyak was giving serious trouble. One large army after another, each under a first-rate general, had to be posted in the Berad country for a year and a half (June 1691-Dec. 1692.) While the Satārā district in the north was probably quiet, the Raibagh-Hukri region in the south was subjected to Maratha raids (June 1691).

The year 1692 witnessed a renewal of Maratha activity* and their conspicuous success in many quarters, one of these being their recovery of Panhālā from Mughal hands. The important post of Akluj, where the great southern highway from Ahmadnagar to Bijapur crossed the Punā-Haidarabad road, was infested by the enemy, and on 8th May Prince Muizz-ud-din was sent there. Santāji Ghorparé's base was the Mahādev hill to the north-east of Satara, and from this refuge he used to make rapid raids far to the east, over the rolling plains of Bijapur. Evidently the prince effected nothing decisive, as we read of Lutfullah Khan being sent

* The whole of the remaining part of this chapter is based on the *Akhbarat*, except when other sources are cited.

to Akluj in the middle of October, to clear the country between Bijapur city and the Bhimā.

At the same time the Marathas were disturbing the Belgāon and Dhārwar districts of the Western Karnatak. On 8th October, Dhanā and Santā with 7,000 men were reported to have seized some forts near Belgaon and invested the latter town itself, and to be feeding their horses on the growing crops. By the 27th, these two generals had left Belgaon to attack Dhārwar, and they finally retired to Nargund (30 m. n. e. of Dhārwar). At the same time, other Maratha bands were roving in the Akluj-Indi region in north Bijapur.

The Emperor stiffened the defence of Kanārā, by sending Hamid-ud-din Khan to Belgaon and Matlab Khan to Dhārwar, while Qāsim Khan, the faujdār of Bijapuri Karnātak or north-west Mysore, was reinforced and ordered to guard Bankāpur and other places near it in addition, (16 Oct.) A little later, Matlab Khan defeated the enemy near Dhārwar and captured a son and a daughter of one of the Maratha generals.*

Soon afterwards (in the beginning of November 1692) the siege of Panhālā began, and the Mughal forces had to be concentrated there. Early next month both Santā and Dhanā were sent to Madras with large armies to relieve Jinji, and therefore Mahārāshtra was for a time denuded of the best national leaders and troops, and the Mughals in the western theatre enjoyed peace for a time.

* His name cannot be read in the transcript of the Persian MS. made for me.

§ 10. *Struggle with Santaji Ghorparé and Dhana Jadav.*
1693-94.

Late in 1693 Maratha activities revived in the west. Their general Amrit Rao* had entered Mughal service after Shambhuji's downfall and been posted to the Phaltan thāna, but in October 1693 he came back to the national side, and crossed the Bhinā to raid Mughal territory. Himmat Khan set out in pursuit of him, but could not catch the elusive Maratha horsemen. At the same time Dhanā, Shankarāji and other leaders were attacking the Mughal force before Panhālā, as we have already seen. And a more active enemy was making his presence felt by the Mughals.

Santā Ghorparé had come back from Jinji in May 1693 after triumphantly raising its siege. As soon as the campaigning season opened in October, he resumed his raids in the homeland. His bands spread near Bhupāl-garh (65 m. n. w. of Bijapur and 76 m. s. e. of Satārā), while Dhanā was attacking the besiegers of Panhālā. Himmat Khan went out in pursuit of Santā and overtook him about 22nd October. The Maratha general, at the head of a vastly superior force, turned at bay at Māngaon and attacked Himmat, whose small column took refuge at the foot of the village, "the enemy occupying three sides and the Khan one." Evidently at this stage reinforcements under Hamid-ud-din and Khwāja Khan joined Himmat, and the Mughals resumed the chase of the raiders. They gained a signal victory over Santā and his Berad allies (about 14th Nov.) at the village of Vikramhalli. Two hundred of the Berads and 300 of Santā's own men were slain, and 300 mares and some flags and kettledrums captured by the Mughals, though they too suffered heavy casualties. [*Akh.* 19 Nov.]

* Called "*Palkar*, a general of Shivaji's son" in the *Akh.* of 24 Oct. 1693. Should be *Nimbalkar*.

Then the Mughal generals quarrelled. Hamid-ud-din and Khwāja Khan, taking offence, left Himmat Khan, gave up the pursuit and returned towards Kulbarga. Himmat alone followed the enemy. Santā now safely divided his force, detaching 4000 troopers under Amrit Rao to raid Berar, while he himself marched with 6,000 horsemen towards Mālkhed, sending in advance threatening letters to the deshmukh of that place to this effect, "For a long time past you have not paid the *chauth*. Send me immediately 7,000 *hun*." The couriers who had brought these letters were arrested by the Mughals and put to death.

Foiled in his object, Santā turned aside to the hills of Torgal in the Berad country, while Himmat Khan halted at Mālkhed, not daring to venture into that wild and broken region. In a day or two the elusive Maratha leader was out again and reported to be marching upon Haidarabad. Himmat Khan, now joined by Sayyid Abdullah, was immediately on his track and drove him into the small fort of Alur (14 miles s.w. of Mālkhed). This happened about 21st Nov. 1693. Then for three months the records have been lost.

On 6th March 1694, a report was received from Himmat Khan that he had followed Santā to village Bahram (in taluqa Kāngrati), and repulsed his counter-attack. We soon afterwards hear of Santā making an attempt to cut off two big guns at Maklur (? or Mahkur), on the way from Aurangabad to Galgalā; but Matlab Khan defeated him and drove him back to the Mahādev hills, where he lay quiet for some months after.

§ 11. *Minor operations till the end of 1695.*

On 2nd August 1694, the Court learnt that Santā and Dhanā were out near fort Waru-garh (25 m. e. of Satārā)

and had detached some troops to invest Mahimāngarh (10 m. s. of Warugarh), and closed the road. A Mughal column was now ordered there to clear the district. In the meantime, Bidār Bakht had been sent to the Kanārese district of Belgaon. The strong rock-fortress of Nargund (30 m. n. e. of Dhārwar) was besieged by the prince's lieutenant Khan-i-Zamān Fath Jang (June 1694), who had constant fights with the enemy's field forces. A month later the Khan delivered an assault on it in person, but "no one followed him, and in disgust he abandoned the siege."* The prince sent Rajah Udwat Singh of Urchhā to replace him. Evidently the fort afterwards came into Mughal hands,† as we find its name changed to Bahādur-nagar in a news-letter of November next.

Throughout 1694 and 1695, though the Maratha bands were active and the Berads troublesome all over the Western Deccan, nothing decisive or note-worthy was done on either side, till the end of 1695, when Santā defeated and killed two first-rate Mughal generals, Qāsim Khan and Himmat Khan.

About November 1694, the Maratha nationalist leaders wreaked vengeance on a traitor to their country's cause, who had served as the agent of the Mughal power. The

* The fort is on a hill, rising 800 feet from the plain. The lower sides of the hill are covered with prickly pear. To about half way up, the hill rises from the plain at an even slope of 35 to 40 feet. In the upper half the rocks rise sheer, in some places in tiers of natural scarps. A committee of British officers reported "This fort is one of the strongest in the Bombay Karnatak, and if well defended its capture would require much time and trouble and a large invading force." (*Bom. Gaz.* xxii. 776—7.)

† It must have been secured by bribery and not by force of arms. Bidar Bakht gained two other forts in the same region,—Parasgarh and Ramdurg,—by the same means.

fort of Kāri‡ was held by Trimbak as deputy governor, assisted by Yādav Shāmraj and Mahādji Bāji. A Muslim inhabitant of Junnar named Beg came there on behalf of the Mughals, bribed Rāyāji Bahulkar, and through his connivance gained the fort by scaling the walls with rope-ladders unopposed. During this attack, Beg captured Trimbak and Moro Narayan, while Yādav and Mahādji escaped with their families by the back-door. But towards the end of 1694 Shankarāji organised an expedition for the recovery of Kāri. From the fort of Rājgarh he sent Shivdev, with Chāndji Kadam of Bhore and the contingents of several forts in that region, to invest Kāri. Beg and his men evacuated the fort under a promise of safety, but the victors seized them in violation of their word. Beg was kept a prisoner, but the lesser men, who had their families with them, were released by Trimbak and Moro. Hearing of the success, Shankarāji himself went to Kari, gave the traitor Rāyāji Bahulkar a good beating, and confined him in the citadel of Rajgarh. [J. S. I have rearranged the events here.]

§ 12. *Santaji Ghorpare's movements, 1694-95.*

On 26th November 1694 Santā was reported as out in Haidarabad territory, with Himmat Khan pursuing him, though the latter's troops were constantly leaving his banners and sneaking back to the imperial base camp to avoid the hardships of campaigning. Then Santā turned towards Bijapur, but on 30th November Himmat brought him to an action near Pānur, and drove him into flight with the loss of two of his captains. Continuing the pursuit, Himmat again came upon Santa (about 7th Dec.) near

‡ Kari, 8 m.s. of Bhor, and very close to Rohira fort.

Naldurg, and again defeated him with many losses on both sides. Santa retired to his base in the Mahādev hills. But at the end of the month he was out again in the Rāichur district, with Himmat Khan's flying force on his heels, and was again driven away with heavy casualties on both sides, as usual.*

About the middle of May 1695. Santā visited Parli to celebrate the marriage of two sons of his brother Bahirji (then absent in Jinji). At the end of this month he came back to the Mahādev hills by way of Bhupālgarh. One of his followers named Mādhav Narayan, with his family and 300 retainers, left him and entered the Mughal service through the qīladār of Parendā. In July the Marathas blockaded the Mughal outpost of Khatāv. Hamid-ud-din Khan was sent against them, but at the end of the next month (August) he found himself dangerously outnumbered by the enemy who had placed three armies in the field. The Emperor pushed up reinforcements. Hamid-ud-din then (September) detached Fathullah to burn the village below forts Chandan-Wandan. Santā, hearing of it, went to attack Fathullah; but Hamid-ud-din hastened in support of his lieutenant. The Marathas were repulsed and driven into the fort, after losing a son of Dhanā and another officer. The Mughals burnt the village and brought away

* J. S. says that in Kartik. *Shaka* 1096, (9 Oct—7 Nov. 1694) Shankaraji the Sachiv sent Santa Ghorpare to the Eastern Karnatak, telling him "Go with your troops and do our king's work. Go, hastening in light kit [or alone] to the Rajah. Remain there with honour. Raise the siege of Jinji. Do not act faithlessly." He took oaths from him to this effect and sent with him Yesāji Malār as *mutaliq* (plenipotentiary deputy.) With him were joined Hanumant Rao Nimbalkar *sar-i-lashkar* and other sardars, making a total of 25,000 troopers. These two formed the above concert at the darbar (office) of Shankaraji, and agreed to manage the revenue matters [together] and remain [mutually] faithful.

200 mares and some Deccani swords &c. as prize of war. Amrit Rao now left Santā and came over to the Mughals with 500 men.

Such was the chequered history of the contest with the Marathas* in Western India till near the end of the year 1695. It was no longer a simple military problem, but had become a trial of endurance and resources between the Mughal empire and the indigenous people of the Deccan.

APPENDIX A.

Rajaram's flight to Jinji.

It is now possible to give a correct and intimate account of Rajaram's journey from Raigarh to Jinji, by using two newly printed sources, namely, the Sanskrit narrative poem *Rājārām-Charitam* of Keshav Pandit (edited by V. S. Bendrey) and the diary of Monsieur Francois Martin, the French chief of Pondicherry. Keshav Pandit was a Brahman judge who accompanied Rajaram during his flight to Jinji. And Jinji, where Rajaram set up his Court after reaching the Karnātak, was only one day's march from Pondicherry, where (as Martin tells us) he could every day count the guns fired on the two sides during the Mughal siege of Jinji. For the safety of this French settlement, its governor kept constant intercourse with the Maratha Government in that fort by means of his French agents and Brahman envoys. He also engaged on his own side Krishnāji Anant,

* These desultory and indecisive fights have been described in some detail in this chapter to serve as an illustration of the task before the Mughal army. In future such minor operations will be either passed over silently or merely mentioned in a few words.

who was "the second minister" under Rajaram, or in other words next in power to Prahād Nirāji, the Regent of the boy-King. By means of money and presents Martin made Krishnaji his mediator at the Raja's Court and thus received full information about the Raja and his affairs. As Krishnāji Anant was the historian who wrote the famous *Sabhāsad Bakhar* of Shivaji, his knowledge of events was invaluable. Martin made daily entries in his diary of what he learnt, and composed from these a *Mémoire* or connected narrative which has been printed in Paris, under the editorship of Alfred Martineau, in three volumes (1931-1934). These two absolutely contemporary and authentic sources enable us to sweep away the legends and worthless traditions in the Marathi language which have so long passed for history.

After the capture of Shambhuji, a Mughal army laid siege to Raigarh fort where the King's younger brother Rajaram had been crowned by a party of Brāhman ministers and Prabhu Kāyastha secretaries, who had been kept out of power and many of whom had been persecuted during the reign of Shambhuji. To avoid being blockaded there, Rajaram slipped out of Raigarh in disguise with a small band of followers on 5th April 1689, but he could not find safety anywhere before reaching Panhālā about 30th June, in the far south of his dominions. Here he passed the rainy season and celebrated the Dasaharā (14th September). But other Mughal forces began to converge upon this fort and Rajaram had to leave for the Eastern Karnatak on 26th September, in order to be beyond the reach of the Mughals.

He was at first accompanied by some three hundred soldiers, besides a picked band of civil officers. Prahād

Nirāji took the leadership of the party and protected the Raja like a son, often carrying the sickly lad on his own shoulders. Three other Brāhman ministers were in the party, *viz.*, Krishnāji Anant (the assistant or *hastak* of Prahād), Nilkanth Moreshwar Pinglé the Peshwā, and his assistant Uddhav, besides Nilkanth's brother Bahiro Pant and Prabhu secretaries like Khando Ballāl Chitnis, Niloji Pārasnis, Bāji Kadam and Indra Kadam. The escort, some 250 men, were under Mān Singh Moré and his lieutenants Bahirji and Māloji Ghorparé (the brothers of Santāji) and Rupāji Bhonslé. But on the way, between the Krishnā and the Tungābhadrā they found that the various Mughal detachments scattered over the Karnātak plateau (modern Mysore) had been alerted, and these men attacked the Maratha fugitives from many sides. Mān Singh led the van, while Rupā Bhonslé fought desperate rear-guard actions to hold the enemy back. In a severe battle on an island in the Tungābhadrā, the Maratha resistance was crushed and Rupāji with 70 officers was captured; but in the confusion of the fighting Rajaram escaped. The rest of his journey was carried out on foot* with break-neck speed in a small broken band disguised as Hindu religious beggars.

The fugitives reached Ambur about 25th October, reduced to the last stage of penury and exhaustion. Thence they sent an envoy to report the Raja's arrival to Bāji Kākdé, the Maratha faujdar of Vellore. After being relieved and welcomed by this officer, Rajaram reached Vellore on 28th October and Jinji, the capital of his father's eastern dominions, on 1st November 1689.

* *Le voyage toujours à pied pendant une marche de plus de deux cents lieus.* (Martin, iii. 64.)

CHAPTER LI.

THE CONQUEST OF THE MADRAS KARNATAK, 1680-1698.

§ 1. *The Eastern Karnatak and its divisions.*

The Eastern or Madras Karnātak, which we must distinguish from the Western Karnātak or the Kanāresc-speaking division of the Bombay Presidency, extends from near the 15th degree of north latitude to the Kāveri river in the south. In the late 17th century it was divided into two halves by the Palar river, or an imaginary line in the southern part of the North Arcot district, slanting from Vellore to Sadras. These two parts were called Haidarabadi Karnātak and Bijapuri Karnātak respectively, and each of them was further sub-divided into uplands (*bālāghāt*, in Persian) and plains (*pāyinghāt*). The upland of Haidarabadi Karnātak began south of Nandiyāl (a frontier fort of Bijapur territory) and included Sidhout, Gandikotā, Gutī, Garamkondā and Kadāpā,—the last-mentioned town being its seat of government. Bijapuri Bālāghāt lay west of Haidarabadi Karnātak and included the Serā and Bangālore districts of Mysore and their dependent zamindaris, Serā being the governor's head-quarters.

Coming down to the lowlands, Haidarabadi Karnātak embraced the sea-coast from Guntur to Sadras.* Bijapuri Pāyinghāt cannot be precisely demarcated, as it was in a

* Wilkes, i. 134—136 (Madras reprint.) Kaepelin, 101. Manucci (*Storia*, iii. 242) says that the two Karnātaks were separated by the Marakkanam river,—the Bijapuri extending to Porto Novo and the Haidarabadi to Sadras. As for Telingana (or the *Gingerlee Country*, as it is called in the Madras Factory Records), it stretched along the coast from the Krishna northwards to the frontier of Orissa and included Masulipatam (the capital), Vizagapatam, and Chicacole. It formed a separate province, under its own viceroy.

disturbed state in 1689. It extended south and west of the Palar river, from Sadrās (12·30 degree of north latitude) to Tanjore. The whole of this tract belonged to Bijapur in theory, having been conquered by Adil Shahi forces in the middle of the 17th century. But the conquests had not been consolidated, the authority of the central Government was feebly exerted in this most distant frontier province, much of the country was still in the hands of unsubdued *poligars* or petty local chieftains, and Adil Shah only held certain forts and their environs; but even in these his authority was exercised by his nobles, who were independent in all but the name. This situation was further complicated by Shivāji's invasion and conquest of the country (1677-78).† But even as the result of that conquest, the entire region did not pass into Maratha possession. Muslim and Hindu servants of the defeated Government maintained themselves here and there, though with diminished territory, and diversified the political geography of what was once Bijapuri Karnātak Pāyinghāt. The new Maratha Government of the South Arcot district (capital, Jinji) wisely ensured a portion of its territorial acquisitions by a sort of armed truce with the Maharajah of Tanjore and the local *poligars*.

§ 2. *Harji Mahadik, the Maratha viceroy of the Eastern Karnatak.*

The great Shivaji in his expedition of 1677-78 had conquered the Bijapuri Karnātak from the Palar to the Kolerun river. Over this vast territory he placed Raghunath Narayan Hanumanté as viceroy, with Jinji for his seat of government and subordinate governors under him at

† Described in my *Shivaji*, ch. 12 (4th ed.)

Kunimedu (13 miles north of Pondicherry) and Mahmudi Bandar (or Porto Novo.)

Shambhuji, soon after his accession, dismissed and imprisoned Raghunath* (early in January 1681), and sent his own sister's husband Harji Mahādik to govern Jinji with Shāmji Nāyak Pundé as his lieutenant or partner in power. The two arrived there with their troops in March 1681 and took charge of the government. Five months afterwards, Shāmji was thrown into prison, evidently on suspicion of complicity in the plots formed by Annāji Datto and his faction against Shambhuji in Maharashtra. Henceforth Harji Mahādik ruled the Eastern Karnatak with undivided power, and circumstances soon afterwards made him practically independent of his master. The Maratha king's absorption in vice, the baneful predominance of the favourite Kavi-kalash in his council, the consequent disorder in the kingdom, and the increasing Mughal pressure on Maharashtra under the personal direction of Aurangzib, all tended to extinguish Shambhuji's authority in the far-off province of Jinji and to make the local viceroy his own master. Harji extended his power over the neighbourhood,†

* The Madras Diary, 8 January 1681, records the popular report that he was seized and put in irons by Santaji Bhonslé on hearing a (false) rumour that Shambhuji had been cut in pieces by one of his great commanders and that Rajaram was seated on the throne. In Dec. 1682 Raghunath returned to Maharashtra and was locally employed by Shambhuji as a *majmuadar*. He died at Valni on the 4th May following [*Jedhe S.*]

† In March 1683 he went with his army to help the Nayak of Trichinopoly in defeating an invasion by the chief of Seringapatam, in which the Mysore general and 2000 horses were captured. (*J. S.*) The ruler of Trichinopoly was driven into the arms of the Jinji Government by his eternal hostility to the king of Tanjore, while Shivaji's conquests in central and eastern Mysore made the chief of Seringapatam the ally of Shivaji's enemy, the Rajah of Tanjore. Vyankoji died in January 1685 and was succeeded on the throne of Tanjore by his son Shahji II. (*J. S.*)

gave himself the airs of a king, assumed (at least in popular speech) the title of Maharajah, and neglected to send the surplus revenue to his sovereign at Raigarh.

The fall of Bijapur (12th Sep. 1686) and the impending siege of Golkondā (which actually began on 28th January 1687) roused Shambhuji to a full sense of the danger which now began to threaten his richest possession, the golden land of Karnatak, from the extension of Mughal dominion in that direction. In October 1686 he sent Kesho Trimbak Pingle with 12,000 horse, outwardly to strengthen his garrisons in the Karnatak, but with secret instructions to seize and depose the refractory Harji Rajah and assume the government of Jinji in the king's name. There was even a popular belief that Harji was thinking of securing his position by disowning Shambhuji's authority and declaring himself a tributary vassal of the all-conquering Mughals on their arrival in the Karnatak. (*Orme's Frag.*, 155.)

Kesho Trimbak arrived near Jinji on 11th February 1687. (*J. S.*) Aurangzib, on hearing of the march of this large enemy force eastwards across the peninsula, could not at first divine its exact destination, but regarded Mysore as its objective. In order to forestall them in the occupation of the Bijapuri territories in that quarter, of which he now considered himself the lawful heir, he quickly detached Qāsim Khan from his siege-camp before Golkondā. The Khan by rapid marches and vigorous attacks forced Bangālore* to surrender on 10th July 1687, and on 27th September next gained by bribery the important fort of Penukundā (75 miles north of Bangālore and once the capital of the fallen Vijayanagar kingdom).

* The *J. S.* is confused here, and I suggest that the text should be rearranged to mean that the Mughal general was aided by the chief of Srīringapatam, the enemy of Shivaji's house.

The Marathas in the Karnatak were too much divided by internal quarrels to hinder his progress. Kesho Trimbak naturally wished to assume immediately the high post to which he had been nominated by the king, and it was probably his impatience that caused his secret orders to leak out. We find that in March it was publicly known at Cuddalore that Harji Rajah had been dismissed and that Kesho was to be the new viceroy (*Madras Diary*, 26 March). But his hopes were doomed to disappointment. Harji having learnt the real object of Kesho's mission from his friends at Court, had effectually secured Jinji fort in his own hands and made the local army absolutely devoted to himself. Kesho, finding the game lost, pretended that he had never had any such hostile aim, and began to obey Harji's authority openly. Then, with a view to exacting tribute from the petty local chiefs and checking the progress of the Mughals, he marched into Mysore at the head of 18,000 horse, after getting Harji's contingent to reinforce his own. But here he could effect nothing, and soon returned to the neighbourhood of Jinji, reaching Trinomāli (23 miles west of that fort) about 10th November.

§ 3. *Mughal penetration into the Eastern Karnatak, 1687.*

In the meantime Golkondā had fallen (7th Sep. 1687) and a Mughal penetration of the Karnatak plains was imminent. Even before the surrender of the Qutb Shahi king and citadel, Aurangzib had been sending out his officers to take possession of its provinces. In July Kondāpillā, the second strongest fort in Telingānā and the king's chief treasury and arsenal, had been gained by bribery, and several scattered parties of the Mughal army were robbing the country within three days' march of Masulipatam (*Madras Diary*, 29 July).

After the conquest, Aurangzib wisely retained the former Qutb Shahi officers at their respective posts for some time. Muhammad Ibrāhim (created by him Mahābat Khan), the highest Golkondā noble to desert to him, was appointed subahdār of Haidarabad and the Khan's confidant, Muhammad Ali Beg (now entitled Ali Askar Khan), was nominated faujdar (or *sar-i-lashkar*, in Golkandā official designation) of the Karnātak,* with Kadāpā for his head-quarters and subordinate qiladars and magistrates under him, such as Fath Khan at Chinglepat, Madanā Ananta Pantulu at Conjeveram and another Hindu at Punāmāli. These officers submissively proclaimed Aurangzib as their sovereign and planted the Mughal flag upon their forts (October 1687).†

But the Emperor changed his mind soon afterwards. It was deemed unwise to leave the newly-conquered country in the hands of the servants of the fallen dynasty. They were now replaced by Mughal officers;—Mahābat Khan was sent away to far-off Lahore, Ruhullah Khan getting the subahdari of Haidarabad; Qāsim Khan supplanted Ali Askar and was directed to march to the Karnātak and

* "A *farman* was sent to Muhammad Ali, a Haidarabadi officer, who had been in supreme control of the Karnatak, creating him a Mughal mansabdar with the title of Askar Khan and directing him not to let the *sehbandi* (militia) troops of that province disperse [on the downfall of their old master, Qutb Shah]. Ismail [Khan Maka], Yachapa Nair and other *jamadars* of the *sehbandi* and zamindars of the place, without any cause fell upon Askar Khan and plundered [him]. Then an imperial force under Makaram Khan arrived and the lawless men dispersed on all sides." [*Dilkasha*, ii. 95a.] But the revolt of Ismail and Yachapa against the Mughal Government took place later, in Jan. 1690, as we learn from *J. S.* and the *Madras Diary*.

† The governor of Punamali said, that as the world turned like a wheel, he had beaten his drums, and fired his guns, for the victory which the mighty Alamgir had gained over his old master." [*Orme's Frag.* 157.]

conduct a vigorous war against the Maratha forces there (January, 1688).*

§ 4. *Indecisive struggle 1688; both sides plunder the country.*

On Kesho Trimbak's return from Mysore, he openly quarrelled with Harji and demanded the delivery of Jinji in obedience to their master's order. A civil war between the partisans of the two rivals for the viceroyalty was expected. Harji, in preparation for the worst, secured a retreat for himself in the fort of Tevenāpatam (near Cuddālore). Then he sent out a detachment of his army under Gopāl Pandit and Vital Pillai (Vital Pildev Garud?), to plunder and conquer on his own account the late territory of Golkondā north of the Palar river, which had recently submitted to Mughal ownership without having as yet received adequate Mughal garrisons. Marching with 2,000 horse, 5,000 foot, and great numbers of pioneers and scaling ladders, these two officers took easy possession of several forts and a hundred towns in this region. On 24th December Arcot was captured by assault and its governor with most of his infantry killed. The Marathas spread over the country plundering and torturing without regard for sex or creed. Several great Brahmans of Conjeveram with their wives and children took refuge in Madras (27th Dec. 1687—10th Jan. 1688), to save their persons and property from Maratha outrage. On 10th January, Madanā Ananta, the governor of that holy city, himself fled to Madras. On the 11th the Marathas burst into Conjeveram plundering the city, killing about 500 men, destroying the houses, and

* A Mughal force, evidently a small advanced corps, reached the Jinji country about the middle of November 1687. (*Madras Diary*, 22 Nov.)

putting the terror-stricken inhabitants to flight. Kesho Trimbak took to the same profitable business with his own contingent: after capturing Chittapet and Kāveripak, he established his camp at Conjeveram and plundered the country around (January 1688). (*Madras Diary*. Martin, ii. 525).

But the Maratha occupation was short-lived. Aurangzib had been roused to the danger, and already in the middle of December he had issued urgent orders to four high generals of the late Golkondā Government—Ismail Khan Maka, Yāchāpā Nāyak, Rustam Khan, and Muhammad Sādiq,—to hasten to the Karnātak plains and succour the Emperor's partisans there. These officers arrived at Conjeveram on 25th February 1688, with 4,000 horse and 7,000 foot. [*Madras Diary*; J. S.; Orme is inaccurate; Kaep. 260. Martin, ii. 530]

The Marathas evacuated that town at their approach and retired beyond Uttrāmālore, plundering the towns of the cows, cattle, etc. as they went. The Mughal vanguard pursued them, and fought them at Wandiwāsh and made it their camp, while the Marathas encamped at Chittapet, a day's march southwards. The main armies on the two sides remained in this position for a year, merely watching each other,* but they daily sent out detachments and foraging parties who plundeered the country indiscriminately. The hapless people, who had not yet recovered from the effects

* The French agent, Mons. Germain, who left Pondicherry on 17th October 1688, reports that on his arrival at Jinji he found there a great confusion at the news of the approach of the Muhammadans. Harji, for a consideration of Rs. 11,760, allowed the French to raise walls and four high towers at Pondicherry; the actual farman was granted on 9th Jan. 1689, the month of December having been wasted by the Maratha Court. [Martin, *Memoires*, ii. 568.]

of the desolating famine of 1686,* had now to endure two sets of robbers instead of one. No regular battle was fought for many months afterwards, but skirmishes and alarms were frequent, the trade of the district was ruined, industry advantage of the disorder by wresting Cuddālore from the constant plunder and ravage, and multitudes flocked to the fortified European settlements on the coast as their only refuge.

Ibrāhīm Khan Lodi, son of Sher Khan the late Bijapuri governor of Valikandapuram, now formed a plan for taking advantage of the disorder by wresting Cuddālore from the Marathas, and making himself its governor (March 1688.) But nothing came of it. Rāmji Krishna was appointed by Harji Rajah with a large force to raid the borders of the Golkondā country, but instead of going there he robbed the country adjacent to Pondicherry, though it was loyal Maratha territory, and in this way he amassed 20,000 *hun* in a short time. (Dec. 1688.)

During 1688 Aurangzib made frequent changes in the governorship of Haiderabadi Karnātak, first Yettamato Rāo Timāpā was retained in office; then soon afterwards (April) he was turned out and Jān Nisār Khan appointed as his successor. In October Askar Ali replaced Jān Nisār, but, pending the arrival of this new governor, Muhammad Sadiq, the deputy, continued to act for him. Askar Ali took charge in January 1689 and Muhammad Sādiq lost his employment. [*Madras Diary*, 25 Oct. 1688, 1 May 1690.]

* When 2,000 famished beggars crowded into Madras town many of them dying daily in the streets, till at last the English raised subscriptions and opened a relief kitchen under their chief dubash. [*Madras Diary*, 19 Aug. 1686.]

§ 5. *Confusion and disorder continue in 1689.*

The year 1689 continued to be as bad for the Karnātak as the year before. The roads were unsafe; Mughal and Maratha armies daily plundered the country. Country-made cotton and other goods could not be brought to the English factory at Kunimedu for export, by reason of the constant warfare and robbery in the region from there to Porto Novo and the deepening scarcity. In July the English factory at Porto Novo was withdrawn for these troubles. The situation in the Karnātak was adversely reacted upon by the situation in the Telingana coast immediately north of it, where "a great famine" was raging in the Vizagapatam district and frequent wars were going on between the new Mughal faujdar and the local rajahs. (*Madras Diary*, 25 March 1689).

In the February of this year, Shambhuji was captured by the Mughals. When the news of the disaster reached Harji, he imprisoned Kesho Trimbak and his adherents at Trinomāli, and made himself free from the chance of his rivalry. But later the reports of Mughal progress and Maratha reverses in the homeland and Rajaram's disappearance into obscurity alarmed him and for a time he seems to have thought of submitting to the Mughals and paying them tribute. (*Madras Diary*, 2 Aug. 1689.) But he wisely decided, instead, to strengthen his army, improve the defences of Jinji, and defy the Mughals from its impregnable shelter. He released Kesho Trimbak on 19th August, but himself died a month afterwards (c. 19th Sep.)* His wife

* J. S. gives the date of his death as Ashwin Badi 11 (=29th Sep. 1689). But the *Madras Diary* records on 26th Sep. the receipt of the report of his death *via* Kunimedu, so that he must have died some days earlier. F. Martin (iii. 55) writes, 'We had news at the beginning of October (N. S.), of the death of Hari Raja, Governor General of the province of Jinji after an illness of 8 to 10 days.'

Ambikā Bāi, (Shivaji's daughter), continued to govern the fort and province on behalf of her minor sons. But the situation at Jinji was unexpectedly reversed by the arrival of Rajaram there on the 1st or 2nd of November, 1689.

§ 6. *Rajaram at Jinji.*

The arrival of Rajaram was followed by a peaceful revolution at Jinji. Harji's widow and her Brahman advisers were reluctant to part with the usurped authority and local independence they had enjoyed for over eight years. [Mémoires of F. Martin, iii. 64.] But Rajaram's right could not be disputed; the government of Jinji passed into his hands. Kesho Trimbak became his chief favourite, took his revenge by placing Harji's son under confinement (15th Nov.), and squeezed money out of the late viceroy's widow by calling upon her to render accounts for her husband's long years of administration of the province. She had to make her peace by paying three lakhs of *hun*, and Santāji Bhonslé one lakh. (*Madras Diary*, 6 Dec. 1689.)

"Rajaram, on his arrival, sent a summons to all in any considerable employment in the Government to make their appearance before him." His aim was reported to be "to divert the Mughal army from his kingdom of Punā and join with several Hindu Nāyaks and raise a considerable army to retake the Golkondā and Bijapur kingdoms." (*Madras Diary*, 6 Dec. and 14 Nov. 1689). For Prahlād Nirāji, his supreme agent, a new post, that of *Pratinidhi* or Regent, was created, while Nilo Moreshwar Pinglé continued to hold the title of *Peshwā* or nominal prime minister. In the French records Krishnāji Anant, the historian of Shivāji, is called his second minister. Timāji, the son of Kesho

Trimbak Pinglé, was appointed subahdar of the Jinji district and Sundar Bālāji that of Kunimedu.

The Regent, Prahād Nirāji, "threw Rajaram into a life of debauchery" and kept "the young king constantly intoxicated by the habitual use of *ganja* and opium" [Wilkes, i. 133.] Then "seizing the reality of power, he caused the Brahmans who had enriched themselves under Harji to disgorge their money and goods by the stroke of confiscation." [Kaep. 267. Martin iii. 67.]*

§ 7. *Rapacity of Maratha Government of Jinji;
its dealings with the European traders.*

But this squeezing of its former officials could not fill the gaping void of the Maratha Government's financial distress. The ministers at Jinji looked round to raise money from the European settlements on the East Coast,—all persons living outside these strong places having been already plundered and ruined. Early in December the subahdar of Jinji demanded 3,000 *hun* as an advance or loan from the English factory at Kunimedu, and a like amount from the French and Dutch factories lying within his jurisdiction; the richer merchants were urged to lend 5000 or even 1000 *hun* each. Before the end of the month, the pressure was increased; in addition to the loan of 3,000 *hun* to the king, 5000 more were demanded as a fine for the buildings and fortifications of each European Company. "They will have no reason or equity, saying that they are in

* F. Martin writes, "The minister Prahād Pandit, who had his own (selfish) designs, threw the young prince into the pleasures and amusements of that race; he made him marry three or four women during the first two or three months of his arrival. The dancing girls were brought by the minister to the Court in many bands, and they served for more than one purpose, (*à divers usages.*)" iii. 67-68.

great want of money, having given the king (Rajaram) their estates to continue themselves in their employments, which they must seek to retrieve." [*Madres Diary*, 4 Jan. 1690]. At the same time the Marathas asked the governor of Madras for 100 barrels of gun-powder and 2500 weight of small shot, to carry on their war against the Mughals; but the English, not wishing to give offence to Aurangzib, managed to evade the request. In March, Rajaram visited the coast to bathe in the sea on the occasion of the lunar eclipse (on the 14th of the month.) The opportunity was taken to extort money gifts from the Indian merchants and European Companies of the region, the French at Pondicherry having to pay 200 *hun*. [Kaep. 274. Martin, iii. 85.]

But this source brought in very little. In their extreme penury, the Maratha Government offered to sell the fort of Tevenāpatam (afterwards St. David) with a gunshot of land round it, to the European Companies, who began to bid for it. The French were given the refusal of it at 50,000 *hun*, but they were too poor and their able agent Francois Martin wisely declined the offer. The English were more eager; after some skilful haggling they beat down the Marathas to 51,500 *chakram*,* or Rs. 1,08,150. Early in August 1690, Rajaram signed a *farmān* selling the fort and a "random shot" of land round it to the English, for that amount. The English governor cunningly wrote to his agent at Kunimedu to contrive to delay taking possession of Tevenāpatam till their best brass gun had arrived from Madras, so that the "random shot" might range over the greatest possible width of territory! But alas for the vanity of human wishes, in their greed of territory they had

* A *chakram* is a small gold coin worth two Rupees and one-tenth, while the value of the *hun* varied from 3½ to 4½ Rupees.

reckoned without Maratha perfidy. F. Martin had found out to his cost that "the Marathas need money so badly that they do not respect old promises and written *farmāns*." [Kaep. 273.] The English president Elihu Yale now discovered the same truth. As he wrote in his bitterness, "the mercenary Marathas may be induced by bribes to resell the fort ten times over to the same or several persons. Nay, they will sell their honour and conscience, too, to any that will buy it." [*Madras Diary*, 21 July.] Manjikupam, one of the villages included within the "random shot," remained a subject of dispute, the Dutch claiming it by virtue of an old *farmān* and the Marathas supporting their claim in order to get more money out of the English.

The Dutch, as the mortal enemies of the French, intrigued hard at Rajaram's Court to destroy the infant French settlement rising at Pondicherry, close to their factory at Cuddalore. In view of the approaching war between the Mughals and the Marathas on the East Coast, which he had clearly foreseen as early as February 1688, Martin had fortified the landward side of Pondicherry and secured through his agent, M. Germain, permission for these defensive works by paying 5,000 *chakram* to Harji Rajah (9 Jan. 1689).

On Rajaram's arrival in the Karnātak, Martin hastened to send the same Germain to Jinji to be one of the first to welcome him. "The young prince showed himself amiable and gave the French a *farman* confirming its predecessors." [Martin, iii. 65.] Even before the death of Harji Rajah, Martin had been negotiating with the Jinji Court to counteract the effect of the pecuniary offers made by the Dutch to the Marathas in order to secure an order expelling the French factory. Aftr Rajaram's coming, the French and Dutch agents continued to intrigue against each other among

the Maratha ministers,—the Dutch offering a large bribe for a proclamation condemning the French. The Jinji ministers encouraged the game, “thinking only how to get the maximum amount of money out of the one or the other.” In June 1690, the Dutch retired with failure, the French having lent Rajaram 6,000 *chakram* at 18 per cent interest. The turn of the Dutch, however, came in 1693, when they at last secured Rajaram’s permission and seized Pondicherry. [iii. 97.]

§ 8. *Campaign of 1690.*

The year 1690 opened very badly for the imperialists in the Karnātak. While the coming of Rajaram gave an impetus to Maratha activity in December 1689, next month the Mughal cause suffered a temporary eclipse from the rebellion of the old Haidarabadi local officers lately taken over into the Emperor’s service. Muhammad Sādiq, the foremost among them, brooded over his removal from the local command; Yachāpā Nāyak and Ismail Makā, too, found out that the profuse promises made to them when the Emperor annexed Golkondā territory and sought their adhesion, were not intended to be kept and that they were sure to be replaced by former servants of the Emperor and doomed to unemployment or humbler offices. So they deserted their new master, made an alliance with Rajaram (through the mediation of Nilo Moreswar Pinglé, the Peshwā) and began to usurp the country and collect the revenue. The imperial representatives, from Madras to Kunimedu, were hopelessly out-numbered and defeated and forced to flee to the European settlements on the coast. The governor Askar Ali Khan himself had to send his family and many of his followers to Madras for refuge (April). The

rebellion was extinguished only at the approach of Zulfiqār Khan as the supreme Mughal commander a few months later. He had been detached from the imperial Court at Korégaon at the end of November 1689, marched by way of Raichur, Karnul, Nandiyāl, Kadāpā, and Garamkondā, and then descended into the Karnatak plain (about June 1690), fighting and capturing many forts on the way and reaching Conjeveram in August and the environs of Jinji at the beginning of September. [*Dil.* ii. 98*b*; *Madras Diary*, 1 and 22 Sep. 1690.] Rajaram had sent his own troops with the contingents of his allies, Tanjore Trimbak Rao and Yachāpā Nāyak, north-westwards into the Karnatak plateau to prevent the Mughal general's descent into the eastern plains, but the terror of his name was too great and they returned "without doing anything." [*J. S.*]

The military situation was now* reversed; the Maratha raiding bands were driven back by the Mughals and "invasion threatened the dominions of Rajaram." [*Kaep.* 272]. The Maratha retreat to Jinji was precipitate, and the coming of Zulfiqār Khan, crowned with his great victory at Rāigarh and the capture of Shambhuji's entire family, as well as his unbroken series of successes in the Kadāpā and Arcot districts, at first created a consternation at Jinji. Rajaram left that fort and went to some safer refuge further south in the Karnatak, nearer his ally the Rajah of Tanjore, [*J. S.*], and in October Zulfiqār wrote to the French to prevent his escape by the sea in an English ship. [*Kaep.* 279. *Martin*, iii. 125-131.]

* Kaepelin says in March, a mistake for August (*Martin*, iii. 113.). Zulfiqar arrived at Conjeveram in August and could not have reached Saddam, the southern frontier station of the Kadapa district and place of descent into the Karnatak plain, earlier than the preceding July.

The miserable country from Jinji to the sea-coast continued to be pillaged by the camp-followers and "couriers" of both sides. The local people fled with their families for safety far to the south in Tanjore territory, or to the European factories on the coast, and hence the population of Pondicherry doubled in the course of one year (rising to 60,000 souls.) [Kaep. 278. Martin iii. 133.]

§ 9. *Fort of Jinji described.*

The rock-fortress of Jinji from its almost central position dominates the vast Karnātak plain from Arcot southwards to Trichinopoly, and from the Eastern Ghāts to the Bay of Bengal. It consists not of one fort, but of three fortified hillocks connected together by strong lines of circumvallation, and forming a rough triangle nearly three miles in circumference.

"These hills are steep, rocky and covered with such enormous boulders that they are almost unclimbable. Each of the three is fortified on all sides with line above line of stone walls, flanked with bastions, filled with embrasures for guns, loopholed for musketry and pierced only by narrow and strong gateways; and from each to the next, connected with these defences, runs a great stone-faced rampart nearly 60 feet thick with a ditch over 80 feet wide outside it. The triangular space thus enclosed (which is about three miles round) forms the lower fort, and the three hills are the citadels. Up each of the three citadels leads, from the lower fort, a steep flight of steps of hewn granite built on and among the great boulders with which the sides of the hills are strewn."

The strongest and highest of the peaks is the western one, called *Rājgiri* (or Great Mountain in Orme's plan),

its top standing 800 feet above the plain below and 400 feet in an almost sheer ascent above the rest of the ridge . . . The only path to Rājgiri, "a steep and narrow way, leads from the lower fort below, from the south-west, through gates in three lines of loopholed walls built one above another on the ridge across the road, and at length scales a mass of rock the top of which is nearly level with the summit of the citadel. But at this point, on the north side of the bluff, a great natural chasm, some 24 feet wide and 50 feet deep, separates this mass of rock from the topmost terrace of Rājgiri. This chasm, the former owners (agents of the Vijayanagar empire) had artificially lengthened and widened, and they had made the only entrance to the citadel pass across a narrow wooded bridge thrown over it, the further end of the bridge leading to a stone gate commanded by more embrasures and loopholes. Orme says that this point could be held by ten men against ten thousand." [*S. Arcot Dist. Gazetteer*, i. 347-348; also *Manual*, 413].

The northernmost of the three hills is *Krishnagiri* ("English Mountain" in Orme's plan), and the southern one is *Chandrāyandurg* ("St. George's Mountain" in Orme). The last is of much lower elevation.

The gates are three: one in the northern wall, now called the Vellore or Arcot gate, but known in the 17th century as the 'gate towards Trinomālī'; a second in the eastern face, now called the Pondicherry gate, which was the principal entrance into the fort in the 17th century; and due west of this second gate, right across the lower enclosure, stands a small postern gate (in the wall connecting Chandrayan with Rājgiri), called by the Indians *Shaitān-dāri* (or *Port du Diable* in French, as in Orme's plan).

About half a mile south of Rājgiri is a fourth hill now called *Chakkili-durg* (and *Chamār-tikri* by Bhimsen), the

summit of which is strongly fortified. But it is not connected with Jinji. [*S. Arcot Manual*, 418.]

§ 10. *Mughal army begins siege of Jinji.*

From Aurangzib's Court Zulfiqār Khan had reached Jinji early in September 1690, but he merely sat down before it. The investment of such a vast group of forts with the forces under him was out of the question, and he had no heavy guns nor enough munitions for a bombardment. About 19th September we find him asking for 200 maunds of powder and 500 soldiers from Madras, and the demand was soon increased to 500 maunds of powder, 500 great shot, 500 soldiers and 30 gunners. The English who owed him ground-rent for their settlement, sent him 200 maunds of powder and 300 iron shot. In November he demanded from the French agent in his camp, European munitions and gunners. Many European soldiers—of the English and other races—were tempted by offers of high pay to join his army, and he thus formed a corps of 100 white men.

In April 1691, the Mughal army before Jinji had become so large and well-provisioned that the country around expected a speedy fall of the fort. [*Madras Diary*, 26 April.] But, in reality, the siege had made little progress in all these months. The Muhammadans could not prevent the victualling of the place, as a complete blockade was beyond their power; and “the Marathas recovering from their first consternation began to harass them incessantly.” [Kaepelin, 280, Martin, iii. 135.] In November 1690 three Maratha chiefs—Nimāji Sindhiā, Mānkoji Pāndhré and Nāgoji Māné—left the Mughal side in Western India, came to Rajaram with 2,000 horsemen, and took

charge of the defence works at Chakra-kulam* in the lower fort. In the February following, Rajaram returned to Jinji. His first plan on coming to the Karnātak was to gain the help of the petty Hindu princes of the East Coast and lead a confederacy against the Mughal forces in Golkondā and Bijapur. But the mutual enmities of the local chieftains were so bitter that this proposal met with no support. Only his first cousin, the Rajah of Tanjore, aided him throughout the siege with men, money and provisions, partly from family affection and partly for cession of territory, and thus enabled him to defy the imperialists from within his stronghold for several years.

§ 11. *Mughal besiegers hard pressed, 1691.*

The military superiority of the Mughals was rapidly lost after April, while the activity of the Maratha bands roving around stopped the supply of grain to Zulfiqār's camp. "Many Deccani mansabdārs who had accompanied him now deserted to the enemy." Sayyid Lashkar Khan brought in a welcome supply of money from the Emperor and grain from the Kadāpā district, which gave the besiegers some relief. "Zulfiqār reported to the Emperor that the enemy were hemming him round, stopping his supply of provisions, and that he needed reinforcements urgently." [*Dil. ii. 99b, M. A. 352.*]

This general's father Asad Khan, the *wazir*, who had been sent from the Court in November 1690 into the country south of the Krishnā, had after many successes encamped at Kadāpā. He now received orders to hasten to his son's aid. Prince Kām Bakhsh, then at Wāgingerā,† was ordered

* *J. S.*, which reads *Chakra-puri*. It is a tank (*kulam*) lying in the valley between Chandrayan and Rajgiri. [*Gaz. i. 359.*]

† *M. A. 339* corrected by reference to 355 and 344; *Dil. 103a*.

by the Emperor (20th July, 1691) to proceed to the Karnatāk and support the wazir from behind. But Asad Khan wasted months without moving. He had often expressed an eager desire to see his son, but now that the son was in sore straits he was in no hurry to go to his side. He had also frequently taunted the other imperial generals with failure against the Marathas and bragged of what he could have done, saying, "His Majesty has not charged me with any enterprise. When he does so, he will see what 'Turk' means." This speech had been reported to the Emperor, and now on hearing of Asad Khan's supine inactivity, Aurangzib turned to his librarian and said, "His Turkship is over. How runs the proverb?" And then they both recited it,—'Don't brag again, as your boast (*Turki*) has come to an end!' This verse was embodied in a despatch now sent to Asad Khan. [*M. A.* 353, letter in *Ruqaat* No. 153.]

On receiving this stinging letter, Asad Khan made active preparations for an advance. The prince reached Kadāpā on 4th October, and the two marched to Jinji, which was reached on 16th December, 1691.*

In the meantime, Zulfiqār had abandoned his futile attacks on Jinji and turned to the more profitable work of levying contributions from the zamindars of South Karnātak. "The Khan Bahādur summoned to himself Ali Mardān Khan, the faujdār of Conjeveram, strengthened his camp, then started [with a mobile field force] against the kingdoms of Tanjore and Trichinopoly, and returned after collecting tributes from the zamindārs of this tract. He fought many battles, but was victorious in them all." [*Dil.* 99b.] At the end of August we find him passing by way

* *M. A.* 355. 344; his march from Wāgingerā described in *Dil.* 103a.—105b.

of Cuddālore towards Tanjore. [*Madras Diary.*] At the end of this year he captured Trinomāli* (23 m. w. of Jinji), for which he was promoted on 16th Jan. 1692. He had asked the French in October to take Valdaur for him, but they had wisely declined. Thus the year 1691 passed without any decisive success for the imperialists.

§ 12. *Siege operations during 1692.*

The next year was equally barren of results for them, in spite of the great accession to their armed strength brought by the prince and the wazir. Ismail Khan Makā (a grandee of the late Qutb Shahi State) was induced to enter the Emperor's service and joined Zulfiqār's camp with his contingent; but Yachāpā Nāyak continued with the Marathas. [*Dil.* 100a.]

With these additions to his forces, Zulfiqār renewed the siege of Jinji in 1692. He himself took post opposite the eastern (or Pondicherry) gate near a hillock called *Ali Madad* (evidently the 'Rock Battery' of Orme's plan), across one of the branches of the Jinji river. Asad Khan and the prince were encamped three miles away from him, beyond the northern gate, on the road leading from Krishnagiri to Singhāvaram† hill. Ismail Khan and other local auxiliaries were stationed in an outpost north-west of the fort, "in the direction of Karnātak-garh",— evidently south of the channel which drains the pool at the northern

* *M. A.* 345, (where the name is mis-spelt as *Tirmal* or *Nirmal*). Its importance in the siege of Jinji is clear from Br. Mus. Sloane MS. 3582, p. 24.

† Two miles north of Jinji. The name is mis-spelt by Bhimsen as *Sholing-varam*, but Sholinghur (also Sholing-puram) is another place 60 miles northwards.

foot of Rājgiri. Each Mughal camp was walled round for safety. The gate of Shaitāndāri could not be blockaded, and the garrison freely came and went out by it and brought in provisions whenever they liked. An outpost under Kākar Khan watched the path through the Vetavalam* wood by which supplies reached the fort, but the task was ineffectively done.

The Marathas made sorties from Krishnagiri, firing rockets and threatening the prince's camp. Zulfiqār strengthened the guards there. One night a Maratha force 5,000 strong sallied out of the north gate, but were defeated by the combined exertions of the entire Mughal army. The danger, however, was great and Zulfiqār removed the prince's camp to the side of his own and joined the two encampments together by the same enclosing walls. The position opposite the north gate, vacated by the prince, was assigned to Sayyid Lashkar Khan. Zulfiqār next selected Chandrayān-durg as his objective and ran trenches towards it. Then he began a bombardment of this hill as well as of the Pondicherry gate. [*Dil.* 105*b*—106*a*.] But all his exertions were a mere show, as the country around knew well.

The condition of the Mughal camp in 1692 is thus described by an eye-witness: "The rain fell with excessive severity. Grain was dear. The soldiers, having to spend days and nights together in the trenches, suffered great hardship. From a position in the hillside, where Muhammad Mumin (the chief of the imperial artillery) had constructed a yard and a strong portico with stages, 24 tanks could be

* Vetavalam, 16 miles south-west of Jinji, and now in the Tiruvannamalai taluk. Here elephants used to roam. [*S. Arcot Gaz.* i. 82.]

seen in the Mughal camp. In the rainy season the entire tract looked like one lake.”*

§ 13. *Santā Ghorparé captures Governor of Conjeveram.*

Bad as the Mughal position had been during the rainy season, it became absolutely untenable in winter. Early in December, a vast Maratha force of more than 30,000 horse, raised in Western India by Rāmchandra (the chief agent of Rajaram) arrived in the Eastern Karnātak under the celebrated generals Dhana Singh Jādav and Santā Ghorparé.

The deluge of the newly arrived Maratha cavalry first burst on the Conjeveram district. The terror inspired by these brigands caused a panic flight of the inhabitants far and near into the city of Madras for refuge (11th to 13th Dec.). When the division under Santā arrived near Kāveripak, Ali Mardān Khan, the Mughal faujdār of Conjeveram, went out to encounter it, without knowing its vast numbers. He fell into a trap laid by Santa and during the battle his corps of *bahelia* musketeers went over to the enemy. The Khan, finding resistance vain, tried to retreat to Conjeveram, but his small force was hemmed round and he was captured with 1,500 horses and six elephants.† All the property and materials of his army were looted (13th Dec.). The Khan was taken to Jinji and held to ransom. Several of his officers and many

* *Dil.* 106b. One night this battery on the hillside was attacked by the garrison and the defenders driven out of their trenches with slaughter. But Dalpat Rao recovered the lost position and restored the damaged trenches. (*Ibid.*)

† Five elephants and 300 *good* horses, according to Martin; but there were many ponies and mares also. Santa's tactics are finely described by Martin in his *Mémoires*.

other nobles on the Mughal side fled precipitately to Madras, where they were well treated and fed at the E. I. Company's expense. After some months Ali Mardān secured his release by paying the huge ransom of one lakh of *hun*, which his brother-in-law Ali Qādir had raised. [*Madras Diary*, 13, 17 and 23 Dec. 1692 and 4 Aug. 1693, *Dil.* 108*b*, J. S. Martin, iii. 268—269.]

§ 14. *Dhanā Jādav captures Ismail Khan Makā.*

The other division of the Maratha reinforcements, led by Dhanā Jādav, attacked the siege trenches on the west side of Jinji. On the reported approach of Santā and Dhanā, Zulfiqar saw himself hopelessly outnumbered, and wisely ordered his outposts to fall in on his main army, as these scattered positions were no longer tenable, Sayyid Lashkar Khan and Kākar Khan quickly carried out the order and joined their general. But Ismail Khan, posted west of the fort, had a longer distance to cross, and his soldiers, also, were dispersed in trying to remove their property, so that when he at last began to withdraw it was too late. The Marathas helped by their brethren in the fort intercepted him. The Khan offered a brave opposition to tenfold odds, but was wounded and captured with 500 horses and two elephants, and carried off a prisoner to Jinji. [*M.A.* 357, *Dil.* 107*a*, *Madras Diary*, 9 Jan. 1693. Martin, iii. 267.]

The victorious Marathas immediately proclaimed their authority over the Haidarabadi Karnātak,—‘the Conjeveram and Kadāpā countries’,—appointing Keshava Ramanā as their subahdar at the head of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot. (Jan. 1693.)

§ 15. *Prince Kam Bakhsh intrigues with Marathas.*

The revival of Maratha activity and predominance in the surrounding country put a stop to the free and plentiful supply of grain in the Mughal camp by way of Punamāli and Madras, which had prevailed ever since the siege began. It also stopped the coming of letters from the Emperor's Court to the siege-camp, with calamitous results. The Mughal army outside Jinji was now besieged in its turn, and its condition became extremely dangerous by reason of internal disputes. Prince Kām Bakhsh was a foolish young man, the spoilt child of his father's old age, untaught to bridle his passions, and ever swayed by his caprices and the counsels of young and worthless favourites. He contrived to offend his guardian, the aged and influential wazir, Asad Khan, by putting him to inconvenience in a childish spirit of mischief. As the Court historian writes, "The Prince, in the intoxication of youth and under the influence of evil counsellors, made the entire long journey [from Kadāpā] to Jinji on horseback, prolonging it still further by hunting and sight-seeing on the way. Asad Khan, as bound by etiquette, had to ride on horseback alongside the prince, in spite of his great weakness and the infirmities of old age. It embittered his feelings towards the prince, and wicked men on both sides aggravated the quarrel by their intervention." [*M. A.* 355.]

After reaching Jinji, the prince acted still more foolishly. Through the medium of "some reckless and mad men" he opened a secret correspondence with Rajaram. The Marathas were greatly elated by their securing such an ally in the enemy's camp; they flattered the prince's humour and mischievously instigated him in new evil projects. Zulfiqār Khan, who "kept watch in every direction and daily paid a thousand rupees to his

spies within the fort" for intelligence, soon learnt the prince's secret, and secured the Emperor's permission to keep him under careful surveillance. Dalpat Rao, the general's bravest and most devoted lieutenant, was posted at the prince's camp in constant attendance on him.* Kām Bakhsh could not ride out, hold Court, admit or send out any one from his encampment without Asad Khan's permission. In fact, he found himself a powerless prisoner of State, and the quarrel in the Mughal camp became a matter of public notoriety. [*M. A.* 356.]

While the unhappy prince was thus fretting in his camp and forming with his wretched servants vain projects for escape, the horizon grew totally dark for the Mughals, as the result of the arrival of Santā and Dhanā in December, 1692. The grain supply of the siege-camp was entirely cut off, famine began to rage among the vast multitude, and for some weeks communication with the Emperor's Court and the Mughal base ceased altogether, as no courier could make his way through the cordon of Maratha cavalry drawn round Zulfiqār's force. Alarming rumours arose immediately, which the Marathas spread and exaggerated,—even if they did not originate them as Khāfi Khan asserts. It was said that Aurangzib was dead and that Shah Alam had succeeded to the throne. Kām Bakhsh considered himself to be in a most perilous position. Asad and Zulfiqār were his enemies; they would naturally try to win the favour of the new Emperor by sending Kām Bakhsh in chains to him, to be imprisoned, blinded or even put to death. It was impossible for him, even if all the imperial forces

* The reason publicly given out for this step was the necessity of guarding the prince from the nightly fire and hostile threats of the garrison of the fort. "The enemy's audacity being reported to the Emperor, he ordered Rao Dalpat to keep watch day and night, armed and ready, in front of the prince's tent." [*Dil.* 105*b.*]

before Jinji had been under his absolute control, to defeat the Marathas, assert his supremacy, and proclaim himself Emperor. His only hope of safety, so his servants assured him, lay in his making terms with Rajaram, escaping to the fort with his family on a dark night, and then trying with Maratha aid to win the throne of Delhi, as his brother Akbar had once tried to do. So, one night he got his elephants and *palkis* ready for himself and his women; but on receiving a warning from Asad Khan and hearing that the latter too had assembled his men and was standing ready to offer armed opposition, the prince dismissed his retinue and postponed the execution of his plan to another day. [*Dil.* 107a, *M. A.* 357.]

§ 16. *Zulfiqar abandons the siege trenches.*

But every project and every step of Kām Bakhsh was reported to Asad Khan by his spies. In extreme alarm and distraction at this division in their own ranks and the immense preponderance of the enemy outside, Asad Khan and Zulfiqār consulted the leading officers of the imperial army; they urged with one voice that the prince should be strictly guarded, the trenches abandoned, and the entire army concentrated in the rear lines round Asad Khan and the prince.

But the withdrawal from the siege lines was not to be effected without a severe fight. Zulfiqār burst his big guns* by firing excessive charges of powder and abandoned them where they stood. Then, as he started from the trenches

* Including some brass artillery purchased at Madras. They were burst, according to Bhimsen and the English soldier Lewis Terrill who had gone six months earlier to serve Zulfiqar. [*Madras Diary*, 30 Jan. 1693.] But *M. A.* 357 says that nails were driven into their touch-holes.

with his men drawn up in compact order and carrying away whatever materials he could, the exultant Marathas fell upon him. The base-camp was four miles in his rear and the fort-walls only half a mile in front; the garrison made a sortie, joined their brethren outside under Dhanā Jadav, and hemmed the Mughal army on all sides. "The audacity of the infidels passed all bounds, and death stared the Muslims in the face." (*M. A.* 357.) The Khan had only 2,000 troopers with him, but they cut their way through "a hundred thousand (!) enemy horsemen and infantry." Zulfiqār and his lieutenants fought, as men fight for dear life. He made a counter-attack, urging his elephant up to the fort-gate and driving away the Marathas on that side. They fled within and shut the gate, losing about a thousand infantry in killed and abandoning in their flight about a thousand mares as spoils to the Mughals. In the whole battle 3000 foot and 300 cavalry are said to have fallen on the Maratha side. The imperialists lost 400 troopers, 400 horses and 8 elephants, mostly killed by artillery fire; and "few of them remained unwounded." At the close of the day they reached Asad Khan's camp. [*M. A.* 358, *Dil.* 107 b.]

§ 17. *Prince Kam Bakhsh arrested.*

Here the prince had been exulting as danger thickened round Zulfiqār and Asad. He had even plotted with his silly courtiers to arrest these two generals at their next visit to him and then grasp the supreme power. But this plot, like all others, had leaked out. Zulfiqār Khan, worn out with his daylong fighting and anxieties, reached his father's side at night, learnt of the new plot, and then the two leaders quickly decided that the safety of the entire army and the

preservation of the Emperor's prestige alike demanded that the prince should be deprived of the power of creating mischief. They immediately entered within the outer canvas-wall (*jali*) seated on their elephants and knocked down the screens of his audience hall. The other nobles stood by as idle spectators, leaving the odium of arresting their master's son to rest solely on these two leaders. The servants of the prince foolishly discharged some bullets and arrows and raised a vain uproar and tumult. But Asad Khan's force was overwhelming and his movements quick. Kām Bakhsh lost heart, and in utter distraction came out of his harem by the main gate. He had advanced only a few steps when the Khan's musketeers (*bahelias*) seized both his arms and dragged him bare-footed to Asad. Rao Dalpat, seeing it, promptly drove his elephant forward, and with great agility lifted the prince up on his *hawdā*, sat behind him as his keeper, and brought him to Asad Khan.*

The wazir was in a towering rage. He severely rebuked the prince, calling him a dancing-girl's son, unworthy to rule over men or to command in war. Then he continued, "The rumours you have heard, are false. The Emperor is alive. What is this that you have done? You have disgraced yourself, and covered my grey hairs with disgrace." The prisoner was taken to Asad Khan's own tent and treated with every courtesy consistent with his safe custody. The grand wazir saluted him and served his dishes with his own hands. [*Dil.* 108a.]

When day broke, Zulfiqār called together all the officers of the army, great and small, explained his late action, reassured them, and bound them to his side by a lavish distribution of money and presents. Thus the Mughal

* *Dil.* 108a. *M. A.* 358. *Storia*, ii. 316. *K. K.* ii. 420 (useless). *Ahkam* § 25.

army was saved by establishing unity of control. The Marathas, hoping to profit by the internal difficulties of the besiegers, created "an astonishing amount of tumult and disturbance near the camp from dawn to sunset." But Zulfiqār defended himself successfully, as he had no longer to fear any enemy within his own camp nor divided counsels. [*M. A.* 359.]

But Santāji Ghorparé, flushed with his signal victory over Ali Mardān Khan and the unresisted plunder of the Conjeveram district, now arrived at Jinji and turned his great talents and energy against Zulfiqār. Fighting took place daily, in warding off the Maratha attacks on the imperial camp and foraging parties. As the eye-witness Bhimsen writes,—“The enemy exceeded 20,000 men, while the imperialists were a small force and many of them were engaged in guarding the prince and the camp. Kām Bakhsh’s contingent was unfriendly and never left their tents to co-operate in the defence. Mān Singh Rāthor (a two-*hazari*) and several other imperial officers hid themselves in their tents on the plea of illness. The whole brunt of the fighting fell on Zulfiqār Khan and Rao Dalpat, Sarāfrāz Khan Deccani, Fathullah Khan Turāni, Kānhoji Maratha and a few other *mansabdārs* with only 2,000 horsemen.” [*Dil.* 108 *b*, also *M. A.* 358.] They, however, fought like heroes and were victorious in every encounter in the open.

§ 18. *Zulfiqar brings food from Wandiwash.*

But such victories were of no avail. The Mughal army was now in a state of siege and famine was its worst enemy. In a few days scarcity deepened into an absolute want of food. “Zulfiqār then marched out with his own division to bring in grain from Wandiwāsh, 24 miles north-east of Jinji.

He arrived there at night. His Turāni soldiers, under cover of the darkness, fell on the helpless grain-dealers (*banjārās*) and carried off whatever they could seize. All discipline was lost. In the morning the Khan collected the grain left un plundered by his men, and set out on his return" (5 Jan. 1693). Santā with 20,000 men, barred his path at Desur, 10 miles southwards, and then enveloped his army. The Mughals, after a hard fight, reached the shelter of the fort of Desur at night and encamped at its foot. Here a halt was made for a day or two.

When the Mughals resumed their march in the morning, the Marathas brought a large force into the field and made a most determined attack. "They fired so many muskets that the soldiers and banjaras of our force were overpowered. Bullets were specially aimed at the elephants ridden by the imperial commanders. Many of these animals were hit. Regardless of the enemy fire, Rao Dalpat and his Bundelas boldly charged to clear a way ahead.... The transport animals and guns stuck in the mud of the rice-fields, artillery munition ran short, no powder or shot was left with any musketeer." But Dalpat, fighting with desperate bravery and assisted by the opportune arrival of the vanguard under Sarāfrāz Khan (who took on himself one enemy division), succeeded in driving the enemy back half a mile, then halting extricated the baggage and guns out of the mud, sent the column on, and brought up the rear. The Marathas abated their shower of bullets and finally withdrew. The Bundelas had saved Zulfiqār's division and thereby saved also the camp before Jinji. [*Dil.* 109 b.]

§ 19. *The imperialists retreat to Wandiwash.*

But the food brought by Zulfiqār at such a heavy cost was all too little for that huge multitude of soldiers and

camp-followers. The condition of the starving imperialists became so bad that many common men daily walked over to the Maratha camp at the foot of Jinji, where provisions were plentiful, bought, cooked and ate the grain there and returned to their own quarters, without being allowed to carry away either raw or cooked food to their army.* "Every day from dawn to sunset the Marathas assembled round our camp and made demonstrations. No aid came from any source except the Gracious to the Lowly; neither money nor food-stuff arrived. All the army, high and low alike, were distracted and depressed."

Asad Khan now made secret overtures of peace to Rajaram, offering a heavy bribe if he was allowed to retreat to Wandiwāsh unmolested. The Maratha generals and ministers pressed their king to continue the war, crush the Mughal army which was half dead from starvation and thus establish his rule over that country before a new army could be sent by the Emperor. But Asad Khan "had cast a spell over Rajaram," so that the latter rejected the advice of his followers and agreed to an armistice to let the Mughals withdraw if the wazir would recommend it to the Emperor to make peace with the Maratha king.† On the other side, too, Dalpat Rao urged Zulfiqār not to withdraw, as it would only bring disgrace in the end, and he offered his own gold

* *Dil.* 110a. Also, Keshava Ramana, the newly appointed Maratha subahdar of Haidarabadi Karnatak, wrote to the English Chief of Madras, on 8 Jan. 1693: "The Mughal army being before Jinji, Dhana Jadav and several other great persons surrounded that army, whereby they cut them off from all manner of provisions coming to the prince and Asad Khan . . . whereupon many of the Mughal's merchants and shopkeepers came to us upon our granting them our *qaul* (safe conduct), and we doubt not in 4 or 5 days to have all our enemies in Jinji fort." [*Madras Diary.*]

† How Zulfiqār bribed Rajaram's Brahman ministers, the Maratha generals protesting. Martin, iii. 285-287.

and silver worth Rs. 40,000 for the Khan's army expenses. But while Zulfiqār was hesitating, his hands were forced by his soldiers.

One day his artilerymen loaded their effects, left the camp and sent word to their general that, as they were dying of hunger there they were going away to Wandiwāsh. It was impossible to fight without the artillery, and hence, at the departure of the gunners every man in the camp turned to packing his baggage for removal.

Asad and Zulfiqār had no help but to start with the prince at noon. "Owing to long continued starvation, most of the horses, camels and other transport animals of the army had perished. Those who had a few left, loaded just enough goods for these. Most men set fire to their belongings. Many in perplexity and helplessness at the terrible confusion and danger then raging, took their own way forgetful of their friends and relatives. Many stores of the Emperor and nobles were left behind there When the army marched out of the camp, about a thousand Maratha horse came after them like a rear-guard, and plundered the men of the army of their property. The imperialists reached Wandiwāsh in three days." [*Dil.* 110 b]

This retreat was effected on 22nd or 23rd January 1693. Ten days latter, Qāsim Khan, the newly appointed faujdar of Conjeveram (*viz* Ali Mardān Khan), was reported to be coming from Kadāpā, with abundant supplies and a strong force. Santā Ghorparé tried to intercept him; he attacked Qāsim between Kaveripak and Conjeveram and pressed him so hard that he had to shut himself up in the great temple enclosure of Conjeveram. Next day Zulfiqār arrived to his aid, drove away the Marathas and escorted Qāsim Khan to Wandiwāsh (7th February). Food again became abundant

in the Mughal camp and the troops were further reassured by getting the latest news and letters from the imperial Court telling them that the Emperor was alive and well. A dark cloud was lifted from the hearts of all the imperialists; "life came back to our bodies," as Bhimsen says. There was much rejoicing, playing the band of victory (kettle-drums), dance parties and distribution of alms by the officers in celebration of the Emperor's safety. [*Dil.*, 111 a.]

Zulfiqār made his camp at Wandiwāsh for four months (February—May, 1693), abandoning the attack on Jinji for the present. He had to wait for the Emperor's orders about Kām Bakhsh and also to replenish his army and military chest, which had been sadly depleted.

§ 20. *Emperor's treatment of Kam Bakhsh and Asad Khan.*

We may here complete the history of this episode in Kām Bakhsh's life. The officers of the Karnātak army, especially Asad and Zulfiqār, lay quaking in mortal anxiety as to how the Emperor would take the arrest of his favourite son. The wildest rumours circulated as to his wrath towards his generals. A story ran in the Wandiwāsh camp that Asad Khan, on being sentenced to disgrace by the Emperor, had poisoned himself (July).

Aurangzib at first ordered the prince to be brought to his presence in charge of Asad Khan, and fresh equipment and furniture to be given to him on the way, to replace what had been abandoned or looted at Jinji, but no order was passed regarding Zulfiqār and his officers. [*Dil.* 111b.] Meantime, Prince Azam had been posted to Kadāpā district to support the Jinji army from the rear. He encamped at Saddam at the southern frontier of his charge;

and thus, after the arrival of Qāsim Khan at Wandiwāsh, the Mughal line of communication from the Eastern Karnātak to the Emperor's Court was again secured from interruption.

When the wazir reached Sāgar on his way to the Court, he received an order to stop there* and send the prince alone to the Emperor at Galgalā. Kām Bakhsh arrived there on 11th June and was presented to his father in the harem through the intercession of his sister Zinat-un-nisā. [*M. A.* 359.] Here the spoilt child tried to justify his late conduct by charging Zulfiqār with treachery and the collusive prolongation of the siege for enriching himself. Aurangzib was too experienced a soldier and too good a judge of men, to credit Kām Bakhsh's words. [*Dil.* 112a.]

Zulfiqār used the reinforcements brought by Qāsim Khan to reassert Mughal authority over the neighbourhood

* This was a mark of censure. In addition, the Emperor taxed Asad Khan a huge sum as the price of the prince's stores which had been looted and the guns and material abandoned at Jinji; two mahals of the wazir's jagir were attached for recovering this amount. [*Dil.* 112a.] Asad Khan was permitted to come to the Emperor as late as 8th Jan. 1694. "On account of the affair of Kam Bakhsh, he anticipated the severe anger of the Emperor. On the day of interview, when Asad reached the place for making his salam, Multafat Khan, who was standing close to the throne, recited in a low tone the verse, 'Forgiveness has a sweet taste which retaliation lacks.' The gracious Emperor replied, 'You have recited it at the right time,' and looking benignantly at his prime minister ordered him to kiss his feet, and raised his head out of the dust of distress." [*M. A.* 365.] Dalpat Rao, in his anxiety, sent Bhimsen to the imperial camp to learn about the Emperor's feelings towards the Jinji army and the chance of Government supplying its officers with what they had lost during the retreat. The historian brought back reassuring news. [*Dil.* 112a.]

and fill his chest. His disastrous retreat from the walls of Jinji had been a signal for the numerous petty zamindars of the Karnātak to rise in rebellion and lawlessness. They plundered banjaras bringing grain to the Mughal camp and seized certain forts. Zulfiqār now chastised them, exacted fines, and returned to Wandiwāsh. [*Dil.* 111a. and 112b.]

§ 21. *Operations during 1693.*

The Eastern Karnātak from the latitude of Madras to that of Porto Novo, was at this time occupied by three sets of authorities, often in conflict with one another,—namely, the representatives of the old Hindu local chieftains and Vijaynagar viceroys, whom the conquering armies of the Bijapur and Golkondā Sultans had imperfectly subdued; the officers of the lately subverted Bijapur and Golkondā Governments, who were loth to recognise their new Mughal master; and the Maratha intruders representing the houses of Shivaji and Vyankoji. To the first of these classes belonged Yachāpā Nāyak,* whose ancestors claimed to be Rajputs of Qanauj and had obtained the fort of Satgarh (26 miles west of Vellore) from the ministers of Rajah Pratap Rudra of Warangal. [*Dil.* 116a.] The Qutb Shahi Government had recognised his position by creating him commander of its local levies (*sehbandi*.) After the fall of Golkondā he had resisted the Mughal conquest of the Kadāpā district [*Dil.* 98b] in the company of Md. Sādiq,

* His name is spelt as *Yachapa Nair* and also *Nayak* in *J. S.*, as *Achap Nair* in Bhimsen's Persian memoirs, as *Arsumma*, *Eachuma*, *Yausomo* and *Arsemo Nayak* in the Madras Diary, *Achna Nayak* in *Akhbarat* (28 Oct. 1693, offers to surrender Satgarh fort to Zulfiqar, who arrives there), and *Achap-nar* by Manucci [iii. 271.]

but had been won over to the imperial side and sent with a considerable force (early in 1690) to expel the Maratha plundering bands infesting the Conjeveram district. [*Mad. Diary*, 1st May 1690.] Soon afterwards these two officers had revolted from the imperial side, and Yachāpā had usurped the country up to the Madras coast. [*Mad. Diary*, 21st July.] When Rajaram reached Jinji, Yachāpā joined him and lived in that fort for some time as his chief military supporter. [*Dil.*, 112*b*; *Mad. Diary*, 9th Jan. 1693.] But in January 1693 he was thrown into the background by the arrival of Dhanā and Santā, and so, in March, he left Rajaram, recovered Sātgarh, and began to fight for his own hand. In extending his territory eastwards to Vellore, he came into conflict with Rajaram in June. [*J. S.*] At the close of the year Zulfiqār Khan won him over, by securing for him a *mansab* of 6-hazari and a jāgir of 3 lakhs of *hun* in the Karnātak. [*Dil.* 112*b*; *Mad. Diary*, 20th Feb. 1694.]

To the second category belonged Ismail Khan Makā, an ex-general of Golkondā and a local zamindār, as well as the sons of Sher Khan Lodi, the former Adil Shahi governor of Valikanda-puram. These joined the Mughals wholeheartedly. The temporary eclipse of the Muhammadan power at the beginning of 1693 was turned to good account by the Marathas. Santāji Ghorparé besieged Trichinopoly in March, Rajaram himself arrived there soon afterwards, and on 10th April the Nāyak of Trichinopoly made peace with the Maratha king, who then went to visit his first cousin and friend Shāhji II at Tanjore (May 1693). But a quarrel now broke out in the Maratha ranks; Santāji's temper was found intolerable and he left for Maharashtra in anger, Dhanāji being appointed Senāpati in his place. [*J. S.* Martin gives a different cause for Santāji's anger, *Mémoires*, iii. 303.]

§ 22. *Mughal successes against the Tanjore Rajah, 1694.*

Zulfiqār had rashly begun the siege of Jinji, without first bringing the country around under his control. His stay before the fort had necessarily involved his army in the risk of destruction in a hostile neighbourhood. But now, strengthened by the adhesion of these men of local influence, he set out in February 1694 to conquer the South Arcot district. The fort of Peru-mukkal, on the top of a steep hill 300 feet above the plain, 18 miles north of Pondicherry and 6 miles east of Tindivanam, was stormed for him by Dalpat Rao's Bundelas under his eyes.* Thence he went to the beach to gaze on the ocean for the first time. Then he marched down the East Coast, towards Tanjore, by way of Pondicherry and other European factories†, capturing many forts in the South Arcot district, and skirting Cuddālore at the end of February. Yachāpā co-operated with him.

When (in March 1694) Zulfiqār with his army arrived near Tanjore, Maharajah Shāhji II found resistance vain, especially as his ever-hostile neighbour, the Nāyak of Trichinopoly, joined the Mughals, helped them with men and money, and besought them to recover for him some forts and districts which the Maharajah of Tanjore had seized from him. The imperialists did this service to their

* This is on the authority of Bhimsen, an eye-witness, who, however, does not give the date. (*Dil.* ii. 112b.) But *Akhbarat*, 14 Nov. 1694, records that the Emperor received a report from Zulfiqar that in the storming of Perumukkal, Aziz Khan, the son of Bahadur Khan Ruhela, had distinguished himself and entered the fort.

† He only looked at their outside from a distance. "These forts of the Europeans were mere shops," as Bhimsen says. [*Dil.* 114a.]

ally. Then they invaded Tanjore itself. [*Dil.*, 114.] Rajaram had sent (March) Baharji Ghorparé (the younger brother of Santā) to the assistance of his constant friend Shahji, but Zulfiqār was now irresistible. Shahji had to yield; on 22nd May he signed a letter of submission, promising to obey the Emperor's orders like a faithful vassal in future, to cease from assisting Rajaram in any way (such as sending provisions into Jinji through the Vetavalam wood), to pay the Mughal Government a tribute of 30 lakhs of rupees annually, (of which 20 lakhs were to be paid down in cash, jewels and elephants, and 10 lakhs next year), and to cede the forts of Palamkotā, Sittānur (?) and Tungānur with their dependent districts as well as Kul-Manārgudi, Shri-mushnam, Tittāgudi, Trinnānur (?), Elavanasore, Kālākurchi, Pandalum*, etc., which had been mortgaged to him by Rajaram. This cession of territory was to take the place of a contingent of 1000 horse and 4000 foot which he had originally agreed to supply for the Emperor's service. The Mughal general, on his part, granted the Maharajah a *qaulnāma* or letter of assurance, accepting the above terms and promising to procure for him an imperial *farmān* pardoning his offences and recognising his title and kingdom.† [Mackenzie Collection.] Shahji II made, in

* *Palamkota*, 15 m. s. w. of Chidambaram. *Sittānur*, 10 m. w. of Tindivanam, (the English records spell it *Cittoners*, which may also stand for Chidambaram). *Tunganur*, 4 m. s. w. of Chidambaram, (spelt in the English records as *Tank*). *Kul-Manargudi*, 13 m. s. w. s. and *Shri-mushnam*, 19 m. w. of Chidambaram. *Tittagudi*, on the n. bank of the Vellar, 17 m. s. w. of Vriddhachalam. *Trinnanur* (in English *Imrapur*), 27 m. n. e. e. of Trichi. *Pandalum*, 11 m. n. of *Kalakurchi*, which is 15 m. w. of Elavanasore. *Elavanasore*, 17 m. n. w. of Vriddhachalam.

† A robe of honour, a jewelled pendant and an elephant were ordered by the Emperor to be presented to Shahji. [*Akhbarat*, 27 Aug. and 3 Sep. 1694.]

addition to the above, large gifts to Zulfiqār Khan and his officers. Out of the stipulated tribute 17 lakhs were paid down and the remaining three lakhs were promised when the invaders would retire beyond the Kolerun. [Mackenzie Collection, *Mad. Diary.*]

But Rajaram, who had mortgaged Palamkotā to Vyānkoji, sent two or three thousand horse, and seized the fort for himself, so that when (middle of June) Zulfiqār's army appeared before it he was refused admission and had to lay siege to it. After six days of trench warfare, Dalpat Rao by one charge seized the fortified village (*pettā*) before the fort-gate, losing 150 of his Rajputs in killed and wounded. The garrison then capitulated, but escaped by the postern gate under cover of the night, 23rd June 1694. [*Dil.*, 114*b*; *Akhbarat*, 18 July.]

Then the Mughal army returned to its base at Wandiwāsh by way of Tiru-vādi, and made another attack on Jinji in September,—this time taking care to plant outposts in the Vetavalam forest through which provisions used to enter the fort. [*Dil.*, 115*b*, *Akhbarat*, 22 Sep.] In this month Zulfiqār suddenly arrested Yachāpā at a darbar and had him beheaded on the charge of treason, with the previous sanction of the Emperor; “of the Nāyak's family then with him all slew one another, and his property was looted by the camp.”*

* *Dil.* ii. 116*a*; *Madras Diary*, 18 and 22 Sep. 1694. Manucci (iii. 271—2) gives horrible details of this suicide and also asserts that Zulfiqār falsely accused Yachapa of treason and killed him, because the Nayak had written a letter to the Emperor exposing Zulfiqār's treasonable collusion with the Marathas and deliberate prolongation of the siege of Jinji, and offering to capture the fort in eight days by his own troops alone, but the letter had been intercepted by Asad Khan.

§ 23. *Zulfiqar's movements and difficulties, 1695.*

Zulfiqār Khan renewed the siege of Jinji towards the close of the year 1694, but it was a mere show intended to deceive the Emperor. The fact of his treasonable collusion with the Marathas was notorious in the country. Francois Martin, the founder of Pondicherry, who was in close and constant touch with the Court of Jinji "frequently in his letters and Memoirs, expressed the opinion that Zulfiqār Khan had, during the course and particularly at the end of the siege of Jinji, an understanding with Rajaram; in expectation of the death of the very old Aurangzib and the civil wars that would fatally follow among his sons, he had conceived the ambition of carving out for himself an independent principality, and with that object he wished to placate (manage) the Marathas." (Martin, *Mémoires*, iii. 287). So, too, the English merchants of Madras record on 5th November 1696: "Zulfiqār Khan has been frequently ordered to take Jinji, and it has been in his power to do so and destroy all the Marathas in the country. But instead of that it appears plain that he hath joined council with them." Even Bhimsen, the right-hand man of Zulfiqār's right hand man Dalpat Rao, frankly charges the Khan with treasonable neglect of duty: "If he had wished it, he could have captured the fort on the very day that he reached Jinji. But it is the practice of generals to prolong operations (for their own profit and ease)." And, again, "God alone knows what policy he adopted." Manucci says the same thing. [*Dil.*, 123a and 106a. *Storia*, iii 271.]

In October 1694, Zulfiqār suddenly marched out of Wandiwāsh and encamped north of the Changāmon fort and pass (42 miles west of Jinji), the Marathas hovering round

him and making daily incursions into his camp, in which they carried off horses. The Mughal cavalry, in its turn, harassed and plundered the country round, carrying away both men and goods. "At Wandiwāsh the people fled in fear of the Muhammadan army and took refuge in the Changāmon hill." There was much disagreement at this time between Zulfiqār and his chief officers,—especially Dāud Khan Pani, Kishore Singh Hādā, and Dalpat Rao Bundela,—who were absurdly credited in public rumour with a design to seize him and send him in chains to the Emperor. The Khan, so it was reported, had sent ten camels laden with rupees for Rajaram, but they had been intercepted by Dāud Khan. Another report was that the Marathas, by poisoning the waters and mixing milk-hedges in some of the tanks, had killed a great number of people. [*Mad. Diary*, 10 Nov. 1694.] Then after taking two or three small forts from the Marathas and receiving three lakhs of Rupees sent from the Court, the Mughal general marched to Saddam (at the end of December, 1694).

Early in April 1695 one of his chief officers, Sarāfrāz Khan, quarrelled with him and marched away to the Court without his permission. We read in the Court news-letters reports about other desertions from his army. Nothing was achieved by the Mughals during 1695, while the scarcity of grain which raged there for the entire year intensified their sufferings. Siege was laid to Vellore in October, but it held out for many years. Early in December came the alarming news that a large Maratha army of 15,000 men under the dreaded Santā and Dhanā was marching to the Eastern Karnātak and that they had already crushed Qāsim Khan, the governor of the uplands of Mysore, (capital Serā). On hearing of this disaster, the imperialists took fright and prepared to decamp and send their families to

places like Madras for protection. [*Mad. Diary*, 5 Dec. 1695.]

§ 24. *Operations during 1696.*

Dhanā Jādav arrived near Vellore at the end of December. Zulfiqār immediately raised the siege, sent off his camp baggage and family to Arcot, and prepared for action. The Maratha general had turned aside towards Jinji, and then roving further south had besieged the Mughal faujdar in Tiru-vādi. Zulfiqār, coming up promptly in pursuit, relieved the outpost, drove Dhanā away,* and fell back on Arcot. But the situation changed entirely against the Mughals in March, when Santā Ghorparé arrived on the scene. The Maratha bands spread to several parts of the country, the imperialists with their depleted numbers could not defend so many places. [*Mad. Diary*, 20 Jan. 1696.] Zulfiqār wisely concentrated his forces; but throughout this year 1696 he was hampered by his extreme want of money, "having received no supply from the Emperor." He vainly begged the English merchants of Madras for a loan of one lakh of *hun*, for which he offered to mortgage to them any part of the country. [*Mad. Diary*, 3 March.] In October he became exasperated by their persistent refusal, and threatened an attack on their city.

In April 1696 Zulfiqār had beaten back Santāji near Arni, but thereafter he confined himself solely to the defensive in the fort of Arcot, as his strength was still further weakened by the death of his captain Rajah Kishore Singh Hādā. [*Dil.* 118*b*.] The Marathas, as usual, hovered round him, there being a secret understanding between the two sides to spare each other.

* *Akhbarat*, 18 Jan. 1696. See *Sanads and Letters*, p. 175, mentioning Dhanāji's fight in which Gangāji Bābar fell (8 Feb.)

In November it was reported that treasure sent by the Emperor for Zulfiqār had reached Kadāpā. Santā immediately marched in that direction to intercept it. Zulfiqār set out after him, but Santā changed his plan and the Khan after three marches fell back on Arcot. Santā entered the Bijapur uplands or Central Mysore instead, and Zulfiqār, under orders of the Emperor, pursued him there and co-operated with Prince Bidār Bakht, who had reached that province from the north-west for expelling the Marathas from beyond the Tungabhadra. These two Mughal forces united near Penu-kondā (75 miles north of Bangālore). The elusive Marathas disappeared without offering battle, and Zulfiqār returned to Arcot in February 1697. [*Dil.*, 121*b*; *Mad. Diary*, 31 Dec. 1696.]

§ 25. *Operations during 1697: Siege renewed.*

But his money difficulties were as great as ever, and he again left Arcot to collect tribute from Tanjore and other places in the south. This source was soon exhausted, "he spent all this money in a short time, but could not clear the arrears of his soldiers' pay." [*Dil.*, 121 *b*.] Then by way of Trikolur and Trinomāli he returned to Wandiwāsh to canton for the rainy season. Happily for him, the Marathas were now very much weakened by a bitter and final rupture between Dhanā and Santāji, the rivals for the post of commander-in-chief. Rajaram sided with Dhanā, an internecine war raged among the Marathas, and finally Dhanā was defeated by his rival and driven back to Mahārāshtra (May 1696). "Among the Marathas not much union was seen. Every one called himself a sardar and went out to plunder (on his own account)." [*Dil.*, 122*a*; *J. S.*]

Rajaram was as much in want of money as the Mughals. In August he sent his natural son Karnā to Zulfiqār (through the mediation of Ram Singh Hādā), offering to make peace on certain conditions. But Aurangzib was inexorable : he rejected the terms, and issued peremptory orders to Zulfiqār to capture Jinji without further delay. So, the Mughal general sent Karna back to his father in the middle of October, and early in November 1697 renewed the siege of Jinji in right earnest. [*Dil.*, 112*b*, *J. S.*, *Mad. Diary*, 26 Oct.]

He himself took post opposite the northern gate towards the Singhāvaram hill; Ram Singh Hādā west of the fort, facing the postern gate Shaitāndāri (*Port du Diable*); and Daud Khan Pani before Chikkali-durg, a mile south of Jinji. Though Dāud Khan's division lacked artillery and siege-materials, he captured Chikkali-durg in one day by a reckless assault at close quarters, and then, coming to Jinji itself, entrenched opposite Chandrāyan-garh, the southern fort. If Zulfiqār had wished it, he could have taken the entire fort the next day. But his secret policy was to prolong the siege in order to keep his army together, enjoy his emoluments, and escape the hardships of active duty on some new expedition. He let the Marathas know that his attacks were for show only, and that he would give Rajaram sufficient notice to escape before he captured the fort. Thus, the siege dragged on for two months more.*

* Wilkes (i. 133),—"To preserve appearances it was necessary to report [to the Emperor] frequent attacks and repulses. On the other side, Daud Khan, second in command of the Mughal army, drank largely of the best European liquors, and when full of the god would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of the infidels. Zulfiqar necessarily assented to these enterprises, but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and place of attack;

§ 26. *The fall of Jinji fort and escape of Rajaram.*

At last this sham warfare could not be kept up any longer, and it became necessary for Zulfiqār to capture the fort if he wished to avoid disgrace and punishment by his master. Rajaram received timely warning, and escaped to Vellore, with his chief officers, but leaving his family behind. Then Zulfiqār gave the order for the assault. While Dāud Khan with a large force was noisily exploring a track for scaling Chandrāyan-garh from the south and had drawn the defenders to that side, Dalpat Rao scaled the northern walls of Krishnā-giri and captured the outer fort after a severe struggle. The garrison retreated to an inner fort called *Kālākot*, which Dalpat's Bundelas entered pell-mell with them and occupied. The surviving Marathas took refuge in Rājgarh or the highest fort.

Meantime Dāud Khan had made his way into Chandrāyan-garh and advanced through the city or the low inner plain of Jinji towards Krishnā-giri. The inhabitants fled to the top of Krishnā-giri, but finding no safety there, capitulated. A vast amount of booty in horses, camels and things fell into the hands of the imperialists.

Rajaram's family was now invested in Rājgiri, the highest and strongest of the three forts in Jinji. But their situation was hopeless. Dalpat held the gate of *Kālākot*; Zulfiqār who had entered by the northern* gate, held the

and the troops of Daud Khan were as often repulsed with slaughter." But Bhimsen, who was present in the camp and accuses Zulfiqār of collusion with the Marathas, does not report more than one assault by Daud Khan.

* Bhimsen (124a) says that the commander-in-chief entered by opening the Shaitan-dari, which had been bricked up: then he met and congratulated Dalpat Rao, and the two entered Kalakot together. I think that this is a mistake for the Vellore gate, because Ram

entrance to Rajgiri fort; and finally Ram Singh Hada made his way to the summit of Rājgiri by crossing the chasm at its foot by means of a wooden gangway. The Maratha royal family begged for safety, which was promised to them, and *palkis* were sent for their conveyance. Four wives, three sons and two daughters of Rajaram now came out of the citadel and were kept in honourable captivity. Another wife of the Rajah avoided surrender; she flung herself down from the summit of the fort into the sheer depths below. Her head struck a projecting rock and she was killed instantly, but her mangled corpse was caught in the branches of a tree on the hillside at an inaccessible place and there it lay without funeral. Nearly 4000 men, women and children were found in the fort, but very few combatants.* [Dil. 124.]

Zulfiqār then supervised the collection and safe storing of the property and war-materials found in the captured fort. He put to death many of the Maratha officers who had fought against him. The ravages made by the siege in the fort-walls were repaired and the foot-tracks for scaling the hill were all closed. Rockets and gunpowder manufactured

Singh was posted opposite the Shaitandari, while Zulfiqar's post was a mile north-east of it, near the northern or Vellore gate.

* *M. A.* 391 explicitly says that Jinji was captured on 6th Shaban 41st year of Aurangzib (=7th Feb. 1698). The *Madras Diary* of 2nd January 1698 records: "A letter from Amir Jahan from the Mughal camp received to-day advises that the Nawab has taken the Jinji forts all but one which also offers to capitulate." If we read *Rajab* instead of *Shaban* in *M. A.*, we get 8th Jan. Bhimsen (135a) says that the fort fell on a *Sankranti*, which would give 2nd or 31st January. Chitnis (ii. 58), as usual is grossly incorrect, giving *Chaitra pratipad Sudi 1618*=23rd March 1696 as the date of the capture!

at St. Thome were accumulated in the fort for its defence. [*Dil.* 124*b*; *Mad. Diary.*]

From Jinji Zulfiqār returned to his base at Wandiwāsh, and then pursued Rajaram from Vellore to Garamkondā.* But the Maratha king had a good start of him and escaped to Vishālgarh in safety (Feb.). Thus the entire work of the Emperor's long siege of Jinji was undone. The bird had flown away.

* On the way back from Garamkonda, Zulfiqar made an attack on Vellore [which, however, fell to Daud Khan as late as 14th Aug. 1702, see *Storia*, iii. 420], and reached Wandiwash about 7th April. He was recalled to the Emperor's side a year later, and leaving Jinji in charge of Jamshid Khan, started for the Court on 25th April, 1699. [*Akhbarat.*]

CHAPTER LII.

STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS DURING 1695-1700.

§ 1. *Qasim Khan marches against Santa Ghorparé.*

The Maratha captains infested various parts of Mughal Deccan in the usual manner throughout October and November, 1695. Early in November Santā was reported to be 'out' near Bhāgdurg* (in the Bijapur district) and Dhanā near Akluj, while other bands were roving in Junnar or threatening to penetrate to Berar and Khandesh. Soon afterwards Dhanā marched with a large force from Satara, across the Krishnā to Bhāgdurg, and thence to the Madras Karnātak, where he propped up the Maratha cause by driving away Zulfiqār Khan from the siege of Vellore. [J. S.] Santā, who had been looting the Bijapur district, vainly pursued by an imperial detachment under Himmat Khan south of the Krishnā, now turned southwards to convey his rich store of plunder to his own estate in N. W. Mysore.

Aurangzib, then encamped at Islāmpuri, ordered Qāsīm Khan, the able and active governor of the Serā country (western Mysore), to intercept the raiders. To reinforce Qāsīm Khan, he sent a detachment from his own camp under some of his highest younger officers,—Khānazād Khan (afterwards Rūhullah Khan II and Lord High Steward), Saf Shikan Khan, Sayyid Asālat Khan and Muhammad Murād (the Paymaster of Prince Kām Bakhsh's army),—with a command of 25,000 men on paper but only 4,800

* The name as spelt in *Akhbarat* (5 and 15 Nov.) Probably Ramdurg, (75°20 E. 16 N.), near Torgal, between Bijapur and Dharwar. [*Ind. Atlas*, 41 N. E. *Bombay Gaz.* xxiv, 396.]

troopers in actual muster. It was, however, a very choice corps, being composed of men from the Emperor's guards and personal retinue and the contingents of the nobles who had to patrol round his tent on different days in the week (*haft chauki*), with artillery. They joined Qāsim Khan about 12 miles from the Marathas' expected track, early in November. Santā, who had been roving at a distance, heard of his enemy's position and movements, came up with them by swift marches, and skilfully matured a plan for their destruction, which the luxury and thoughtlessness of the Mughal generals crowned with the most complete success imaginable.

Khānazād Khan was a Persian of the highest descent, being the son of the late Paymaster-General, Ruhullah Khan I, and great-grandson of the Empress Mumtāz Mahal's sister. With him had come some officers of the greatest influence and favour in the Emperor's personal circle. Qāsim Khan rose to the height of hospitality required by guests of such a rank. Discarding the simple and light kit of a general who would wage war with the Marathas wisely, he brought out of his stores in Adoni fort, his 'showy articles, such as brand-new Karnātaki tents, gold silver and China vessels of all kinds, etc., and sent them six miles ahead of his halting place to be kept ready for himself and his guests when they would arrive there at the end of the next day's march.' [*M. A.* 375.]

§ 2. *Santa defeats Qasim Khan.*

But on that day doom overtook him in the person of Santā Ghorparé, who showed the highest tactical power in making his dispositions and moving his three distinct and scattered divisions so as to ensure the perfect timing of their movements and exact co-operation among them. He

divided his army into three bodies, of which one was sent to plunder the Mughal camp, another to fight the soldiers, and the third was held in reserve ready for action wherever required. Barmāppā Nāyak, the zamindar of the Chittaldurg district, who bore a grudge against Qāsim Khan for having been humbled by that general, now sided with the Marathas in the hope of a share of the spoils, and thus the Mughals were ringed round by enemies and cut off from all information. [*M. A.* 375, *Dil.* 117*b.*]

An hour and a half after sunrise, the first Maratha division fell upon Qāsim Khan's advanced tents (six miles to the front), slew and wounded the guards and servants, carried off everything they could, and set fire to the heavy tents. On the news of it reaching Qāsim Khan, he hurried towards the point of attack, without rousing Khānazād Khan from his sleep or maturing any plan of concerted action. Before he had gone two miles, the second body of the enemy appeared in sight and the battle began. The noise awoke Khānazād Khan, who left his camp, baggage and everything else on the spot and quickly advanced to the aid of his friend. But the enemy's numbers were overwhelming, and they had a very large body of *Kālā-piādā* musketeers,—the best marksmen and bravest infantry of the Deccan,—in addition to their numberless mobile light cavalry. “A great battle was fought and many were slain on both sides. In spite of the steadiness of the imperialists and the destruction done by them, the enemy did not yield one foot of ground or show the least wavering. Then the reserve division of Santa fell upon the camp and baggage left behind and looted everything. This news reached Qāsim and Khānazād in the heat of the battle and shook their firmness. They took counsel together and decided to go to the small fort of

Dodderi* close to which their advanced-tents had been sent and where there was a tank. Fighting for two miles they reached the tank in the evening and halted; the enemy retired from the attack but encamped close by." The fort of Dodderi was small and the food-store in it limited. So "its imperial garrison shut its gates upon their newly arrived comrades. The two Khans shared with the other officers the food they had brought with themselves, and the common soldiers found nothing to eat except the water of the tank; grass and gram for the elephants and horses could be had nowhere. As the night closed, the enemy completely encircled them. The imperialists stood to arms ready to meet any attack. But for three days the Marathas only appeared in sight without fighting, till some thousands of infantry sent by Barmāppā Nāyak,† joined them. Then they seized the opportunity and made an attack. On the fourth day, before sunrise, ten times the former number of *Kālā-piādās* (Kanārese musketeers) darkened the plain and began to fight. The imperial artillery munitions had been plundered in their camp and what little was carried with the soldiers was now exhausted; so after vain exertions for some hours, they sat down in despair. The enemy's hail of bullets destroyed many men in this situation."§ Fully

* *Dodderi*, 14° 20' N., 75° 46' E., in the Chittaldurg division of Mysore, 22 miles east of Chittaldurg, and 96 miles in a straight line south of Adoni. South of it stands a large reservoir. "The imperialists, giving up all plan of fighting, took the road to Dodderi in confusion, reached the place with extreme difficulty, and were invested." [*Dil.* 118a.]

† His relations with the Mughals can be traced from four Persian *farmans* addressed to him and preserved in the Madras Record Office under "Carnatic Records." For his family (of Berad origin) and history, see Rice's *Mysore Gazetteer*, ii. 461. Chittaldurg is a famous Lingayet centre.

§ This is the contemporary record compiled from State papers like despatches and news-letters, (*M. A.* 375—377). But more than

one-third of the Mughal army had been slain at the two camps, during the retreat, and on the banks of the tank of Dodderi.

§ 3. *Qasim Khan flees to Dodderi fort.*

Then the chiefs decided to save their own lives by sneaking into the fort, and a disgraceful scene ensued which is thus described by Khāfi Khan (ii. 331) :—

"In this extremity of distress, Qāsim, Khānazād and Saf Shikan, who had dismounted close to one another, planned to enter into the *garhi* secretly without informing Muhammad Murād and other comrades who were at a distance. They began to send within such stores as were left after the enemy's plunder, pretending to lighten themselves for fighting. The first night Qāsim Khan, on the pretext of patrolling, left his post and entered the fort by scaling the wall with ropes, as it was found inadvisable to enter by the gate owing to the crowd assembled before it. Then Khānazād and Saf Shikan entered through the gate

30 years later, Khafi Khan (ii. 429), gave the following different and seemingly inaccurate account:—"A party of the enemy fell upon Qasim Khan's tents.....and 10 to 12 thousand horsemen attacked the baggage of Khanazad.....7 or 8 thousand more appeared between the two Khans, so that neither could reinforce the other..... The battle raged till sunset.....All night the chiefs remained on their elephants and the soldiers holding the bridles of their horses, to repel night-attacks. At dawn the Marathas renewed their attack.....in this way the imperialists were attacked for 3 days, at last [on the *fourth* day] they marched fighting all the way and took refuge under the *garhi* of Dodderi. For these three days they had no food. In the same way 3 or 4 *more* days were passed, the imperialists entrenching and repelling charges under shelter of the walls of the *garhi* day and night, while their camels, horses and oxen were carried off by the Marathas. As the gates of the *garhi*.....had been closed upon them, the grocers of the *garhi* threw down to them grain from the top of the wall, charging one or two rupees per *seer*. On the 4th or 5th day [*i.e.*, the 7th or 8th day after the first battle] the two Khans decided to enter the *garhi*."

by charging the crowd of common soldiers round it. Lastly Muhammad Murād and other officers, learning of it, came in with the greatest difficulty. Saf Shikan, turning to Muhammad Murād, cried out—‘How gallantly have we brought ourselves here!’ Murād’s nephew retorted—‘Shame on the type of gallantry that you have shown in coming here, of which you are bragging!’ ”

The Marathas besieged the fort on all sides, being confident that hunger would destroy its defenders. On the day of entering the fort, the soldiers, high and low, were all given bread of millet (*jawāri* and *bajrā*) from the local stores, while the transport cattle fed on the old and new straw-thatching pulled down from the roofs of houses. On the second day no food was left for either man or beast. Many of the cattle of the army had been carried away by the Marathas, many others had perished from hunger,—“They chewed each other’s tails, mistaking them for straw,” as the graphic exaggeration of a Persian writer well describes it;—and the remaining oxen ‘lean like the ass’s tail,’ were now eaten up by the Muslim soldiery. Then they faced utter starvation. Qāsim Khan was a great eater of opium; his life depended on the drug, and the lack of it caused his death on the third day. [*M. A.*, 378; but many suspected that he committed suicide to escape disgrace at the hands of the enemy and censure by the Emperor.] Of the common soldiers, many in the agony of hunger leaped down from the fort walls and sought refuge in the enemy’s camp, who took away the money they had concealed in their belts, and turned them adrift. The traders of Santā’s camp-bazar used to come below the wall of the fort and sell fruits and sweets at fancy prices to the starving Mughals on the top, who threw ‘down money tied in rags and drew the food up by means of ropes. [K. K.].

§ 4. *Capitulation of Mughal force in Dodderi.*

When the food supply was absolutely exhausted and the water in the fort became scanty and unwholesome, Khānazād Khan, in despair of relief, sent his diwan and a Deccani captain of the imperial army to Santa to beg for terms of capitulation.

Santā at first demanded a lakh of *hun* besides the elephants, horses and property of the Mughal army. But the treacherous Deccani captain whispered to him, "What is this that you are asking for? Raise your terms. This amount will be paid by Khānazād Khan alone as his ransom." At last the ransom was fixed at 20 lakhs of rupees; and all the cash articles, jewels, horses and elephants of the doomed army were to be given up, each general being allowed to go away on a single horse with the clothes he wore on his person. The generals individually signed bonds for their respective ransoms and each left a kinsman or his chief servant as security for its payment. The terms were faithfully kept on the Maratha side,* thanks to Santā's iron discipline, [K. K. corrected by *M. A.*]

Santāji sent word that the men might come out of the fort without any fear and stay for two nights in front of its gate; those who had any money need fear no extortion but might buy their necessities from the Maratha camp. The lean woebegone and bedraggled remnant of the imperial army filed out of the fort 13 days after entering it. The enemy gave them bread from one side and water from the other. Thus they were nursed back to life and strength in two days. On the third day Khānazād started for the Court

* But not on the Mughal side, according to Khañi Khan, who says, 'Not even half the ransom was paid as many of the hostages escaped from the wretch's army and he was [soon afterwards] killed. But the property seized by him was worth 50 or 60 lakhs.' [ii. 433.]

with a Maratha escort. He had lost everything, but the imperial officers on the way supplied him and his men with horses, tents, dress, food and money to relieve their urgent distress. [*M. A.* 378, K. K. 433.]

Meantime, the Emperor, then at Islāmpuri, 280 miles north of the scene of this disaster, on hearing of the danger to Qāsim Khan, had sent Hamid-ud-din Khan from his side and Rustam-dil Khan from Haidarabad to support him. They had united near Adoni, but too late to do anything except to receive and help Khanazad on his return. Here Khānazād's army was reclothed and newly furnished by the gifts and forced contributions from the officers and residents of Adoni. [*M. A.* 379, but *Akhbarat*, year 39, sh. 72, differs.]*

§ 5. *Santā slays Himmat Khan at Basavapatan.*

In less than a month from this stroke, Santā achieved another and equally famous victory. Himmat Khan Bahādūr, who had been deputed to co-operate with Qāsim Khan, had taken refuge in Bāsavapatan (40 miles west of Dodderi) on account of the smallness of his force, which did not exceed one thousand cavalry, though he had received the impossible order to go out and punish Santā. [*M. A.* 379.]

After the fall of Dodderi, Santā had planted his own garrison there and told off two divisions of his army to

* *M. A.* 375 has made an astounding mistake of date by saying that Khanazad and Qasim Khan united their forces *before* sighting the enemy, on 23 *Jamadi-us-sani* (= 19 Jan., 1696). But the absolutely trustworthy contemporary news-letter, *Akhbarat*, shows that on that date the mace-bearers sent by the Emperor *returned to him* at Brahmāpuri after delivering his gifts to the vanquished officers, who had then reached Adoni. Qasim Khan had died more than a month before 19th Jan. The Madras Diary records on 15th Dec. 1695, the report of Qasim Khan having been *already* defeated. [say, about 20th Nov.]

watch and oppose Hamid-ud-din (in the north) and Himmat Khan (in the west). On 20th January 1696, he appeared before Himmat Khan's position at the head of ten thousand cavalry and nearly the same number of infantry. His Karnātaki foot-musketeers—the best marksmen in the Deccan, took post on a hill. Himmat Khan, with a very small force, advanced to the attack and dislodged them from it, slaying 500 of them. Then he drove his elephant towards the place where Santa was standing, when suddenly he was shot by a bullet in the forehead and fell down unconscious into the *hawda*. His driver wanted to turn the elephant back, but the captain of his contingent (*Jamadār*), Ali Bāqi, told the driver—"The Khan is alive. Urge the elephant onward. I shall drive the enemy back." But he, too, was wounded, thrown down to the ground and carried off by the enemy. Then his son fell fighting. Santa received two arrow-wounds. The leaderless imperialists fell back to their trenches. At midnight Himmat Khan breathed his last. Three hundred of his men were dispersed and fled to various places. The rest held their fortified enclosure successfully for some days, after which the Marathas withdrew from its siege and went away with the captured baggage of the Khan.*

§ 6. *Mughal force at Basavapatan relieved.*

At the first news of Himmat Khan's perilous situation Aurangzib had ordered (22 January 1696) Hamid-ud-din Khan to hasten to the relief of Himmat at Bāsavāpatan. On the 28th of the month the Emperor learnt of Himmat

* This narrative is based upon the despatch received by the Emperor on 2nd February and included in the *Akhbarat* of the next day, with some additions from *M. A.* The rest of *M. A.* and the whole of Khafi Khan (gossipy fabrication) have been rejected by me.

Khan's death and the blockade of his troops in the fort of Bāsavapatan by Santā; and a great effort was made to gather troops and retrieve the position in N. W. Mysore.

Meantime, Hamid-ud-din Khan, after leaving his heavy baggage in the fort of Adoni, had started on 1st February for the relief of Bāsavapatan, which was being ably defended by Sayyid Azmatullah and Muhammad Euz (the qīladār). His force was 12,000 strong. Some twenty miles* before his destination he was attacked by Santā (26th February). But the Marathas were defeated and pushed back eight miles, their camp being looted by the Mughals. Santā fled to Khargdurg (?) The victorious Hamid, after a halt of two or three days for burying his dead and tending his wounded soldiers, marched to Bāsavapatan. Here a few days later Santā re-appeared, but Hamid-ud-din made a sally from the fort and drove away the Marathas, taking 200 mares and many weapons from them. On receiving the despatches of these victories, the Emperor in open Court praised Hamid-ud-din very highly and wrote to Zulfiqār Khan, "That is how a soldier fights!" [*Akhbarat.*]

§ 7. *Military arrangements of the imperialists during 1696.*

Meantime, Prince Bidār Bakht had been ordered (end of January) to march from Panhālā to Bāsavapatan, while Fīruz Jang was to take his place at the siege of Panhālā. The troops of Qāsim and Himmat were joined to the prince's command. He proceeded first to Bankāpur (some 60 miles north of Bāsavapatan), from which he resumed his advance on 3rd March, but by that time the siege of Bāsavapatan had been raised. Arriving at this place in a few weeks, he

* Probably at Cakargola, 4 m.e. of Harihar on the Tungabhadra, which latter is 22 m.n. of Basavapatan (Shimoga district.)

stayed there for some time, sending out detachments to punish the rebel zamindars of the district. Barmāppā Nāyak of Chittaldurg seems to have felt his heavy hand, as he made a humble submission and promise of loyalty. On 16th May 1696 Bidār Bakht, on behalf of the Emperor, granted him a written pardon on certain conditions.*

Before the prince's arrival, Santā had left the Chittaldurg district for Jinji in the Madras Karnātak (March 1696.) In the other theatres of the war the disposition of the imperial troops in 1696 was as follows.

In the Junnar district, the qiladar of Junnar had seized Kumāri fort in October 1695, but the Marathas had raided Talégāon. Prince Muhammad Azam had been sent from the Emperor's camp at Islāmpuri to Pedgāon (Bahādurgarh) 90 miles north of it in February 1696. After a visit to the Junnar region to restore order there (April), he returned to Pedgāon, which remained his head-quarters till he was recalled to the Emperor's side at Miraj three years later. In April Firuz Jang was sent against the Berads of Wagingerā; he sat down on the frontier of Sāgar to guard that side. [*M. A.* 380, *J. S.*; *Akhbarat*, 10 May 1696.]

Nothing extraordinary happened in the autumn and winter of 1696 to vary the tale of Maratha raids here and there throughout the Western Deccan. But in March 1697,

* "Carnatic records" (Persian) in the Madras Record Office. The conditions are: (1) If Barmappa behaves badly again, he would be killed with his family and his country desolated; (2) he should cede to the Emperor the small fort of Dodderi with 2 elephants and the guns [? in it] and demolish the fort of Ramgiri, nor ever rebuild the latter; (3) he should agree to a tribute and fine of 8 lakhs of Rupees,—(three lakhs in cash down and five lakhs by instalments under a written bond)—and another lakh to the prince; and (4) his army under his brother should serve under the prince in the Emperor's wars. In Sep. 1700 Barmappa received a *farman* and a robe in reward of his military aid.

Santā Ghorparé returned from the East Coast to the Satārā district, and Firuz Jang was despatched against him; at the same time Bidār Bakht was sent to strengthen his father at Pedgāon. But a civil war among the Maratha generals weakened their power during the first half of this year (1697), and in order to understand its cause and course it is necessary to resume the history of Santā Ghorparé.

§ 8. *Civil war between Santa Ghorpare and
Dhana Jadav*

Flushed with his far-resounding victories over two first-grade Mughal generals, Santāji went to Jinji to wait on Rajaram (March 1696). He seems to have claimed the office of Senāpati, contrasting his own brilliant performances with Dhanā's poor record of victories. Hitherto Prahlād Niraji (the *Pratinidhi* or regent) had, with great tact and diplomacy, kept peace between the two rival generals and taken great pains to show in all the acts of government that the king treated the two as absolutely equal. But he was now dead, and his successor in the king's council was less clever and could not keep the balance even. [Sardesai, *Rajaram*, p. 72.] Santā's vanity, imperious temper and spirit of insubordination, roused to an inordinate height by his recent triumphs, gave great offence to the Court at Jinji and the result was an open rupture near Conjeveram (May 1696). [J. S.] Rajaram sided with Dhanā and placing Amrit Rao Nimbalkar in the Van of his army, attacked his refractory general. But Santā's genius again triumphed; Dhanā was defeated and driven precipitately to his home in Western India; Amrit Rao fell on the field.*

* J. S. But K. K. wrongly gives the victory to Dhana.

This encounter is thus graphically described in *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, which wrongly places it in October 1689:—"On the way to Jinji,

Santa's doings in the Eastern Karnatak this year have been fully described in Chap. LI.

§ 9. *Defeat and death of Santā.*

He finally returned to the homeland in March 1697. Here an internecine war now raged between him and Dhanā, all the other captains being ranged on the two sides. They fought together in the Satārā district in March 1697. But fortune now deserted Santaji; his severity and insolence had disgusted his officers and most of them were secretly corrupted by the agents of Dhanā. Hanumant Rao Nimbālkar, in concert with Dhanā's troops, fell on Santā's baggage train, and most of the latter's officers deserted to Dhanā while the rest were killed or wounded. Santā, despoiled of all and deserted by his army, fled from the field with only a few followers to Mhaswād, the home of Nāgoji Māné whose wife's brother Amrit Rao he had killed. With

this wretch had a fight with Dhana Jadav, who was escorting Rajaram there, on account of an old quarrel. Santa triumphed, and caused Amrit Rao, the brother [-in-law] of Nagoji, the comrade and assistant of Dhana, to be crushed to death by an elephant. He also captured Rajaram, but Dhana escaped. The next day Santa appeared before Rajaram with his wrists bound together, saying—"I am still the same loyal servant [as before]. My rudeness was due to this that you wanted to make Dhana my equal and to reach Jinji with his help. I shall now do whatever you bid me." Then he released and conducted Rajaram to Jinji." (401.)

Bhimsen is more accurate:—"A quarrel had broken out between Santa Ghorpare and Dhana Jadav. Dhana convinced Rajaram that Santa had seized too much power and being a good soldier was trying to found an independent State, and therefore he ought to be killed. Rajaram and Dhana with a large army, placing Amrit Rao Navalkar in command of the Van, attacked Santa. Amrit Rao was slain by Santa's men, and a civil war ensued." [*Dil.* ii. 122a.]

The battle was fought at Aiwar-gudi, 11 m.n.w. of Vriddhachalam. *Sanads & Letters*, p. 177. Sardesai, *Rajaram*, p. 80—82.

Nāgoji, however, the sacred rights of hospitality to a refugee rose higher than the claims of blood-feud; he gave Santā shelter and food for some days, and then dismissed him in safety. But his wife Rādhā Bāi followed her brother's slayer with a woman's unquenchable vindictiveness. She had urged her husband to slay their guest, but in vain. And now when she saw him escaping unscathed, she sent her surviving brother after him. Of the many diverse accounts* of his death the one accepted by Khāfi Khan is that the pursuer (wrongly called Nāgoji Māné by both Khāfi Khan and J. S.) came upon Santāji when, exhausted by fast travel, he was bathing in a *nāla* near the Shambhu Mahādev hill, in the Satārā district. The party from Mhaswad surprised him in this helpless situation and cut off his head, (June, 1697.) "Māné [*i.e.*, Nimbālkar] threw it into the saddlebag fastened behind his seat..... On the way the bag got loose and fell down. Firuz Jang's spies, who had spread in that hilly region, in pursuit of Santā, picked it up, recognised it as that general's head, and sent it to Firuz Jang, who..... sent it on to the Emperor. The severed head was paraded through the imperial encampment and some cities of the Deccan." [M. A. 401-402, J. S., K. K. ii. 447-448, *Dilkasha* 112a.]

§ 10. *Character of Santa Ghorparé.*

Thus died Santāji Ghorparé, like Charles XII of Sweden, most ignominiously at the end of a most dazzling

* Admittedly diverse and conflicting, according to M. A. 402, which omits all of them. The Mané family "old paper" printed in Parasnis's *Itihas Sangraha*, *Junya Aitihasik Goshti*, ii. 45, is so palpably incorrect as to suggest an opium-eater's tale. Khafi Khan, after giving the account adopted by me above, adds, "There is another story current [about his end]. God alone knows the truth!" [ii. 448].

military career. But his greatest monument is the abject fear he inspired in all ranks of the Mughal army,† which is faithfully reflected in the curses and abuses invariably used as the epithet to his name in the Persian histories.

Santāji had an inborn genius for handling large bodies of troops spread over a wide area, changing his tactics so as to take prompt advantage of every change in the enemy's plans and condition, and organising combined movements. The success of his tactics depended on the rapid movement of his troops and on his subordinates carrying out his orders punctually to the minute. He, therefore, insisted on implicit obedience from his officers and enforced the strictest discipline in his army by draconic punishments. As Khāfi Khan writes [ii. 446], "Santā used to inflict severe punishments on his followers. For the slightest fault he would cause the offender to be trampled to death by an elephant."

The man who insists on efficiency and discipline in a tropical country makes himself universally unpopular, and, therefore, we are not surprised to learn that "most of the Maratha nobles became Santā's enemies and made a secret agreement with his rival Dhanā to destroy him." [*Ibid.*]

The two lifelong rivals, Santā and Dhanā, were both army leaders and organisers of the highest ability courage and activity, but with contrasted characters. Dhanā made war like a gentleman. He knew that the fickle goddess of Fortune might desert him in the field any day; therefore he never went to an extreme. He was moderate in victory, generous to the vanquished, polite in his address, practised

† 'When the news arrived that Santa had come within 16 or 18 miles of his, Firuz Jang [Aurangzib's highest general] lost colour in terror, and making a false announcement that he would ride out to oppose him, appointed officers to clear the path, sent his advanced tents onward, but then fled towards Bijapur by a roundabout route!' [K. K. ii. 446].

in self-control, and capable of taking long views and making statesmanly arrangements. His inborn courtesy to the Mughal generals who had the misfortune to encounter him, is noticed with praise by the Muslim historians. Moreover, he served his country's Government unselfishly for many years.

Santāji Ghorparé, on the other hand, was in comparison with Dhana, a barbarian devoid of culture or generosity, unable to restrain his passions or to take thought of the distant future. He loved to hustle all whom he met with, not excepting his king. The hour of his victory was the hour of gratification of his vindictiveness. He showed no mercy and expected none. Therefore, he excited among the Mughal generals, as well as his Maratha adversaries, a feeling of mixed terror and repulsion.

By his temperament, Santā was incapable of co-operating with others, and he had not the patriotism to subordinate his own will to the needs of his nation. He lived and died merely as a most successful brigand and selfish adventurer, and exercised no influence on the political history of the Marathas or even on the general effect of Aurangzib's campaigns. He flashed through the Deccan sky like a lonely meteor, without ever having a companion or ally or even sharing the counsels of his nation's leaders, among whom he might have naturally claimed a place.

§ 11. *Events in Maharashtra during 1698.*

Nothing remarkable seems to have happened in the second half of 1697, except a heavy flood of the Bhimā river which washed away the Mughal camps at Pedgāon and Islāmpuri (19 July) and spread universal misery and ruin, and whose effects could not be repaired for months.

But in January next, Jinji fell to the Mughals. Rajaram fled from it and reached Vishālgarh in Mahārāshtra in the following month. The Emperor immediately afterwards posted Bidār Bakht to the Panhālā region in the south-west, while Azam continued to guard the northern route from his camp at Pedgaon and Firuz Jang held the Berard country in the south-east.

The extant records for the year 1698 are meagre. It is not probable that any unusual activity was shown by the Marathas immediately after Rajaram's return home. He seems to have taken time to recover from the effects of the loss of Jinji and the extinction of the Government he had set up there, while the feud between Dhanā Jādv and Santā's son Rānuji Ghorparé made a combined effort impossible for the present.* In September the Maratha Rajah's envoy Anāji visited an imperial minister with a letter from him begging for peace; but nothing came of it. Some of his followers at this time deserted his service in despair and joined the Mughals.

§ 12. *Rajaram's doings during 1699.*

Early in 1699 Rajaram set out on a tour of inspection in Konkan, visiting all his forts, and returned to Satārā at the end of June, whence he went to Basantgarh about 20th July. In September he began to form plans for setting out on an extensive raid through Khandesh and Berar, in imitation of his father and elder brother. When the campaigning season opened in October, Aurangzib left Islām-

* In May 1699, Dhana was out in the Bidar district. On 4th June he passed by 22 miles of the imperial camp on his return *via* Haidarabad; a few days later Chin Qalich Khan and Zabardast Khan came up with him near Bhalavani, and after heavy casualties on both sides captured 200 mares and some flags and drums from him [*Akhbarat*.]

puri (on the 19th) to undertake the conquest of the famous hill-forts of Maharashtra in person; and in less than a week from that date Rajaram sallied out of Satārā.

Evidently Aurangzib's intention to besiege this fort first had leaked out, for, immediately after his starting from Islāmpuri, Rajaram removed his family from Satārā to Khelnā and himself coming out of Satārā halted 8 miles outside it. Here two envoys of Bakht Buland, the rebel Gond Rajah of Deogarh, met him and invited him to Gondwānā to cause a diversion in the Emperor's rear. The Maratha king had long been intriguing with the Gond chiefs; and now, setting aside the advice of Dhanā Jādav and Dādo Malhār to flee to Jinji once again, he decided upon making a bold counter-stroke by a raid into Berar and Gondwānā.

From the environs of Satārā, Rajaram sent one of his confidential servants back to the fort to fetch his turban-jewel (*kalagi*) and some other ornaments. On the return journey the man was killed and the jewels plundered. Taking this incident as an unhappy omen, the Rajah returned to the fort, but that very day a fire broke out there and burnt some houses. Finally, on 26th October, he left Satara in order to escape falling into the Emperor's hands. Dhanā Jādav, Rāmchandra, Dādo Malhār and other generals, with 7,000 cavalry escorted him to Chandan-Wandan, while Rānuji Ghorparé (the son of Santāji) was posted at the foot of Satara with 4,000 troopers.

§ 13. *Last expedition of Rajaram.*

After a three days' halt at Chandan-Wandan, Rajaram on 31st October left for the Adarki pass, n.e. of Chandan, where he was joined by 12,000 men, and took the route to Surat.

The Emperor immediately sent urgent orders to Bidār Bakht to pursue and defeat this hostile force. The prince, who had arrived at a place 20 miles west of Miraj, on his way to Panhala, immediately turned aside and leaving his family and baggage in Miraj, rapidly advanced on the enemy's track. Nasrat Jang was ordered to reinforce him by forced marches; and so also was Chin Qalich Khan (then in the Aurangabad district). But neither of them arrived in time to take part in the first battle.

Four miles beyond the fort of Parendā, Bidār Bakht came upon the Marathas. Rajaram himself stopped in safety 8 miles further east, while he sent back his generals under Dhana to check the prince's advance. After a bloody fight, the Marathas were broken and driven towards Ahmadnagar, (13th or 14th November). Two days later the prince was joined by Chin Qalich Khan at Barsi, (20 m.e. of Parendā), and resuming the pursuit reached Ausā about the 22nd or 23rd. We find him, a month later, back at the Emperor's side (26th December), and on the same date Rajaram was reported as having dismounted some 30 miles from the imperial camp below Satara fort and intending to go to Vishālgarh. The Maratha king's raid into Berar had been nipped in the bud.* But one division under Krishna

* Bhimsen gives Zulfiqar Khan an important part in this defeat of Rajaram. He writes,—“Ram with a large force entered the imperial territory for doing mischief. Bidar Bakht was appointed to oppose him. The Khan Bahadur [Zulfiqar] was ordered to chase the enemy. Leaving his baggage at Sholapur, he met the prince near Charthana and set out to pursue Rajaram, who took to flight on hearing of it. By way of Parendā, Ram crossed the Bhima near Tamarni, and took the road to his home, sending Dhana and some other generals against the camp at Islampuri. They made a demonstration there..... fled before Zulfiqar.....were defeated near Basantgarh.....” (*Dil.* ii. 129.)

Sāvant plundered some places near Dhāmuni and returned. This was the first time that a Maratha force crossed the Narmadā. [*Dil.* 129a.]

Meantime, battles had been fought with the other Maratha bands too. Rānuji was out near Kararabad (1st Dec.) and in the Sangulā *thāna* four days later. Hamid-ud-din Khan, who had been sent from the Emperor's side at Satara against Dhanā Jādav, left his baggage at Masur and advanced on Karārābād, fighting a vast Maratha army of five divisions which tried to envelop him. After a two days' struggle (20th and 21st Dec.) with heavy casualties, the Khan fell back on Masur.

Shortly afterwards Nasrat Jang arrived there with his army and took up the pursuit of the elusive Maratha generals. On 9th January 1700 he fought Dhanā, Rānu and Hanumant Rao beyond Masur, and defeated them, killing 500 of their men. A few days later Dhanā attacked the outpost of Khānapur and carried off its Mughal officer, Avji Adhal. Nasrat Jang, who had been sent from the Emperor's camp against Dhanā, arrived too late to save Avji, but on 25th January, when on the return march from Parenda, he overtook this Maratha band near the pargana of Undirgaon (19 m. s. of Parendā) and repulsed it, after slaying about a hundred men.

In the meantime the Emperor's siege of Satara continued and battles took place in its environs between the Mughal invaders and the Maratha field armies. On 27th December 1699 Hanumant Rao had attacked a patrolling party under Ikhlās Khan, only four miles outside the siege-camp, and slain the Khan and his son Muhammad Yar with many imperial soldiers, and carried off the elephants and baggage of this force. [*Akhbarat*, Nasrat Jang's campaign in *Dil.* ii. 129.]

§ 14. *Death of Rajaram.*

On 2nd March 1700, Rajaram died at Singharh, of a fever which was most probably caused by the hardships of his raid and the vehement pursuit by the Mughals. His family was then in the fort of Vishālgarh. His favourite natural son Karna was immediately afterwards crowned as king by his ministers, with the help of Dhanā Jādav, but died of small-pox in three weeks. Then, his legitimate son by his wife Tārā Bāi was placed on the throne as Shivāji III, with the support of Rāmchandra, 'the Regent of the West.'*

§ 15. *Tara Bai, widow of Rajaram.*

An internecine quarrel now broke out in the Maratha Court between Rajaram's surviving widows, Tārā Bāi and Rājas Bāi (the mothers of Shivaji III. and Shambhuji II. respectively) each standing up for her own son, and being supported by a faction among the officers and generals. But the ability and energy of Tārā Bāi, the elder wife, gave her the supreme power in the State in that hour of extreme confusion and danger.†

* This date of Rajaram's death is given by *Akhbarat*. The death of his immediate successor, of small-pox, on 24th March, is mentioned in *Akhbarat* (1st and 4th April), *M. A.* 420, and *Dilkasha*, ii, 130a, but the Maratha records are entirely silent about the event. Karna is named by *Dil.* as this king for three weeks, while the other two Persian sources simply call him 'Shivaji',—which title was also assumed by his legitimate half-brother and successor, the son of Tara Bai. The latter Shivaji did not die in three weeks.

† A false rumour reached the Mughals about this time. On 11 March—"A *desai* of the country below the Ghats then serving under Ramchandra, on being ordered to go to Paril, refused to march unless the arrears of salary due to him and his men were paid. Hot words followed between them, and at last the *desai* stabbed Ramchandra to death with his dagger."

Immediately after learning of her husband's death, Tārā Bāi offered submission to the Emperor through Ruhullah Khan, asking for a 7-hazari mansab and the deshmukhi rights over the Deccan for Rajaram's legitimate son, and proposing to supply a contingent of 5,000 men for service under the imperial viceroys of the Deccan, and to cede seven forts, including Panhālā, Satara, Chandan-Wandan, and Parli. The Maratha king was to be exempted from personal attendance on the Emperor, as the great Shivaji had been and the Maharana of Udaipur always was. [*Akh.* 12th March 1700.]

Aurangzib refused this offer, and demanded all the forts of the enemy. We read of another fruitless overture for peace, in the *Akhlbārāt*. Towards the end of May, Rām-chandra's agent Rāmāji Pandit and Parashuram's agent Ambāji visited Prince Azam and begged him to intercede with the Emperor for sparing Rajaram's young son in return for the surrender of the Maratha forts. These overtures seem to have been insincere; the Emperor suspected the envoys of spying, and after keeping them under arrest for some months, released them on furnishing security, (22nd Dec. 1700.)

CHAPTER LIII

THE MUGHAL-MARATHA STRUGGLE IN KONKAN, 1680-1704.

§ 1. *The Land of Konkan: its features and divisions.*

The Sahyādri range or Western Ghāt, running parallel to the western coast of India, cuts off a long narrow strip of country from the Deccan plateau. Moving southwards from Surat along this tract, we have first the Surat Agency States of the present day, covering a wild broken and jungly country, the original home of the predatory Bhil and Koli tribes, —whence its Marathi name of *Kolvan* or the Koli country,—the two chief States here being Rāmnagar (modern Dharampur) and Jawhar, the last of which is in the same latitude as Nāsik across the Ghats. This Kolvan occupies only the inland or eastern portion of the long narrow strip, while the sea-coast was, in the late 17th century, covered by Portuguese possessions stretching from Dāman (almost the same latitude as Chāndor) downwards to Bassein (26 miles north of Bombay), and including many places which have now come to the British through the intervening Maratha conquerors.

South of Kolvan begins Konkan proper, its northern part forming the modern Thāna and Kolābā districts, from some distance north of Kaliān Junction (opposite Junnar, on the tableland across the Ghats) to Mahād close to the southern frontier of the Kolābā district (near Māhabaleshwar). In other words, North Konkan is the coast tract parallel to the Punā and Nāsik districts which lie east of the

mountain chain. South Konkan is formed by the Ratnagiri district, which stretches parallel to the Satara and Kolhāpur districts of the Deccan plateau, till the coast is broken near about Vingurlā by the territory of the ancient Maratha family of Sāvants of Vādi (or Desais of Kudal, as they were popularly called in the 17th century) and, immediately south of it, the Portuguese province of Goa. Still further south begins Kanārā, with the Kārwar district along the coast, and the Sundā and Bednur States in the interior, far to the east, leading into the Mysore plateau.

The strategic bearings of the different points in this coastal region should be carefully remembered if Maratha history is to be intelligently followed. North of Dharampur and east of Surat, the Western Ghats sink near the Khandesh city of Nandurbār*, before they run into the Sātpurā range stretching west to east at right angles to them. Through this natural gap, the Tapti river rushes down to meet the western ocean near Surat. A Maratha force which had advanced beyond Dharampur, could either sack Surat and Broach (37 miles north of Surat) by going due north; or easily enter northern Khandesh by swerving eastwards and marching through this gap, past the city of Nāndurbar, and then make a wide sweep, raiding the whole of Khandesh and Berār and returning home southwards and westwards through the north Golkondā territory.

Again, from the nearest north-eastern corner of the Koli country, another but more difficult route led, through the Babhulnā pass and skirting the forts of Sālhir and Mulhir

* Sultanpur-Nandurbar was a most important military charge (faujdari) in the Mughal scheme of the defence of the empire, and was entrusted by Aurangzib only to the ablest officers. They have now lost their wealth and importance. Sultanpur is 30 miles north-east of Nandurbar (sometimes mis-spelt as *Nazarbar*). .

(in Baglānā, or the broken country immediately east of the Ghats and north of the Chāndor range), into West Khandesh, or turning south and crossing the Chāndor range into the rich plains of the north Nāsik district and further east to the neighbourhood of Aurangabad, the capital of Mughal Deccan, without having to overcome any natural obstacle on the way. Similarly, from Kalian in the heart of the Thāna district (30 miles north-east of Bombay), an army can march north-east, cross the western range by the Tal Ghāt, and thus enter the Nāsik district through its south-western corner, or by marching due east enter the Punā district in its extreme north, near Junnar, by the Nānāghāt pass. Southwards the Western Ghats along their entire length are pierced by numberless passes, more or less difficult, which shorten the journey from any part of the Konkan plain to places immediately east of them on the highlands across the mountain barrier.

§ 2. *History of Konkan under Shivaji.*

Konkan, both North and South, had been an outlying province of the kingdom of Bijapur. The great Shivaji had conquered the country round Kaliān (*i.e.*, the modern Thāna district) in 1657 and then worked his way southwards into the Kolābā district down to Mahād. Between 1655 and 1660 he completed his annexation of Konkan by conquering the Ratnagiri district. The Koli country (in the extreme north) was brought under his control between 1670 and 1673. His possession of Konkan* remained unchallenged till his death, in 1680.

* Excluding the territories (mostly bordering the ocean) of the Siddis of Janjira and the Portuguese of Daman, Bassein, Salsette, Karanja and Chaul.

With the accession of Shambhuji the scene changed. The flight of the rebel prince Muhammad Akbar to the Maratha Court forced Aurangzib to march to the Deccan to watch this new danger to his throne and to personally guide the operations of his troops. He arrived at Aurangabad on 22nd March 1682, and soon began a well-planned and vigorous offensive against the Maratha power.

§ 3. *First Mughal descent into Konkan, 1682.**

Nāsik and Punā were in his hands. From Junnar his general Hasan Ali Khan descended into the Thāna district by the Nānāghāt pass, early in January 1682 and entered the city of Kaliān, the seat of the governor, towards the end of that month. His army was reported to be 20,000 horse and 15,000 foot, and his progress was marked by the burning of all Maratha villages on the way, together with some eight or nine villages in Portuguese territory by mistake. This sudden incursion of the Mughals diverted Shambhuji from the siege of Janjira and he fled to his strong hills (February). Kaliān itself was occupied by Ranmast Khan, the lieutenant of the Mughal general. But in May next, Hasan Ali withdrew from the province, to save his horses from the heavy rainfall of the west coast, and Konkan had no Mughal force left in it.

In April and May the imperial forces immediately east of the Ghat were absorbed in the futile siege of Rāmsij, (7 miles north of Nāsik), which was finally abandoned in September or October. But late in November Ranmast Khan, now in independent command, again marched down into Konkan through the Mahjé pass, [*Dil.* i. 178], and

* The Mughals had invaded Konkan, burnt Kalian, Titvala &c., and laid the villages waste early in 1675 also. See Fryer's *New Account*.

reoccupied Kaliān. Shambhuji had sent Rupā Bhonslé, Kesho T. Pinglé and Nilo M. Pinglé (his Peshwā) to oppose him, and they fought many battles with heavy slaughter. Ranmast lay in Kaliān for some months. Afterwards, Ruhullah Khan, descending through Kolvan, reinforced him (April 1683), and withdrew the Mughal garrison from Konkan, under orders of the Emperor. Evidently he had to cut his way through the Marathas. According to a Marathi chronicle, Rupā Bhonslé opposed the march of the Mughal army near Titvālā (7 m. n. e. of Kaliān) and captured Padam Singh, a Rajput chief in the imperial service, but “in the stress of the battle Rupāji slew Padam Singh and many other high officers.” [*J. S., Dil. i. 172-3 supports.*]

But the Mughal possession of Kaliān did not mean the occupation of all North Konkan, nor even of the entire Thāna district. The invaders merely held the cities of Kalia and Bhivandi, and a few miles of land round them. The rest of the country, especially the forts, remained in Maratha hands, as the country was very broken, the forts numerous and strong by Nature, and the Mughal army too small to besiege and hold all of them.

In June 1683, Shihāb-ud-din Khan was recalled from Junnar to the Emperor's side. When the campaigning season opened again, early in November, he occupied Punā, and next month crossed the Devghāt (Devasthali pass) and looted Nizāmpur near the centre of the Kolābā district (27 Dec.). Prince Azam was posted to Nāsik, in November.

§ 4. *Marathas recover Konkan.*

In December a Maratha army reoccupied Kaliān, from which they ravaged all the Portuguese country between Bassein and Dāman. From this time till six years later,

Konkan remained in undisturbed Maratha possession. True, the coast-villages in Maratha territory were subject to depredation by landing parties from the Siddi fleet in alliance with the Mughals. But the inland parts were safe. Here the Marathas, at the end of Shambhuji's war of 1685, came to an understanding with their Portuguese neighbours for mutual aid against the Mughals. Here they repaired and strengthened their numberless old forts, and here most of the leading Marathas placed their families for safe refuge, as their old homeland on the plateau east of the Ghats was ravaged by warfare or occupied by Mughal forces. In this Thāna district, Shahji had found his last stronghold when pursued by Shah Jahān's forces in 1636. Here the great Shivaji had built many forts. In Konkan lay Rāigarh, the real capital of Shivaji and Shambhuji.

In January 1685, Shihāb-ud-din Khan had made a dash from his post of Punā, crossed the Bhorghāt and penetrated to Gārgoli, but Kavi-kalash had met and repulsed him there. [J. S.] Throughout 1684 and the next three years the Mughals had to concentrate their forces in the south and south-east for the conquest of Bijapur and Golkondā, and could spare no troops for the occupation of Kaliān.

The situation changed in the last year of Shambhuji's reign (1688), when vast Mughal forces were set free by the fall of the last independent Sultanate of the Deccan and the Maratha king was overwhelmed by civil war and sunk most deeply in his own vices.

§ 5. *Matabar Khan's victories in Nasik district.**

Matabar Khan, a Sayyid of the Navaiyat clan of Arabs long settled in Kaliān, was at first employed in the sub-

* Career of Matabar Khan, based upon the letter-book of his secretary, Jethmal entitled *Karnamah* (I. O. L. MS.)

ordinate capacity of a thanadar in the Nāsik district. Even there his enterprising spirit and far-sightedness had inspired him to enlist about a thousand hill-infantry (Kolís, Bhíls, and Mavlés) of the Western Ghats and to bring many of the zamindars round Pattā and other Maratha forts over to the imperial side by lavish bribes. An influential local Maratha leader, Harji Jākhré, had left Tarbiyat Khan (the Mughal thanadar of Nāsik) in anger and was living at Sonambā (a village six miles s. w. of Sinnar and 9 miles n. e. of Pattā.) But Matabar Khan gave him a large cash subsidy, a horse and a robe, and sent him at the head of the above-mentioned force to capture Pattā, one of the most valued forts of the Marathas, where Shivaji had sought refuge in his last year and which he had renamed Vishrām-garh.

At first the enterprise failed through Tarbiyat Khan's jealous opposition. But at the end of 1687, Matabar was placed by the Emperor in charge of the Nāsik district, as thanadar, and on the 11th January following he sent a second and more successful expedition against Pattā. A force composed of imperial troops and his own retainers scaled the walls of that fort by means of rope-ladders at midnight, 17th January, 1688. This was the first great Mughal success in that quarter. Pattā is a large fort with many other enemy forts in its vicinity.

Matabar had spent Rs. 45,000 of his own to effect its capture; but the Emperor gave him in return Rs. 2,000 only, with a robe of honour, an elephant, and a promotion of 500 in his rank (*zat*.)

Matabar next turned against Kulang (9 miles s. e. of Igātpuri railway station), where Shivaji had built lofty palaces for himself, and against the smaller forts in that neighbourhood, such as Bābhar, Tabāka and Ratangarh

(9 miles s. of Kulang.) But "Kulang is loftier than Daulatabad fort by some 450 yards, and steeper in its scarped sides, so that it cannot be captured by blockade or escalade." The Mughal general, therefore, found out through his spies that the wives and children of the Kulang garrison were living in concealment in the skirts of the hill crowned by Prabal* fort in Konkan. A detachment of 1,000 infantry captured them by a night attack with heavy slaughter on both sides. Another detachment surprised some of the smaller forts. Then the garrison of Kulang capitulated and also gave up the forts dependent on it. Undhā Kāwani, Harish (4 miles s. of Trimbak), Tringalvādi† (12 miles s. of Nāsik), Madangarh, and Murdānt were next besieged and taken.

To crown all, the famous hill-fort of Trimbak was invested by a force of 2,000 men, who constantly patrolled round it for six months, so as to cut off its grain supply. But a prolonged siege in that region always involved the risk of Maratha bands raiding the other parts of the district which were denuded of troops. Matabar Khan, therefore, bribed the qiladar with Rs. 80,000 in cash and kind and the offer of high rank in the Emperor's service and induced him to yield the fort (8 January 1689). Telang Rao and Shyāmraaj, the commandant and civil officer of the fort, were high officers of Shambhuji, and had often commanded his field armies independently.

Trimbak was so important a place that Matabar Khan rightly expected and demanded that the Emperor should reward him and the Maratha qiladar on the same lavish scale

* Also called Muranjan, three miles west of Matheran.

† Tringalvadi fell after the surrender of Trimbak, the garrison of the former holding out in order to see what bribe was paid to the men of Trimbak for its capitulation.

that he had adopted when he secured Sālhir by bribing its qiladar Asuji (1687). But, though Matabar had spent 1,20,000 out of his own pocket on these enterprises, the Emperor in return granted him only a quarter of this amount, and even then the grant was not actually paid for years afterwards. He, however, received a promotion of 500 in rank.

§ 6. *Final Mughal conquest of N. Konkan.*

The triumphant thānadār of Nāsik now crossed the Ghāts and descended into Konkan. At this time came the cheering news of the capture of Shambhuji, the terror of the Mughals in the Deccan. The north Konkan plain now lay at the invader's mercy, without any defender worth a thought. In this region the most important fort was Mahuli (18 miles n. e. of Kaliān), while the cities of Kaliān and Bhivandi were the chief seats of government and trade respectively. Further south, Zulfiqār Khan was soon to penetrate with an army and lay siege to Rāigarh, the Maratha capital, which actually fell, after a ten months' siege, on 19 October 1689.

On 11th March 1689, Matabar Khan received the Emperor's order to march against Māhuli. He immediately issued from Nāsik, but had to halt for some days outside the city, in order to allow the neighbouring thanadars and other officers appointed to his force sufficient time to join him with their forces,—his own contingent being only 1,000 strong. Resuming his march on 3rd April, by way of the Kāshtighāt (4 miles n. n. e. of Birvādā) and Birvādā (4 miles n. e. of Atgaon railway station), he reached Khardi, 9 miles north-east of Māhuli, on the 17th. The country was desolate and lacked water and fodder, while no grain could be had locally. Provisions for the invaders had to be ordered from Surat.

Between Khardi and Māhuli lies a difficult pass, which a party of Marathas from Māhuli held against the advancing Mughals, but they were put to flight after a three hours' struggle. Matabar's force, however, was too small, as only a few of the officers ordered to reinforce him had actually joined him, and he had not with him artillery munition, gunners, musketeers, rocket-men, farriers, water carriers, sappers and pioneers adequate to the siege of a fort like Māhuli. So, he wrote to the Court for these necessities and turning away from Mahuli arrived at Kaliān on the 27th, and then laid siege to Dugadi, a fort overlooking Kaliān.

The capture of Māhuli by attack appeared impossible to Matabar Khan, in view of the limited force and time at his disposal and his utter lack of gunners and gun materials. As he wrote in his despatches, "Māhuli was the seat of the governor of the Konkan plain under the Ahmadnagar dynasty. It is well provisioned. Five to six thousand infantry are required for investing it completely, and its siege will cost much money and time." It stands on the top of a hill range with two other strong fortified peaks close to it, namely Palāsgarh and Bhandārgarh on the north and south. Matabar, therefore, set himself to gain the fort by corruption. Through Narso Mahādik he opened negotiations with Dwārkoji, the *havladar* of Māhuli, and other leading officers of the place, promising them high ranks in the imperial army if they submitted. They asked for an imperial letter formally granting them these terms. Such a letter addressed to Dwārkoji reached Kaliān on 28th July 1689.

§ 7. *More hill-forts taken by Matabar.*

While the plan for buying Māhuli was maturing, Matabar Khan was not inactive. At midnight, 17th July,

in the midst of a severe storm of wind and rain, a party of 900 Kolis and Bhils, sent by him under Rāghuji and Kākāji, silently scaled the fort of Prabal.* The Maratha garrison fought till dawn, and then laid down their arms. His next acquisitions were Karnālā, Mukut-garh, Malang-garh, Chanderi, Khatudā, Mānikgarh, Sankiā and Dugad. With the fall of Māhuli all North Konkan, from the Koli country southwards to the latitude of Bombay, passed into the possession of the imperialists, while the capture of Rāigarh (October 1689) was followed by the Mughal occupation of much of South Konkan including the ports of Chaul and Rajapur.

Matabar Khan's achievements brought lustre to the Mughal arms in that quarter. As his Secretary writes in the introduction to his letter-book, "The Khan captured about 50 forts which Shivaji had seized in his lifetime. He cleared the hills from Aurangabad to the sea, especially the Nizām Shāhi Konkan plain and the district of Junnar, from the impure dust of the presence of the infidels. The thana of Kaliān and other parganas in North Konkan had been ruined by twenty years' unbroken Maratha predominance. These he recovered, strengthened, colonised, and caused to be cultivated again, and beautified with new mansions, gardens, canals etc." [*Kārṇāmah*, 3-4.]

After these arduous and successful campaigns extending over more than a year, Matabar Khan returned to Kaliān (1690) and gave himself up to repose and pleasure for a few years. He beautified this city by building a governor's mansion, a private residence (*haveli*), a mosque, a Turkish bath, a garden, a porticoed hall (*izwan*), and a terrace with a reservoir of water and fountains in the middle. A fort

* It was a most important fort, and used to have a garrison of 5,000 in Shivaji's time.

was also built near the village of Barhā and a lofty hall of audience for public ceremonies. Here his wife died suddenly at the age of 56, and was buried in a magnificent tomb, built near the tank of Saniālā at a cost of a lakh of rupees.

§ 8. *Revival of Maratha activity, 1693.*

But early in 1693, the military position was reversed. The execution of Shambhuji, the capture of his capital with his entire family, and the helpless flight of his successor Rajaram to the Madras coast, in 1689, had for a time stunned the Marathas and effaced all opposition to the Mughal power in Maharashtra. But within two years from this the Marathas recovered from the blow; they organised a large force and sent it to the East Coast, where it raised the siege of Jinji and closely blockaded the Emperor's army and son there (Jan. 1693). This signal success reacted on the military situation in the western theatre. The Mughals lost their dominant position there and were driven to assume the defensive. Roving Maratha bands harried Mughal territory in the Deccan on all sides and began to recover the forts recently acquired by the imperialists but slenderly held.

Konkan served the Marathas as an excellent base for organising these operations, as the Western Ghats formed a screen in their front, while the possessions of the friendly Portuguese along the western coast afforded a safe refuge to the wives and children of their fighters even when the enemy descended into the eastern belt of Konkan. The Ghats, with their countless forts and intricate pathways, were the most suitable place for launching expeditions from, being equally convenient for surprising the Mughals and evading their strong outposts. Thus the natural strategic

value of Konkan was heightened by the present distribution of the rival forces.

In such a situation Matabar Khan was not the man to rest in idleness. He bade adieu to his hard-earned repose in the newly-built palaces and gardens of Kalian and once more took to campaigning.

§ 9. *Matabar Khan's new campaigns.*

Sidhgarh (11 miles s. e. of Murbād and 29 miles s. e. of Māhuli) was the refuge of the Marathas of that quarter. Matabar gave an assurance of imperial favours under the grand wazir's seal to Lomānji [or Gomāji] and other Māvlé leaders and incited them to capture this fort. After six months of watching for a suitable opportunity, they gained the fort by escalade on 20th October 1693. On hearing of this loss, Khāndoji Kadam and Dāmāji Narayan, two generals of the Maratha king, issued in force from Rajmāchi and blockaded Lomānji in Sidhgarh, by occupying the village (*machi*) below the fort. Reinforcements hurried up by Matabar under Kākāji and Rāwat Mal Jhāla, stormed the village and expelled the enemy after a bloody fight.

But the situation was now complicated by the entrance of a new actor on the scene. The local Portuguese governor was bribed by the Marathas to give them shelter and to supply provisions to their forts and villages. Matabar Khan sums up the offences of the Portuguese Government thus:—“I have been here for four years. In the first, I reassured and conciliated the ryots who had fled to Jawhār and Rāmnagar owing to the former Maratha disturbances, and induced them to return to their original homes, thus repeopling 600 villages in Konkan. In the second year, the Portuguese gave shelter to the families of the Maratha officers of Rajaram and helped them in attacking our fort

Vaikunthgarh (?). In the third year they surprised fort Karnālā from us, and constantly sent supplies and reinforcements to the forts belonging to Rajaram. Hence, all our ryots have fled and taken refuge in Portuguese territory. The recovery of Patta by the Marathas emboldened the Feringis still further, and Tristan de Melo,* their general of Salsette, summoned Shyamji Moro-dev, an officer of Rajaram, from the island of Khanderi and harboured him and his 1,500 infantry in the Portuguese village of Thāna, agreeing to co-operate with him in attacking the fort of Māhuli and the village of Bhivandi held by the Mughals."

§ 10. *Mughals attack Portuguese of Bassein.*

Matabar Khan, as we might have expected from his character, forestalled the enemy and struck the first blow. A strong detachment of his troops invaded Portuguese Konkan, drove the peasants to the Mughal side of the border, and made prisoners of the enemy's families wherever found. The Portuguese offered fight, but were routed after a severe contest. The Mughals chased them up to the fort of Bassein, set fire to their church outside it, and then halted at Bahadurpura,† appealing to the Emperor for some large pieces of artillery and reinforcements to aid them in attacking Bassein and other forts, as "the Feringis were the source of

* Gemelli Careri speaks of him as "General of the North," resident at Bassein, who murdered admiral Antonio Machado de Brito on 30th December 1694. (Churchill's *Voyages*, iv. 199.)

† Khafi Khan (ii. 402—403) briefly describes the campaign thus: "Matabar Khan made a surprise attack and took two of the small forts of the Feringis. Most of them fled to Daman and Bassein, because they are weak in fighting on the plain and use no weapon except the musket and a short sword looking like a spit, and do not ride chargers. Many Feringis with their women were captured. At this a great terror seized them."

the mischief, and unless they were expelled the idolators (Marathas) could not be entirely rooted out." Siddi Yaqut, the governor of Dandā-Rājpurī and Mughal admiral of the Western Ocean, co-operated with him by sea.

The domestic enemies of the Portuguese took advantage of their distress. The inhabitants of Uran (a small island, due south of Elephanta) betrayed to the Mughal general the existence of three pearl beds there which the Portuguese had jealously guarded by sentries and whose very existence they had carefully kept concealed from the great Muslim kings of the Deccan. "Through many years' abstention from fishing, countless pearls have accumulated in these beds. Only on dark nights some men have stealthily fished some small pearls on this coast."

The defeat of the Portuguese was complete. The viceroy of Goa now sent a most submissive letter to the Emperor with presents for his ministers and servants. He worked so well on the Emperor's feelings, possibly with the assistance of Christian priests and Armenian traders in the imperial camp and Matabar's jealous rivals among the courtiers, that Aurangzib peremptorily ordered the cessation of the war and the restitution of the prisoners and booty carried off from the Portuguese villages, as a quarrel with the Europeans hindered trade and diminished his customs revenue. Matabar tried in vain to explain his conduct and clear his enemies' misrepresentations at Court. The captives had to be released.

§ 11. *Last years of Matabar Khan.*

We may here complete the life of this able general and administrator and carry the history of North Konkan to the end of Aurangzib's reign.

The news-letters of Aurangzib's Court contain many examples of Matabar's vigilant care for his charge, his strict

maintenance of efficiency by removing negligent or drunken officers and recommending the promotion of his abler subordinates, and his efforts to induce the Emperor to post the most useful men under him.

In May 1695, the powder-magazine in Māhuli fort exploded, destroying Matabar's stores, worth Rs. 18,000 lodged there. In November 1700 the Mughal position in S. Konkan was further improved by Siddi Yaqut's capture of Anjanvel fort, after defeating a relieving army of Marathas sent by Ramchandra. Matabar usually co-operated with the Siddi of Janjirā in the military operations for upholding the Mughal power and defeating any Maratha bands that might enter the district. Thus, he rendered valuable service at the Emperor's siege of Khelnā (1702) by guarding the route to the north-west of that fort.

On 13th February 1704, an order was issued to him to raise a thousand infantry for service with the Emperor, for whose equipment and bounty Rs. 8,000 were paid to him. Probably the faithful servant could not carry out this last command of his master, as death overtook him at the end of the month; (the report of the event reached the Emperor at Tornā on 9th March).

Matabar Khan, though a mere thanadar and without influential relatives at Court, rose by sheer merit to be a commander of 2500 in rank with the same number of troopers (*zat* and *sawar*), and enjoyed this high mansab for about ten years before his death. He left no issue of his own, but only an adopted son named Abu Muhammad Khan, and some nephews (sister's sons), to whom the Emperor gave offices.

CHAPTER LIV.

AURANGZIB BESIEGES MARATHA FORTS, 1700-1704.

§ 1. *Aurangzib's arrangements on leaving Islāmpuri.*

On 19th October, 1699, Aurangzib started from Islāmpuri on that campaign against the great Maratha strongholds which was to occupy the next six years of his life. One by one the famous hillforts of Satārā, Parli, Panhālā, Vishālgarh (Khelnā), Kondānā (Singhgarh), Rajgarh, and Tornā were captured by him, besides five places of lesser note. But it should be remembered that with the sole exception of Tornā, none of these was taken by assault; all capitulated after a time and for a price; their garrisons were permitted to march out with their personal effects, and their commandants were given costly rewards for ceasing resistance. The first, namely Satara, was long and obstinately defended. And so also was the last, the Berad capital Wāgingerā (1705.) The capture of Wāgingerā forms a chapter by itself (ch. lvi.) A minute account of the siege of Satara, based on the details supplied by the daily Court-bulletins, has been published by me in the *Proceedings* of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1922, and may serve as an example of Mughal sieges at the end of the 17th century. It is, therefore, unnecessary to describe here the sieges of the Maratha forts except in outline.

During the Emperor's stay for 4½ years at Islāmpuri with his family, officers and main army, his camp had grown into a city. Houses of a more permanent structure had in many cases replaced the tents, and a small stone fort had been built in 1698, which sheltered the Emperor's residence. Around the whole camp an earthen wall, five miles in

circuit, was now run up in fifteen days, as a protection from the Maratha light horse. [*M. A.* 388, 408.] We shall, following the Persian histories, henceforth designate it as the Base Camp.

Here he left his wife Udipuri and her son Kām Bakhsh, and his daughter Zinat-un-nisā, with all the surplus baggage and unnecessary officials, and the families of his soldiers and camp-followers. The wazir Asad Khan remained in charge of them with a suitable force. Princes Azam and Bidār Bakht joined the Emperor on the way; but Bidār Bakht was soon afterwards detached to pursue Rajaram, who was making a dash for Khandesh and Berār. Zulfiqār surnamed Nasrat Jang, who was coming up from the Madras side, joined the prince near the village of Chārthānā (45 m. east of Jālnā), but was afterwards given a roving commission, being charged with the special duty of fighting the Maratha field armies that hovered round the siege camp or threatened the Base at Islāmpuri. Another division, under Ruhullah and Hamid-ud-din, was sent to ravage the country between Satara and Panhālā [*M. A.* 408-409; *Dil.* ii. 129a.]

§ 2. *Aurangzib begins the siege of Satara.*

After marching south-westwards from Islampuri to Miraj, as if he were going to invest Panhālā, the Emperor made a sharp turn to the north and reached Masur (21 miles south of Satārā) on 21st November. A detachment under Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of artillery, went in advance and quickly put his guns in position for bombarding Basantgarh,* a fort 6 miles south-west of Masur. At the Emperor's approach the garrison lost heart and fled away in the night

* *Bombay Gaz.* xix. 238, 11, some seven miles n.w. of Karad, which is 8 m. s. of Masur. Basantgarh is 3000 ft. above sea-level, and south of Talbid, and 3 m. w. of the Krishna.

of the 24th. The imperialists entered the fort the next day and named it the "Key to Victory" (*Kilid-i-Fath*), as a happy omen of their success in the ensuing campaign. [*M.A.*, 411.] Some buried treasure, weapons, and provisions were seized by the victors here.

Marching thence, the imperialists arrived before Satara on 8th December. Aurangzib took up his quarters at the village of Karanjā, a mile and a half to the north of the fort-walls. Azam's division was posted to the west, on the way to Parli, Tarbiyat Khan opposite the northern wall, and Ruhullah Khan on the south side.

The Mughal army with its followers and transport animals was concentrated in one spot, five miles round, and this encampment was walled round to keep out the Maratha raiders. A body of musketeers patrolled round it thrice daily.

Siege operations began on 9th December, the different nobles being given different sections round the fort to entrench.

From his position opposite the Mangalai or northern gate of the fort, Tarbiyat Khan, the Chief of the Mughal Artillery, made a covered lane, and arriving 13 yards from the gate, began to build a raised battery opposite the tower guarding the gate. The rocky soil made digging a very slow and difficult work. The garrison fired upon his men day and night without cessation with every kind of missile. The marksmanship was bad on both sides, and not much loss was done by the firing.

But the lines of investment were not complete. The enemy entered and issued from Satara almost to the end of the siege, Prince Azam being suspected of conniving at their efforts to provision and reinforce the fort.

§ 3. *Fighting before and around Satara.*

The garrison made frequent sorties, all of which were repulsed with more or less loss. But the greatest danger to the Mughals came from the Maratha field forces, which practically reduced the besiegers to the position of a beleaguered city. Foraging parties could leave the Mughal camp only under very strong escorts, led by the foremost nobles. Dhanā, Shankarā, and other enemy leaders spread through the Mughal possessions, raiding villages, cutting off outposts, and closing the roads to the grain-dealers (banjārās.) Ghorī Khan, the faujdar of Karārābad, was captured by Dhanā (19 Dec.) but rescued by Hamid-ud-din three days later near Masur, though with heavy losses on both sides. On the 27th, Ikhlas Khan, when patrolling only four miles from the camp, was enveloped by Hanumant and slain with his son and many followers, and all his property was looted. The enemy appeared here, there, and everywhere, round the camp. On 10th January 1700, Nasrat Jang, Bahramand, and Hamid-ud-din attacked Dhanā Jādv, Hanumant Nimbālkar, and Ranuji Ghorparé, and after a pitched battle six miles beyond Rahmatpur, repulsed them with slaughter. By order of the Emperor, a pyramid was built with the severed enemy heads (500.) On the 22nd, Dhanā captured the thanadar of Khānāpur.

Enemy activity stopped the coming of grain and foraging in the vicinity of the Mughal camp, and produced scarcity. Rāmchand, the thanadar of Khātāu, received lavish rewards for bringing a convoy of grain into the imperial camp (10 Jan.), as also did some other local officers. On 3rd Feb. 8,000 oxen loaded with grain were escorted into the camp, which gave some relief.

Tarbiyat Khan raised his gun-platform 24 yards high, to the level of the bastion of the fort gate. "In procuring materials for it, not a tree was left standing within thirty or forty *kos* of Satara." [*M. A.* 414.] Eight thousand sacks were taken from the grain market and filled with sand to form a bulwark round it. Three hundred oxen were set to transport timber for the battery. But the stones showered down by the enemy made further progress impossible. Orders were then issued to fill the empty chests of the public treasury and of the money-changers with stone and sand and line the battery with them.—150 water-carriers being posted there to put out fires promptly.

§ 4. *Attempts to storm Satara fail.*

Tarbiyat Khan by hard labour dug a mine 24 yards long and carried it under the fort-wall. But assault by breaching was deemed inadvisable. Then, a surprise escalade was attempted by 2,000 Māvlés in Mughal pay,—who were experts in hill-climbing,—on 23rd January, an hour before dawn. Three years' salary was paid to them in advance to inspire them to the deed of daring. But the garrison were warned by some friends outside and the attempt failed.

Then Ruhullah Khan carried another mine under the *fausse braye* (*rauni*) of the fort, on the other side of the gate. On 13th April the two mines were fired. The first killed many of the garrison and buried the havladār Prāgji Prabhu under the debris of the wall, but he was dug out alive. The second exploded outwards with disastrous consequences to the Mughals. A tower was blown up and fell upon the Mughal troops densely assembled at the foot of the wall for the assault. Nearly two thousand of them, including 500 Māvlés, perished.

This explosion made a breach in the wall, 20 yards wide. Some brave imperialists, notably Baji Chāvān Dāflé, the son of Satvā Dāflé (the founder of the State of Jath in the Bijapur district), ran up to the top of the wall, shouting to their comrades, "Come up! there is no enemy here!" But none followed them; the men in the Mughal trenches who survived were too dazed and alarmed by the catastrophe to stir outside. The garrison now recovered from their surprise, and rushing up to the breach, slew the gallant forlorn hope.

The huge raised platform had collapsed and its guns lay overturned on the hillside. The Māvlé infantry, saddened by the loss of 500 of their kinsmen and comrades and unable to recover their bodies from under "that hill of stone and clay," at night set fire to the entrenchments, which were entirely made of wood, so as to ensure the Hindu form of funeral for their dead! The fire burnt for a week and these costly siege-works were reduced to ashes. [*M. A.* 419.]

§ 5. *Satara capitulates, 21st April, 1700.*

Meantime Rajaram had died (March) and his minister Parashurām offered submission to the Mughals. Tarbiyat Khān had demolished 70 yards of the fort walls, 400 of the garrison had been killed by the mines. Considering all these facts, Subhānji, the qiladar of Satara, lost heart and made terms with the Emperor through Prince Azam. On 21st April he hoisted the imperial flag on his fort and vacated it with the garrison the next day. Subhānji was taken into the Emperor's service as a 5-hazari *zat* (2,000 troopers) with a cash reward of Rs. 20,000, besides many presents. His relatives and followers were also enlisted.*

* *M. A.* 410-420; *Akhbarat* (years 43 and 44); *Ahkam* (my ed.) § 71.

The fort was renamed *Azamtārā* in honour of Prince Md. Azam.

§ 6. *Parli besieged.*

Satara fell on 21st April, 1700. On that very day Fathullah Khan was sent in advance to open trenches before Parli, six miles west of Satara. This fort had been the seat of Śhivaji's *guru* Rāmdās Swāmi and it was serving as the head-quarters of the Maratha Government while Satara was invested by the enemy. The siege materials used at Satara were quickly transferred to Parli, and the Emperor arrived before the fort on 30th April. The Mughal lines of investment encircled the hill.

Parashurām, the chief revenue officer of the Maratha Government, being disheartened by the death of Rajaram and the fall of Satara, escaped from Parli and sent to beg for terms of peace. Parli, however, continued its resistance under his subordinates, with whom he frequently corresponded from outside.

But the invaders suffered terribly from excessive rain and the scarcity of grain and fodder. Aurangzib held grimly on. Fathullah's covered way having reached the foot of a big sloping rock in front of the smaller gate of the fort, his men scaled it with ladders on 4th June. The general wished to hold the top of the rock, mount guns there, and batter down the fort-gate. A few of his men had entered the fort pell-mell with the fugitives, but they were killed, and the garrison, soon recovering from the panic, shut the door and shot down the Mughals standing unsheltered on the rock. They also blew up a mine previously laid by them under the road leading from this rock to the gate. Fathullah had, therefore, to abandon his gain after losing 60 or 70 men. Terms were now made with the qiladar of Parli,

and he evacuated the fort (on 9th June) for a bribe. The old and neglected mosque built within it during the Bijapuri occupation was restored and used again for prayers, while the new temple of Shivaji's reign was demolished. "Thus was verified," as the pious official chronicler writes, "the Quranic verse, *Truth came and falsehood disappeared.*" The fort was newly named Nauras-tāra. (*M. A.* 428, Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam* § 17.)

§ 7. *Hardships of the imperialists.*

These two sieges had caused an enormous waste of men, horses and transport animals in the imperial army. The treasury was empty, the soldiers were starving at their pay being in arrears for three years. Heavy and unprecedented rain began to fall early in May and continued till the end of July. The army was eager to withdraw to a place of greater comfort and plenty. On 21st June the return march towards Bhushangarh commenced, but the sufferings of the miserable soldiers were only aggravated by the change.

All transport animals had perished during the siege, and, as the official historian humorously describes the situation, "the gypsies of the army had to load their household goods on their cocks." No camel was left alive in the army, on account of the excessive rain and the unsuitability of the climate for these animals. The few cart-oxen and even the elephants that survived had nothing but their skins and bones left. Only a small part of the property of the Emperor and the nobles could be loaded on these weak elephants, half-dead bullocks, day-labourers and paupers from the charity-kitchen. Much had to be left in the forts or burnt. Many of the elephants and bullocks under their excessive burdens fell down dead and blocked the roads.

Many persons of noble birth had to walk on foot through the mud for mile after mile. [*M. A.* 429; *K. K.* ii. 472-73; *Dil.* ii. 133*b*.]

One march was followed by two days' halt, in order to allow the stragglers time to come up. Only three miles were covered by a day's march. The Krishnā was in such high flood that the opposite bank could not be seen from this. Great difficulty was felt in crossing such a huge army over the swollen river. Only seven half-broken and clumsily-patched up boats were available for ferrying the men across. The people in their struggle to get seats in them took to their swords, and thus every day some men were killed or wounded at the ferry. Some Turāni soldiers seized two boats by attacking them sword in hand, and then made much money by charging one gold *mohar* instead of the normal Rupee, as ferry-fee from every passenger that they took on board. Many thousands of the poorer people were left behind and died there. [*K. K.* ii. 473.]

Then, by way of Sābitgarh, the army reached Bhushangarh* on 25th July, having taken 35 days to cover some 45 miles! Here a month's halt was made, during which the rain ceased and the camp again "breathed at ease." The generals were dispersed to various fertile comfortable places to recuperate their war-worn men. Prince Azam was sent to Khandesh to refresh, the other nobles to their jagirs, if within 10 or 12 marches, or to Bijapur and other cities. Orders were sent to the provincial governors to send fresh troops to the Emperor's side. Bidār Bakht, who was guarding the Base, was deputed with Nasrat Jang to attack Panhālā.

* 7 m. s. of Aundh, 10 m. s. of Vaduj, and 30 m. s. e. of Satara in a straight line. [*Atlas*, 40 N. W.]

§ 8. *Imperial camp at Khawāspur flooded.*

After five weeks' rest at Bhushangarh, the imperial camp was shifted (on 30th August 1700), to Khawāspur,* 36 miles off, where food-stuffs and grass were abundant. Khawāspur stands on the left bank of the Mān, a small waterless stream at that point. The tents of the army covered both its banks and even its dry bed, which in that season presented "only the mirage of water." But in the night of 1st October, while the men were fast asleep, a high flood caused by heavy and untimely rainfall on the hills, came suddenly sweeping through the river bed, overtopped its banks and spread over the plains beyond, "turning the land into one sheet of water." Many men and animals perished; many more, including even the nobles, were left absolutely poor and naked; nearly all the tents and property were damaged. Happily, the water went down early in the morning, otherwise "not one man would have survived." [M. A. 431, K. K. ii. 475.]

When the flood first struck the camp, a little before midnight, and the tents began to fill with water, men tried to run to safety, but could see no path of escape in the darkness, only waves on all sides. A loud cry arose throughout the army. The Emperor was in his privy when this universal outcry reached his ears. Imagining that the Marathas had burst into the camp, he rose in alarm, but stumbled and dislocated his right knee. The doctors failed to set it properly, and he remained a little lame for the rest of his life.† The Court flatterers used to console him by

* Khawāspur (17°30 N. 75°1 E.) on the Man river (*Atlas*, sheet 40 N.E.); 36 m. east of Bhushangarh, and 14 m. s. e. of Mhasvad.

† He took his bath of recovery, on leaving the sick-bed, on 30th November. [*Akhbarat*.]

saying that it was the heritage of his ancestor Timur the Lame and a token that he would repeat the victories and success of that world-conqueror! [K. K. 476, *Storia*, 255, *Dil.* ii. 134a.]

But vigorous efforts were made to replenish his army. Orders were sent to the governors of Northern India to enlist strong men and buy good horses in every province and send them to the Deccan. Two thousand horses were bought in Kabul, and 2,000 mares locally, besides the remounts purchased in other provinces. The new recruits began to arrive in January 1701.

The Marathas put the misfortunes and weakness of the imperialists to the best account. In addition to their normal raids, Hanumant Rao* plundered the *thana* of Khātāu and killed its Mughal officer Rāmchand (a Maratha), 18 August, 1700. The Berad chief, Pidiā Nāyak, posted his infantry all over the Bijapur district levying *chauth*, while the Marathas plundered up to the very tank of Shāpur, outside Bijapur city, (c. 15th Nov.) Ranuji killed the Mughal thānadār of Bāgehvari (30 m. s. e. of Bijapur) and looted that outpost as well as Indi (north-east of Bijapur city.)

The camp was broken up on 16th Dec. 1700, and the city of Miraj was reached on 1st January 1701. Here the Emperor spent the month of fasting (29th Jan.—27 Feb.) and received during the interval the new recruits and materials sent up from the provinces.† The imperial Paymaster Mukhlis Khan (a grand-nephew of the prime

* His adopted son Anantaji died of wounds received in this battle, and Hanumant himself was soon afterwards taken ill of dropsy (swelling of the body.) [*Akhbarat.*]

† *Akh.* 2, 3 Aug. 1700, 11 Jan. 1701. Horses were ordered to be bought in Kabul and Surat.

minister of Persia) died on 3rd January and was buried in the tomb-garden of the saint Sayyid Shams-ud-din in Miraj. [M. A. 434.]

§ 9. *Siege of Panhala, 1701.*

Panhala was the next point of attack. An advanced force under Bidār Bakht had been sent to that region in the autumn of 1700; the prince lay encamped at the foot of the fort, while his lieutenant Nasrat Jang besieged its western (or Konkani) gate. [*Dil.* 134*b.*] The Emperor himself arrived there on 9th March 1701 and formed a complete circle of investment, fourteen miles in length, round Panhala and its sister fort of Pavangarh. A mobile force under Nasrat Jang was sent out to "chastise the robbers wherever they should raise their heads."

Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of artillery, worked hard in running lanes and raising gun-platforms. In a short time five towers of the fort were battered down to half their heights. A mine, large enough for three armed men to walk abreast erect, was gradually carried under the tower and outer breast-work of the fort-gate. It was a most elaborate structure, with a chamber for 20 soldiers furnished with windows on both sides for admitting air and light and musketry-holes for firing at the ramparts. But in that stony region the progress of mining was necessarily very slow, and the dreaded rainy season was approaching. In addition to the notorious rivalry between his two highest generals,—Nasrat Jang and Firuz Jang,—which made it impossible to employ both at the same place, there now broke out a bitter jealousy between Tarbiyat Khan and Fathullah Khan and another between the older officers in general and a very able upstart from Gujrat named Muhammad Murad.

The Emperor had summoned Fathullah from Aurangabad and charged him to lay a mine from Kām Bakhsh's position. Working incessantly in rivalry with Tarbiyat, he carried his mine to the foot of the gate in one month. Tarbiyat, on his part, in order not to be outdone, pushed his covered lane further onwards. But the mutual jealousies of the generals made true co-operation among them impossible. They secretly thwarted one another, and thus spoiled their master's business and prolonged the siege. [K. K. 488; *M. A.* 437.]

Muhammad Murād, a petty officer (*faujdar*) of Godrā in Gujrat, had suddenly risen in the Emperor's favour by coming to his side in his need with 500 well-mounted recruits raised at his own initiative, while his superior, the subahdar of the province, had pleaded inability to enlist a single soldier in the province and had even tried to hinder recruitment by Md. Murād. At the siege of Panhala, Murād was given charge of the attack on Pavangarh. [K. K. 478, 485.]

Midway between Panhala and Pavangarh there is a lower hill, with some enemy houses on its top, sheltered by the guns of the two forts. One day Murād chased up the hill a party of the enemy who had descended from it to carry off some camp cattle out grazing there. Arriving at the top, he planted his flag there, sat down in a shelter of the rock, and sent to beg for reinforcements planks and trenching tools in order to entrench and hold the position gained.

The Emperor wrote to Ruhullah and Hamid-ud-din with his own hand, ordering them to go and help Murād. These two arrived at the foot of the hillock, but sent word to Murād saying that he had made an inadvisable advance and that it was impossible to send up succour to him where he was; so that if he wanted to entrench on the top he must do so by his unaided efforts, or else he must inform the

Emperor and abandon the position. The day was wasted in this exchange of messages.

Murād refused to come down and persisted in his demands, but the other two generals taunted him, saying "Do you expect us to act as your subordinates and do you wish to nullify all the exertions of Tarbiyat Khan and other nobles up to this time?" Then Ruhullah (the imperial Paymaster) reported to Aurangzib that the hill-top was untenable, and a night attack on it by the enemy might lead to a disaster. So, the Emperor censured Murād for having made a rash advance, whose only result was disgrace to his arms. The courtiers took up the cue, and were now loud in their blame of Murad, whom they had been extolling above all other generals only a few hours before, when his flag was first hoisted on the hillock!

Next day Murād was received in audience and highly praised. Tarbiyat Khan was urged to deliver an assault, but he ironically replied, "The preparations for an assault are complete. Please order Md. Murād, who has done such heroic deeds, to support us on the day of storming." [K. K. 485-489.] With this spirit animating Aurangzib's generals, it was only natural that all his efforts came to nothing. A few attempts at escalade were made, but failed with loss, and the siege dragged on for two months, without success seeming to come any nearer.

§ 10. *Panhala gained by bribery.*

The terrible loss caused by the exploded mine at Satara and in the failure of the assault on that fort, had effectually damped the spirit of the Mughal army. Two mines had been completed at Panhālā, but the generals shrank from firing them, as no soldier could be depended upon to rush to the breach and face the enemy's fire or even show himself in

the open within range of the fort guns. So, the Emperor, after this heavy loss of money time and labour in mining and bombardment, was at last driven to bribery for gaining the fort before the rains began. Through Tarbiyat Khan secret negotiations were opened, a large bribe was paid to Trimbak, the qiladar, and he delivered the two forts on 28th May, 1701, the garrison being allowed to depart with their lives and property. Sir William Norris, the English ambassador, witnessed the scene.

When its defeated commandant Trimbakji went to the royal minister Rāmchandra in Vishālgarh, the latter charged him with treachery, saying "You turned faithless to your master's salt and gave the fort up to the Mughals." Trimbak retorted, "My artillery munitions ran short, and yet you did not care to inquire about my state. I had therefore to give up the fort." For this he was put in prison. [*Akhbarat*, 7th June.]

§ 11. *Maratha activities during the siege of Panhālā.*

We shall now describe the efforts of the Marathas to relieve the siege of Panhālā. On 23rd January, Dhanā Jādav appeared two miles from the imperial camp, and a fierce battle raged all the day, the entire imperial army being engaged. There were heavy losses, and the Mughals had to entrench their position at night. Two days later, on hearing that Nasrat Jang was coming up from Panhālā, Dhanā Jādav fell back four miles; Hamid-ud-din followed him, but the Marathas fought while fleeing, inflicting a heavy slaughter and drawing this Mughal force 22 miles away from its camp. Next day there was another pitched battle towards Rāibāgh (in the east), and yet another battle on the day following. Then Dhanā rapidly retreated and the Mughal general

returned to the Emperor's side (29th January), [*Akhbarat* and *Dil.* 134*b.*]

The pursuit of Dhanā was continued by Nasrat Jang, who drove him back after an attack on him 12 miles beyond Chikodi (40 m. s. e. of Panhala), and then fell back on Panhala. Dhanā then resumed his activity and sent Krishnā Malhār with 10,000 horsemen to raid the highway near Panhala,—evidently to cut off the grain supply and communications of the besiegers (4th Feb.) Dhanā himself tried to intercept some Mughal heavy guns which had reached Kararabad, while Krishna Malhār attacked the outpost of Khātāu, and Ramchandra and Dādo Malhār descended into Konkan to fight Siddi Yaqut of Dandā-Rājpurī (4th Feb.) A little later, while Ramchandra was trying to convey provisions under escort of 2,000 foot-musketeers to beleaguered Panhala, Nasrat Jang came upon him, slew many of his men and looted most of the provisions. Ramchandra, however, succeeded in entering the fort, (24th Feb.)* Before the fall of Panhala, the elusive Dhanā Jādav was roving here and there, vainly pursued by Nasrat Jang, who could not keep pace with him and constantly lost troopers and horses through forced marches. On 20th April Ranuji was reported as coming towards the fort at the head of 20,000 men, and Baharji as having been captured by the imperialists. Dhanā now halted for some time in Singhgarh, with only 400 men, while the main division of his army (15,000 strong) was sent under Dādo Malhār to raid Mughal territory.

The day after the fall of Panhala, Aurangzib began his return from it (29th May, 1701), wishing to encamp in the

* Nasrat Jang also rescued and safely escorted to the siege camp a party of *banjaras* whom Ramchandra had invested in Kolhapur, 10 miles from Panhala. [*Dil.* 135*a.*]

safer and more fertile region of Khātāu (25 miles east of Satara and on the left bank of the Yerla river). Quick as the departure was, it had not been made soon enough. A cyclone passed over the camp "blowing away tents and sheds like paper. Kings and beggars had to sit down in the sun. Veiled ladies became exposed to the public gaze." [K. K. 490; *Akh.* has 17 May 1703.]

Fathullah Khan, highly promoted and created a Bahadur, was sent ahead to take Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w. of Khātāu) and three other forts in the neighbourhood. Wardhan was vacated by the enemy on 6th June; it was renamed Sādiqgarh after Fathullah's original name of Md. Šādiq. The Khan Bahadur next took Nandgir (6th July), Chandan, and Wandan (6th Oct.).

The wazir Asad Khan was recalled to the Emperor's side, arriving there on 28th August, while Firuz Jang, who had been recalled from Berar, took his place as defender of the Base Camp at Islampuri.

§ 12. *March to Khelnā.*

When the campaigning season reopened in October 1701, the Emperor set out for the conquest of Khelnā (or Vishālgarh). This fort stands thirty miles west of Panhala, on the crest of the Sahyādri hill, 3,350 feet above the sea and overlooking the Konkan plain lying on its west. The district is wet and cool, and the hills were thickly covered with trees and dense underwood in the 17th century.* Even

* The *Masir-i-Alamgiri* (458) writes, "The hills and soil of this tract are wonderful: there is no trace of hill or land, you only see herbs and flowers. . . . There is not a tree that does not cause some gain [to man.] It has no flower that does not charm the brain with its fragrance. Every particle of this wide plain can supply the revenue of kingdoms from its fruits and aromatic roots.

now, though most of the timber has disappeared, there are still fine groves and stretches of hill-side closely covered with brushwood. The scenery is wild and picturesque. The fort stands on an isolated spur jutting into Konkan and is joined to the Sahyādrī range by a narrow neck of land. The easiest means of reaching it is by the Ambā pass, five miles north of it, and some 35 miles n. w. of Kolhāpur. [*Bombay Gaz.* xxiv. 2—5.]

The road to Khelnā passes through Mālkāpur, fifteen miles north-west of Panhala. Eight miles further on begins the head of Ambā pass. These eight miles leading to the defile were very difficult ground. There was in that age no road here for wheeled traffic and the ups and downs were so sharp and the path so narrow that even horses could not use it with ease or safety.

Leaving Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w. of Khātāu) on 7th Nov. 1701, the Emperor arrived near Mālkāpur* in 12 marches. Here he halted for a week, while pioneers were set to make a road ahead. Bidār Bakht, who had cantoned for the rainy season in the Gokak-Hukri region (Belgāon district, in the south-east), here joined the Emperor, after taking some Maratha forts and burning some enemy villages on the way. On 6th December [23rd ?] the Emperor encamped on a high and broad open space on the side of the Sahyādrī, seven miles north of Khelnā.

But the Ambā pass itself had yet to be made fit for the passage of an army. This was a formidable task. "In all the paths of this hilly region there are impregnable forests

. . . It was a frontier fort, . . . and the vast provinces of Konkan Upland and Lowland were annexed to the empire through its conquest." Khafi Khan, as usual, gives a mere paraphrase of the *Masir*.

* On 15 Dec., according to *Akhbarat*.

and dense thorny jungles through which the sun cannot peep. Lofty and stout trees abound on all sides. The branches were so intertwined that even an ant could hardly pass through them. The track was difficult even for footmen. The defiles and pits were deep, the rocks firmly rooted in the soil." [M. A. 448-449.]

But Fathullah Khan after one week's incessant toil with an army of pioneers and stone-cutters, made a broad level road through the pass. Then Asad Khan was detached on 26th December to begin the siege. His vanguard under Fathullah and Hamid-ud-din forced the defile before sunrise. A hillock overlooking Khelnā had been fortified by the enemy and was held in force. Fathullah charged up its side and drove the defenders away from the top. In their attempt to escape to Khelnā through the valley on the left, these Marathas fell into a Mughal ambuscade planted there and were forced by its matchlock fire to run into the woods, where most of them were captured and put to death by being flung into the chasms with stones tied to their waists. Next day the Mughals captured another hillock from which arrows could be shot into Khelnā. Guns were mounted here and began to set fire to the houses of the garrison. A covered lane was also begun.

On 16th January 1702, the Emperor's tent was pitched a mile from Khelnā. His followers suffered terrible hardship and loss in crossing the pass and bringing his camp and equipage to the foot of the fort.

§ 13. *Siege of Khelnā, 1702.*

Bidār Bakht was posted to guard the environs of Panhala and keep the road to Khelnā open, while Md. Amin Khan descended into the lowlands of Konkan and ravaged the country up to the Konkani gate on the further (or

western) side of Khelnā, trying to close the enemy's grain supply to the fort through that side. The head of the Ambā pass was held by Hamid-ud-din.

The siege dragged on for five months (January-June 1702). During this year Nasrat Jang with his mobile division marched in pursuit of the Maratha field forces* nearly 6,000 miles and fought 19 great battles with them, besides numberless skirmishes. The details of his doings fill ten pages in the memoirs of his eulogist, Bhimsen. [*Dil.* 129a—138b; 141a.] It will be enough to say here that he passed fighting and chasing all the time, by way of Parendā, Chārthāna, thē lake of Lonār (in pargana Mehkar, Berār), to 20 miles from Elichpur, Nander, Maloni, Kaulas (in Haidarabad territory), Bidar, Maloni again, Mudgal (on the Bānganga), Maloni and Nander† again. No wonder that Bhimsen, a sharer in these campaigns should write of the result as, "This year much forced marching was done. All the troops became worn out and distracted in mind." And again, "The enemy were kept in rapid movement for eight successive

* The Marathas in Khandesh and Berar mustered nearly 60,000 men in concert with the local zamindars. Nasrat Jang's strength at one time sank to 2,500 only [*Dil.* 137a.] The imperial subahdar of Berar at first durst not leave his capital Elichpur for joining Nasrat Jang, lest his small force should be cut off by the enemy in the open.

† *Parenda*, 2 m.e. of the Sina, (18°15' N. 75°31' E.) *Charthanah*, 45 m.e. of Jalna, and 25 m.s. of Lake *Lonar*, (20° N. 76°33' E.), which is 12 m.s.e. of Malkapur in Berar. *Nander*, on the Godavari, 80 m.s.e. of Lonar. *Maloni* is either *Billoli*, 35 m.s.e. of Nander and 30 m.n. of Kaulas, or *Banouli*, 11 m.s.e. of Mudhol. *Mudgal* is said to be a dependency of Nander and situated on the Bānganga. There is a smaller *Mudgir* 11 m.e. of Nander (on the Sitaba) and a much larger *Mudhol*, 40 m.e. of Nander but on a river unnamed in map. *Kaulas* is 30 m.n. of Bidar, and 65 m.s. of Nander. [*Atlas*, Sh. 56.]

months....The horses of the imperialists were so worn out as to be unable to walk, and many of our troopers had to march on foot....The elephants became lame and weak.... I too lost my horses and camels." [Dil. 135b, 132b.]

§ 14. *Fathullah's heroic efforts: fall of Khelnā.*

Meantime, the siege of Khelnā went on. Fathullah advanced his covered lane to the ditch in front of the *fausse braye* (*rauni*) of the fort, in the face of a terrible fire from the walls which did heavy loss to the sappers and soldiers working there. "He spent *mohars* like *cowries*, and worked day and night with pickaxe and hammer in his hand, like one of the labourers." [K. K. 496.]

The enemy in the *rauni* demolished the first ladders that Fathullah had planted in front of the end of his covered lane, reaching up to the height of the level ground below the fort-gate. But the Khan made more ladders, and by driving rafters (*dhāb*) into the hard rock where the ladders ended, he reached the waist of the tower, but could advance no further. The Mughal artillery beat in vain against the solid rock of the walls of Khelnā; only a few stones were loosened from the tower, and success seemed as far off as ever.

On the other hand, the catapults of the garrison showered huge stones ("100 to 200 maunds in weight") upon the advancing siege-works. They also raided the trenches at night. One day Fathullah himself was struck on the head by the flying splinters of a plank of the covering of the lane, smashed by a Maratha stone, and so severely injured that he could not leave his bed for a month afterwards.

In fact, Fathullah was the hero of this siege. "He was of the same age as Aurangzib and a Turani (Central Asian)

by race like him. Therefore, the Khan was fearless in speaking to the Emperor. When he was recovering from these injuries, a eunuch was sent by the Emperor to reprimand him for the folly of exposing himself to danger so recklessly. The grey-haired veteran replied. 'Tell His Majesty that when a wise man reaches the age of 80 or 90, his intellect suffers decay, his five senses do not remain unimpaired. I am a soldier, and therefore a hundred stages behind the prudent man, being as thoughtless now as on the day of my birth!'" [K. K. 498.]

But all his valiant exertions were thrown away against that impregnable rock. No better success was achieved at the Konkani (or western) gate of the fort. Here Muhammad Amin Khan had stormed the fortified hillock opposite this gate and commanding its *rauni* (4th March.) Bidār Bakht, who replaced the Khan, delivered an assault led by Jai Singh, the young Rajah of Amber, on 27th April, and captured the *rauni*, in spite of heavy losses. The next step was to drag big guns up to the position and batter down the Konkani gate with them.

But the terrible monsoon of the Bombay Coast now burst on the heads of the devoted Mughal army. The rain fell incessantly for weeks on end. There was a race among the nobles for the capture of the fort by bribery, every one of them sending a private message to the qiladar Parashurām,* offering him a large sum of money if the key was

* On 9 March 1702 [copyist of *Akhbarat* wrongly writes 20 Shaban year 45=19 March 1701], we have this entry in the Court news-letter,—“Spies report that Parashuram, the head assistant (*peshdast*) of Ramchandra, is in Khelna and wished to cede the fort to the Emperor. Hearing of it, Trimbak Inglé and other officers of the enemy have arrested and imprisoned him.”

surrendered through his hands, so that in the official history he might be described as its captor! [K. K. ii. 500.] Bidār Bakht seems to have bid the highest. On 4th June the Maratha commandant planted the prince's banner on the ramparts, and in the night of the 7th the garrison evacuated the fort. By the Emperor's command, none hindered them. [M. A. 457.] The Mughals lost at this siege six thousand mansabdars, according to Manucci, [iii. 419.]

§ 15. *Sufferings of Mughal army during return from
Khelnā, 1702.*

In fear of the malarious climate of Konkan during the monsoons, the Emperor beat a hasty retreat from its neighbourhood, on 10th June, only three days after the fall of the fort. But the rain had already begun with tropical fury and the Mughal army underwent terrible hardships in crossing the dreadful Amba pass again in this weather. "The camels refused to set foot on this path. The elephants, in a dazed condition, tried to carry the loads, but sank into the mud like donkeys. The only goods carried were on the heads of porters." [M. A. 463; Dil. 142b.] A sudden rise of a *nālā* on the way, "running like a race-horse," cut the imperial army into two, and many were drowned. *Nālās* in a similar condition intersected the path of retreat at three places. Grain sold at one Rupee a seer. "Fodder and firewood appeared in the isolated camp only by mistake." Many men also perished of cold amidst the incessant rain, from having no tent or change of clothings left to them. Even the princes and nobles could not always get tents to shelter their heads in. At some stages only a small canvas cover was all that could be pitched for the Emperor himself. [M. A. 464-466; K. K. 503-505.]

One day the prime minister, after crossing a *nala*, could not find a single dry spot on which to pitch a tent for himself. He set up a small square canopy (*raoti*) ; but at night it rained heavily and the canopy twice came down on the wazir's head ; and for the rest of the night his servants stood holding the canvas sheet up by the ropes and thus saved him from being smothered to death. It was impossible to cook anything. "The condition of poorer men can be imagined from this," as Khafi Khan says, (ii. 505.)

In this condition, after covering 30 miles in 38 days, the miserable army arrived near Panhala (17 July 1702.)* Then the sun reappeared, after having been hidden by the clouds for 3½ months, as also had been the moon. The remnant of the people revived. Food and porters began to come from all sides.

After a halt of five days here, the march was resumed on 23rd July and Vadgaon (13 miles east of Panhala) was reached on the 30th. Here a month's halt was made, while a suitable camping ground was being searched for. It was decided to cross the Krishnā near Miraj (40 m. e. of Panhala.) The river was in high flood. The incessant rain had turned the roads into quagmires. The 18 miles leading to the river's bank took 16 days to traverse, and many men

* The above account of the return journey from Khelna is based upon the *Akhbarat*, year 46. *M.A.*'s dates are incorrect and self-inconsistent. Aurangzib's itinerary was the following:—Khelna (departure 10 June)—Ambaghat (5 days' halt)—Malkapur (20 June)—two *nalas*—near Panhala (17 July, 5 days' halt)—Bānsgāon—Vathar—Vadgaon (30 July)—...—Krishna crossed near Miraj—Idgah of Miraj (25 Sep.)—Malgaon—Dhulgaon—Daflapur (5 Oct.)—Pratap-pur—Jujharpur—Najra (on the Man)—Yaqutpur—Vaki—Bhalavani—Velapur—Akluj (24 Oct., three days' halt)—Baura—Babulgaon—Indapur—Kalthan—Warkuti—Palasdev (on the Bhima)—Jiti—Pedgaon (13 Nov.) [*Akh.* year 46.]

and beasts sank down in the mud before reaching it. The Krishnā was crossed in eight days (19-26 September.) Then, by way of Miraj, Dāflapur, Bhalāvani, Akluj, and Indāpur, the army reached Bahadurgarh or Pedgaon on the northern bank of the Bhimā, on 13th November.

§ 16. *Siege of Kondānā (Singharh) 1703.*

But even here there was no rest for Aurangzib's army. After a stay of only 18 days, he set out on 2nd December to capture Kondānā (Singharh), which was reached on the 27th [*M. A.* 469.] The imperial family, offices, and heavy baggage were removed from the Base Camp at Islāmpuri to Bahadurgarh, and the former post was made Nasrat Jang's cantonment. Bidār Bakht was sent to Aurangabad as viceroy (arrived 15 Nov.) and later (Feb. 1703) given the subahdari of Khandesh in addition, [*M. A.* 461, 471, 470], the last-named province being governed by his deputy.

The Mughals began the siege of Kondānā in their usual manner with entrenching and cannonade from a hillock opposite the tower of the fort. They lost many men. But there was no life in the work of the besiegers, and success seemed as remote as ever. Three months were wasted in this way. The rainy season was now approaching. So, the Emperor's servants secured the fort on 14th April 1703, by heavily bribing the qiladar.* [*K. K.* 510, *Dil.* 145a.]

* This act of bribery is cleverly hinted at in the official history, which says, "Kondana was newly named *Bakhshenda-Bakhsh*, or the Giver's gift. Truly, it is so strong a fort that nothing save the gift of God could have led to its capture." [*M. A.* 474.] The qiladar had died during the siege [*Akh.* 10 March 1703], and the fort was surrendered by his subordinates.

From Kondānā the army marched back to Puna in a week (1 May), in the neighbourhood of which it spent nearly seven months, before setting out against Rājgarh and Torna.

The excessive rainfall of 1702 had been followed by a drought in 1703-4, and there was famine throughout Maharashtra, with its natural companion, pestilence. Large numbers of the poorer classes perished,—two millions, according to Manucci [iv. 96.] But nothing could bend Aurangzib's obstinacy. On 10th November he issued for fresh conquests [*M. A.* 477.]

§ 17. *Capture of Rājgarh and Tornā, 1704.*

From the neighbourhood of Punā, the Mughal army reached Rajgarh in 18 days, and began its siege on 2nd December, 1703. The entire hill, 24 miles in circuit, is really one stronghold. To borrow the hyperbole of the Persian chronicler, "Imagination cannot estimate its height. The wind alone can cross its thorny jungles and spectre-haunted chasms." [*M. A.* 478.] So vast a position could neither be invested, nor its food supply from outside stopped. The Mughals bombarded it for two months, and then captured the first gate by assault on 6th Feb. 1704. The garrison under their chiefs Firangji and Hamanji retired to the inner citadel, and kept up the resistance for ten days more, during which the Mughal troops in their unsheltered newly-won position suffered heavy losses from the enemy's fire. At last the qiladar made terms, hoisted the imperial flag on his town, and fled away at night (16 Feb.) [*M. A.* 484-485, K. K. 513.]

Extreme scarcity had been raging in the Mughal camp all this time; even grass sold at two seers for a Rupee. A desolating Maratha raid into Berar and Mālwa had been repulsed with great difficulty by Firuz Jang.

But Aurangzib blindly persisted in following his own plans. He next laid siege to Tornā, eight miles from Rājgarh, on 23rd February. In the night of 10th March (which was the Emperor's 89th lunar birthday), Amānuīlah Khan with only 23 Māvlé infantry silently scaled the fort-wall by means of rope-ladders, blew his trumpets, and charged the enemy. Other Mughal generals, drawn by the noise, followed him. Those of the garrison who resisted were put to the sword, the rest fled to the citadel and cried for mercy. They were permitted to go away without their arms. This was the only Maratha fort that Aurangzib captured by force without resort to bribery. No wonder then that it was named by the pious Emperor as *Fatuh-ul-Ghaib* or 'Victory from the Invisible.' [*M. A.* 487, *K. K.* 521-523.]

From Tornā the imperial camp set out on its return (on 15th March) and after arriving at Khed (7 miles north of Chākan, and 25 m. n. of Puna,—on the left bank of the Bhimā) encamped there for six months, from 17 April to 21 October, 1704. From this place the Emperor started on 22nd October for Wāgingerā, the Berad capital, some 250 miles south-eastwads, which was reached after a slow march of three and a half months, on 8th February 1705, and immediately besieged. This was the last campaign of Aurangzib.

CHAPTER LV.

INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE MARATHAS.

§ 1. *Ramchandra Nilkantha, the Regent of the West,* *1689-1697.*

When Rajaram, the newly crowned king of the Marathas, fled away to the Madras coast (July, 1689), affairs in the Maharashtra country were left to his ministers. Ramchandra Nilkantha was created Regent of the West, with the title of *Hakumat-panāh*, and he guided the fortunes of this virtually kingless State with remarkable wisdom and tact. He checked the progress of the Mughals, organised raids into imperial territory, sent succour repeatedly to his master who was then shut up in the far-off fort of Jinji, and—what was more difficult than all these,—he succeeded in keeping peace among the intractable and mutually jealous Maratha generals, each of whom felt himself to be his own master. Letters, no doubt, passed between the king and his Regent in the West, but the route was long and often unsafe and Rajaram could not exercise any real control over Ramchandra, who enjoyed full initiative and supreme authority in the homeland during the nine years of the king's absence.

Rajaram, in addition to being plunged into debauchery in the Karnatak, was naturally weak-minded. His position made him powerless. He was a king without an army or treasury of his own, or subjects under his undisputed rule. Cooped up in a fort, he had to be all things to all men, and could not say No to anybody, nor enforce discipline among his servants. Any Maratha captain who could get together

a thousand or even five hundred men of his own, could dictate the terms of his obedience to his nominal king.

§ 2. *Rajaram's policy and doings at Jinji.*

Rajaram was, therefore, profuse in his gifts of titles and unconquered lands.* "All the Maratha *sardars* went to the king at Jinji, and he gave them titles, army commands, and grants for the different districts where they were to go, loot the country, and impose the *chauth*. They were to go there, take shelter in the woods, and establish their rule by acting like *Paligars*, avoiding battles . . . and employing the men of their contingents in work, . . . so that the kingdom would increase . . . All his ministers and captains [thus] began to prosper and became happy." [Chitnis, ii. 35.]

Rajaram's political impotence is best illustrated by his duplication of offices and titles at a time when his kingdom was shrinking to nothing. He could not afford to disoblige any of his proud and selfish chiefs. If we can accept Chitnis's statements, public offices like the *Amātya*-ship, the chief command etc., changed hands very frequently during his short reign: a man was appointed to a high post one year, and next year some one else, more powerful or more influential, cajoled or coerced the king into giving him that very post, and the first incumbent was reinstated a year or two later! To provide posts for all his most influential servants, the normal council of eight ministers was expanded by adding two more men,—the *Hakumat-panah* and the

* Streams of people from Maharashtra flocked to Jinji to get offices, titles and lands or to renew the title-deeds of their ancestral property or rights as hereditary village officers,—as is illustrated in the contemporary documents printed by Rajwadé.

Pratinidhi. Another office of ministerial rank was the *Rājājñā*, which though created by Shambhuji rose to first-rate importance in Rajaram's government.

At Jinji Rajaram created Prahād Nirāji his *Pratinidhi* (king's proxy), who eclipsed the nominal prime-minister or *Peshwa* Nilkantha Moreshwar Pingle. We have a parallel to this in the action of Bahadur Shah I., the weak successor of Aurangzib, who could not help appointing Munim Khan as his *wazir* (prime-minister) and at the same time felt bound to oblige his foremost noble, Asad Khan, by giving him an equally high position as *wakil* (or king's proxy),—with the result of friction between the two. The office of *Senāpati* (commander-in-chief) was changed five times in Rajaram's short reign of eleven years; and, in addition, five officers at one time enjoyed titles varying in terminology but all meaning "leader of the army"* and all being entitled to the rank banner and other paraphernalia of the *Senapati*! [Chitnis, ii. 40-41.]

§ 3. Maratha system of guerilla warfare.

But this decentralisation of authority was exactly suited to the situation in Maharashtra. The Maratha captains, each acting on his own account, carried on a guerilla warfare (as described in Chitnis, ii. 43-45), and caused the greatest loss and disturbance to the Mughal territories. The imperialists did not know what point to defend, nor where to find a vital enemy position for their attack. The extremely mobile Maratha bands covered long distances and

* The titles of *Senapati*, *Sena-sahib-subah*, *Sar-i-lashkar*, *Sena-dhurandhar*, and "with honour equal to the Senapati." It would be incorrect to call four of these divisional commanders, as they were declared to be *equal* to the *Senapati* (c-in-c) and in no way subordinate to him.

delivered attacks at the most unexpected quarters; and such roving bands were countless. The result was universal unrest throughout the Deccan. In addition to the (regular) divisions under the three generals (totally 60 to 70 thousand cavalry), and the king's own contingent of 10,000,—there were roving bands of 15 to 20 thousand, who fought their way to Maharashtra, levied *chauth* from the provinces, drove out the imperial outposts, and strengthened their own strategic points (*nāké jāgā*) and forts.

Fortifying out-of-the-way places, they remained encamped in the shelter of woods and cut off Mughal detachments." [Chitnis, ii. 43.]

At this stage the Marathas avoided pitched battles—except when they had to relieve a fort, nor did they stay long within easy reach of the Mughal armies. Their encampments during the rainy months were in obscure and inaccessible places. Their bands did not hold together all the year round, but dispersed to their several homes after the campaigning season of six months (October to April) was over.

§ 4. *Mutual jealousies of the Maratha ministers and generals: factions formed.*

Ramchandra's task was no easy one. For one thing, many of his best forts and most of his fertile country were in Aurangzib's hands. He had, besides, to control generals who were inclined to pay him little obedience though Rajaram had publicly proclaimed that the *Hakumat-panāh's* orders were not to be upset even by the king. [Chit., 40.] The distribution of territory for plunder made by Ramchandra among his generals was not always respected by them, and hence they frequently came to blows among themselves over the booty or the fields of their raids.

There was mutual jealousy among the ministers left in Maharashtra as well as at the Court of Jinji. Parashurām Trimbak formed a faction of his own and drew Santāji Ghorparé into it. The natural consequence was that Dhana Singh Jādv was backed by Ramachandra. Santā's insubordination proved unbearable; he would not obey the Regent of the West, nor co-operate in any national enterprise (like the relief of Panhala in 1693) planned by him, preferring to conquer an independent estate for himself. Ramchandra had, therefore, to secure the king's consent to Santā's dismissal and even refused for a month together to grant him an interview [Chit. 34.] Then another minister Shankarāji Malhār took Santā under his wing, formed a plan of co-operation and division of spoils with him and sent him to Madras with an earnest request to serve the king more faithfully than he had done in the West. Another refractory and selfish general of great power was Nimā Sindhiā, but he rose to prominence after the death of Rajaram. [J. S.]

Ramchandra struggled against these difficulties as best he could, and on the whole he succeeded fairly well. As the acute observer Bhimsen remarks about the year 1697, "Among the Marathas not much union was seen. Every one called himself a *sardar* and set out to raid and plunder [for himself]" (*Dilkasha*, ii. 122a).

The rivalry between Santā Ghorparé and Dhanā Jādv precipitated a civil war in 1696, as we have seen [Ch. 52, § 8 and 9.] Three battles were fought between them, Dhanā being supported by the king's authority. The first encounter was a mere demonstration, in the second Santā was victorious, and in the last one Dhana. The murder of Santā (June 1697) created a blood-feud between his son Ranuji and his brother Baharji (surnamed *Hindu Rao*)

on one side and Dhanā's party on the other, which took long to heal. But this internal discord among the Marathas gave the Mughals only a brief respite.

Ramchandra cleverly provided shelters for the families for the Maratha combatants in South Konkan and the Portuguese territory of Daman, which had not yet been penetrated by Mughal armies, and also in the Berad country and the north-western corner of Mysore, which the Emperor was not yet free to invade. Many Marathas also lived unknown for years in the Mughal cities, even at Aurangabad, with the secret sympathy of local residents (many of whom were kin to them).

§ 5. *Tara Bai rules as queen-mother; her character and policy.*

A change took place at the Maratha head-quarters when Rajaram returned home in March 1698. Nominally the king assumed the authority, but in fact Ramchandra still continued to guide the operations and issue the orders. This state of things, however, lasted for only two years. When Rajaram died, on 2nd March 1700, and then his natural son Karna after a three weeks' reign, Tārā Bāi crowned her own (legitimate) son Shivaji, a boy under ten years, and ruled with the help of Parashuram Trimbak.

Thus a second regency ensued in the Maratha kingdom; but it was of a different kind from the earlier regency of 1689-1697. There was no longer a grown-up king or regular Court, as a final authority and source of reference, even in distant Jinji. The new king was a minor, a mere child; nor was his right undisputed among his subjects, as his half-brother Shambhuji II was set up as rival for the throne. The supreme guiding force in Maharashtra now was not any minister but the dowager queen Tārā Bai

Mohité. Her administrative genius and strength of character saved the nation in the awful crisis that threatened it in consequence of Rajaram's death, the disputed succession to his throne, and Aurangzib's unbroken victories from 1699 to 1701. Already in her husband's lifetime she had displayed masculine energy and intelligence, and begun to draw the threads of the administration into her own hands. The hostile Muslim historian Khafi Khan is constrained to call her wise, enterprising, expert in administration, and popular with the army. The entire Mughal camp had exulted on first hearing the news of Rajaram's death, "as if the roots of the Maratha disturbances had been thereby cut away. Alas! they knew not God's will. Under Tārā Bai's guidance,* Maratha activity began to increase daily." [K. K. ii. 469.] "She took into her own hands the control of all affairs,—such as the appointment and change of generals, cultivation of the country and planning raids into Mughal territory. She made such arrangements for sending troops to ravage the six subahs of the Deccan, nay even up to Sironj and Mandesor in Malwa,—and winning the hearts of her officers, that all the efforts of Aurangzib against the Marathas down to the end of his reign failed." [*Ibid*, 516.]

Immediately after the death of Rajaram, Parashurām Trimbak, out of jealousy for the other ministers then in Satara, came out of his own fort of Parli and offered to join the Mughals. But he did not definitely enter their service, nor did the Emperor fully trust him. Tārā Bai won this supremely able officer over to her interest by creating him *Pratinidhi*. She also appointed Shankara Narayan Gandekar

* We have seen in Ch. 52 how she was at first diffident and had proposed terms of submission to Aurangzib.

as *Sachiv*, after removing Shankara Malhar Nargundkar from the post. "Ramchandra continued as *Amātya* and, seemingly the supreme head of the administration, but Parashuram enjoyed the queen-mother's favour most." [Chit. ii. 71.]

§ 6. *Internal dissensions in the Maratha State.*

But it was only after a hard struggle that Tārā Bai's supremacy was established. "Some of the generals obeyed her, some did not. Rājas Bai [the junior wife of Rajaram and the mother of Shambhuji II.] began to quarrel with Tārā Bai and form her own faction." [*Ibid*, 72.] There was a third party among the Maratha leaders, who wanted to secure national unity by placing Shahu on the throne, as he represented the elder branch of Shivaji's descendants.

These dynastic quarrels were complicated by the cross-currents of personal rivalry among the Maratha generals Dhana Jādvā, as we have seen, had defeated Santā Ghorparé in 1697, and thus driven Santā's son Ranuji and brother Baharji into armed opposition to him. Late in December 1700 the two factions fought a battle ten or twelve miles from Islampur, both sides losing heavily in this fratricidal contest. Krishna Malhar sided with Dhana, and the Ghorparés were defeated and fled towards Ahirwari. Three weeks later (16 Jan. 1701) we hear of Ranuji staying at Jagjivani and forming plans for avenging his defeat on Dhana. [*Ahirwari*, 13 m. s. of Sholapur. *Jagjivani* 24 m. n. of Bijapur.]

On 11th Sep. 1701 it was reported to the Emperor that another battle had been fought between Dhana (with Dādo Malhar) and Hanumant Nimbālkar (his former ally) near Fachuni (? Jejuri or Chincholi) on the left side of the Nirā, in which Hanumant was taken prisoner. [*Akh*.]

Some time later Dhana visited Ranuji near Firuzabad (20 m. s. of Kulbargā) to make up their quarrel and form an alliance for the future. [*Dil.* 130*b.*] In September 1701, Ranuji and Baharji made an offer to join the Mughal service, and Dhana a similar proposal in July 1703, but all these overtures were insincere and solely prompted by the temporary pressure of rivals at home. Nothing resulted from them. The internal discords of the Marathas in 1707 will be described in Ch. LVII.

§ 7. *Shāhu's captive life, 1689-1707.*

Shāhu, the eldest son of Shambhuji, had become a prisoner of the Mughals at the age of nine, when Raigarh surrendered in October 1689, and was kept under strict watch, though kindly treated, close to the Emperor's tent and within the circle of the red canvas screen (*gulāl-bār*) of the imperial quarters.* With him were his mother Yesu Bai and his half-brothers Madan Singh and Madhu Singh.

At the capture of Jinji (Jan. 1698), four wives, three sons, and two daughters of Rajaram were taken, and they were brought to the Emperor's camp and lodged near Shāhu [*M.A.* 407.] On the 10th September of this year, Shāhu's half-brother Madhu Singh died. [*Akh.*]

* "The Emperor ordered that suitable tents should be pitched within the *gulal-bar* for Shambhuji's mother and other relatives, and they should be made to alight there with all respect and privacy. Close to the camp of the wazir, the camp of the *Rani's bazar* was located, for her servants and dependents to live in. Annual pensions were settled on them all, according to their position. Shahu was given the *mansab* of 7-hazari (*zat* and *sawar*) and the title of Rajah . . . and with his younger brothers . . . made to live with his grandmother and mother." [*M. A.* 332.]

In 1700 Shāhu had a severe attack of illness, which seems to have left his body and mind shattered for the rest of his life. The Court news-letter gives the following account of it :—

Rajah Shāhu came to the audience on 26th August and made his bow. The Emperor after looking at him remarked that his colour had turned entirely yellow, and asked the reason for it. Hāfiz Ambar (eunuch) replied that the rajah did not eat any cooked *dal*, bread or rice, but only sweets (*pakwān*), on the ground that Hindus must not eat cooked food in prison, and he regarded himself as a prisoner. The Emperor replied, "Tell the rajah to visit Hamid-ud-din, who will talk to him."*

As difficulties thickened round Aurangzib and the Deccan tangle seemed insoluble, he began to form plans for settling the contest with the Maratha generals through Shāhu. First, on 9th May 1703, he sent Hamid-ud-din Khan to urge Shāhu to become a Muslim,† as the heirs to some other Hindu thrones had already been tempted to do in this reign. [*Akh.*] But Shāhu refused to apostatize. Next, the Emperor tried to create a division among the Marathas by releasing Shāhu. The terms of his release were to be settled by treaty with the leading Maratha generals, through the mediation of Prince Kām Bakhsh. For approaching the national leaders and winning them over, Raibhān the

* [*Akh.* Brief mention in *M. A.* 433; Chitnis 69 simply records his fever.] This dyspepsia, leading to fever and jaundice, seems to have troubled him long, as we read of his having taken the bath of recovery on the 4th June preceding. [*Akh.*]

† Rajaram's wife's brothers Khande Rao and Jagjivan, when prisoners of war under Aurangzib, were induced to become Muhammadans with the names of Abdur Rahim and A. Rahman, in return for their liberation. [*Akh.* 27 May, 22 July 1700.]

son of Vyankoji Bhonslé of Tanjore, was taken into the Emperor's service, created a 6-*hazari*, and sent to visit Shāhu (10th July 1703.)

On 27th November Shāhu was removed from the *gulal-bar* or enclosure of the Emperor's residence and sent to lodge near Kām Bakhsh's tents. Here some of the Maratha generals were expected to come and see him.* But the move failed. As Bhimsen bluntly puts it;—"The prince repeatedly sent his men to Dhana. But, as the Marathas had not been vanquished, and the entire Deccan had come into their possession like a deliciously cooked pudding, why should they make peace?.....The envoys of the prince returned in disappointment. Rajah Shāhu was again placed under surveillance in the *gulal-bar*." Further details of these negotiations are given by Khāfi Khan (ii. 520);—Dhana Jadav proposed terms of peace on behalf of all the authoritative Maratha generals, *viz.* that the Emperor should issue *farmāns* reassuring all the chief officers of Tara Bai and calling them. On their arrival, Kām Bakhsh with Rajah Shāhu should meet them ten miles in advance of the imperial camp; the Maratha chiefs would first wait on Shāhu and would then be presented to the Emperor by the prince. The Emperor ordered 80 such *farmāns* to be written; but in the end he distrusted the tricky Marathas and declined the proposal. Sultan Husain (Kām Bakhsh's officer and intermediary in these negotiations) had to fight his way back through the Marathas to the imperial camp.

* *Akh.*, M.A. 473, *Dil.* 145b, 147a. "Aurangzib tries to sow dissension among the Marathas by releasing Shahu, granting him the *chauth* [of the Deccan], and leaving Kam Bakhsh as governor of Bijapur, Golkonda and the two Karnataks, and himself retiring to Delhi." [*Storia*, iii. 499.]

On 29th Nov. 1703, it having been settled to marry Shāhu to the daughter of Bahadurji (the son of Rustam Rao), the latter was ordered to bring the girl from his estate to Court for the ceremony. [*Akh.* 29 Nov. 1703; *M.A.* 482.] In January 1704, two captive daughters of Rajaram were married to Shamshir Beg (grandson of Aghar Khan) and Rajah Necknam of Deogarh (a Muslim Gond), and a daughter of Shambhuji to Md. Muhi-ud-din (the son of Sikandar Adil Shah.)*

Aurangzib felt himself utterly helpless. In the last year of his life (1706) he decided to make another attempt at peace with the Marathas. Shāhu was transferred from his own camp to that of Nasrat Jang (25 Jan.) Raibhān, too, was posted under him in the hope of his being able to persuade the Maratha generals to make terms with the Emperor as the price of the release of Shāhu. Nasrat Jang wrote conciliatory letters to the Maratha generals and invited them to come and join Rajah Shāhu. But it was to no effect. A civil war had indeed broken out among the Marathas, Rājas Bai trying to seize Tārā Bai and thwarting all her plans; but the Emperor's hope of taking advantage of it and creating a further division by bringing Shāhu into it, failed. [*Dil.* ii. 154b-155a, *M.A.* 511.] It was only after Aurangzib's death that Prince Azam, then marching towards Agra, connived at the escape of Shāhu to the Deccan. [*Dil.* ii. 163a.]

* *M.A.* 480, 482; *Akh.* 24th and 25th Jan. 1704. On 5th Feb. 1704, a report reached the Emperor's camp that a boy slave had administered poison to the son of Rajaram and that son's mother, as well as to five maidservants, and that the maidservants were dead already and the prince and his mother were dying. [*Akh.*]

§ 8. *Notable Maratha chiefs on Aurangzib's side.*

It is not true that all the leading Maratha families were on the national side during the struggle with Aurangzib. Many of them served the Mughal Government, and for various reasons.

The noble house of Jādav Rai of Sindhkhed, in which the great Shivaji's mother had been born, entered the Mughal army early in Shah Jahan's reign (1630), after the murder of Lakhji Jādav Rao,* and they remained on the imperial side for several generations. But in Aurangzib's time, this family, though enjoying its wealth and honours, did not hold any high command or position of importance. This was probably due to the intellectual and moral decay which usually seizes old aristocracies. The Mughal official records do not mention any member of the family of Chandra Rao Moré (of Jāvli), though some of them had joined the Emperor's party in 1665, as we learn from Jai Singh's letters. They seem to have returned to the national cause or sunk into obscurity.†

Kānhoji Shirké and his sons, to whose family Rajaram's mother belonged, had been persecuted by Shambhuji and had fled for refuge to the Mughal Emperor, who gave them high posts. The Shirkés as well as Nāgoi

* Lakhji had deserted Malik Ambar for the Mughal side in 1620 and received a high mansab. Later, about 1630, he came back to his old master the Ahmadnagar king, by whom he was put to death at an audience. [Abd. Hamid, I.A. 308—310.]

† The despatches of Muizz-ud-din written by Madhuram mention a Moré as opposing the Mughals at the siege of Panhala in 1693. Vyankat, son of Chandra Rao (Moré?), the Mughal qiladar of Shah-bandar, was captured by the Marathas in Nov. 1694, and in consequence dismissed by the Emperor from the rank of a *hazari*. [Akh.]

Mané (the thanadar of Mhasvad and a Mughal partisan from 1694) remained consistently loyal and rendered long and meritorious service to the Mughals. In 1705, Kānhoji for his gallant exertions at Wagingerā was promoted to the second class of the Mughal peerage, as a commander of six thousand. [*Akh.*]

Three other devoted servants of the Emperor were Avji Adhal (thanadar of Khānāpur) who was made captive by the Marathas on 23rd Jan. 1700, Ramchandra (thanadar of Khātāu) who was mortally wounded when fighting at his post on 18th August 1700, and Baharji Panhré, whom we find in Mughal service as early as June 1694, and who was sometimes thanadar of Kashigaon. Baharji's brother Tukoji was promoted to be a commander of 1500 in July 1694 [*Akh.*]

Another Maratha chief in Mughal pay was Satvāji Dāflé, who had a more chequered career. This family* were the zamindars of Athni (west of Bijapur city) and barons under the Adil Shahi kings. On the fall of that monarchy they took service with the Mughal conqueror.

Satvā's son, Rāji Chāvan Dāflé, gave up his life most heroically in leading the storming party at the siege of Satara (13th April 1700).† But Satvā himself had deserted the Mughals before 1695 and continued to raid the imperial territory for many years after [*M. A.* 406 and *Akh.*] Towards the end of 1699 he offered his submission, but on

* Now represented by the Chief of *Jath*, one of the sardars of the Bombay Presidency. Another seat of the Dafles is *Daflapur*, in the Bijapur district. Aurangzib's *qaul-namah*, sent through Lutfullah Khan, forgiving Nagoji Mane's past offences and rewarding him for having stopped the flight of Santa, is given in *Sanads and Letters*, p. 85, with the incorrect date 1699.

† Described in chapter 54, § 4.

his way to the Mughal camp he was captured by Rajaram's men and taken to Satara [*Akh.* 15 Nov. 1699.] He continued his hostile activities for two years more, and came over to the Emperor as late as 30th August 1701, when he was presented to Aurangzib with his wrists bound together with a handkerchief like a captive. Imperial dignity having been thus satisfied, he was immediately released, created a 5-hazari, and given the jagir of Jath in reward of his late son's gallantry. In November he was employed to win the other Maratha sardars over to the imperial side. [*Akh.* 1 Nov. 1701.] Aurangzib always distrusted Satvāji Dāflē as being in secret concert with the enemy; but he was too important a chief to be dismissed, and is very frequently mentioned in the Court bulletins. Satvā died at Islampuri in July 1706. [*M. A.* 516.]

Amrit Rao Nimbalkar* at first sought and obtained service under the Mughals,—probably after the fall of Shambhuji. But in 1693 he deserted to the national side and served under Santā for some time [*Akh.* 23 and 24 Oct., 21 Nov. 1693.] A news-letter of 24 Sep. 1695 speaks of his leaving Santā and coming over to the Mughals. But he was soon afterwards back to Rajaram at Jinji, as we learn that he fell near Kanchi in May 1696 in the vanguard of Dhanā Jādv's army in a battle with Santā. [*J. S.*]

Achalji, called in the Persian histories a *khesb* (son-in-law) of Shivaji, joined Aurangzib in Feb. 1686 and was created a 5-hazari. We find him still in service in March 1694. [*M. A.* 271; *Akh.* 13 March 1694.] Madhaji Narayan, who is described as the son of Shivaji's uncle, came over to the Mughal side with his son and nephews in Nov.

* Hanumant Nimbalkar was one of the most persistent and active raiders of Mughal territory, and second only to Santa and Dhana in this respect. He died about March 1705. [*Dil.* ii. 152a.]

1694, and received his first appointment as a *2-hazari* on 6th Jan. 1695. We find him as the Mughal thanadar of Budh-Panchgaon in 1704.*

A very late accession to the Mughal banners was Raibhān, a son of Vyankoji the Rajah of Tanjore, and therefore a nephew of Shivaji. He was induced by a *6-hazari* mansab to join the Emperor's side (19 June 1703), and was at first employed as negotiator for making a peace with the Maratha generals by releasing Shahu. Though the attempt failed, Raibhān continued to serve the Emperor for the rest of his reign, and in 1706 tried again, under Nasrat Jang's orders, to make terms with the Maratha national leaders, using Shahu as the pawn in the Mughal hands. [*Dil.* 145*b*, 154*b*; *Akh.*]

Among the other adherents of the Mughals were Kānhoji (son of that Khāndoji Khopdé who had been beheaded by Shivaji in 1659) and whose paternal estate of Utroli had been seized by that king. Rao Jagdev (or Jagdalé of Masur thana, *Akh.* 11 May 1695),—Mānāji (son of Nāro Rāghav, *Akh.* Dec. 1694),—and Subhānji, the ex-commandant of Satara and his son (1700). The Marathi *bakhar* of Chitnis speaks of the family of Pisāl being on the Mughal side, and one branch of it turning Muslim, but they evidently occupied a low rank, as the Persian records do not mention their names.†

* *M. A.* 480; *Akh.* 24 June, 11 Nov. (interviews) 1694, 6 Jan. 8 June, 1695. On 2 Nov. 1701 the Emperor received at Court as new adherents the sons of a "Mahdāji, brother-in-law of Santa" (namely, Bajaji and Maloji) and the sons of Mādhuji (*viz.*, Jagdev, Kuldev and Firanguji.) Here *Santa* may also be read as *Shambha*. [*Akh.*]

† *J. S. Akh.* 5 Jan. 1701. Much minute information on the old Maratha families can be found in Rajwade, vols. xv and following and in *Kaifiyats*, *Yadis* &c. (in Marathi.)

Several thousands of Māvlés, or Maratha hill infantry, served under Aurangzib, having at their head a *chaudhuri* or *dārogha* to control them. But on the whole the presence of hired Maratha auxiliaries on the Mughal side had merely the effect of keeping them out of mischief, and did not add much to the strength of the imperial army. For one thing, their equipment and armament were far inferior to those of the regular Mughal troops, [*Dil.* ii. '146*b*, quoted in Ch. L. § 4] Then, they fought half-heartedly for their paymaster, and not in a true spirit of devotion. Thirdly, these Deccani captains were so often flitting in and out of the Emperor's service that no operation could be planned or carried out in reliance on them.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE CAPTURE OF WAGINGERA, 1705.

§ 1. *The Berad people and their country.*

The country extending east of Bijapur city, and enclosed by the Bhimā and the Krishnā rivers, is the home of the Berads, a race of aboriginal Kanarese, also called Dheds, and regarded as one of the lowest in the scale of Hindu castes. They are a virile and hardy people, not much advanced from savagery, but at the same time not toned down like the over-refined upper castes of Hindu society. They eat mutton, beef, pork, domestic fowls, etc., and drink to excess. Dark, muscular, and of middle height, with round faces, flat cheeks, thin lips and lank or frizzled hair, the Berads can bear fatigue and hardship, but have no taste for settled industry or peaceful arts. Their race name in Kanarese means "hunter", and while devoted to field sports of all kinds, they are also adepts in lawless pursuits, and often engage in organized crimes, such as dacoity and cattle-lifting, etc., in which they take pride. Their religion still consists of primitive superstitions and spirit-worship, though outwardly most of them profess to be Lingāyet and some Vaishnav Hindus. Their tribal organization under the heads of families and the judicial authority of their hereditary headmen ensured discipline and solidarity among them, and they supplied the most steady and accurate musketeers of South India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; Tipu Sultan's famous infantry was mostly composed of these people. According to their own story, the founder of their tribe pleased the god Shiva by his devotion and gained from him the two blessings that his descendants would be sure

shots and their lands would grow corn without much labour or water. Hence, the Berads have been good marksmen and they grow only the spring crops which require little water or care.

Their gallantry in war and contempt for wounds and death were as conspicuous as their skill in making night-attacks and surprises,—which we might naturally expect from such expert cattle-stealers. Indeed, their repeated victories over the regular troops of the Mughal empire in Aurangzib's reign led contemporary Persian historians to call them *Be-dar* (fearless) by a play on their name. [K. K. ii. 524; *Dil.* ii. 150*b*.]*

§ 2. *The Nāyak family of Shorāpur.*

The cradle-land of the Berads was Mysore, from which they advanced into the Rāichur doab and then further north into the country beyond the Krishnā and even the Bhimā. We are here concerned only with the Berard Nāyaks or chieftains of Shorāpur, lying in the fork between these two rivers. Their earliest capital was Sāgar, some 72 miles east of Bijapur city. When this was lost to the Mughals (1687), the Nāyak built a new capital at Wāgingerā, twelve miles south-west of Sāgar. At the close of Aurangzib's reign even this fort was taken from him, and the Nāyak removed his seat to Shorāpur, on the eastern face of the same hill-mass as Wāgingerā and four miles from it. Here the last of their princes, though brought up by Colonel Meadows Taylor with fatherly care, joined the Sepoy Mutiny, and when captured and sentenced to confinement shot himself dead (1858). With him the line ended.

* Meadows Taylor's *Story of My Life*, 3rd ed., 144, 210—213. *Bombay Gazetteer*, xxi. 163, xxiii. 91.

The Berad principality is now included in the Nizām's territory, but in the seventeenth century it was a vassal State of the kings of Bijapur. Pām Nāyak, its ruler, had loyally helped his sovereign Adil Shah during Aurangzib's siege of Bijapur and six years earlier had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mughal general Dilir Khan. But in November 1687 he had been attacked by an imperial army under Khānazād Khan and forced to give up his kingdom and fort of Sagar and visit Aurangzib's Court at Bijapur, where he died in a few days.*

The position of the Berad country, midway between Bijapur and Golkondā, and the martial but predatory character of its people made it very necessary for Aurangzib to keep it under his control. Bijapur is only 72 miles west, the rich and holy city of Kulbargā is 50 miles to the north, and the important strategic post of Malkhed (the gate to the Haidarabad kingdom) is some 45 miles north-east of Sāgar. The whole of the country bounded by these three towns, and even Bidar (60 miles north-east of Kulbargā) and Rāichur (in the south, across the Krishnā), lay within easy range of the raids of these unsubdued savages. Having lost their dominion at the surrender of 1687, their chiefs had now no resource left to them except to rebel, build new strongholds among the hills, and rob the Mughal territory around in imitation of the Marathas and afterwards in concert with them. The examples of the profitable defiance of the imperial power set by Dhana Jādav and Santā Ghorparé were not lost upon the Berad leaders. The Kulbargā district was kept in constant disturbance and the roads were closed to caravans by persistent but elusive bands

* For the history of this ruling family, see Appendix B, at the end of this chapter.

of Berad horsemen for many years after the fall of Sāgar. [*Akhbarat.*]

§ 3. *Pidiā Nāyak's career after 1687.*

Pidiā Nāyak, the nephew and adopted heir of Pām Nāyak, had succeeded to the headship of his clan after the Mughal conquest of Sāgar and the death of his uncle (on 1 Jan. 1688.) He rendered useful service at Ruhullah Khan's siege of Rāichur (1689). On the fall of that fort, he went to his home on a week's leave to replenish his equipment and quota of troops, but busied himself in fortifying Wāgingerā and raising an army. After the loss of Sāgar, the families of the Berad Nāyak and his nobles had taken refuge in the village of Wāgingerā, twelve miles west of it. Their houses stood on a hill which Pidiā now enclosed with fortifications and to which he added a walled village on a lower level. He collected twelve thousand excellent musketeers of his tribesmen and steadily increased his artillery and munitions of war. "While outwardly conducting himself as a loyal subject and paying revenue to the Emperor, he gradually collected money and men. By strengthening the defences of the town (Wāgingerā) and increasing cultivation in its neighbourhood, he acquired power and authority, became the chief ally of the Marathas in robbery and rebellion, and dispossessed Pam Nāyak's own son Chokapā. The latter appealed to the Emperor for his patrimony," and took from him a sanad of succession, but could not get possession of the zamindari. [*M. A.* 491-2, *K. K.* ii. 525-26.]

§ 4. *Early Mughal campaigns against Pidiā.*

Pidiā's robberies in the Kulbargā district became too serious to be neglected any longer. At last, on 27th May

1691 the Emperor sent his son Kām Bakhsh from Bijapur, in charge of Bahramand Khan, to attack Wāgingerā. Three weeks later, another high commander Hamid-ud-din Khan, was deputed to the Sāgar district, evidently to keep in check the roving field armies of the Berads. Kām Bakhsh spent only two months before Wāgingerā, during which he dug trenches, mounted guns, and fought almost daily conflicts with the enemy. On 20th July he was sent off to the Madras Karnātak, and the operations against the Berads were entrusted to Ruhullah Khan. [*M. A.* 339-40, 344, 354-55; *Dil.* ii. 102*b*]. The latter "could not achieve the task; the Berads twice fell on his entrenchment and destroyed it; many on the Mughal side were slain, including the celebrated Ranmast Khan.* So Ruhullah Khan opened negotiations with the enemy." This was exactly what Pidia was seeking. It was not in his interest to carry the contest to an extreme. He bribed Ruhullah and lulled him into inactivity. [*Dil.* ii. 103*a*; *M. A.* 491.]

After five months Ruhullah was recalled and Azam sent to relieve him (18th December 1691). This prince stayed there for a year, ravaging the country and checking Berad activities. Pidiā then submitted, appealed to the prince's mercy, presented him with two lakhs of rupees and made peace with the Emperor by paying an indemnity of seven lakhs and promising to remain as an obedient subject and pay the revenue regularly. But in December 1692 the critical situation at Jinji compelled the Emperor to remove Azam from Sāgar to Kadāpā in order to support the Karnatak expedition, and Pidiā soon afterwards resumed his old brigandage and usurpation of land. When Firuz

* Brother of Khizr Khan Pani of Bijapur. He had been created Bahadur Khan in 1683 (*M.A.* 235). Had defeated Shivaji in 1679.

Jang was sent against him (April 1696),* he “played the same jackal’s trick on him” and escaped destruction by promising a tribute of nine lakhs. [M. A. 345, 492; K. K. ii. 526.]

§ 5. *Aurangzib marches against Pidiā Nāyak.*

Thereafter for nine years the Emperor was too deeply entangled with the Marathas to attend to the Berads, and Pidiā resumed his raids and extension of territory without fear or hindrance.

At last, towards the close of the year 1704, after the great Maratha forts of Satara and Parli, Panhālā and Vishālgarh, Kondānā and Tornā had all been captured, the Emperor turned to Wāgingerā, as Pidiā was now menacing the city of Bijapur itself. [Dil. ii. 149b.] Arriving before the fort on 8th February 1705, he laid siege to it. Chin Qalich Khan, the subahdar of Bijapur, in whose jagir the Berad country lay, took up his position half-a-mile from the fort with Muhammad Amin Khan, Tarbiyat Khan (Mir Atish), and the officers of the imperial artillery. Aurangzib’s tents were pitched two miles from the walls.

§ 6. *Fort and environs of Wāgingerā described.*

Wāgingerā † stands on the western crest of the same short range on the eastern extremity of which Shorāpur

* J. S. Also *Akhbarat*, year 40, under 6th and 10th May 1696. He captures a *garhi* named Samal or Chamal from these highway robbers.

† Description based on *Dil.* ii. 153a; *M.A.* 499; Meadows Taylor, 123; Framroz Jang’s *Shorapur*. A smaller fort was built on a neighbouring hill 5,000 feet apart, at a later date, by Nishti Irana, but it is now totally in ruins.

was built in later times. The hill here is about 250 feet high above the plain, and the fort is an irregular pentagon with seven bastions along its length. The fortifications are neither striking nor elaborate. In certain places the natural granite rock rising abruptly from the ground forms the only defence, but on the lower sides of the hill boulders have been utilized by connecting them with a wall $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick and composed of large irregular stones cemented together. The denuded tops present the spectacle of strange *tors* and huge piles of rocks. The old gate, named after Rām, faces the south-east and is eleven feet by nine. But after Aurangzib's conquest of the place another gate of nearly the same size was built in the western wall by his order, and an inscription records its completion by Hafiz Masaud on 1st Rajab 1117 A. H. (8th October 1705).

On the plain in the south, facing the fort gate, there is a village called *Talwārgerā*, enclosed by a mud wall and containing the market for the supply of the garrison. Close to it was *Dhedpura*, a hamlet of grass huts, where the families of the common Berads lived and from which they tilled the surrounding lands. These three were the only inhabited places there; but close to the fort in the east and north were a number of hillocks which would be of great service to besiegers. One of these, called *Lāt Tikri* from its red soil, slightly commanded a portion of Wāgingerā itself and had a very important bearing on the defence of that fort. The Berads had not thought of protecting any of these outlying eminences by redoubt or outpost.

The strength of Wāgingerā lay not so much in its natural position or artificial defences, as in the courage and number of its garrison, the deadly accuracy of their musketry fire, and its ample supply of guns, rockets and artillery munitions. In addition to the famous *Kālā-piādās* or Berad

foot-musketeers, Pidiā had engaged some thousand active cavalry, both Hindu and Muhammadan, including many Sayyids of the Deccan (to the intense abhorrence of the pious Muslim Aurangzib).

The siege began early in February 1705. Tarbiyat Khan (Chief of Artillery), Chin Qalich Khan, Hamid-uddin Khan (a favourite of the Emperor and a very experienced fighter) and other officers began to throw up two high platforms and to run covered approaches from a position facing the gate of the fort. Prince Kām Bakhsh's contingent co-operated with them. [*Dil.* ii. 150*b*.] But, for many weeks the Mughals could do nothing. As the Court historian writes, "Every day the enemy sallied forth and attacked the imperialists. Great fights were fought. The big guns from the top of the hill raised the tumult of slaughter; rockets followed each other with vehement force." (*M. A.* 498). This bombardment continued incessantly and made the advance of the Mughal trenches, or even their maintenance within range of the fort guns, impossible.*

§ 7. *Lāl Tikri taken and lost by Mughals.*

One morning while the Mughal generals were out reconnoitring for weak points in the defences, they suddenly charged up Lāl Tikri, drove away the Berad musketeers on its top and seized the position. But it was impossible for them to dig themselves in on that rocky height. Moreover, its capture was made on a sudden impulse, without any preconcerted plan for sending up a supporting force, sappers

* History of the siege in *M.A.* 498—506; *Dil.* ii. 153*a*; K. K. ii. 527—538 (a mere secondary compilation). For the manners and character of the Berad people see Meadows Taylor's *Story of My Life*;

and miners and trenching materials, or the co-operation of the other wings of the army in diverting the enemy from this hill. The Berads immediately sent there large bodies of their infantry, who swarmed up the hillside "numberless like ants and locusts," and plied their muskets and hurled stones with deadly accuracy on the imperialists crowded helplessly on the top. The Mughals began to fall back by the way they had come, and even reinforcements, tardily sent by Kām Bakhsh and Asad Khan, failed to restore the battle. The narrow crest and side of Lāl Tikri were so much encumbered with dead horses, elephants and men that these fresh troops could not reach the spot; they only added to the crowd and confusion on the hillside. The position had at last to be abandoned after heavy losses.

The Emperor disapproved of the plan of making another attempt on Lāl Tikri, and ordered his generals to attack Wāgingerā from some other side. That day, while Chin Qalich and Muhammad Amin were riding out to select suitable places for trenching, a cannon ball from the fort killed the horses of both, but the the riders were unhurt.

The Mughal trenches started from a spot between Lal Tikri and the hillock opposite Talwārgerā, while an outpost was established under Muhammad Amin Khan between Lal Tikri and these trenches, to guard against enemy attacks from that hill. The hillock facing Talwārgerā* was occupied by Kām Bakhsh's troops and another mound near by was held by Bāqar Khan, both being subjected to daily

* The hillock occupied "for a time" by Kam Bakhsh's men is called in *M.A.* "the conquered hillock," which Khafi Khan takes to mean Lal Tikri. But we know that the Mughals were dislodged from this Lal Tikri the very day they surprised it, and also that it was in Berad possession when Nasrat Jang arrived there later. So, I take it that Talwargera, the hillock opposite the *peth*, is meant here.

attacks of the enemy, but checking their advance and thus safeguarding the siege trenches. The Mughals now seemed to be fairly on the road to success.

§ 8. *Arrival of Marathas.*

But a new enemy now appeared to dash down their hopes and nullify their efforts. On 8th March [acc. to *M. A.*, but 26th acc. to *Akh.*] a Maratha force of five to six thousand horse under Dhana Jādav and Hindu Rao (brother of Santā Ghorparé) arrived near the fort to support their Berad allies, because the families of many Maratha generals had taken refuge there while Aurangzib had been capturing their own strongholds in Maharashtra. The only force that Aurangzib could spare from the siege-trenches to go out and fight the new comers numbered 8,181 men. [*Akhbarat* 27th March.]

The first task of the Marathas was to remove their families safely from this fort, whose fall they believed to be certain, as not even the most powerful forts of Shivaji had been able to withstand Aurangzib's assault. [*M. A.* 500.] While the main body of the new comers kept the imperialists in play by a noisy feint against the siege lines in front of the fort, assisted by a heavy fire from the walls, another body of 2,000 picked troopers brought their women and children out by the back-door of Wagingera, mounted them on swift mares, and escaped, their rear being guarded by a body of infantry that sallied out of the fort.

Pidiā had promised the Marathas a daily subsidy of several thousand rupees as long as they would assist in the defence of his capital, but they advised him to make terms with the Emperor, as resistance to him was vain. The Berad chief, however, continued to subsidise and feed them, and they halted in the neighbourhood, and made frequent

attacks on the Mughals. Though no decisive action took place and the Marathas retired from the field every evening, the imperialists suffered much loss and their hearts were shaken.

The Mughal army itself was now thrown into a state of siege. Its activities ceased and it was confined to its own lines. "Though a strong wall had been raised round the imperial camp, the enemy used to make sorties every night and fire rockets and muskets into the camp, thus reducing the men there to extreme distress, so that no one could step outside. Grain and fodder became extremely scarce in the camp. The Emperor censured his generals, but it had no effect. They were distracted on seeing the enemy's large number and their own dangerous situation." [*Dil.* ii. 150b.]

§ 9. *False peace proposals by Pidiā Nāyak.*

Pidiā, as advised by his Maratha allies and also following his old policy, made proposals of submission to the Emperor. Aurangzib appeared to welcome these negotiations, but his real object was to gain time and call up heavy reinforcements from far and near for a supreme effort.

Abdul Ghani, a glib-tongued lying Kashmiri pedlar, who used to hawk his wares in the camp and secretly in the fort too, one day brought to Hedāyet-kesh (the chief of the imperial Intelligence Department) a letter from Pidiā proposing peace, and told a story of his having gone near the fort wall to say his evening prayer when some Berads had suddenly seized him and taken him inside, where their chieftain had entrusted him with the letter. Aurangzib failed to detect the enemy's trick and the Kashmiri's worthless character; he gave a favourable reply to the letter and nominated his son Kām Bakhsh as mediator in the negotia-

tions, so that in the official proclamations and histories the credit for gaining Wāgingerā might be recorded in that prince's name. Pidiā next sent his brother Som Singh to the Mughal camp, offering to give up the fort and asking that the zamindari, the headship of the clan, and a *mansab* might be granted to his brother. Muhtasham Khan, an officer then living in the camp without employment and a debtor to the Kashmiri, was requested by Pidiā to be sent in to take delivery of Wagingera. He was given a *mansab* by the Emperor and was admitted into the fort with some men [c. 20 March], while Som Singh stayed in the camp and spread the tale that Pidiā had turned mad and fled with the Marathas. The Kashmiri next brought a message from the Berad chief's mother repeating this story and begging that Som Singh might now be allowed to return and undertake the management of his estate, while the fort would be vacated in seven days. The Emperor sent Som Singh back with a *mansab*, a robe of honour and an elephant for himself and some jewels for his mother. And Abdul Ghani, the great maker of this glorious treaty, was created a commander of 300 horse! "The fire from the trenches ceased, and the generals were recalled from their posts to the Emperor's camp." [M. A. 502.]

And then the bubble burst. The whole thing was a fraud. Pidiā was alive and sane and still within the fort; he refused to surrender it and renewed his attacks. The Emperor almost went mad with rage and shame.

§ 10. *Nasrat Jang's vigorous operations.*

Meanwhile he had summoned his ablest generals from all sides,—Nasrat Jang (the captor of Jinji and Raigarh), Dāud Khan Pani (the wild Afghan fighter) and many brave giladars and faujdars with their choicest troops. Nasrat

Jang arrived on 27th March and the others soon afterwards. [*Akhbarat.*]

The day after his arrival Nasrat Jang rode out in full force to reconnoitre the fort,—Dalpat Rao's Bundelas forming his Van and Ram Singh Hādā's clansmen guarding his rear. After viewing the gate of Wāgingerā, he went to the side where two mounds were held by the imperialists, and galloped up to the hillock of Lāl Tikri from which the Mughals had been dislodged in the early days of the siege. The Berads in a large body offered him battle, firing at him from behind the boulders. Nasrat Jang charged them, climbed the hill, and drove out the enemy, who ran into the village of Talwārgerā at its foot, and began to ply their muskets from behind its mud wall. Many Rajputs fell in the attack on Lāl Tikri and outside the village. Rao Dalpat on his elephant came to the Van and, with the blind impetuosity of a true Rajput, wanted to storm the village, though it was walled round and held by such good shots. But Nasrat Jang turned away the hot-headed Bundela to a neighbouring hillock which was still in the enemy's hands. Here, too, many Rajputs, with only sword and spear, blindly advanced to the very edge of the fort ditch, only to be shot down by the garrison. Fifty Rajputs were slain and more than a hundred wounded in this part of the field; their loss in horses also was very great. "Most of the Rajputs now turned aside to pick up their dead and wounded brethren, and Dalpat was left with a very slender force, but he bravely went to the right wing of the Khan where the fighting was then hottest. The enemy fled from the second mound too and hid in the village of Dhedpurā. On this day twenty-one bullets and one rocket hit Dalpat Rao's elephant. The historian Bhimsen, sitting behind him on the same elephant, was struck by some musket shots, but his armour saved him.

Even the driver of the elephant was wounded, though clad in steel. The banners of Nasrat Jang were pitted with shot-holes like a crocodile's hide, and two of his elephant drivers were wounded and one killed. Similarly, there were heavy casualties in the centre and rear of the Mughal general's force." [*Dil.* ii. 152a.]* Jamshid Khan of Bijapur was killed by a cannon ball, but Nasrat Jang kept hold of the position he had gained with so much blood near the wall. Hamid-ud-din Khan, Tarbiyat Khan and other officers were pushed up by the Emperor to strengthen the point won here, while Chin Qalich Khan guarded the line of communications from behind some hillocks between Lal Tikri and the Emperor's camp.

Next day Nasrat Jang rode to the back of the fort to select a site for his own trenches. A large enemy force attacked him, but was defeated with heavy loss and driven back to the hill by Dalpat Rao. A few days later the Khan captured some wells situated on the skirt of the hill whence

* The battle is thus described in *Akh*. "Spies report that the Berads, having issued from the fort, had occupied different points of the [now deserted] outposts of Sultan Husain [Kam Bakhsh's lieutenant], Md. Baqar and others. So, Nasrat Jang, on 31st March, after placing Dalpat in his Van and Ram Singh Hada in his rear-guard, . . . had gone to the top of a hillock and stood there. He had sent word to Chin Qalich Khan to guard his rear, while he was fighting the Berads in the front. Then N. J. advanced quickly and attacked the Berads with arrows and bullets. The enemy in Sultan Husain's trenches were killed. Then N. J. hastened against the Berad forces near the fort, who fled pursued by him to the fort-gate. Just then Dhana and Hindu Rao came to the rescue of the Berads, and there was a severe fight at close quarters. About 400 Berads were slain or wounded. The Marathas fled. The Mughals too lost heavily. . . . Then N. J. came back to his own quarters and sent a message to the Emperor that he would try to force the fort gate the next day."

the enemy used to draw their water; he then strengthened the position in front of the gate by entrenching and mounting guns on the two hillocks facing the gate which were now in Mughal hands. Under the protection of palisades and head-covers his men advanced and made a lodgement close to the fort wall. The Berads now offered submission with greater earnestness than before, but Nasrat Jang, without heeding their words, delivered an assault on Talwārgerā on 27th April. His own contingent under Daud Khan, Dalpat Rao, and Ram Singh Hādā, with imperial troops under Hamid-ud-din, Tarbiyat and some other generals, formed two parallel columns of attack, while he stood on horseback to support them from behind. The imperialists eagerly charged on foot. The enemy fought while fleeing, but could not stop the onset. The Mughals entered the *peth* (walled village), slaying all who resisted, and the rest fled. The village was thereafter firmly held in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort above it.

§ 11. *Berads evacuate Wāgingerā.*

The Berads now found that further struggle was hopeless. Stationing a body of musketeers to keep firing on the Mughals outside the front gate all the day, Pidiā fled out of the back-door at night, "with the Marathā companions of his day of adversity."

When night came and the sound of musketry from within died down, some Mughal soldiers entered the fort to find out the true state of things. They saw the place entirely deserted. Then began the wild scene of confusion, rapine and burning which is always witnessed whenever an enemy fort is entered by soldiers and camp followers in the absence of any commanding officer and a strong police guard.

The few imperialists who were first within Wāgingerā set fire to the houses.*

The flames were visible for miles around, proclaiming the fall of the enemy's stronghold. Daud Khan and some other nobles verified the fact of Pidiā's flight; they did not remain in the fort that night, but went to Nasrat Jang's tents to congratulate him on the final success of his operations.

It was well that they went outside. For, at the news of the fort being vacated, there was a wild rush of camp followers, common soldiers and all the ruffians of the camp, in the hope of plunder before the Government agents should come and attach the property. The fire from the burning roofs spread to a powder magazine, and there was a terrible explosion. "Many people were blown up into the air, and their corpses could not be found. After two or three days, a second magazine exploded." [*Dil.* ii. 153a.]

Wagingerā was captured, but its chieftain had escaped and lived to give trouble to the victors.† Thus, all Aurangzib's labours for these three months were lost. Nasrat Jang

* *Dilkashā* (eye-witness). But *M. A.* says that the Berad rear-guard of musketeers set fire to their houses and property in the evening, before leaving the fort. (Unlikely.)

† We may summarise here the further history of the Berads: In 1706 Pidia and Hindu Rao captured Penu-konda and made its Mughal qiladar a prisoner. The Berads seized fort Allur, 28 m. from Kulbarga, but Tarbiyat Kh. recovered it. About April 1706 Pidia was chased by Sarafraz Kh., evidently in the Berad country, and Chokkāpā (the present chief of Sagar) who had been loyally helping the imperialists was rewarded. [*M.A.* 513.] In July 1706 the Marathas again threatened Wagingera, [*Ibid.* 516] and a force had to be detached to the place under Tarbiyat. In the civil war between Dhana and Hindu Rao (Jan. 1707), Pidia deserted his former ally and joined Dhana in the attack on Sindur. [*Dil.* 158a.]

and his lieutenant Dalpat Rao were suspected by the Emperor of collusive help in the flight of Pidiā, and they fell into disgrace, getting rewards quite inadequate for such a glorious feat and being soon afterwards sent away to a distance to punish rebels and guard the road.*

The siege of Wāgingerā was the last military undertaking of the great Emperor Aurangzib, with all the resources of the empire of Delhi at his command. It supplies the most graphic illustration of the utter decline and weakness of the great State which Akbar had founded and Shah Jahan had carried to the highest pitch of wealth and splendour. For these two reasons its history has been fully narrated here.

APPENDIX B.

History of the Berad Nāyak family (based on the Telugu *Surapura-Rājula-Vamsāvali*, Mackenzie ms. No. 38, Madras Govt. Or. Libr. No. D 2656).

The Berad Nāyaks claimed descent from Guha, the hunter friend of Rāma. Gadde Pididi Nayak, who was settled at Karaki-halli or Vāginagiri, being childless, adopted his elder brother Gadde Lingi Nayak's fourth son Pāmi. The Nāyaks wrested Shorapur from an Adil Shahi qīladār c 1664. Gadde Pididi, after ruling for 3 years at Vāginagiri

* *Dil* ii. 153a and b. The official history, however, conceals the fact and represents that the Khan and all his followers were promptly and highly rewarded. [*M.A.* 505, 506.] But Tarbiyat Khan and the imperial eunuchs even, who, on the showing of this very official history, had done absolutely nothing at the siege, were lavishly rewarded for the fall of Wagingera, while the real captors got only modest promotions and gifts. Nasrat Jang had acquired a bad name at Jinji for collusion with the enemy.

and 12 years at Shorapur, died in 1678. His successor and adopted son Pāmi Nāyak, adopted his own elder brother's son Peda Pididi. About 1684 a son named Chokkappa was born to Pāmi. After a visit to Aurangzib's camp (1688) Pāmi was killed by the foul play of the wife of an old Muslim foe of his, after a reign of ten years. From that time Peda Pididi (popularly called Pid) was held as a hostage in Aurangzib's camp, till 1695, when the Emperor released him. Chokkappa, who had ruled during the interval of seven years, was deposed and confined, but escaped.

Peda Pididi was besieged in Vāginagiri by Aurangzib, but took to flight when Aurangzib gave Hindu Rao [Ghorparé] a bribe of one lakh of Rupees to induce him to betray the Nāyak. Aurangzib then razed the walls of Vāginagiri and the Gopalaswami temple and mutilated the idols. With the ruins he built a mosque and slaughtered cows there. (See inscription on the gate. 1116 A.H.)

After the death of Aurangzib Peda Pididi recovered Vāginagiri, demolished the mosque and rebuilt the Gopalaswami temple; he himself adopted Sri Vaishnavism with the name of Pitambara. Died in 1725 as a feudatory of Asaf Jah I. Nizām-ul-mulk. His son Pāmi Nayak founded the *fort* of Surapur and made it the capital of the family estate, named Sāgara-mandal.

CHAPTER LVII.

THE LAST PHASE 1705-1707.

§ 1. *Desolation of the country caused by Aurangzib's wars.*

The siege of Wāgingerā was the last campaign of Aurangzib. He was already turned of eighty-seven, and this fort was destined to be the bourne of his lifelong warfare and ambition to extend his empire. After its capture he set out on his return to Delhi, which death was to interrupt at Ahmadnagar less than two years afterwards. This is a point where the historian can most conveniently turn away from Aurangzib's camp and take a general view of the situation all over the country.

Such a survey afforded a most gloomy prospect. At the end of the 17th century the great empire founded by Akbar and raised to world-famed prosperity and splendour by Shah Jahan, was in a state of hopeless decay; administration, culture, economic life, military strength and social organisation,—all seemed to be hastening to utter ruin and dissolution.

The material waste caused to the empire by this quarter century of warfare was frightful. The desolation of the Deccan was complete. As a contemporary European observer notes, "Aurangzib withdrew to Ahmadnagar leaving behind him the fields of these provinces devoid of trees and bare of crops, their place being taken by the bones of men and beasts. Instead of verdure all is blank and barren. The country is so entirely desolated and depopulated that neither fire nor light can be found in the course of a three or four days' journey. . . . There have died in his armies over a hundred thousand souls yearly, and of animals, pack-oxen,

camels, elephants, &c., over three hundred thousand. . . . In the Deccan provinces from 1702 to 1704 plague [and famine] prevailed. In these two years there expired over two millions of souls." [*Storia do Mogor*, iv. 252 and 96.]

§ 2. *Maratha raiders dominant throughout the Deccan.*

As Aurangzib began his retreat northwards from the environs of Wāgingerā, the exultant Marathas in a vast horde of 50 to 60 thousand men followed his army a few miles in the rear, cutting off grain supplies and stragglers and even threatening to break into his camp. A force sent under Hamid-ud-din Khan to repel them was defeated, many of the Mughals being killed or carried off prisoners and giving their horses up to capture. On another side a second Maratha band looted a part of the baggage of the imperialists; but when they beheld the Emperor's *palki* they did not venture near it, "out of respect for him" as Bhimsen imagines. [*Dil.* ii. 155a.]

The same eye-witness writes, "When the Emperor was involved in the siege of Khelnā, the Marathas became completely dominant over the whole kingdom and closed the roads. By means of robbery they escaped from poverty and gained great wealth. I have heard that every week they gave away sweets and money in charity, praying for the long life of the Emperor who had proved [to them] the Feeder of the Universe! The price of grain grew higher and higher; in the imperial camp in particular vast numbers perished (of hunger), and many kinds of illegal exactions and practices appeared. Ever since His Majesty had come to the throne he had not lived in a city but elected all these wars and hard marching, so that the inmates of his camp, sick of long separation, summoned their families to the camp and lived there. A new generation was thus born [under

canvas] ; they passed from infancy to youth, from youth to old age, and passing beyond old age girt up their loins for the journey to the world of the angels, and yet never once saw the look of a house, but only knew that in this world there is no other shelter than a tent." [*Dil.* ii. 141a.]

The difficulties of the imperialists were the opportunity of the Marathas. Bhimsen adds, "As the Marathas are gaining large sums on the road, they have changed its name from *shāh-rāh* (king's highway) to *shāh-rān* (? royal beauty.) When they invade a country they take from every pargana as much money as they desire and make their horses eat the standing crops or tread them underfoot. The imperial army that comes in pursuit can subsist only when the fields are cultivated [anew.] All administration has disappeared. . . . The realm has been desolated, nobody gets justice, they have been utterly ruined. The ryots have given up cultivation; the jagirdars do not get a penny from their fiefs. . . . Many mansabdars in the Deccan, starving and impoverished, have gone over to the Marathas." [*Dil.* ii. 139b.—140a, 157b.]

§ 3. *Causes of the dissolution of government.*

This contemporary observer tries to account for the dissolution of government thus: "When after the death of Shivaji his dominions passed on to Shambhuji, the system of the Maratha Government paying salaries to its officials disappeared. Rajaram, who succeeded Shambhuji, lost his capital (Raigarh) and had to flee to Jinji. So, the Maratha State servants supported themselves by plundering on all sides, and paying a small part of their booty to the king. . . . In despair of getting their monthly salaries regularly, they regarded the plunder of Mughal territory as a gain and a means of maintaining themselves." [*Dil.* ii. 140a.]

There was a regular trade in booty by the Maratha raiders. Bhimsen gives one example. "The ruined village of Abhonā* was colonised by a Maratha named Rāgho, who had formerly served under the Mughal faujdar of Nāsik, and had afterwards taken to robbery. He used to bring his plunder from the surrounding country and lodge it here, and traders used to buy and sell these articles. As Rāgho was on friendly terms with all men, none hindered him!" [*Dil.* ii. 145a.]

§ 4. *Famine and chronic scarcity of grain.*

The effect of the enemy's robbery and stoppage of rent from the Mughal officers' jagirs was aggravated by a long-continued famine. 'Nowhere south of the Narmadā could grain be found cheaper than six seers a Rupee,'—while in certain periods it sold in the imperial camp for two seers or even less. Hence, "the condition of the Mughal army grew worse from the high price of grain and the devastation of jagirs, while the resources of the Marathas increased through robbery. They even attacked walled cities like Haidarabad, Bijapur, Aurangabad, and Burhānpur. When the Emperor was marching from Khed to Wāgingerā (Nov. 1704), the Marathas plundered his baggage near Bahadurgarh and set fire to much that they could not carry off. This year their audacity was even greater than in the past. Out of the capital cities of the eight chief subahs of the empire, population has decreased in the three Deccan towns of Bijapur, Haidarabad and Burhānpur, while the villages round them have been totally ruined. From the Narmadā southwards, throughout the entire Deccan, in every pargana

* 23 m. n. w. of Chandor and 7 m. w. of Kalvan.

and village, the Marathas have spread like ants and locusts." [Dil. ii. 146a, 149, 138b.]

The break-down of the administration and of public peace created a vicious circle aggravating the evil, as Bhimsen has clearly pointed out: "The mansabdars, on account of the small forces under them, cannot gain control over the territories granted to them in jagir. The local zamindars, growing stronger, have joined the Marathas, levied troops, and stretched the hand of oppression over the realm. . . . As the imperial dominions have been given out in *tankha* (fief) to the jagirdars, so too the Marathas have made a distribution of the whole empire among their generals, and thus one kingdom has to maintain two sets of jagirdars! . . . The peasants subjected to this double exaction have collected arms and horses and joined the Marathas." [Dil. ii. 139a.—140a.]

Many of the Mughal mansabdars, goaded by poverty, began to plunder the innocent and loyal peasants to support themselves, and some went into shares with the Maratha raiders. Thoughtful people of Northern India serving in the Deccan now became so seriously alarmed about the future that they began to send away their wives and children for safety to their ancestral homes in Hindustan. [Dil. ii. 149b.]

§ 5. *Maratha system of spoliation described.*

The Marathas had reduced spoliation to a system. "As the Emperor and his troops were engaged in the inaccessible hills far in the south, the Marathas began to show greater audacity and raid the old provinces of the empire. Wherever they arrived they engaged in a regular revenue collection of the place and passed months and years there with wife and children in peace of mind. They divided the parganas

among themselves, and in imitation of the imperial Government they appointed their own *subahdārs*, *kamāvish-dārs* (revenue collectors) and *rāhdārs* (road-guards). Their subahdar was a leader of troops: whenever he heard of a large caravan coming, he overtook it at the head of [some] seven thousand cavalry and looted it. Everywhere *kamāvish-dārs* were posted for collecting the *chauth*. When a *kamāvish-dar* was opposed by a strong zamindar or imperial faujdar and could not levy the blackmail, the Maratha subahdar came to his aid, besieged and desolated the habitations there. The duty of the Maratha *rahdar* was this,—when traders wanted to travel unmolested by these people, the *rahdar* took a sum of money from each cart or bullock (three or fourfold the imperial faujdar's transit duty), and left the road open to them. In each subah the Marathas built one or two small forts (*garhis*), which they made their place of refuge and from which they issued to raid the country around.

“The powerful headmen of certain villages, in concert with the Maratha *subahdars*, built small forts and refused to pay revenue to the imperial Government, the Maratha troops supporting them. Up to the boundary of Gujrat and Malwa they have raided and reduced the country to dust. They looted caravans within 10 or 12 *koses* of the imperial army, and have even plundered the grain-market of the Emperor's own camp!” [K. K. ii. 517—518].

§ 6. *Changes in Maratha equipment and tactics.*

After 1703 the Marathas were masters of the situation all over the Deccan and even in parts of Northern India. The Mughal officers were helpless and reduced to the defensive; they only sought to escape from the enemy by flight

or by the payment of blackmail, without venturing to resist them. A change now came over the Maratha tactics with this growth of their power: they were no longer, as in Shivaji's and Shambhuji's times, light forayers who "cut and ran" or merely looted defenceless traders and villages, and dispersed at the first report of the Mughal army's approach,—moving like the wind and keeping themselves in hiding as far as possible. On the contrary, as Manucci noticed in 1704, "These [Maratha] leaders and their troops move in these days with much confidence, because they cowed the Mughal commanders and inspired them with fear. At the present time they possess artillery, musketry, bows and arrows, with elephants and camels for all their baggage and tents. They carry these last to secure some repose from time to time. . . . In short, they are equipped and move about just like the armies of the Mughal. . . . Only a few years ago they did not march in this fashion. In those days their arms were only lances and long swords two inches wide. Armed thus, they [used to] prowl about on the frontiers, picking up here and there what they could; then they made off to home again. But at the present time they move like conquerors, showing no fear of any Mughal troops." [*Storia*, iii. 505].

In the internal administration the break-down of Aurangzib's Government was equally conspicuous. On account of his absorption in the Deccan wars, the exhaustion of his resources and best men there, and, according to Khāfi Khan, his senile softness in not punishing wrongdoers sternly,—all administration ceased, the officials became incorrigibly corrupt and inefficient, all the forbidden exactions (*abwabs*) were revived by the local governors in violation of his orders, and even the sergeants sent from the Court to punish the wrongdoers took bribes and let the evils continue. [K. K.

ii. 550-551.] As Manucci observed [iv. 100], the Emperor in his old age was disobeyed by his distant officials and the administration lost its efficiency.

§ 7. *Aurangzib encamps at Devāpur, 1705.*

Immediately after the capture of Wāgingerā (27th April, 1705), the Emperor removed his camp to Devāpur, a quiet green village near the Krishnā, eight miles south of the fort. Here his soldiers and followers gained unwonted comfort and repose. [*M.A.* 507.] The district, so long ravaged by war, was settled again; lawless oppressors were put down by a strong roving column under Chin Qalich Khan; the peasantry were reassured and induced to return to their homes and engage in tilling again. The walls of Wāgingerā were repaired and strengthened, and a new gate* and mosque added to it by the Emperor's eunuch Khwājah Masaud. The tributes collected from the refractory chiefs of the surrounding country reached the Treasury.

During the rainy season the Marathas recovered Kondānā, thanks to the cowardice and negligence of the Mughal qiladar. Hamid-ud-din Khan was immediately afterwards detached to recover it, but he returned after merely riding round it. So, at the end of January 1706, Nasrat Jang was ordered to capture it. This he succeeded in doing in a month's time, by cutting off the grain supply of the garrison and forcing them to evacuate the fort with their bare lives. [*M.A.* 508-'12; *Dil.* ii. 155*b*.]

* This western gate (8 feet by 11) bears his inscription: "By command of the Emperor....Aurangzib....under the management of....Hafiz Masaud, built on 1st Rajab 1117 A. H. 49th year of the reign"=8 Oct. 1705.

§ 8. *Illness of Aurangzib at Devapur.*

At Devāpur the soldiers had just recovered a little from their campaigning hardships of the last six years, when the whole camp was thrown into the greatest alarm and distress by the Emperor's illness. His spare frame had been enabled by regular habits and a sober life to stand incessant work and rigorous marching for well-nigh ninety years marvellously well; but at last it seemed to have been worn out. And if he died, the only bond that held the empire together, the single force that guided and protected the lives of hundreds of millions, would be dissolved, and the North-Indian army, girt round by countless ill-subdued enemies in that far-off southern land of hills and jungles and strange peoples, would perish helplessly. Despair seized all men, from the highest officers to the humblest tent-pitcher, when Aurangzib fell ill and took to his bed.

At first he had courageously struggled with disease, and had through sheer strength of mind continued for some days to transact business as usual and even to peep out of his bed-room window to reassure the public that he was alive. Though he could not hold public Court, "he received petitions from all who had business with him; and wrote answers and orders on them with his own hand with great firmness." [*M.A.* 508.] But the strain of this work only increased his malady, till he was seized with great pain, which at times made him senseless. Then the terror and agitation of the camp reached the extreme, and the wildest rumours spread about his death, wars among his sons, and usurpation of power by his generals ambitious of creating independent principalities for themselves.

The Emperor lay in this state for ten or twelve days, and then he began to rally, but slowly, and still feeling very

weak. At this time, one day in extreme agony he muttered these verses of Shaikh Ganja:

*"By the time you reach your 80th
or 90th year,
You must have received many a hard blow
from the hand of Time;
And when from that point you reach the
stage of a hundred years,
Death will put on the garb of your life."*

Amir Khan, who was in attendance by the sick-bed, tried to console the sufferer, saying "Peace be on your Majesty! Shaikh Ganjā composed those verses merely as introductory to the following couplet:—

*Then, it is better for you to be cheerful,
Because, by being cheerful you can remember
God!"*

The Emperor had the couplet recited to him again and again and read it written down on a piece of paper, and received from it divinely sent comfort and strength in his troubles.* The next morning he left his bed and visited the Court of Justice. "The people got back their lives." [M.A. 509-510.]

§ 9. Imperial camp marches to Ahmadnagar, 1706.

On 23rd October, 1705, Aurangzib broke up the encampment at Devāpur and set out northwards in a *palki*. Travelling slowly by easy stages, in a month and a half he reached Bahadurgarh, on the Bhimā, on 6th December. Here a halt of 40 days was made for passing the month of fasting (6 Dec.—4 Jan.) and the days of religious celebra-

* The royal physician Haziq Khan, who had effected the cure by means of the China root (*Similax China*) was weighed against gold.

tion following it. Then resuming his march on 14th January, 1706, he reached Ahmadnagar, 50 miles northwards, on the 20th, after an interval of 23 years since the time when he had started from it to begin his Deccan conquests.

This place he declared as his "journey's end," [K. K. ii. 541; *Ahkam* § 56], and here he stayed till death overtook him on 20th February 1707.

At Ahmadnagar Prince Muhammad Azam arrived on 25th March. On hearing of the Emperor's illness at Devāpur last year, he had begged hard to be allowed to come to his side, but Aurangzib had refused permission: he did not wish to suffer the fate of Shah Jahan at the hands of his ambitious and powerful sons in his sickness and old age [K. K. ii. 541.] Furthermore, he wanted to keep poor weak Kām Bakhsh at a safe distance from Azam's unscrupulous ambition. But at last he had yielded to repeated entreaty and allowed Azam to come to him. Bidār Bakht was sent to take charge of the province of Gujrat vacated by his father, pending the arrival of the new subahdar Ibrāhim Khan from Kashmir (who, however, died on the way). Malwa and Khandesh were placed under Khan-i-Alam and Najābat Khan respectively, while Bijapur continued to be governed by Chin Qalich Khan. [*M.A.* 512.]

§ 10. *Sorrow and despair of Aurangzib's last years.*

The last years of Aurangzib's life were inexpressibly sad. On the political side he found that his lifelong endeavour to govern India justly and strongly had ended in anarchy and disruption throughout the empire. His own health had broken down, and the Court news-letters every now and then give us pathetic glimpses of the weak old Emperor ordering the screen of his bedroom tent to be drawn

aside a little, while officers, horses &c. were passed in the courtyard below, as if presented to him for inspection. In this way did he keep up the form of holding public darbars daily, to which he had been devoted for fifty years.

A sense of unutterable loneliness haunted the heart of Aurangzib in his old age. One by one all the older nobles had died out, and the sole personal friend and survivor of the generation in which his youth had been nurtured that was now left to Aurangzib was Asad Khan the wazir, and even he was thirteen years his junior. As the aged monarch looked round his Court circle he only found on all sides younger men, timid sycophants, afraid of responsibility, afraid to tell the truth, and eternally intriguing in a mean spirit of personal greed and mutual jealousy. His Puritan austerity had, at all times, chilled the advances of other men towards him, but its effect was intensified by the reputation of being a miracle-working saint (*Alamgir, zinda pir*) which grew on him with each succeeding year. Men shrank in almost supernatural dread from one who was above the joys and sorrows, weakness and pity of mortals, one who seemed to have hardly any element of common humanity in him, who lived in the world but did not seem to be of it. The genial human heart was not touched in others by Aurangzib, and therefore his own heart's hunger could not be satisfied. His sole companions, when free from the ever-engrossing State affairs, were his daughter Zinat-un-nisā, already an old maid, and his last wife Udipuri, a low animal type of partner, whose son Kām Bakhsh broke his imperial father's heart by his freaks of insane folly and passion.

His domestic life was darkened, as bereavements thickened round his closing eyes. His best-loved daughter-in-law, Jahānzeb Bānu, died in Gujrat in March 1705. His rebel son Akbar had died in exile in a foreign soil in 1704,

but the authentic news of it reached him only in 1705. Still earlier, his gifted daughter, the poetess Zeb-un-nisā had ended her days in the prison of Delhi (1702). And now Gauhar-ārā Begam, the sole survivor among his numerous brothers and sisters, died in 1706, and the news of it dragged out of his heart the pathetic cry, which he repeated again and again, "She and I alone were left among Shah Jahan's children." [*M. A.* 513.] In May 1706, his daughter Mihr-un-nisā and her husband Izid Bakhsh (Murād's son) both died together in Delhi, and next month Buland Akhtar, the son of Akbar. Two of his grand-children died shortly before his own death (1707), but his ministers mercifully withheld the news from the sinking man.

§ 11. *Imperial dominions harassed by Marathas,*
1706-1707.

Aurangzib had left desolation and anarchy behind him when he set out for Ahmadnagar. But his retreat to this city did not bring rest to his army or peace to his empire. In April or May 1706, a vast Maratha army under all their great generals,—Dhana Jādav, Nimā Sindhia, Dādo Malhār, Rambhā Nimbālkar and others,—appeared four miles from the imperial encampment and threatened it. Aurangzib sent Khan-i-Alam and other officers to drive them away, but this force was hopelessly out-numbered and had to be strongly reinforced before it could succeed, after a long and severe contest, in repulsing the Marathas from the neighbourhood. [*Dil.* ii. 155*b.*]

In Gujrat, the interval between Azam's departure and Bidār Bakht's arrival was marked by a terrible disaster to the imperialists. Inu Mānd, a former brewer of Khandesh, who had taken to a very profitable course of highway

robbery, gathered a band of followers and made a league with the Maratha generals. Inviting Dhana Jādav and his army, he sacked the large and rich trading centre of Barodā (Mar. 1706). Nazar Ali, the faujdar of the place, was defeated by the Marathas and captured with his men; other imperial officers fled to Broach; and the raiders retired in safety with a vast booty* [*Dil.* ii. 156a.]

Similarly, the province of Aurangabad was frequently ravaged by the Maratha bands under Dhana Jādav and other leaders. The Emperor ordered Nasrat Jang to punish the enemy. Leaving his baggage in Ahmadnagar (May 1706), he rapidly advanced to Tisgāon (24 m. e.) and thence followed the trail of the ever-shifting Marathas to Bir (65 m. e. of Ahmadnagar). The pursuit was closely kept up. The Marathas fled by way of the Dharamपुरi *ghat*, Purley (13 m.n.e. of Ambājogāi), Ausā, Tuljāpur and Parendā, and then across the Bhimā to their refuge in the Mahādev hills. Nasrat Jang came back to the imperial camp, but was soon afterwards sent against Dhana, who was now reported as roving near Miraj. The latter retired beyond the Krishnā, and the Khan halted for the rainy season 24 miles from Miraj. In his recent forced marches nearly all of his horses and transport-cattle had perished through scarcity of fodder. Grain and fodder continued to be very scarce in his camp even during this monsoon halt; the soldiers were greatly distressed and the horses lost condition. [*Dil.* ii. 156b—157a; *M. A.* 515.]

* Khafi Khan (ii. 518) wrongly says that this invasion took place just after the death of Shujaet Kh. (June 1701.) But *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* gives the exact date 4th March 1706 (i. 383.) A very long account of this series of battles, fought at Ratanpur on the Narmada, is given in *Mirat* (i. 379-388), and very briefly in Khafi Khan (ii. 518-519) and Manucci (iv. 246.) Ratanpur is 25 m. east of Broach.

§ 12. *Notable Maratha victories, 1706.*

In July Maratha activity near Wāgingerā forced the Emperor to detach Tarbiyat Khan to that region to punish them. [*M. A.* 516.] Pidiā Berad, in alliance with Hindu Rao, gained Penu-kondā, "the key of both the Karnātak," by bribing its Mughal qiladar, who had been starving from his salary being left in arrears.* Flushed with their gain of such a fort, the Marathas turned to Serā, the capital of Bijapuri Karnātak Uplands, the district round which they had plundered before, in June 1704, [*Storia*, iii. 506.] Daud Khan, the faujdar of Karnātak, afterwards recovered Penu-kondā. [*Dil.* ii. 157a.] Siādat Khan, an officer of the Court, was wounded in both eyes by musket-shot, captured, and held to ransom by the enemy. [*Ibid.*] They also recovered Basantgarh from the imperialists about this time. [*Ibid.*, 156b.]

When the rainy season ended (Sep. 1706), Maratha activity was renewed with tenfold intensity. Muhammad Amin Khan was detached against their bands in the Ahmadnagar district and returned after driving them away and taking some spoils. (Nov.) [*M.A.* 518.] Dhana Jādav now made a dash for the old dominions, Berar and Khandesh; but Nasrat Jang, leaving his camp near Miraj, headed him off into Bijapur and thence beyond the Krishnā. The Berads had seized the fort of Allur (28 m. n. w. of Kulbargā), but Tarbiyat Khan reconquered it. A long train of caravans coming from Aurangabad to the imperial camp was plundered of everything near Chandā, 24 m. from Ahmadnagar. [*Dil.* ii. 157.]

* *Storia*, iv. 249, 251 (details); *Dil.* ii. 156b. The qiladar was, however, taken prisoner and held to ransom by the Marathas.

Chin Qalich Khan, the subahdar of Bijapur, having been summoned to Court (Dec. 1706), Nasrat Jang marched from Miraj and guarded the environs of Bijapur. (Jan.—Feb. 1707.) At this time Tārā Bāi, the Maratha Queen Regent, sent Dhana to arrest Baharji Ghorparé. The latter took refuge in fort Kurkal,* but all his property and animals were captured by Dhana, who besieged him in a fort. Baharji begged succour from Nasrat Jang, offering to enter the Emperor's service. The Mughal general advanced across the Bhima river and the Rāichur Doab to the bank of the Tungabhadra, to attack Dhana, who fled away to Mysore at the news of it. But Baharji, thus delivered from danger, retired to his home in fort Sindur (18 m. s. of the ruins of Vijaynagar) and evaded coming over to Nasrat Jang. [*Dil.* ii. 158.]

§ 13. *Azam's plan for murdering Kām Bakhsh.*

While dangers were thus thickening round Aurangzib's forces, the internal troubles of his camp became even more ominous. Muhammad Azam's inordinate vanity and ambition urged him to secure the succession for himself. Confident of his valour and of the money and men he had gathered when in Gujrat, and eager to increase them by seizing the treasure and troops in the imperial camp at the moment of his father's death,—he considered himself as senior to his elder brother Muazzam and regarded poor young Kām Bakhsh as “non-existent.” In view of the

* *Dil.* places this fort 14 kos from Adoni. There is a *Kupgal*, 35 m. s. w. of Adoni, and a *Kudikul*, 75 m. n. (not likely.) N. J. had left his heavy baggage in fort *Sindunur*, 35 m. n. w. of Adoni, and 12 m. n. of the Tungabhadra, while Baharji's *Sindur* is 18 m. s. of that river.

Emperor's frequent fits of illness, Azam planned to remove all his rivals from his path. So, he poisoned the ears of the Emperor against Azim-ush-shān, the able third son of Muazzam and had him recalled from the government of Pātnā, where he was rumoured to have amassed a vast treasure. He also drew over to his side the prime minister Asad Khan and some other nobles. Then he looked out for an opportunity to make a sudden attack on Kām Bakhsh and kill him. Every day Azam's hostile designs against Kām Bakhsh became more evident, and therefore the Emperor appointed the brave and faithful Sultan Husain (Mir Malang) paymaster of Kām Bakhsh's forces, and charged him with that prince's defence. Whenever Kām Bakhsh came to his father's Court, Sultan Husain attended him with a strong body of comrades fully armed, and also stood guard round his tent day and night. Azam complained of these acts to the Emperor, but the latter gave no reply, till at last Azam wrote his grievances to his younger sister Zinat-un-nisā, saying, "Though it would not be very hard for me to punish the insolence of this rude fellow, yet respect for His Majesty hinders me from doing it." The letter was shown to Aurangzib, who wrote across it with his own hand, "The power of Husain is well-known, and yet you are overcome with so much terror and suspicion about him! I shall send away Kām Bakhsh elsewhere." The irony of the reply stung Azam to the quick but he had no help except to wait patiently for the end. [K. K. ii. 546—548.]

§ 14. *Emperor sends his sons away from him.*

That end was not long in coming. Early in February 1707, Aurangzib had one more of the attacks of languor and ill-health which had become rather frequent of late.

He recovered for a time and began once more to hold public darbars and do business of the State. But he felt that this time the inevitable could not be far off, and that the peace of his camp and the safety of the vast host assembled there were threatened by Azam's growing impatience and violent ambition which might break bounds any day. So he appointed Kām Bakhsh subahdar of Bijapur and sent him away with a large force to his charge on 9th February. The leave-taking from this Benjamin of his old age, whom he felt he would never see again, broke the Emperor's heart; he burst into tears as he gave the prince the parting embrace and sent him away with the band playing from the gate of the imperial tent-enclosure (*gulāl-bār.*) [*Dil.* ii. 158a.]

Four days later, (13th Feb.) Md. Azam was despatched to Malwa as its governor; but the cunning prince, knowing his father's death to be very near, marched slowly, halting every other day, so that he had passed only 50 miles when he received the news that Aurangzib was no more.

§ 15. *Last illness and death of Aurangzib.*

The event happened only a week after his departure. Four days after sending away the last of his sons from his side, the aged and worn-out monarch, now left in utter loneliness, was seized with a severe fever; but for three days he obstinately insisted on coming to the Court-room and saying the five daily prayers in full congregation. In these days he often recited the couplet of foreboding—

*"In a twinkle, in a minute, in a breath,
The condition of the world changes."*

On Thursday, the 19th, Hamid-ud-din Khan, by the advice of astrologers submitted a petition for giving away an elephant worth Rs. 4,000 in alms (*tasadduq*) for averting evil influences from the Emperor. The dying man sanctioned

it, but added across the petition, "The giving away of an elephant in charity is a custom of the Hindus and star-worshippers. Give, instead, Rs. 4000 to the Chief Qazi for distribution among the poor. Convey quickly to the first station and consign to dust this heap of dust." [M. A. 521; K. K. 549 adds, "Do not go to the ornament of a coffin."]

During these last days he dictated two pathetic letters to his sons Azam and Kām Bakhsh, entreating them to cultivate brotherly love peace and moderation, and illustrating the vanity of all earthly things. These are given in the next appendix, as also is a paper, said to have been found under his pillow after his death, in which he proposed a peaceful partition of his empire among his three surviving sons.

In the morning of Friday, 21st February, 1707, Aurangzib came out of his bedroom, went through his morning prayer, and began to count his beads and repeat the Islamic confession of faith in the oneness of the Godhead and the Prophetship of Muhammad. Gradually unconsciousness crept on, his breathing became harder and harder; but such was the mastery of that indomitable spirit over the natural weakness of the body that his fingers continued to move over his rosary and his lips to gasp out the *Kalimah* (the Muslim *Credo*), till about eight o'clock when all was over. He had ever wished to die on a Friday, and that prayer had been granted by a gracious Deity to one of His truest servants. [M.A. 521, K. K. ii. 549.]

§ 16. *Burial of Aurangzib.*

Muhammad Azam arrived in the camp on the 22nd, and after mourning for his father and consoling his sister Zinat-un-nisā Begam, he took part in carrying the corpse a

short distance, and then sent it away to Khuldābād near Daulatābād, for burial in the enclosure hallowed by the earthly remains of the saint Shaikh Zain-ud-din.

A low simple tomb, without any marble platform below or dome over it, but having the trough in its covering slab filled with earth for growing green herbs (in imitation of his sister Jahānārā's tomb outside Delhi),—now covers all that remains of the greatest of the Great Mughals save one.

APPENDIX

Aurangzib's last letter to Azam.

“Peace be on you!

“Old age has arrived and weakness has grown strong, strength has left my limbs. I came alone and am going away alone. I know not who I am and what I have been doing. The days that have been spent except in austerities have left only regret behind them. I have not at all done any (true) government of the realm or cherishing of the peasantry.

“Life, so valuable, has gone away for nothing. The Master has been in my house, but my darkened eyes cannot see His splendour. Life lasts not; no trace is left of the days that are no more; and of the future there is no hope.

“My fever has departed, leaving only the skin and husks behind it. My son Kām Bakhsh, who has gone to Bijapur, is near me. And you are nearer even than he. Dear Shah Alam is farthest of all. Grandson Muhammad Azim has, by order of the Great God, arrived near Hindustan (from Bengal).

“All the soldiers are feeling helpless, bewildered, and perturbed like me, who having chosen to leave my Master,

am now in a state of trepidation like quicksilver. They think not that we have our Lord Father (ever with us). I brought nothing with me (into the world), and am carrying away with me the fruits of my sins. I know not what punishment will fall on me. Though I have strong hopes of His grace and kindness, yet in view of my acts anxiety does not leave me. When I am parting from my own self, who else would remain to me? (Verse)

Whatever the wind may be

I am launching my boat on the water.

“Though the Lord Cherisher will preserve His slaves, yet from the point of view of the outer world, it is also the duty of my sons to see that God’s creatures and Muslims may not be unjustly slain.

“Convey to my grandson Bahādur (*i.e.* Bidār Bakht) my parting blessing. At the time of going away I do not see him; the desire of meeting remains (unsatisfied). Though the Begam is, as can be seen, afflicted with grief, yet God is the master of hearts. Shortness of sight bears no other fruit than disappointment.

“Farewell! farewell! farewell!”*

Aurangzib’s last letter to Kām Bakhsh.

“My son, [close to my heart like] my liver! Although, in the days of my power, I gave advice for submission to the will of God and exerted myself beyond the limits of possibility,—God having willed it otherwise, none listened to me. Now that I am dying, it will do no good. I shall carry away with myself the fruits of all the punishments and sins I have done. What a marvel that I came [into the world] alone and am [now] departing with this [large]

* Translated by me from Br. Museum Addl. 26240. The version given in the lithographed edition of the *Ruqat* has been rejected.

caravan. Wherever I cast my eyes, no caravan-leader save God comes into my view. Anxiety about the army and camp-followers has been the cause of [my] depression of mind and fear of final torment. Although God will undertake the protection of His people, yet it is also obligatory on Muslims and my sons. When I was full of strength, I could not at all protect them; and now I am unable to take care of myself! My limbs have ceased to move. The breath that subsides, there is no hope of its return. What else can I do in such a condition than to pray? Your mother Udipuri [Begam] has attended me during my illness; she wishes to accompany me [to the next world]. I consign thee and thy children to God. I am in trepidation. I bid you farewell. . . . Worldly men are deceivers (literally, they show wheat as sample but deliver barley); do not do any work in reliance on their fidelity. Work ought to be done by means of hints and signs. Dārā Shukoh made unsound arrangements and hence he failed to reach his point. He increased the salaries of his retainers to more than what they were before, but at the time of need got less and less work out of them. Hence he was unhappy. Set your feet within the limits of your carpet.

"I have told you what I had to say and now I take my leave. See to it that the peasantry and the people. . . . are not unjustly ruined, and that Musalmans may not be slain, lest punishment should descend on me." [India Office MS. 1344, f. 26a]."*

Aurangzib's last will

(From India Office Library MS. 1344, f. 49b.)

* I have not accepted the other version of this letter given in the lithographed bazar edition of *Ruqat*, No. 73. Udipuri died a natural death at Gwalior in June 1707.

Said to have been written with his own hand and left under his pillow on the death-bed.

"I was helpless [in life] and I am departing helpless. Whichever of my sons has the good fortune of gaining the kingship, he should not trouble Kām Bakhsh if the latter is content with the two provinces of Bijapur and Haiderabad. There is not, nor will there [ever] be any wazir better than Asad Khan. Diānat Khan, the diwan of the Deccan, is better than other imperial servants. With true devotion entreat Muhammad Azam Shah,—if he agrees to the mode of partitioning the empire which was proposed in my lifetime, then there will be no fighting between armies and no slaughter of mankind. Do not dismiss my hereditary servants, nor molest them. The occupant of the throne should have [one of] the two subahs of Agra and Delhi, and whoever agrees to take the former [of these] will get four subahs of the old kingdom—Agra [*sic*], Malwa, Gujrat, and Ajmir and the *chaklas* dependent on them,—and four subahs of the Deccan, namely Khandesh, Berar, Aurangabad and Bidar and their ports. And whosoever agrees to take the latter [*i.e.*, Delhi] will get the eleven subahs of the old kingdom—Delhi, Punjab, Kabul, Multan, Tatta, Kashmir, Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Allahabad and Oudh." [Another version is given in Fraser's *Nadir Shah*, 36-37. See Irvine's *Later Mughals*, i. 6.]

Another alleged will of Aurangzib is given in the *Ahkām-i-Alamgiri* ascribed to Hamid-ud-din Khan Bahadur (§ 8 of the text and translation published by me.) It runs thus :

"Praise be to God and blessing on those servants of Him who have become sanctified and have given satisfaction to Him.

I have [some instructions to leave as my] last will and testament :—

FIRST,—On behalf of this sinner sunk in iniquity [*i.e.*, myself] cover [with an offering of cloth] the holy tomb of Hasan (ON HIM BE PEACE!), because those who are drowned in the ocean of sin have no other protection than seeking refuge with that Portal of Mercy and Forgiveness. The means of performing this great auspicious act are with my noble son, Prince Alijāh [Azam] ; take them.

SECOND,—Four rupees and two annas, out of the price of the caps sewn by me, are with Aia Beg, the *mahaldār*. Take the amount and spend it on the shroud of this helpless creature. Three hundred and five rupees, from the wages of copying the *Qurān*, are in my purse for personal expenses. Distribute them to the faqirs on the day of my death. As the money got by copying the *Qurān* is regarded with respect by the Shia sect*, do not spend it on my shroud and other necessities.

THIRD,—Take the remaining necessary articles from the agent of Prince Alijāh ; as he is the nearest heir among my sons, and on him lies the responsibility of the lawful or unlawful [practices at my funeral] ; this helpless person (*i.e.*, Aurangzib) is not answerable for them, because the dead are at the mercy of the survivors.

FOURTH,—Bury this wanderer in ‘the Valley of Deviation from the Right Path’ with his head bare, because every ruined sinner who is conducted bare-headed before the Grand Emperor (*i.e.*, God), is sure to be an object of mercy.

FIFTH,—Cover the top of the coffin on my bier with the coarse white cloth called *gazi*. Avoid the spreading of a

* The reading in MS. N. may be taken to mean, “As the money got by copying the Quran is suspected by the Shia sect to be unlawful [kind of wealth.]”

canopy and innovations like [processions of] musicians and the celebration of the Prophet's Nativity (*maulud*).

SIXTH,—It is proper for the ruler of the kingdom (*i.e.*, my heir) to treat kindly the helpless servants who in the train of this shameless creature [Aurangzib] have been roving in the deserts and wilderness [of the Deccan]. Even if any manifest fault is committed by them, give them in return for it gracious forgiveness and benignant overlooking [of the fault].

SEVENTH,—No other nation is better than the Persians for acting as clerks (*mutasaddi*). And in war, too, from the age of the Emperor Humāyun to the present time, none of this nation has turned his face away from the field, and their firm feet have never been shaken. Moreover, they have not once been guilty of disobedience or treachery to their master. But, as they insist on being treated with great honour it is very difficult to get on together with them. You have anyhow to conciliate them, and should employ subterfuges.

EIGHTH,—The Turāni people have ever been soldiers. They are very expert in making charges, raids, night-attacks and arrests. They feel no suspicion, despair or shame when commanded to make a retreat in the very midst of a fight, which means, in other words, 'when the arrow is drawn back';—and they are a hundred stages remote from the crass stupidity of the Hindustanis, who would part with their heads but not leave their positions [in battle]. In every way, you should confer favours on this race, because on many occasions these men can do the necessary service, when no other race can.

NINTH,—You should treat the Sayyids of Bārha, who are worthy of blessing, according to the Quranic verse, 'GIVE UNTO THE NEAR RELATIONS [OF THE PROPHET] THEIR DUES,' and never grow slack in honouring and favouring them.

Inasmuch as, according to the blessed verse, 'I SAY I DO NOT ASK OF YOU ANY RECOMPENSE FOR IT EXCEPT LOVE TO [MY] KINSMEN,' love for this family is THE WAGES OF [MUHAMMAD'S] PROPHETSHIP, you should never be wanting [in respect for them], and it will bear fruit in this world and the next. But you should be extremely cautious in dealing with the Sayyids of Bārha. Be not wanting in love of them at heart, but externally do not increase their rank, because a strong partner in the government soon wants to seize the kingship for himself. If you let them take the reins ever so little, the result will be your own disgrace.

TENTH,—As far as possible the ruler of a kingdom should not spare himself from moving about; he should avoid staying in one place, which outwardly gives him repose but in effect brings on a thousand calamities and troubles.

ELEVENTH,—Never trust your sons, nor treat them during your lifetime in an intimate manner, because, if the Emperor Shāh Jahān had not treated Dārā Shukoh in this manner, his affairs would not have come to such a sorry pass. Ever keep in view the saying, 'THE WORD OF A KING IS BARREN.'

TWELFTH,—The main pillar of government is to be well informed in the news of the kingdom. Negligence for a single moment becomes the cause of disgrace for long years. The escape of the wretch Shivā took place through [my] carelessness, and I have to labour hard [against the Marathas] to the end of my life, [as the result of it].

TWELVE IS BLESSED [among numbers]. I have concluded with twelve directions. (*Verse*)

If you learn [the lesson], a kiss on your wisdom,

If you neglect it, then alas! alas!

CHAPTER LVIII.

THE WAR IN RAJPUTANA, 1681—1707.

§ I. *How Aurangzib began war with the Rathors.*

In chapter 36 of volume III I have told the story of how Durgādās Rāthor had rescued Maharajah Jaswant's heir Ajit Singh from the clutches of Aurangzib at Delhi, taken him to a safe refuge on Mount Abu, and, with the help of other devoted clansmen, had for two years fought against the Mughal occupation of Marwar. Then, as his ally Udaipur grew fainter in its efforts under the new Mahārānā Jai Singh, Durgādās had (December 1680) instigated the Emperor's son, Muhammad Akbar, to rebel and make an attempt to seize the Mughal crown. When that attempt signally failed (16th January, 1681), Durgādās had most chivalrously escorted the unhappy prince through every danger to the Court of the Maratha king Shambhuji, who alone in India could dare to harbour the Emperor's enemy (1st June, 1681). As long as Akbar remained in India (up to October 1686), Durgādās stayed with him, promoting his interests, reconciling his occasional differences with the Maratha Government, and acting in all matters as his guardian and chief minister.*

This junction between Shambhuji and the rebellious Akbar alarmed the Emperor, and he made haste to go to the Deccan in person after patching up a peace with the Mahārānā (June 1681). This peace ended the war so far as Mewār was concerned, but not in respect of Mārwar. True, one of the conditions of the treaty was that when Ajit Singh would come of age, the Emperor would recognise him as a vassal

* See vol. iv. ch. 44 and 48.

rajah and imperial mansabdar, as his father and grandfather had been. But Ajit Singh was then an infant of two years only, and his suzerain occupied the kingdom of Marwar for the present. The new Maharana of Udaipur was too weak to insist on Marwar being placed in the hands of a Council of Regency of its native nobles. So, the Emperor's troops continued to hold the chief towns and strategic points of the State and its legal government was that exercised by the Mughal officers posted there.

For Marwar, therefore, there was no peace, and the Rāthor patriots remained in a state of war with the alien rule imposed on their country. They occupied the hills and deserts and every now and then swooped down upon the plains, cutting off convoys and trade caravans, capturing weakly held Mughal outposts, and rendering the cultivation of the fields and traffic on the roads impossible except under the protection of the imperial garrisons. No wonder that famine was constantly present in Jodhpur, and that the Rathor bard records of certain years that "the sword and pestilence united to clear the land."

A generation of time passed in Marwar in ceaseless conflict, captures and recaptures. But the resources of the empire were far superior to those of a small desert province ravaged by perpetual warfare. The imperialists could draw their supplies from the other parts of India; the Rathors had no friend or supplier outside their own country. Being a clan only, they could not replenish their ranks thinned by the Mughal sword, famine and pestilence, while the Emperor had the manhood of half India to draw upon. The Rathor national opposition, therefore, would have gradually grown weaker and finally died out through attrition, if only the Emperor had not been plunged into a more serious conflict in the Deccan, which drained all his resources. The military

situation in Maharashtra reacted on the situation in Jodhpur, and worked for the ultimate success of the Rathor patriots and the restoration of their chieftain to his hereditary throne immediately after Aurangzib's death.

§ 2. *Thirty years of war in Marwar.*

The history of these 27 years (1681-1707) in Marwar falls into three well-defined periods. From 1681 to 1687 it was a people's war, because their king was a child and their national leader Durgādās was absent in the Deccan. The Rathor people fought under different captains, group by group, with no central authority and no common plan of action except to attack the Mughals wherever they could. This desultory warfare afforded many examples of Rathor bravery and devotion, but its military effect was nothing more than to keep the Mughal garrisons in constant alarm and to make their occupation of Marwar financially ruinous. The patriots might capture a post, but it would be immediately re-established by a fresh Mughal force, while the thinned Rathor bands had to flee to the hills and starve there. They, however, kept up the struggle, repeating their raids year after year.

It was rather an advantage to the Rathors that at this stage they had no common leader, because a pitched battle of all the forces of the tribe with the better armed and better organised imperialists would have led to their decisive defeat and prevented them from raising their heads for a generation to come, whereas by adopting guerilla tactics they wore out the Mughals and minimised the disadvantage of their own numbers and equipment. The numerous eponymous septs into which the Rathor clan was sub-divided, each supplied a ready-made battalion of soldiers, self-contained and organised from birth.

The second stage of the war began in 1687 when Durgādās returned from the Deccan, and Ajit Singh came out of the concealment in which his infancy had been protected and nurtured. The success of the Rathors was at first brilliant. Reinforced by the Hādās of Bundi, they cleared the plains of Marwar and, sweeping onwards beyond the limits of their own country, raided Mālpurā and Pur-Mandal (1687), and even defeated the subahdar of Ajmir (1690), and carried their ravages into Mewat and the west of Delhi. But they could not recover their country. The Emperor had, by the year 1687, conquered the last of the independent kingdoms of the Deccan, and two years later slew the Maratha king and took his capital. During 1689, 1690 and 1691 the Marathas could not recover from these blows, and the Emperor had a free hand. Moreover, in the very year 1687 in which Ajit Singh and Durgādās appeared together at the head of the national forces, an exceptionally able and enterprising officer named Shujāet Khan became governor of Jodhpur on behalf of the Emperor, and held that office for 14 years, during which he succeeded in maintaining the Mughal hold on Marwar though Aurangzib's increasing entanglement in the Deccan made it "impossible for him to send a single soldier to reinforce"* his agent in Jodhpur.

§ 3. *Shujāet Khan's government of Marwar,*
1687—1701.

Up to the year 1687, the faujdari of Marwar† had been added to the subahdari of Ajmir. But Ajmir was a small

* Aurangzib's view when appointing Shujaet Khan (*Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, i. 317.)

† Inayet Khan, who had been appointed faujdar of Jodhpur in March 1681, became in addition subahdar of Ajmir in Dec. 1683. On his death in 1687, Marwar was joined to Gujrat.

province, governed by a third-rate noble with a poor income and small army. Hence, the Ajmir subahdar (Ināyet Khan) had not been able to cope with the Rathors with his normal resources. But now Shujāet Khan, in addition to the faujdari of Marwar, held the subahdari of Gujrat,—one of the three great frontier provinces of the Mughal empire and famous in those days as a recruiting ground of brave soldiers (*lashkar-khez*). Shujāet Khan's contingent and income were much larger than those of the Ajmir subahdar, and he also knew how to put them to the best use. He always kept his retainers to their full number and was prompt and quick in his movements. He used to spend six months (sometimes eight) every year in Marwar and the other six in Gujrat. Thus, he succeeded in checking the Rathors when it came to fighting, while he made an understanding with them, paying them one-fourth of the imperial custom duties on all merchandise if they spared the traders on the roads (1688). This was another form of the *chauth*, which a few years afterwards many Mughal officers in the Deccan, conscious of their own helplessness and the hopelessness of succour from the Emperor, were glad to pay to the Maratha roving bands as a yearly blackmail.

But from the year 1692 onwards the imperial forces in the Deccan began to feel the increasing pressure of the revived Maratha power under their able regent Rāmchandra and their brilliant generals Dhanaji Jādav and Santāji Ghorparé, and the Emperor began to look out wistfully for some means of ensuring peace in his rear in Rajputana. There was another and a stronger motive working with him: he must recover his grand-daughter who had been left with the Rathors by her father Akbar in his flight soon after her birth. This girl was now thirteen and Aurangzib's family honour required that she should come to his house before

attaining the age of marriage, which for a Mughal princess was usually fourteen. He could have made an honourable and lasting peace and turned the Rathors again into devoted allies, by restoring Ajit Singh to all his father's territory and rank. But a strange obsession, or more probably religious bigotry,* made Aurangzib cling blindly to the soil of Jodhpur. He higgled like a Jew and waited for some turn in the die of war which would enable him to keep the bulk of Marwar and especially its capital in his own hands and delude Ajit with a small tract as jagir. Negotiations inspired by such a motive were bound to fail, though a truce was secured to his weary army during the year (1692) through which they were protracted. But this fanatical obstinacy or obsession, born of unlimited power and old age, was relaxed by wiser counsels, and at last in 1696 he agreed to restore a portion of Marwar to Ajit Singh in return for the delivery of Akbar's children.

But on 9 July 1701 † Shujāet Khan died, Prince Muhammad Azam succeeded him as governor of Marwar and renewed hostilities with Ajit, and the third stage of the Rajput war of independence began, which after much bloodshed and many reverses on both sides ended in the complete break-down of the imperial policy of greed and the final recovery of Marwar by its national ruling dynasty (1707). This was the just consequence of Mughal insincerity and unscrupulous opportunism.

* He wanted to dismember Marwar and thus prevent the possible opposition to his anti-Hindu measures which a great independent Hindu State in Northern India might have offered. There was to be no second high-spirited and strong Jaswant Singh to rally round himself and lead to victory the discontented Hindus of the empire.

† On 16 June 1701, according to *M.A.* p. 441, but *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* gives 9 July.

§ 4. *The struggle during 1681—1686.*

When the Emperor marched away from Rajputana to the Deccan (September, 1681), he left his wazir Asad Khan at Ajmir to control the occupation of Marwar. Mughal garrisons were posted in all the important positions (*thānas*) in the country, such as Sambhar and Didwānā in the north, Mairta in the north-east, Jitāran Sojāt Pāli and Godwār along the eastern side, Jodhpur in the centre, Bālotrā Panchbhadra and Siwānā in the west, and Jhālōr in the south,*—besides many smaller stations.

After the Mughal occupation of their capital and other cities, the Rathors took refuge in the hills and out of the way nooks; but the plains lay exposed to the raids of their roving bands; and encounters frequently took place between them and the army of occupation near one or other of these outposts with varying success. The year 1682 is described as one of perpetual conflict, captures and recaptures of the Mughal thanas.

The Rathor patriots suffered heavy losses in all these battles, even when they were victorious. But while, on the one hand, their ranks were thinned by the Mughal sword, they also received considerable additions to their strength. In 1681, Muhakam Singh of Mairtā, the son of Rajah Kalyān Singh and a hereditary noble under Delhi, threw up the Mughal service and joined the national cause. Late in the same year, most of the Rathor chiefs who had escorted Akbar to Maharashtra returned home. In 1682 the Bhatti tribe of Jesalmir rose against the Mughals and joined the Rathors.

* Nagor in the extreme north of the State had long been a Mughal dependency, independent of Marwar, though ruled by a Rathor chieftain.

The success of the Rajput patriots was often chequered by the death of notable leaders, and the annihilation of their invading force in a grand raid into Gujrat, in the hills of Rainpur, in 1682. In fact the situation of the country is best described in the words of the bard Karnani-dān: "An hour before sunset every gate of Maru was shut. The Muslims held the strongholds, but the plains obeyed Ajit . . . The roads were now impassable."

§ 5. *Durgādās again in Mārwar, 1687—1696.*

We now turn to the history of the second stage of the contest. Durgādās's return from Maharashtra (1687) greatly stimulated Rathor activity, and happily just then they gained a valuable ally. Durjan Sāl Hādā, the leading vassal of Bundi, on being insulted by his chieftain Anurudh Singh (a loyal feudatory and general of Aurangzib) armed his kinsmen and retainers and seized the fort of Bundi by a sudden attack.* He then came over to Marwar, married a sister of Mukund Singh Champāwat (a Rathor leader) and strengthened the Rathor national army with his thousand horsemen of the Hādā clan.

The united Rathors and Hādās, having slaughtered or driven away most of the Mughal outposts in Marwar, made a daring raid into the imperial dominions in the north. With a vast force of horsemen, Durgādās and Durjan Sāl plundered

* *M.A.*, 226, says that on 21 April 1683 the Emperor learnt that Durjan Singh Hada had taken Bundi by siege, and also that on 13 Aug. he received a despatch from Mughal Khan reporting that he had assaulted Bundi like lightning and after a nine hours' fight put Durjan to flight, when Anurudh entered the city with the imperialists (235). I have followed Ishwardās (f. 122-), as he was a friend of Durgadas and had actually served in Jodhpur.

Muhim, Rohtak, and Rewāri, collecting a rich booty, and even menaced the capital Delhi. But hearing that a force of 4000 regular cavalry had been sent out against them from that city and had arrived within 20 miles of them, they declined an encounter, swerved away towards Sarhind, and finally returned to Marwar. Meantime, Ināyet Khan, the faujdar of Jodhpur, had issued with his own troops to chase them. Durjan Sāl evaded him and marched to Mandal, intending to sack it. "A party of banjārās (traveling grain dealers) had dismounted in the vicinity. They attacked him and a battle with bows and muskets began. Just then Dindār Khan, the faujdar of Mandal, and Raghunāth Singh, the agent of Anurudh Hādā, arrived there and joined in the battle. Durjan Sāl was killed by a bullet in the front rank of the fight." [Ishwardas, 121*a*, 122*b*-123*a*.] Tod, however, adds that the Rathors succeeded in massacring the garrisons of Mālpurā, Pur and Mandal and in imposing a contribution on those parts.

In 1690 Durgādās gained a conspicuous success; he routed and drove back on Ajmir Safi Khan, the new governor of that province, who had taken post on the Marwar frontier. He kept up plundering and disturbing the parts of Marwar in Mughal occupation and rendered the roads unsafe for travellers. This alarming situation called Shujāet Khan,* the new governor, to the scene. He very tactfully won over many of the Rajput headmen (*thākurs* and *pattāwas*) by granting them *pattas* (written land grants) on the terms

* Shujaet Khan was primarily subahdar of Gujrat and, in addition, *faujdar* of Marwar. In the latter country he usually governed by means of a deputy,—Kazim Beg (d. 1693), Firuz Miwātī (d. 1699), Shaikh Muhammad Zahid [or Fazil?] (up to 1701), Jafar Quli, Yusuf (1704), Murshid Quli, and Jafar Khan. The fort of Jodhpur was held by another officer, called the *qiladar*. *Mirat*, i. 312.

enjoyed by their forefathers, while others were recommended for *mansab* and *jāgir* on the condition of their serving under his deputy Kāzim Beg in Marwar. By his friendly policy and polite dealings he turned many of the Rathors into allies and inspired them with ardour for the Emperor's cause. Kamāl Khan defended Jhālōr against the Rathor raiders in the south, Kāzim Beg with a strong force was detached towards Mairta to suppress Durgādās's roving bands in that quarter, while Shujāet Khan himself took post at Jodhpur for some time. For the protection of trade, he bound down the carters and hired porters (such as owners of transport camels and ponies) of Mairtā in security that in future they would transport goods to Gujrat through loyal Udaipur and not by way of disturbed Marwar.* (*Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, i. 325.)

Thus the year 1690 ended without any disaster. During the next year the Mughals enjoyed respite as the Rathor national army was diverted to Mewar in order to assist Maharana Jai Singh in suppressing the rebellion of his heir Amar Singh and all the leading nobles of that State. In 1692, also, there was truce in Marwar, as Safi Khan, the governor of Ajmir, opened negotiations with the Rathors for the surrender of Akbar's daughter, whom they had been nourishing since her father's flight in 1681. But nothing came of these overtures as the Emperor was not yet prepared to make any real concession to Ajit Singh. So, the war was renewed in 1693. Ajit Singh, guided by Durgādās, took post at Bhilārā† and caused trouble. But Shujāet Khan soon hastened to Marwar, and a concerted movement by the

* It was probably at this time that he promised the Rathors one-fourth of the custom duties on all goods that they spared during passage through Marwar, as Tod tells us.

† The Persian text reads *T h l h ā*, which I take to be an error for either Bhilara or Bhinmal.

faujdars of Jodhpur, Jhālōr and Siwānā forced Ajit Singh to flee back to the hills, after Akho Ballā, who met the Mughal attack, had been defeated. [*Mirat*, i. 328; Tod.]

§ 6. *The restoration of Aurangzib's grand-daughter
by Durgādās, 1696.*

But here the Mughal success ended. The situation in the Deccan had now become so serious that the Emperor could not spare any troops for a decisive campaign in Rajputana. Moreover, with the growing youth of his captive grand-daughter, his anxiety to get her back increased. The negotiations for this purpose which had failed in 1692 were renewed in 1694, but this time they were entrusted to the able and wise Shujāet Khan, and though protracted through the Emperor's niggardliness they bore fruit in 1696.*

Shujāet Khan employed as his intermediary in this affair the historian Ishwardās, a Nāgar Brahman of Patan (now in the Gaikwar's territory), who had been employed as a revenue collector (*shiqdar* or *amin*) in Jodhpur and had made many friends among the Rathors. He has left a graphic account of the restoration of the son and daughter of Akbar, which we quote here, as the evidence of the chief actor in the scene.

Akbar's infant son Buland Akhtar and daughter Safiyat-un-nisā had been left in Marwar with his Rathor allies, as

* On 11th June 1696 the Emperor sent a slave named Shah Beg from his Court to Shujaet Khan, to take charge of Akbar's daughter and bring her away. If this girl was named Safiyat-un-nisā (as Ishwardas says), then she was married to Prince Khujista Akhtar, and died of fever on 1 July 1699 and was buried at Mangalvire (north of Bijapur) in a tomb built for Rs. 420. [*Akh.*] Negotiations for the princess, *Mirat-i-Ahm*, i. 332-333.

the children were too tender to bear the hardships of his flight from the country in 1681. Durgādās placed them in charge of Girdhar Joshi in an obscure place difficult of access. They were brought up with every care not only for their health and morals, but also for her education in the Islamic religion.

After Ishwardās had repeatedly approached Durgādās, the latter, who had wearied of the long and desolating struggle, wished to make terms for his chieftain and himself. "So he sent a letter to the author (Ishwardas) stating that if Shujāet Khan gave him a safe-conduct and spared his home from ravage pending the coming of the Emperor's reply to his petition for forgiveness, he would send Safiyat-un-nisā Begam to the imperial Court. The Emperor at once consented. On the arrival of his reply, the author, under instructions from Shujāet Khan, visited Durgādās, who was living at a place extremely difficult of access, and induced him by wise counsels to agree finally to the restoration of the princess. Then, returning to the Khan, he took proper escort and conveyances with him, and going back to Durgādās brought the princess away with him. As she was well pleased with the author's serviceableness and excellent arrangements during the journey, she asked him to accompany her to the imperial Court. On their arrival there, Aurangzib immediately spoke of appointing a tutoress to give his granddaughter that education in Islamic scriptures which she must have missed so long in that uncivilised and inaccessible Hindu State. But the Begam informed him that Durgādās had been so attentive to her welfare that he had secured for her a Muslim mistress from Ajmir under whose tuition she had already studied the *Qurān* and committed it to her memory.

This fact convinced the Emperor of Durgādās's devotion and induced him to forget all his past offences. In exuberance of royal grace he asked her, "Tell me what

reward Durgādās wants.” The Begam answered that Ishwardās knew it. His Majesty at once ordered the author to be brought before him in his private chamber. Durgādās was granted a *mansab* and money allowance,* while Ishwardās was created a commander of 200 horse, invested with a robe of honour, and sent back to Marwar to bring Durgādās and Buland Akhtar to the Court.

But in effecting this there was nearly two years’ delay, mainly because Durgādās demanded the restoration of Jodhpur to Ajit Singh, while Aurangzib wished to satisfy the heir of Jaswant with a small portion of Marwar only. Durgādās could not be bought even with the highest *mansab* for himself; he insisted on the whole of the State being released by the Mughals. He knew what a valuable political pawn he held in his hand in the person of Buland Akhtar, a full-blooded heir to the Mughal throne, whom any powerful rebel might use as a potent instrument by proclaiming him Emperor of Delhi and trying to subvert Aurangzib’s throne under his nominal leadership. So, the negotiations dragged on.

§ 7. *Surrender of Akbar’s son and submission of Durgādās, 1698.*

But Ajit Singh’s position was now one of distress and despair. He was weary of roving in the wilderness, hunted by Mughal columns and subjected to every hardship. And his recent marriage to the daughter of Gaj Singh, the brother of the Maharana, made him eager for a settled home and income. So, in 1698, Durgādās abated his demands. Ajit was pardoned by the Emperor and given a *mansab* in the

* Durgadas was granted Mairta (afterwards Dhanduqa) pargana as *jagir*, but he was posted to Patan as *faujdar*. *Mirat*, i .333, 338, 348.

imperial army, with the parganas of Jhālor, Sānchod and Siwānā as his jāgir, of which he was also appointed faujdar.*

Ishwardās thus describes his second embassy:—"After my return from the Emperor's Court (in 1696), I paid repeated visits to Durgādās, took solemn oaths of fidelity on behalf of Shujāet Khan, and reassured his mind by my promises. Durgādās, on getting letters-patent (*parwanas*) conferring jāgirs on himself, and being put in actual possession of the land assigned to him, came with the prince in my company to Ahmadabad and then to Surat. At the latter city many officers deputed by the Emperor met the prince in advance, both to welcome him on the way and also to teach him Court-etiquette. But the prince remained obstinately silent, and the Court doctors failed to remedy this defect."

Poor Buland Akhtar! We can well sympathise with him in his distress. He had been brought up ever since his birth among the rude Rajput peasantry, without seeing any city or Court, or talking with any cultured person. He did not even know the polished Hindustani language. Aurangzib was shocked and his Court was amused to find a grandson of the Emperor who could speak only the Rajput patois (*Rājasthāni bolī*)! Buland Akhtar felt overcome with shyness like a country youth suddenly brought to a large and polished city. Moreover, he had been taught by his life among the Rathor nationalists to regard Aurangzib as a sort of demon and the relentless enemy of Akbar and Akbar's family; and now he was being torn away from the protectors

* *Mirat*, i. 341. Tod adds incorrectly that Ajit was also given Jodhpur. There is no support of the Rajput bard's assertion that in 1700 Ajit gained possession of the city of Jodhpur, "Prince Azam leading the way." The latter statement is impossible, as Azam became faujdar of Jodhpur (by deputy) late in 1701.

of his boyhood and the comrades of his youth and delivered over to this very Aurangzib. He thought it the wisest course under the circumstances not to open his lips at all but to pretend dumbness, like the clownish new son-in-law of the Bengali folktale.

[He was, however, gradually educated and polished, and lived to be employed in the Court, close to the Emperor's person, in charge of one of the royal seals].

When, after surrendering Buland Akhtar, Durgādās arrived at the portico of the Audience Hall, in the camp at Islāmpuri on the Bhimā, he was ordered to be ushered in unarmed, like a prisoner. Without a moment's hesitation or protest, he took off his sword. Hearing of it, His Majesty ordered him to enter with his arms on. As he entered the imperial tent, the finance minister Ruhullah Khan advanced to him, tied his wrists together with a handkerchief and conducted him to the Emperor. [This was a theatrical action by which, in Mughal times, the offender had to beg the royal pardon and soothe the royal dignity.] His Majesty now graciously ordered Durgādās's arms to be untied, appointed him a commander of 3,000 horse (nominal rank), presented him with a jewelled dagger, a gold pendant (*padak*), and a string of pearls, and advanced him one lakh of Rupees from the imperial treasury. (Ishwardas, 167a—168b, *M. A.* 395.)

In October 1700 the Emperor received a letter from Ajit offering to come to Court with a contingent of 4,000 horse, and asking for some cash or jagir to maintain his retainers. The Emperor ordered a sum of money to be given to him from the Ajmir treasury and promised him a jāgir on his arrival at Court. [*Akhbarat*, 16 Nov.]

§ 8. *Second revolt of Ajit and Durgadas, 1701.*

This reconciliation with Durgādās took place in May 1698, but within three years of it there was another rupture. Durgādās had been employed as faujdar of Patan (in Gujrat) to keep him out of Marwar. But in 1701-2 he was driven into rebellion a second time. In fact both he and Ajit Singh had continued to distrust the Mughal Government and kept themselves at a suspicious distance from the Court. Early in 1701, Ajit Singh, though repeatedly summoned to pay his respects in person to the Emperor, like other high nobles, put off going there under various pretexts. After the death of Shujāet Khan (9 July 1701), a rupture could no longer be averted. The new governor, Prince Muhammad Azam Shah, was haughty and imperious. He was ordered by the Emperor to send Durgādās to the imperial camp if he could, otherwise to kill him there, so that Durgā might no more instigate Ajit Singh and the other Rathors.*

Muhammad Azam summoned Durgādās to wait on him at Ahmadabad, the seat of his government. One of his officers, Safdar Khan Bābi, undertook to arrest or murder Durgādās at the prince's *darbār*. From his faujdari of Patan Durgādās arrived with his retainers and dismounted near the village of Kārij, on the Sabarmati river, close to Ahmadabad.† On the day fixed for his interview, the

* *Mirat*, i. 344, 348; *Kalimat-i-T.* 149; Inayetullah's *Akham* 4 b. The concert between the two is thus described in a letter of the Emperor, "The hellish Durga shoots arrows from the same bow as Ajit" [I. O. L. M.S. 1344, No. 28]. According to the Rajput bard, Ajit was expelled from Jodhpur by Prince Azam in 1702 (wrong).

† The local tradition is that he halted in the imperial *sarai* (Kare ka Sarai), 3 miles north of Ahmadabad, and looted it when retreating. *Kari* is 25 m. n. w. of Ahmadabad, *Unjha* is 35 m. further north (and 17 m. e. of Patan). *Unawwa* is 3½ m. s. w. of Unjha.

prince's troops were drawn up in readiness on the pretext of his going out on a hunting excursion. All the mansabdars posted there and Safdar Khan with his sons and retainers, fully armed, attended the *'darbar*. The prince arrived there and issued orders for Durgādās to be brought to him. As the preceding day had been a day of fast (*ekādashi*) with him, Durgādās wanted to eat his meal before going to the *darbār*. But the arrival of couriers in succession to hasten his visit excited his suspicion, which passed into alarm when he heard reports about the prince's troops having been drawn up armed. Therefore, without breaking his fast, Durgādās set fire to his tents and baggage and immediately rode away towards Marwar with all his followers.

A Mughal force gave him chase. The best mounted among them, including Safdar Khan's contingent, overtook the fugitives on the road to Patan. Durgādās's grandson, then in the first bloom of youth, said to him, "It is a shame to leave a battle-field without a wound. Let me bar the enemy's path, while you escape." The gallant youth did so and was killed with the Rathor rear-guard in resisting the Mughals, while on the other side Safdar Khan's son and Muhammad Ashraf Ghurni (another Gujrati officer) were wounded. Durgādās made use of the respite thus gained, to reach Unjhā-Unauwā, 60 miles off, while the tired pursuers halted. At the end of the night he made another forced march, reached Patan, and taking his family out of that city set off for Therad in Marwar. The imperialists on coming to Patan killed Durgādās's kotwāl who had stayed behind, and then gave up the pursuit. [*Mirat*, i. 349.]*

* A garbled version of this fight is given by Manucci (iv. 243) with the wrong date 1705. His account is absurd and utterly inconsistent with known facts.

§ 9. *Failure and second submission of Ajit and Durgadās, 1704—5.*

When Durgādās was back again in Marwar as an enemy of the empire, Ajit Singh joined him in open rebellion (1702) and made some attacks on the Mughals. [*Mirat*, i. 354.] But the two could effect nothing. Owing to incessant war and spoliation, frequent famines and drought,* and many years' plague in Gujrat and the neighbouring districts of Rajputana, the economic exhaustion of Marwar was complete, and war-weariness seized the Rathor clansmen after a quarter century of continuous guerilla fighting. As the bard Karani-dān writes of the year 1702, "Ajit retired to Jhālor. Some Rathor chiefs took service with the Maharana and some with the Mughals. Muslim oppression reached its climax."

To aggravate the evil, disagreement now broke out between Ajit and Durgādās,† of which the Emperor was not slow to take advantage. Ajit Singh lacked his father's ability and power of command. He seems to have been capricious and self-indulgent and incapable of thinking out or following any deeply-laid scheme of concerted action. He was impatient of advice, imperious in temper, and jealous of Durgādās's well-merited influence in the royal council and popularity among his clansmen. It speaks very ill of the character and intelligence of Ajit that for this supremely devoted and unselfish servant of his house and saviour of his own infancy, he could find no place in his Government but at last drove him out to seek Mughal service or take refuge in Udaipur territory. This internal

* In 1696, "from Patan to Jodhpur no water and not a blade of grass could be seen." [*Mirat* i. 335.]

† Aurangzib's letter in *Kalimat-i-T.* 74 a, 30 a.

discord among the Rathor leaders helped Aurangzib's designs just when all seemed to be going against him, and it enabled him to keep Ajit Singh out of his kingdom and capital for five years more. With Durgādās and Ajit working together, the recovery of Marwar from the Mughals would have been completed in 1702, instead of 1707.

In 1704 Aurangzib, at last admitting his growing helplessness against a sea of enemies, made a sort of peace with Ajit by giving him Mairtā as jagir. As this place was put by Ajit in charge of Khush-hāl Singh, Muhakam Singh (son of Indra Singh of Nāgor), who had fought for Ajit throughout his minority at great sacrifice of his own interests, felt offended at his just claim to the governorship of Mairtā being overlooked by Ajit, and he immediately went over to Aurangzib (1705) and attacked his own clansmen! In November 1705, Durgādās,* too, unable to maintain himself in barren independence, made his submission to the Emperor through Prince Azam, and was restored to his old mansab and post in Gujrat. [*M.A.* 498, *Mirat* i. 358; *Kalimat-i-T.* 50b, 104a.]

§ 10. *Renewal of struggle and final success of the Rathors.*

Next year, the last of Aurangzib's reign, a Maratha incursion into Gujrat was followed by a crushing disaster†

* We read in the Court bulletins that in May 1704 Aurangzib dismissed from his service Khem-Karna the brother and Dev-Karna and Dal-Karna the nephews of Durgadas, evidently to punish that rebel. Orders had been sent to drag Durgadas from Ahmadabad to the imperial Court, but these were cancelled in June 1704.

† Dhana Jadav's victory at Ratanpur, 15 March 1706. *Mirat*, i. 359—366.

to the Mughal army posted there, which encouraged all the enemies of the empire. Ajit Singh raised his head in rebellion for the *third* time. Durgādās again fled the Mughal camp and began to act in concert with him, causing risings in Therad and other places. But Prince Bidār Bakht, the gallant son of Azam Shah, was in charge of Gujrat. He sent a force against Durgādās, who now fled to the broken Koli country, south of Surat. [*Mirat* i. 374.]

Ajit Singh had now been in open rebellion for some time. He fought Muhakam Singh (now on the Emperor's side again) at Drunerā, and by defeating him gained an increase of prestige and strength. Just after this, on 4th March 1707, the news of Aurangzib's death at Ahmadnagar arrived, and three days afterwards (when the happy news had been placed beyond doubt), Ajit took horse for Jodhpur, expelled Jafar Quli (the deputy faujdar of the city), and took possession of his father's capital. As Ajit entered Jodhpur, the Mughals fled, leaving their property behind; they were slain or made captive. Many of them fled in the disguise of Hindus, to escape the merciless retribution of the Rajputs smarting under 26 years of oppression. Mairtā was evacuated by Muhakam Singh, who fled wounded to Nāgor. Sojāt and Pāli were regained. The fort of Jodhpur was purified with Ganges water and *tulsi* leaves. Ajit Singh was crowned Maharajah of Marwar. [*Mirat*, i. 377; Tod, ii. ch. 8.]

Durgādās's life's task was thus crowned with success. Marwar was freed from alien rule and placed under her own kings once more.

CHAPTER LIX.

DISORDERS IN NORTHERN INDIA.

§ 1. *Early Jat disturbances near Agra.*

The endless wars in which Aurangzib became involved in 1679 and which were to continue till his death, began very soon to react on the political condition of Northern India. The Emperor left Delhi in 1679 for Rajputana, and thence proceeded to the Deccan two years later. For the remainder of his reign all his sons and highest generals were assembled there. In unvarying succession Northern India continued to be annually drained of its public money and youthful recruits in order to fill the ever-gaping void caused by the Deccan wars. Reports of occasional disasters to the imperial arms, of Prince Akbar's rebellion, Shambhuji's daring raids and the hopeless entanglement of the Emperor with Bijapur, Golkondā and the Maratha people, reached the bazars and hamlets of Northern India with the usual exaggeration. Years passed away, and yet the Emperor did not return to his capital, nor did any of the princes. The rich old provinces of the empire north of the Narmadā were left in the charge of second-rate nobles with insufficient troops.

At the same time, the long caravans of merchandise, State revenue, army provisions, and the families and property of the nobles, so frequently making their way to the far-off South under slender escort, offered an irresistible temptation to robber tribes. The great royal road, leading from Delhi to Agra and Dholpur and thence through Malwa to the Deccan, passed directly through a country inhabited by a people whose predatory instinct can be kept in check only by the terror of superior force. These are the Jats, a race of

hardy peasants whose bodily vigour and growing numbers had made them spread rapidly from the north-eastern frontier of Rajputana to the bank of the Jamunā, filling the present Agra, Mathurā and Aligarh districts as well as the Bharatpur and Alwar States. Northwards their settlements dotted south-eastern Panjab, and southwards the adjacent parts of Malwa. Whether the Jats were really descendants of the ancient nomadic Getæ is uncertain, but though they are to-day essentially agriculturists, their many affinities with the wandering predatory tribe of Gujars have for many centuries made them, equally with the latter, the greatest enemies of public peace and private property. The Jat population in a province requires strong government and constant vigilance on the part of the ruler. As the proverb runs, "The Jat, like a wound, is better when bound."

In the administrative slackness and military weakness which affected the Mughal Government in consequence of the Deccan wars, the Agra district was the first to feel the truth of this proverb. The ill-guarded wealth of the rich cities and mansions of the metropolitan *subah* and the valuable convoys moving along the king's highway, called forth the cupidity of the Jats, now that the fear of the Emperor's return was daily growing more remote. Here was a surer means of growing rich than by the slow process of painfully tilling a grudging soil under an uncertain rainfall. And such a course of rapine involved little risk, as the weak local troops could not always punish the robbers in the field, nor follow their quickly fleeing bands to the nooks of their wide jungly country.

The Tenwā clan of Jats had first entered the Mathurā and Aligarh districts about 1600 as servants and peasants, but in the next sixty years they had grown powerful enough to make themselves masters of the Joar pargana. Their chief

Nandarām had withheld revenue at the end of Shah Jahan's reign, but had been forced to submit in 1660. Nine years later the Jat peasantry rose under Goklā, the zamindar of Tilpat,* killed Abdun Nabi, the Mughal faujdar of Mathurā, and spread disorder through the Mathurā and Agrā districts. After nearly a year of fighting, the rising was suppressed with terrible bloodshed by Hasan Ali Khan, the Jat stronghold was taken, Goklā was captured and put to death, and their mud-forts were dismantled. [Vol. iii. ch. 26 and 35.]

§ 2. *Jat rising under Rajaram, 1685-1688.*

Fifteen years now passed in peace. And then the opportunity created by the Emperor's Deccan invasion was seized by two new leaders of the Jats, Rājārām and Rāmchehrā, the petty zamindars of Sinsani and Soghar.†

* There is a *Tilpat*, 14 m. s. of Delhi and 3 m. n. of Faridabad. Joar (*Jewar*) in the Aligarh district is, however, 28 m. s. e. of it (*Ind. At.* 49 S. E.)

† *Sinsani* 16 m. n. w. of Bharatpur, and 8 m. s. of Deeg (*Ind. Atlas*, 50 N. E.). *Soghar* (spelt *Sogghair* in the Fr. MS.) is 4 miles due north of Bharatpur and 14 m. e. of Sinsani, and the home of the Soghoria branch of the Jats.

A French MS. account of the Jats preserved in the India office, London, (Orme MSS. vol. 216, no. 2, copy in vol. 15, no. 11), and ascribed to Father Francois Xavier Wendel, is the only source that mentions *Ramchehra*. Churaman is spoken of by Ishwardas (*Fatuhāt*, 135 b) as a son of the brother of Rajaram, but all other authorities known to me are silent about his relationship with the latter. A Persian work used by W. Irvine names *Bhajja* as the father of Churaman (*Later Mughals*, i. 322). Life of Churaman (mostly after Aurangzib's death) in *M. U.* i. 540-548. The fullest history of the Jat wars in Aurangzib's latter years is given by Ishwardas (131b-133a, 134a, 137b, 164b), with some confusion of persons and dates, which I have corrected from the authentic but meagre official history, *Masir-i-Alamgiri*.

These were the first to challenge the forces of the empire and train their clansmen in group organisation and open warfare. Every Jat peasant was practised in wielding the staff and the sword; they had only to be embodied in regiments, taught to obey their captains, and supplied with fire-arms to make them into an army. As bases for their operations, refuges for their chiefs in defeat, and storing places for their booty, they built several small forts (*garhi*) amidst their almost trackless jungle, and strengthened them with mud walls that could defy artillery.

Then they began to raid the king's highway and carry their depredations to the suburbs of Agra.

The bloody suppression of Goklā Jat had become a faded memory in the course of the next 16 years, and by 1686 a generation of Jat young men had arisen who had not tasted the sword of Hasan Ali Khan.

Rajaram's lawless activities could not be checked by Safi Khan, the governor of Agra. The Jat gangs closed the roads to traffic, and after plundering many villages of the district, Rajaram moved towards Sikandrā, wishing to rob Akbar's tomb there of its costly decorations. The faujdar of the place (Mir Abul Fazl) fought him with very inferior forces, and though he was wounded with most of his followers, he succeeded in turning the rebel back, who marched by way of Shikārpur to Ratanpur, sacking both these places.

Rajaram soon showed even greater audacity. The renowned Turāni warrior Aghar Khan was going from Kābul to the Emperor's camp at Bijapur. Near Dholpur, as his troops were marching carelessly and without order, a large party of Jats suddenly fell on his baggage and carried off some carts, horses and women. The Khan, without making any proper arrangement or concerted plan, impetuously galloped in pursuit of the raiders, at the head of a small force,

and overtook them five miles off. Here the Jats turned at bay and killed Aghar Khan and his son-in-law with 80 of their followers.*

As early as May 1686, Aurangzib had recognised the gravity of the situation by detaching against the Jats a great general, Khān-i-Jahān Kokaltāsh Zafar Jang (*M. A.* 274). Now the success of Rajaram and the failure of Khan-i-Jahān thoroughly alarmed the Emperor, and in December he ordered his son Azam to go there and command the operations in person. But the prince had only reached Burhānpur, when he was recalled to the Emperor's side by the more pressing need of retrieving Mughal prestige before Golkondā (July, 1687). The prince's eldest son, Bidār Bakht, a gallant lad of 17, was however sent (in December, 1687), to assume the supreme command in the Jat war, while Khān-i-Jahān was to continue as his adviser and chief officer [*M. A.* 298, 311; *K. K.* 316, 395].

But before the prince could arrive, the Jat leader committed more atrocities. Early in 1688, Mir Ibrāhim of Haidarabad (newly entitled Mahābat Khan) was marching to his viceroyalty of the Panjab. Near Sikandrā he was encamped on the bank of the Jamunā, when Rajaram attacked him, but was repulsed after a long and stubborn fight with the loss of 400 men, while the Mughals lost 190 in killed and wounded. Rajaram soon returned to the scene, and profiting by the delay in the coming of Shāista Khan, the new subahdar of Agra, he plundered Akbar's tomb,† taking away its

* Ishwardas, 164*b*. The Jat loss in this action is given by him as 200. Khafi Khan (ii. 395), however, says that Aghar Khan rescued his women and then assaulted the *garhi* in which the Jats had taken refuge, but was shot dead.

† Ishwardas, 132*b*. Manucci (ii. 320) adds: "They began their pillage by breaking in the great gates of bronze which it had, robbing

carpets, gold and silver vessels, lamps, &c., and damaging the building. Khan-i-Jahan did nothing to check him.

Bidār Bakht, on his arrival, infused greater vigour into the Mughal operations. At this time an internecine war was raging between the Shekhāwat and Chauhān clans of Rajputs for lands in the Bagthariā and some other parganas. The Chauhāns enlisted the support of Rajaram, while the Shekhāwats bought the armed help of the Mughal faujdar of Mewat. A severe battle was fought between them near the village of Bijal. The Rajputs grappled with one another in deadly animosity, and many were slain on both sides. In the thick of the contest Rajaram was shot dead by a Mughal musketeer hiding in a tree (4 July, 1688).*

the valuable precious stones and plates of gold and silver, and destroying what they were not able to carry away. Dragging out the bones of Akbar, they threw them angrily into the fire and burnt them."

* This is based upon Ishwardas (134*b*), with date from *M. A.* 311. The Fr. MS., however, says: "Ramchehra fell into the prince's hands, and Rajaram, dangerously wounded in the pursuit,died of his wounds shortly afterwards. Ramchehra's head was cut off at Agra and publicly exposed on the great gate in front of the fort, above the bazar."

The official historian and Ishwardas alike ignore Ramchehra and say that it was Rajaram whose head was cut off and sent to the Emperor at Bijapur, where it arrived on 5th Sep. 1688. (*M. A.* 312.)

Bagtharia—There is a Bagthala, 24 m. n. e. of Alwar and 14 m. n. w. of Firuzpur in Gurgaon. (*Ind. At.* 50 N. W.)

Bijal—There is a village named *Bijwar*, on the old bed of the Saubi river, 18 m. s. of Rewari and 4 m. s. of the small town of Shahjahanpur (*Ind. At.* 49 S. W.) *Tijara*, 20 m. e. of Bijwar.

Ishwardas (137*a* and *b*) says that Soghar was taken immediately after Sinsani and that 'the rebel' was captured at the former place. This is wrong.

The fullest account of this war against the Jats is given in K. R. Qanungo's *History of the House of Diggi*, detailing the work of the Jaipur contingent.

§ 3. *Rajah Bishun Singh suppresses the Jats, 1690.*

Bishun Singh Kachhwā, the new Rajah of Amber (Jaipur), was appointed by the Emperor as faujdar of Mathurā with a special charge to root out the Jats and take Sinsani as his own jagir. [Ishwar, 133*a*; the *farman* appointing him is preserved in Jaipur, as also is another on the same terms issued to Rām Singh just before his death.] He gave the Emperor a written undertaking to demolish the fort of Sinsani [Ishwar, 139*a*, 135*b*], as he was burning to distinguish himself and win a high *mansab* like his father Rām Singh and great grandfather Mirzā Rajah Jai Singh. Bidār Bakht laid siege to Sinsani. But the campaign in the jungles of the Jat country severely taxed the invading army. The Mughals before Sinsani had to undergo great hardship from scarcity of provisions and water, as the enemy by frequent attacks cut off their grain-convoys and watering parties. Incessant night-attacks kept the siege-camp in perpetual alarm. "The men were prostrated by hunger, and the animals perished in large numbers through weakness." But the besiegers held tenaciously on, and in four months carried their trenches to the gate of the fort, mounted guns on raised platforms, and laid mines. The jungle round the fort was cleared. One mine under the gate was fired; but the Jats having previously detected it and blocked its further side with stones, the charge was driven backwards, destroying many of the artillerymen and supervising officers of the Mughal army. A second mine was then laid and carried under the wall in a month's time. It was successfully fired (end of January 1690), the wall was breached, the Jat defenders lining it were blown up, and the Mughals stormed the fort after three hours of stubborn opposition. The Jats disputed every inch of the ground and were dispersed only after losing 1500 of their men. On the imperial side, 200

Mughals fell and 700 Rajputs were slain or wounded. The remnant of the garrison was put to the sword. [Ishwardas 136*b*-137*a*; *M. A.* 334; Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam*, §26. Jaipur records.]

Next year (21st May, 1691) Rajah Bishun Singh surprised the other Jat stronghold of Soghar. "The Rajah hastened there with the imperial army. By chance, as the gate of this little fort was kept open at the time for admitting grain, the invaders entered it at the gallop, slaying all who raised their hands and taking 500 of the rebels prisoner." [Ishwar, 137 *a* and *b*; *M. A.*, 340. Jaipur records.]

§ 4. *Rise of Churāman Jat.*

The result of these operations was that the new Jat leader went into hiding in 'nooks and corners' unknown to the imperialists. The tribesmen returned to the peaceful work of cultivation and the district enjoyed repose for some years after. But in 1695, when Prince Shah Alam reached Agra, the Jats were again causing trouble. [*M. U.*, i. 542.] Their next leader was Churāman, the son of Bhajjā, a brother of Rajaram. This Churāman had a genius for organisation and using opportunities, and succeeded in founding a dynasty which still rules over Bharatpur. "He soon built other . . places for retreat and the safe-keeping of booty. . . Most likely he was aided in this work by the wealth secreted by Rajaram and others of his ancestors. Being more enterprising than those who had preceded him, he not only increased the number of his soldiers, but also strengthened them by the addition of fusiliers (musketeers) and a troop of cavalry, whom he shortly afterwards set on foot. . . and having robbed many of the ministers of the Court on the road, he attacked the royal wardrobe and the revenue sent from the provinces." (Wendel MS., 41.) But this full development of Churaman's power

was witnessed after the death of Aurangzib. The wars of succession among that Emperor's sons and then among Bahadur Shah's descendants proved to be golden opportunities to the Jat leader.

About 1704 he recovered Sinsani from Mughal possession. It was, however, wrested from the Jats a second time, on 9th October 1705 by Mukhtār Khan, the governor of Agra.*

§ 5. *Pahār Singh Gaur disturbs Malwa, 1685.*

During the Emperor's prolonged absence in the Deccan, while the Jats were raiding the great royal road from Delhi to Bijapur at its northern end, another body of rebels disturbed its middle portion, which passed through Malwa. Private feuds very often ended in outbreaks which went beyond their original subjects of dispute and developed into revolts against the imperial Government and public peace.

Pahār Singh Gaur, a Rajput zamindar of *Indrakhi* in western Bundelkhand, was serving the Emperor as faujdar of Shahabad Dhamdherā† in Malwa. He was a man of matchless bravery and as chivalrous as he was brave. A zamindar of the neighbourhood named Lāl Singh (of the Khichi Chauhān clan) was driven to despair by the exactions and oppression of his overlord, Anurudh Singh Hādā (the Rajah of Bundi), and bought the alliance of Pahār Singh by offering him the hand of his daughter. Pahār Singh, who ranked

* *M. A.*, 498; Inayetullah's *Ahkam*, 7b. Churaman's history after the death of Aurangzib is given in full in Irvine's *Later Mughals*, i. 322-326; ii. 120-124.

† *Indrakhi*, 43 m. east of Gwalior. It should not be confounded with *Indragarh*, which is 35 m. south-west of it and 30 m. n. of Jhansi. *Shahabad* is 90 m. n. of Sironj and nearly the same distance s. s. w. of Gwalior.

low in Rajput society on account of his being a *Chamār Gaur*,* jumped at the proposal of such an ennobling match, and immediately rode out with his 5000 expert troopers to the villages of Lāl Singh and sent word to Anurudh Singh to spare his vassal. The Hādā Rajah replied scornfully, “*You presume to make a display of your force to prevent me from taking my tribute! When an ant puts forth wings, it is a sign of its approaching death.*” The Gaur leader, on getting this reply, sent a challenge to Anurudh to prepare for battle, but the latter arrogantly said that such a foe was unworthy of his sword and that a few of his armed vassals would be sufficient to drive him away. But the Hādā vanguard was defeated and driven back on their Rajah’s camp by the heroic charges of Pahār Singh, and the boastful Anurudh fled on horseback without having time to tie his turban on his head. Pahār Singh refused to pursue him, replying to his counsellors in these noble words: “It is against the rules of chivalry and heroism to strike a man who has turned his back.” But the Bundi Rajah’s camp and baggage, worth lakhs of Rupees, fell into the victor’s hands, who then returned home (early in 1685).

The Emperor, on hearing of it, ordered the victor to send the booty to him. Pahār Singh refused, and then openly broke with the imperial Government, taking to a life of rebellion and plundering in the villages of Malwa. At this time that province was being administered, in the absence of Prince Muhammad Azam, by Rai Muluk Chand, the assistant (*peshdast*) to his diwan. He carried out the Emperor’s order to suppress the rebel, and attacked Pahār

* Beames’s *Memoirs on..Races*, i. 150: “They are ashamed of their name, as it presumes a connexion with Chamars.” A Lal Singh Khichi is reported as in rebellion in Itawa, in *Akhbarat*, 6 Nov. 1695.

Singh at the village of Udaipur, some 28 miles south-east of Sironj.

After a severe battle the rebel was slain (Nov. or Dec. 1685.) His head was cut off by the victor and sent to the Emperor, who on viewing it remarked, "A sparrow decked in a handful of feathers has struck down a high flying falcon!" Muluk Chand was, however, rewarded with increase of rank (500) and the title of *Rāi-i-rāiān*, the highest that a Hindu civilian could then hold.*

§ 6. *Rebellion in Malwa by Pahār Singh's sons.*

But the rising continued under Pahār Singh's son Bhagwant, who collected a large body of fierce peasants and began to plunder the country round Gwalior, entirely closing the roads to traffic. Muluk Chand marched to Gwalior with his troops and was reinforced by some officers detached from the Agra province. Bhagwant Singh, who had gone towards Kālpi, now turned back and halted at the village of Bijurrā (4 miles south-east of Antri). The imperialists marched out of Gwalior to Antri, 12 m. s. of it. A pitched battle was fought on the spacious plain near the village of Chiruli (6 m. s. e. of Antri.) Bhagwant, who had been encouraging his men from the rear, while the battle was at its hottest, made a sudden charge at the head of 500 fresh men, and cut his way to the elephant of Muluk Chand. The imperialists broke and fled; their general's elephant was driven away, though he continued shooting arrows behind him; the Gaur soldiers plundered all the baggage, horses, etc., of the Mughals, and returned to their base to secure the booty. Bhagwant Singh, though victorious, was thus left almost alone

* The Emperor's letter to Azam reporting this victory and describing Muluk Chand's rewards, in I. O. L. 1344, 15b=*Ruqat* No. 18.

in the field. Some of the Mughal officers who were still maintaining their ground, now joined together and charged Bhagwant in a compact body. After a brief but severe contest the defeat was marvellously turned into a victory; the rebel chief was killed; Muluk Chand turned his elephant back to the lately lost field, cut off Bhagwant's head, and came back to Gwalior (March 1686). But in the very night of his return he died of cholera. [Ishwardas, 94a-97a (full); *M. A.*, 266, 273 (dates only)] His orphan son visited the Emperor and was given a civil post in recognition of his father's services. [I. O. L., 1344, 20a.]

But the trouble did not end even then. Devi Singh, another son of Pahār Singh, joined Chhatra Sāl Bundelā, and took to plundering the imperial territory and molesting the people in Bundelkhand. [Ishwar, 119b.] In 1690, Gopāl Singh,* the grandson of Pahār Singh, assembled a large army and captured the fort of *Indrakhi*, belonging to Bakhtawar of the Bhādauriā clan. The dispossessed zamindar appealed for protection to Safdar Khan, the faujdar of Gwalior, who did nothing for him. The Emperor severely reprimanded this officer and compelled him to proceed against the rebels. Safdar Khan, therefore, rode in force against a petty fort near the village of Gujwārā† in the pargana of Palwā, to which he laid siege. On the sixteenth day, while he was making preparations for delivering an assault next morning, the rebels made a night-attack on the siege-camp. The Khan, fighting in front of his men, was killed by a musket-shot in his navel (May 1690). [Ishwar, 135b, 138a; *M. A.* 335.]

* Gopal Singh *Gaur* must not be confounded with Gopal *Chaudhuri* of Sironj, who rebelled on release from captivity (about 1704), [Inayet's *Ahkam*, 3b,] nor with Rao Gopal Singh *Chandrawat*.

† *Goojurma*, 15 m. e. of Antri railway station. *Palwa*, not found.

But two years later the Gaur rebels submitted. Gopāl Singh and five other kinsmen of Pahār Singh waited on Shāista Khan, the governor of Agra, paid a tribute of Rs. 85,000 in cash and kind, and were restored to their mansabs and deputed to serve in Kābul. [Ishwar, 149a.] On 6 Nov., 1693, Kirat Singh, a son of Pahār Singh, brought 250 Gaur recruits to the Emperor and was paid Rs. 25 for each. [*Akhbarat*, year 36.] In August 1695 we find Devi Singh serving the Emperor in the Deccan as qiladar of Machandragarh. [*Akhbarat*, year 39.]

§ 7. *Gangaram's rising in Bihar.*

Further east, in the province of Bihār, the imperial authority was defied by Gangārām.* This poor Nāgar Brahman of Gujrat had first secured a small post in the accounts department at the recommendation of the historian Bhimsen, and afterwards became diwan of Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur. When the Khan went to the Deccan as viceroy in 1680, he sent Gangaram to manage his estates (*jagirs*) in Allahabad and Bihar. The sudden rise of this obscure Hindu excited the jealous hate of the other servants of the Khan, who had been displaced from his favour; and they conspired to poison his ears against his absent diwan, by charging him with peculation. Gangaram, on hearing of it, at once went to his master and by his explanations regained his esteem. But as soon as he was back in his charge, his rivals renewed their tactics and with greater success. The unruly peasantry of Khan-i-Jahan's jagirs in North India did not pay rent except under coercion, and Gangaram had to keep a large army to enforce his revenue collection. This

* Based on *Dilkasha*, i. 175 and Stewart's *Bengal*, sec. vi. *M. A.* 205 says that his rising was in subah Allahabad, Ishwardas, 119b, in Kalpi, (both wrong).

fact was misrepresented by Khan-i-Jahan's courtiers as a proof of Gangaram's design for independence and self-aggrandisement. The Khan's suspicion was deepened, and he summoned the diwan to his presence. Gangaram, disgusted with such a light-minded master and despairing of his life and honour, flew to arms. Collecting some four thousand soldiers he plundered the city of Bihār and advancing laid siege to Pātnā. The governor Saif Khan was a coward and miser; he had kept less than his due contingent of troops and allowed the fortifications of the city to fall out of repair. The rebel set up a bogus Prince Akbar and called upon the people to rally round his standard. (March 1681.) But he had neither the skill nor the material necessary for taking a walled city, and turned to the more profitable work of plundering the neighbouring villages, while the governor shut himself up in the fort. At length imperial reinforcements arrived from Dacca and Benares and raised the siege of Patna. Gangaram was wounded, but he turned away from the city and engaged in dispossessing many of the zamindars of that district and seizing their wealth and lands. The Emperor dismissed Saif Khan, 1682. [*M. A.* 226.]

After some time Gangaram entered Malwa and in concert with Rajput rebels plundered Sironj.* (Oct. 1684). He died shortly afterwards at Ujjain. [*Dil.* i. 176. Details in Hamid-ud-din's letters.]

* Orme MSS. 126. Dharamgaon to Surat, 18 Nov. 1684. Here Gangaram is spoken of as a "Rajput belonging to the Rana." Bhimsen adds that he was then going to the Deccan in order to win a mansab by fighting for the Emperor. *Akhbarat*, year 40, records on 5 May 1696, "Gangaram Dawa, son of Chand *Bundela*, reported as looting the zamindari of Urchha." This was a different man.

§ 8. *Gopāl Singh Chandrawat.*

Rao Gopāl Singh Chandrāwat, the zamindar of Rāmpurā in Malwa, was serving in the Emperor's army in the Deccan. He had sent his son Ratan Singh home to manage his affairs. This wicked youth made himself master of the zamindari, drove out his father's agents, and stopped sending the revenue to Gopāl Singh. The Emperor paid no heed to the father's complaints; Ratan Singh became a convert to Islam, through Mukhtār Khan the governor of Malwa, and thus secured from the Emperor the grant of his ancestral estate, which was newly named *Islāmpurā*! At the news of it, Gopāl Singh left the Mughal army, returned home, and tried to raise a body of men for recovering Rāmpurā (June 1700). But the Malwa governor's forces, assisted by Ratan Singh, marched against him, and he had to flee into the territory of Udaipur (Feb. 1701.) [*Dil.* ii. 130a; *Akh.*]

But the Maharana could do nothing for him, and at last Gopal Singh in despair made his submission to the Emperor. He was introduced with his wrists tied together like a captive's but was ordered to be unbound, restored to his mansab, and appointed faujdar of Kaulās (in Haidarabad), although his ancestral estate was not given back to him. [*Dil.* 145b. and *Akh.*]

Early in 1706, Gopāl Singh again fell into extreme poverty, on his being deprived of the faujdari of Kaulās. He then joined the Marathas for a living, [*Dil.* 155a], and accompanied them in the sack of Barodā in the month of March in that year. [*Ibid.* 156a. See Ch. 61 § 36.]

CHAPTER LX

THE ENGLISH TRADERS IN INDIA.

§ 1. *The beginnings of English trade with Bengal.*

The English nation established their first trade factory at Surat in 1612 and exchanged goods with Agrā and Delhi by the land route. From Agrā attempts were made in 1620 and 1632 to open up trade at Patnā in Bihār, but the cost of land transport from Surat all the long way across the Indian peninsula to Agrā and thence to Patna was prohibitive, especially for bulky goods like saltpetre, and this project was wisely abandoned.*

In 1633 the English agent at Masulipatam on the Madras coast sent a commercial mission to Orissā. The Mughal subahdar received them very kindly at Cuttack and gave them permission to trade in that province without molestation or duty (5th May.) The result was that an English factory was opened at Balasore and another at Hariharpur, 25 miles south-east of Cuttack. A little later, in 1640, the building of Fort St. George was begun at Madras, on a piece of land bought from a Hindu Rajah of the Vijayanagar dynasty, and thus "the English established their first independent station in India." It lay, however, outside the Mughal empire.

But at this time the trade and industry of the Madras coast steadily declined for several years in consequence of famines and wars between local dynasties. In Bengal, on the other hand, there was going on a rapid growth of prosperity and production on account of the long peace which

* Except when otherwise stated, this chapter § 1—12, is based on C. R. Wilson's *Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, vol. i.

Jahangir's final suppression of the local Afghan chiefs and rebel zamindars and Shah Jahan's strong and beneficent rule had given to the people. So, in 1651 the English opened their first commercial house in Bengal at Hughli on the Ganges, 24 miles north of Calcutta. Their chief exports were saltpetre (brought down in boats from Singhiā or Lālganj, north of Patna), silk and sugar. Prince Shujā was then governor of Bengal, and an English surgeon named Boughton was high in his favour. This doctor used his influence to secure from the prince a trade license and freedom from official exactions for his countrymen. In 1651 Shuja granted them a *nishān* (or prince's order) by which the English were allowed to trade in Bengal on payment of Rs. 3,000 a year in lieu of all kinds of customs and dues.*

The beginning of the Hughli factory was very unpromising. The English suffered much loss in the first few years chiefly in consequence of the dishonesty and carelessness of their local agents. Balasore, too, languished on account of its being "distant, unhealthy, and dangerous," though it continued for several years as the place for loading and unloading Europe-going ships.

But in 1658 the Home authorities reorganised the English establishments in India. All the Company's factories were to be subordinate to the President and Council of Surat, besides which there were to be chief agencies at Madras and Hughli, with out-agencies at Balasore, Qāsim-bāzār and Patna, under the agent of Hughli.

* Wilson's arguments (i. 28n.) in favour of its date being the 25th year of Shah Jahan's reign are convincing. In Persian MSS the figure 5 is easily misread as 8.

§ 2. *Rapid Growth of English trade in Bengal.*

The trade with Bengal was very prosperous. Raw silk was abundant; the taffetas were various and fine; the salt-petre was cheap and of the best quality; the gold and silver sent from England were eagerly taken up by the Indians. Such was the happy prospect in 1658. But the war of succession which broke out in that very year disturbed the country's peace and unsettled the administration everywhere, and most of all in a frontier province like Bengal. The viceroyalty of Mir Jumla (1659-1663) was entirely occupied by a series of campaigns which left him no time to settle the country and restore the civil government. Local officials began to make illegal exactions from the English traders, fearing no punishment for violating their former master's charter. Then followed the rule of a temporary acting viceroy*, which only increased the disorder and oppression, till Shāista Khan, the permanent subahdar of Bengal, arrived in March 1664.

In 1661 further changes were made in the government of the English factories in India; all the Bengal establishments were made subordinate to the Presidency of Madras, which now became of equal rank with Surat. The Bengal trade continued to grow rapidly: in 1668 the Company exported from the province goods worth £34,000, in 1675 the value rose to £85,000, in 1677 to £100,000, and in 1680 to £150,000. Subordinate factories were opened at Dacca in 1668, and at Māldā in 1676. In addition to buying local manufactures, the English sent out European dyers to Bengal to improve the colour of the silk cloth bought locally, and they also inaugurated the Bengal Pilot Service

* Of the disorders during this interregnum a graphic picture has been drawn by Talish in his *Continuation*. (Bodleian MS. 589.)

for navigating the Ganges from Hughli to the sea (1668). The first British ship sailed up the Ganges from the Bay of Bengal in 1679.

§ 3. *Friction between the English traders and the Mughal officials in Bengal.*

In 1681 the Hughli agency was made independent of Madras, and placed under a Governor and Council. William Hedges, the first governor and agent of Bengal, arrived at Hughli on 24th August, 1682. But the Directors changed their policy soon afterwards, and in 1684 the Bengal establishments were again placed under Madras. In the meantime, the differences between the English traders and the local Mughal officers had come to a head. "When Hedges reached Hughli in 1682, he found that the general trade there was almost at a standstill. . . . 'The several affronts, insolences, and abuses daily put upon us by Balchand (the superintendent of customs at Hughli) being grown insufferable, the Agent and Council made use of divers expedients for redress of their grievances; but all means proving ineffectual it was agreed in consultation that the only expedient now left was for the Agent to go himself in person to the Nawab and Diwan at Dacca, . . . to make some settled adjustment concerning the custom.'"

Arriving at Dacca on 25th October, Hedges spent a month and a half in negotiations and returned with promises from Shāista Khan, the *subahdar*, that he would procure a *farman* from the Emperor in favour of the English, take off the claim to 5 p.c. duty on all the treasure imported since 1679, and remove the interdiction of English trade throughout Bengal. But nothing practically resulted from this mission. The local officials at Hughli continued to stop the Company's boats and seize their goods. In vain Hedges

offered large sums of money in order to be excused the payment of customs. [Hedges, *Diary*, ed. by Yule.]

At last the English traders lost all patience with the Mughal Government. "Experience soon showed that treaties were of no avail against the lawlessness of the local officials. It was not that the Mughal Government would not protect the foreign merchants against oppression and wrong. It could not. Whatever control it had, it was gradually losing." The Company, therefore, decided to protect itself by force, break with the Indian rulers, and seize and fortify some convenient place on the Indian coast where its trade would be safe from molestation. This war actually broke out in 1686.

§ 4. *The grievances of the English traders examined.*

The complaints of the English traders against the local agents of the Mughal Government were three:—

(i) The demand of an *ad valorem* duty on the actual merchandise imported, instead of the lump sum of Rs. 3,000 per annum into which it had been commuted during the viceroyalty of Prince Shujā, and also the enhancement of the rate of duty from time to time. The English also claimed that Aurangzib's *farmān* of 15th March 1680 entitled them, on the payment of a consolidated duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. at Surat to import goods and to trade absolutely free of customs and other exactions at all *other* places in the Mughal empire, even though these goods had not been imported *via* Surat and therefore not taxed at all.

(ii) Exactions by local officers under the name of *rāhdāri* (road patrol charge or internal transit duty), presents (*peshkash*), writer's fee, and *farmāish* (supplying

manufactures to order of the governor for which it was not customary to take the price.)

(iii) The practice of high officials (such as Shāista Khan and Prince Azim-ush-shān, subahdars of Bengal),—a practice sometimes resorted to by local faujdars also,—to open the packages of goods in transit and take way articles at prices capriciously fixed by them far below the fair market price, or what the English records call “opening and forcing goods.” Even this unfairly low price could not always be realised from these great men. Some governors (notably Azim-ush-shan) tried to enrich themselves by seizing goods at low prices and then selling them in the market at normal prices,—a practice called *sauda-i-khās*.

As for the first of the above grievances, the question will become clear to us if we bear in mind the principles of taxation followed by Aurangzib during his reign. The general rule was to levy a duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. on the value of all goods imported. But evidently different rates were followed at different places, and so on 10th April 1665 the Emperor issued an order that in all provinces there would be two uniform rates for customs in future, namely $2\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. for Muslims and 5 p. c. for Hindus. A little later, the merchandise of Muslim importers was declared to be duty free from 9th May 1667 onwards.

In addition to this import duty, a poll-tax called *jaziya* was imposed on non-Muslims from 2nd April 1679. The Christians, both European and Armenian, objected to this last impost, but the Quranic law does not exempt Christians and Jews from it, though they are *ahal-i-kitāb* or believers in the Old Testament like the Muhammadans. The Mughal Government seems to have found it difficult to assess and levy the *jaziya* per head from the Europeans in the same manner as from the Hindus, and consequently it seems to

have offered them a compromise by turning the *jaziya* into an addition to the import duty on their goods, raising the latter to 3½ p. c. [Farmān of 15 March, 1680 in Stewart's *Bengal*].

§ 5. *The Mughal rules of taxation of merchandise.*

Now, for the fiscal relations of the Mughal Government with the English traders. In 1664, the gallantry displayed by the English (and Dutch) merchants of Surat in defending their factories against Shivaji and thereby saving the houses of some of their Indian neighbours, was rewarded by the Emperor who ordered a reduction of half a per cent on the normal import duty on the goods of these two nations for an undefined period in future, *i.e.*, they had to pay 2 p.c. instead of 2½ p.c. customs. This concession* was withdrawn in 1679.

In 1665, a very reasonable order was passed that the goods of "the Feringis and the Dutch" in Ahmadabad city were not to be taxed as they had already paid the duty at Surat. [*Mirat* i. 264.]

A *farman* of Aurangzib, dated 26th June 1667, informs the officials at Surat that in future the English traders there should pay only 2 p.c. *ad valorem* duty on all goods imported by them to that harbour, and that the governors, captains of guards, lieutenants of countries (*i.e.*, *faujdārs*), guards of passes and highways (*rāhdārs*)....should not stop on the way the merchandise which the English purchased in Bengal Agra and other provinces and transported by way of Burhānpur and Ahmadabad for sale in the port of Surat,

* Granted by a *hasb-ul-hukm* dated 14th March 1664, the language of which shows that the popular belief that the reduction was by one per cent is wrong. Its withdrawal was in Nov. 1679. Foster's *Eng. Factories*, xi. 314-315.

on the pretence of taking *rāhdāri* or other duties and *abwabs* abolished by the Emperor. This concession was granted at the prayer of the English merchants, backed by a letter from Ghiyās-ud-din Khan, the governor of Surat, to the wazir Jafar Khan, recommending the English as deserving of imperial favours. [Forrest, *Select. Bombay*, Home Series, i. 213.]

In the second Maratha sack of Surat, 1670, the three European nations, English, Dutch, and French, were suspected of having come to a secret understanding with the raiders, instead of resisting them. Hence no privileges were given to them this time. In 1679 the *jaziya* or poll-tax was revived, and the Christians were asked to pay it in the form of an addition of one per cent to the custom duty, at the same time that the reduction of $\frac{1}{2}$ p.c. made in 1664 was withdrawn,—i.e., they were subjected to a $3\frac{1}{2}$ p.c. import duty.

§ 6. *The Mughal Government's position explained.*

Next, the claims of the English in Bengal (*a*) to escape the duty on the actual value of their imports by a fixed annual payment of Rs. 3,000 (as conceded by Shujā in 1651) and (*b*) to trade absolutely free in all other parts of India on payment of customs at Surat (in virtue of Aurangzib's *farman* of 1680), are both false and indefensible on any reasoning. (See Appendix C at the end of this Chapter.)

Shuja was merely a provincial governor. He could, as he pleased, let off some favoured body of merchants on easy terms during his own viceroyalty, but his grant (*nishan*) could not bind his successors in office, unless it was confirmed by the Emperor and turned into an imperial charter (*farman*.) According to the practice of the Mughal

times, every charter (even when issued by a king or Emperor) had to be renewed by his successor on the throne, otherwise it would lose its validity,—though the renewal, in most cases, followed as a matter of course, on the payment of the customary presents of congratulation at the accession of the new monarch.* A fixed sum of Rs. 3,000 a year might have satisfied Shujā; it was his personal lookout to take the legal amount of duty or less; and English trade in Bengal was of too small a volume in his days. There was no reason why later governors of Bengal should be content with such a small sum and not levy the legal rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ p.c. on the goods, especially when the volume of English imports into Bengal had multiplied several times since Shujā's days.

The English interpretation of Aurangzib's *farmān* of 1680 was equally wrong. Payment of duty on the goods landed at Surat could, by no exercise of ingenuity, exempt from duty a different cargo that had come from Home or China not through Surat but directly to Bengal, and which, therefore, could not have paid any duty at Surat. The English traders in Bengal had no reason to claim exemption from a law of the land, which merchants of all other nations had to obey. If at a later date (in Ibrāhim Khan's viceroyalty, 1691) Aurangzib's representative in Bengal was content to accept a fixed annual payment of Rs. 3,000 from the English, instead of $2\frac{1}{2}$ p.c. on the actual value

* The old Marathi grants for village headmanship of which thousands have been printed, prove that it was the custom in those days to question the validity of an old grant unless it was renewed by the new king or governor. At every change of authorities, the right of the grantee had to be established and a new order for respecting it had to be taken from the new governor.

of their imports, it was the result of a definite contract to that effect authorised by the Emperor.

There was another element, too, in this dispute. Judging from the fraudulent use of the right of issuing passes ("sale of *dastak*") to cover other people's goods under the English flag, which was notoriously practised by the E. I. Co.'s servants in Bengal in the 18th century, we shall be justified in supposing that, with the relaxation of the Mughal administration in Bengal during Aurangzib's absence in the Deccan (1680-1707), the English factors tried to evade the payment of the lawful duty. Hence their frequent collisions with the local revenue officers, who tried to prevent this fraud on the Exchequer.

§ 7. *Exaction of illegal perquisites was universal though condemned by Emperor*

As for the second and third grievances of the English, we must remark that the exactions here complained of had been declared illegal by Aurangzib and were practised only in disregard of his orders. *Rāhdāri* had been abolished in the second year of his reign, while "benevolences" and forced presents were condemned in the general order abolishing *abwabs* issued on 29th April 1673.* The "forcing of goods" by his grandson Azim-ush-shan for his private trade called forth Aurangzib's sternest censures, when it was brought to his ears (about 1703). He sarcastically called the practice *sauda-i-kham* or 'very crude plan' instead of *sauda-i-khas* or 'the prince's own business' which title Azim had given to it, and he ended his letter by calling the prince a fool and a tyrant for practising such "plunder of the

* J. Sarkar's *History of Aurangzib*, iii. ch. 28, *Mughal Adm.* ch. 5.

people." [*Riyaz-us-salatin*, Eng. tr. 246; I.O.L. MS. 3021 folio 53a.]

But the traders thus wronged by the local officers could have redress on those rare occasions only when their cries reached the ears of the old Emperor in the far-off Deccan, and the redress was merely an order on paper. As even the Indian historians of the age admit and as is illustrated by many instances cited in the Court bulletins and Aurangzib's letters,—in many places the local officers levied the forbidden cesses and presents, whenever they felt themselves sufficiently distant from the Emperor or backed by influential ministers at his Court, or if their victims had not sufficient influence and courage to convey their complaints to the Emperor's ears.

Purity of administration was impossible in a society devoid of public spirit and accustomed to submit helplessly to every man in power in public life as well as private. The Emperor could not look to everything; he could not be present everywhere; he had to act through agents, and these did not share his integrity and regard for his subjects. The quality of the administration is determined by the character of the official class and the intelligence, spirit, and power of union of the governed.*

§ 8. *The English sack Hughli, 1686.*

We shall now proceed to the history of the contest between the Mughal Government and the English traders

* In England at that very time (reign of William III.) the highest officers, including the Attorney-General (Seymour) and the prime minister (Leeds) took bribes. But they were *punished* when detected, while in Mughal India the receiving of presents and perquisites was considered legitimate. [Macaulay's *History*, iv. ch. 20 and 21.]

in Bengal. The Indian merchants and brokers employed by the E. I. Co. at Qasimbazar (Bengal) made a large claim against Job Charnock, the chief of the factory there and his colleagues. The Indian judge of the place decreed the sum of Rs. 43,000 against the Englishmen (1684-85). On appeal the judgment was confirmed by the provincial governor, who, in default of payment, summoned Charnock to appear before him at Dacca. As Charnock refused to comply with the order, his factory was invested by Mughal troops (August 1685). But in April next, he escaped to Hughli and took the chief direction of English affairs in Bengal. The war began in six months' time from this event.

By October 1686 the English forces at Hughli had increased to nearly 400 men,—Englishmen, Portuguese half-breeds, and Rajput mercenaries, with two men-of-war and two frigates. Shaista Khan, the governor of Benga on his part, had not been negligent. He had concentrated 300 horse and 3,000 foot at Hughli to guard the town from any surprise by the English, whose assembling of force had become known. Abdul Ghani, the faujdar of the town, stopped the trade of the English, forbade the supply of provisions to them, and placed the local market out of bounds for English troops. On the 28th of the month, three English soldiers, in trying to enter the market in defiance of this order, were wounded and carried prisoner to the faujdar. An advance made by Captain Leslie from the English factory (near Golghāt) to rescue them was beaten back with loss, and the thatched huts surrounding the factory were set on fire to arrest their progress. The Mughal battery, midway between the faujdar's residence and the factory, opened fire on the enemy's shipping in the river. But reinforcements soon arrived from the English camp

three miles down the river, took the battery spiking the guns, and advanced further, sacking and burning the faujdar's house and the town lying beyond it. In the evening the English ships came abreast of Hughli, captured a ship of the Mughal's, and "kept firing and battering most part of the night and next day, and making frequent sallies on shore, burning and plundering all they met with." Long before this the faujdar had fled away in disguise in a boat, without making any attempt to defend the panic-stricken city or save the people from outrage. On the Indian side sixty soldiers were killed and four or five hundred houses burnt down together with a great number of barges and boats.

The Hughli faujdar sought the mediation of the Dutch (whose factory was at Chinsurā) and opened negotiations with the English in order to gain time for the arrival of reinforcements. The English agreed, and made use of this truce to pack their store of saltpetre and prepare for evacuating the place with all their officers and stores. But they continued to seize Mughal ships at sea and made an alliance with the Muslim zamindar of Hijli, who was in rebellion against the Delhi Emperor.

Shāista Khan, on hearing of the sack of Hughli by the English, decided to crush these disturbers of public peace. Vast detachments of cavalry were sent to Hughli and the English factors at Patnā were ordered to be seized. On 20th December, the English withdrew from Hughli with all their property, and falling 24 miles down the river halted at Sutānati (modern Calcutta), and from that base continued their negotiations with the subahdar at Dacca for securing land for a fortified trade-settlement and an imperial order allowing them to carry on their commerce free of duty! Shāista Khan temporised, and used the month's

time thus gained to complete his armed preparations, and then threw off the mask.

§ 9. *The English renew war and seize Hijli, 1687.*

The war was renewed in February 1687. The English burnt down the imperial salt-warehouses near Matiaburuj and then stormed the forts at Thānā (modern Garden Reach, south-west of Calcutta). Sailing down the river they seized the island of Hijli, on the east coast of the Medinipur district (Contāi sub-division),—a swamp of deadly malaria, but rich in fruits corn and game, and the seat of salt manufacture by evaporating sea-water. At the end of February the English were established in this island, the local Mughal commandant having evacuated the fort without a blow. Here all the English land and sea forces in the Bay of Bengal were assembled.

Next March a body of 170 English soldiers and sailors landed at Balasore, took the Mughal fort, and burnt the two towns called Old and New Balasore, after looting them for two days. The Indian shipping in the docks were burnt, and two vessels belonging to Prince Azam and Shāista Khan were seized as prizes. [Martin, *Mémoires*, ii. 483.]

About the middle of May 1687, Abdus Samad, a lieutenant of Shāista Khan, arrived before Hijli with 12,000 men to expel the English. The invaders had been daily losing men from disease, both on land and in the ships, during the trying months of March and April, and their provisions had now run very short. From the mainland in the west the heavy Mughal batteries began to fire across the Rasulpur river upon the English position in the island and drove the English ships from their anchorage. On 28th May a body of 700 Mughal cavalry and 200 gunners crossed the river three miles above Hijli town, surprised an English

battery on the island, and pushing further south seized that town itself and set it on fire. The English held only the small weakly-walled fort. Their losses in the meantime had been terrible: 200 soldiers had perished and only a hundred, weakened by fever, survived, while the forty officers had sunk to five only. Yet, for four days they held the fort, and the two batteries guarding the road to the landing place, against overwhelming odds, and in spite of their being hemmed round on all the three landward sides. On 1st June their reinforcements arrived, and next day they made a successful sortie, beating the enemy back from their guns.

On 4th June Abdus Samad sued for peace. On the 11th the English evacuated Hijli fort, carrying off all their ammunition and artillery, their drums beating and their banners flying. But the indemnity and fresh commercial privileges which they had demanded and Abdus Samad had promised, were refused by the subahdar of Dacca. On 16th August Shāista Khan issued a letter in which he rebuked the English for their recent acts of violence, but permitted them to build a fort at Uluberiā (about 20 miles south of Calcutta) and renew their trade at Hughli. So, Charnock returned with his ships and halted at Sutānati (September 1687), where the first buildings of Calcutta were projected.

But in the meantime the English had also made war on the Mughal shipping on the Bombay Coast. Shāista Khan, on hearing of this fresh provocation, felt himself no longer bound to observe the terms which he had recently offered to Charnock. He ordered the English to return to Hughli, forbade any building at Sutānati, and demanded large sums as war-compensation. Charnock, however, sent an embassy to Dacca, seeking permission to remain at Sutanati and to buy land there for an English factory.

These new negotiations spread over a year after the landing at Calcutta in September 1687. Next year Captain Heath arrived from England, replacing Charnock as Agent in Bengal. The new chief decided to withdraw from Bengal proper, and on 8th November 1688 sailed away from Sutānati with all the men and property of the Company, while the officers of the branch-factories in the interior of Bengal were abandoned to their fate.

§ 10. *English atrocities at Balasore, 1688.*

Sailing to Balasore with 300 soldiers, Captain Heath, on 29th November, stormed the Mughal fortification (called Point of Sand) at the easternmost point of Old Balasore, capturing its artillery and stores. Next day he seized New Balasore (further inland, to the west) and committed great excesses, ill-treating Christians and non-Christians,* men and women alike. But before this the merchants and servants of the English factory, in the heart of New Balasore, had been seized and removed far inland by the Mughal faujdar, and Heath could not rescue them. After some time spent in indecision and halting peace talk, the Captain sailed away on 23rd December. Arriving before Chatgaon about 18th January 1689, he planned to wrest that fort from the Mughal officers and make it the safe and independent base desired by the English for their trade in Bengal. A council of war dissuaded him from this mad project, and at last in utter disgust Heath sailed away, for Madras (17th Feb.), abandoning all his Bengal projects.

* Martin, *Mémoires*, iii. 8.

§ 11. *Negotiations with the Mughal Government.*

We now turn to the action of the imperial Court during these years, 1687—1689. The sack of Hughli (28 Oct. 1686) and the seizure of Hijli (Feb. 1687) by the English had been duly reported to Aurangzib, then engaged in the siege of Golkondā. The next provocation by the English had been the attack on his shipping in the Western Sea by the Bombay fleet (under the directions of Sir John Child.) The Emperor had immediately ordered the arrest of all the Englishmen, the occupation of their factories all over his dominions, and the prohibition of all trade or other intercourse with the audacious foreigners by his subjects. But the English were supreme at sea, and could stop the journey of pilgrim-ships to Mecca. The loss to his customs revenue through stoppage of their trade was also serious. Therefore, after a time he was inclined to come to terms with them. Shāista Khan had been removed from Bengal in June 1688, and his temporary successor, Khan-i-Jahan, sent (through the governor of Cuttack, on 1st Sep. 1688) a letter to the President at Madras “complaining much of Agent Charnock’s irregular proceedings there and desiring some discreet person to be sent to treat with him, promising all just and courteous usage.”

This letter was received by the Madras Council on 3rd January 1689, and they replied to it on 25th February, offering to re-establish the English factory in Bengal. Meantime, on 12th February, Henry Stanley and James Ravenhill, the imprisoned factors of Balasore, wrote to Madras, complaining of the ill-usage to which they were subjected by the Mughal faujdar in retaliation for the injury done by Heath’s squadron and begging the Madras Council

to try for their release soon, as otherwise they would be sent to Dacca in chains, under orders of the subahdar.

A few months later Ibrāhim Khan,* a friend of the English, came to Bengal as permanent viceroy, and on 2nd July he wrote a letter to Madras (which was received there on 7th October), inviting the English to return to Bengal. Charnock praised the Khan (whom he had long known when governor of Patna), as a mild man of friendly disposition, whose word could be relied on, and he counselled the Madras authorities to re-establish the Bengal factory.

§ 12. *Emperor again permits the English to trade, 1690.*

In the meantime, the English prisoners lately set free by Ibrāhim Khan had again, under new orders from the Emperor, been placed under restraint. But in this the subahdar had merely made a show of harshness, to please his master.† At last in February 1690, peace was finally concluded between the Mughal Government and the English on the West Coast. As Aurangzib wrote on 22nd Feb.

* "The new Nawab was a man of peace. Without military abilities, he desired to administer justice with strict impartiality and to encourage agriculture and commerce." (*Early Annals*, i. 123.)

† "The Nawab has forborne to execute the Emperor's severe orders for extirpating the English in this country and demolishing their factories in Bengal. He had lately released the English captives and said, 'The late subahdar [Shaista Khan] wrote many stories against you [to the Emperor]. . . . You have many enemies, esp. the Dutch.'" [Letter from Bengal dated 25 Nov. 1689, recd. at Madras 23 Jan. 1690.]

On 13 Sep. 1689, under the general orders of Aurangzib, his local officer in Telingana had seized the English factory at Vizagapatam, killing three of the factors and carrying off the rest to Chicacole. A little later, their Masulipatam factory was also seized. [Fort St. George Diary, 2, 7 and 10 Oct. 1689.]

1690, "The English [of Surat] having made a most humble, submissive petition, and [promised] that they would present the Emperor with a fine of Rs. 150,000, and behave themselves no more in such a shameful manner, His Majesty hath pardoned their faults and agrees that they follow their trade as in former times."

After this settlement, the Emperor also wrote to Ibrāhim Khan, on 23rd April 1690, to let the English trade freely in Bengal as formerly, without giving them any further trouble. [Stewart's *Bengal*, App. vii and vi.]

On 25th July the Madras Council decided to send Charnock back to Bengal as Agent, and he arrived once more at Sutanati on 24th August. This was the foundation of Calcutta and of the British Power in Northern India. Ibrāhim Khan's subordinates respected the traders, and on 10th February 1691 an imperial order (*hasb-ul-hukm*) was issued by the grand wazir to the diwān of Bengal, allowing the English to carry on their trade in that province without molestation on paying Rs. 3,000 a year in lieu of all custom and other dues. In the terms of this imperial rescript, Ibrāhim Khan issued a circular letter (*parwāna*) to all revenue and other officers in Bengal to "take, instead of custom, but Rs. 3,000 of the English yearly, and in their buying and selling take not a pice more; that ye assist their gumashtas in their lawful and just business upon all accounts; and that no one, upon the account of *rahdari*, *jamadāri* or *farmāish* &c., be suffered to defraud or molest them, it being forbidden by the Emperor." [*Ibid*, App. viii and ix].

This was the final settlement of the English in Bengal.

§ 13. *English traders at Surat ill-treated by
Mughal officials.*

As in Bengal, so also on the Western Coast of India, the English traders suffered from the vexatious and illegal interference and greed of the local officers of the Mughal Government, which the Emperor could not check. In addition, they were threatened with a new tax in violation of the privileges enjoyed by them in the past. Thus, on 20th April 1680 the Surat factors write, "Not only we but the Dutch and French are grown so inconsiderable with these Moors that they fear not to push what they please upon us; for having demanded of us to pay the poll [*i.e.*, the *jaziya*] as other inhabitants in the country, and we refusing, the king has some few days since sent down a positive order for all the natives to pay 3½ per cent custom as formerly, which will cost the Company little less than Rs. 20,000 yearly." [Orme MSS. 116, Bombay letters received.]

The friction continued; the local agents of the E. I. Co. were powerless to find a remedy. The island of Bombay had not yet become so well-developed and self-supporting as to enable the English to conduct their Indian trade from this centre and to close the factory at Surat which was constantly subject to Mughal oppression.

But Sir Josiah Child, the Chairman of the Company in London, was a man of fiery disposition and exceptional force of character. He decided on a policy of firmness, independence, and if necessary of reprisal, against the Mughal empire. Such a policy required three things, namely (*a*) the withdrawal of the English factory from Surat, which was really a "fool's paradise," (*b*) concentrating the Company's trade and officers in Bombay as "the Key of India," in order to be free from the intolerable

restraints and indignities to which the Company's servants were subjected at Surat, and (c) seizing the Indian shipping at sea in retaliation for the oppression done to English trade in the Mughal dominions.

In fact, the Home authorities of the Company decided on war and issued orders to their agents in India to carry out such a strong policy. Its unsuitability was pointed out by the Madras and Bombay officials, but the London Chairman was immovable. The war he desired was sure to end in failure in consequence of the weakness and incompetence of Sir *John* Child, the "General and Director in Chief" of all the Company's factories in India.

We have already seen the results of this policy of aggression in Bengal and Telingāna from October 1686 to November 1689. On the West Coast, Sir John Child, in obedience to orders from Home, left Surat for Bombay on 25th April 1687, in order to be beyond the reach of the Mughals. The imperial governor of Surat disliked this retreat of the English to an independent position, as he thus lost the power of intimidating and fleecing the Company. Child's departure was justly taken to be a preparation for war, and the governor put troops round the English factory, with the effect that Benjamin Harris, the chief of the Surat Council, and Samuel Annesley, his second in office, could not go outside. This greatly hampered the Company's business.

§ 14. *Sir John Child makes war, but submits,*
1688-1689.

The Mughal Government's relations with the English continued in an unsettled and undefined state for more than a year afterwards. At last, on 9th October 1688, Sir John Child appeared with a fleet before Swally and sent to the

governor of Surat a list of the grievances of the English, demanding compensation for past injuries and a new charter confirming and extending their privileges. The governor gained time by drawing the negotiations out, which could be authoritatively concluded by the Emperor only. But on 26th December, his preparations being complete, he threw off the mask and began open hostility by suddenly imprisoning the English factors and their Indian brokers, placing a guard over the English factory, and sending a force to Swally to seize Child. The latter escaped, and retaliated by blockading the mouth of the river below Surat and then sailing down the coast and capturing all sorts of Indian shipping indiscriminately. His prizes included 40 large ships, 4 smaller ones, and 36 *ghurabs* and *gallivats*, mostly laden with grain oil and other country produce. [Arnold Wright's *Annesley of Surat*, 92-98, 125-127, superseding Bruce's *Annals*, iii.]

The Mughal Government's reply was to put the captive Englishmen at Surat in irons, in which deplorable condition they remained for 16 months (Dec. 1688—April 1690.)* At the same time, the Siddi of Janjirā, as Mughal admiral, delivered an attack on Bombay (May 1689) and landed on the island, occupying its outlying parts. Child's supine administration and neglect of defensive preparations, as well as his incapable leadership and personal timidity, led to the English garrison being driven within Bombay fort and besieged there by a daily increasing mob of Muslims. They offered a stout defence and performed prodigies of valour,

* "They were at times made to gratify the mob by parading the streets with chains suspended from their necks." When Sir John Child made his submission in April 1690, they were released from the jail, but closely confined to their factory until 17th Oct. 1691. [Anderson, 243.]

but suffered terrible losses from disease and desertion, without any chance of filling up the gaps in their ranks.

Governor Child, therefore, made an abject appeal for pardon, sending a mission to Aurangzib under G. Weldon and Abraham Navarro (10th Dec. 1689.) At this time the credit of the English nation in India had been shaken by exaggerated Dutch reports of the flight of James II, the landing of William of Orange, and his assumption of the crown of England.

The Mughal Court was favourably inclined towards peace. "Neither the leading Court officials, nor the Surat [Indian] merchants, wanted to see the English ruined." In Bengal, too, the new governor, Ibrahim Khan, was eager for the return of the English traders. So, the Emperor granted his pardon to them, by an order dated 25th December 1689. The *farmān* was received at Surat with due ceremony on 4th April 1690, the factors having been released by the governor a day earlier. The English were restored to their old position in the Indian trade on condition of paying a fine of one-and-a half lakhs of Rupees, and restoring the goods taken from Indian ships. [Wright, 130-143.]

The position of the English, however, continued to be very bad during 1691, 1692, and 1693, on account of dull trade, the lack of capital, the intrusion of interlopers of their own race, and civil discord in the Bombay Council. Early in 1694 Sir John Gayer arrived as governor of Bombay and chief agent in Western India, and in the May of the same year Annesley succeeded as chief of the Surat factory, on President Harris turning mad. [*Ibid*, 153.]

And then the situation was entirely changed by the appearance of a new element. The English interests in the Mughal empire were dominated for the next six years by the acts of European pirates in Asiatic waters.

§ 15. *European pirates in Indian seas, early 17th century.*

European piracy in the Indian Ocean had begun with the coming of Vasco da Gama at the end of the 15th century. It excited no moral reprobation in Christendom. "To prey upon Muhammadan ships was simply to pursue in other waters the chronic warfare carried on against Moors and Turks in the Mediterranean." [Biddulph's *Pirates of Malabar*, 2.] Merchants and adventures of all classes and nationalities flocked from Europe to the Indian seas in the 16th and 17th centuries, and with the growth of Indian trade there was a corresponding growth of piracy. In 1623 the depredations of the Dutch brought the English into disgrace; their warehouses at Surat were seized and the President and factors were placed in irons by the Mughal Government for seven months.

In 1635, Cobb, the captain of a ship licensed by Charles I, of England, plundered two Mughal vessels at the mouth of the Red Sea, though one of them had a pass from the Surat factory. In 1638, Sir William Courten, under a grant from the same king, sent out four ships which robbed Indian vessels and tortured their crews. For these misdeeds of their fellow-countrymen, the innocent servants of the E. I. Co. at Surat were kept in prison for two months, and released only on the payment of Rs. 1,70,000 as compensation. [*Ibid*, 2-6.]

In the second half of the 17th century an even more lawless race of men than the old Buccaneers appeared and extended their operations to the Indian Ocean, acting generally in single ships and plundering vessels of every nationality. "Of these men, chiefly English, the most notorious were Teach, Evory, Kidd, Roberts, England and Tew, with many others less known to fame. . . . Roberts alone was credited with the destruction of 400 trading

vessels in three years. . . . The chief cause of their immunity lay in the fact that it was the business of nobody in particular to act against them. . . . Their friends on shore supplied their wants and gave them timely information of rich prizes to be looked for, or armed ships to be avoided. Officials high in authority winked at their doings, from which they drew a profit. . . . Not only were the greater number of pirates of English blood, but pirate captains of other nationalities often sailed under English colours. The native officials, unable to distinguish the rogues from the honest traders, held the E. I. Co.'s servants responsible for their misdeeds." (*Ibid*, viii-x).

§ 16. *Atrocities of English pirates.*

In 1684, six Europeans,—four of them being English and the other two Dutch,—begged their passage in a Persian merchant's richly laden vessel bound for India. In the Gulf of Persia they killed the owner, his two wives and many other persons, including 26 lascars. Fifteen of the lascars leaped overboard and escaped in a small boat to Masqat. These pirates committed more atrocities, made their way to Goa, and cast six more lascars overboard tied hand and foot. But when they landed at Honore, they were arrested by the local governor. Their ringleader was supposed to be Terrell. [Orme MSS. 117, p. 291.]

In 1688 two ships under English colours seized vessels in the Red Sea worth six lakhs of Rupees. Next year a number of sea-rovers from the West Indies made their appearance and infested the Malabar coast, hoisted the red or black flag, and robbed Indian and European vessels alike. [*Madras Diary*.] There were besides, other European pirates in the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Red Sea,

in the Mozambique Channel and some lying off Achen (Sumatra.)

"As pirates and interlopers alike sailed under English colours, the whole odium fell on the English. In August 1691 a ship belonging to Abdul Ghafur was taken by them near Surat with nine lakhs of cash on board." The Mughal Government immediately placed a guard on the English factory at Surat and forbade their trade in the country. But one of the pirate crew having been captured and proved to be a Dane, the embargo was removed. [Biddulph, 13.]

The most famous of these pirates was Henry Bridgman, who took the *alias* of Evory. On 30th May 1694, while acting as the mate of an English ship hired by the Spanish Government, he overpowered the officers, renamed his ship *Fancy* and took to a life of piracy, with 46 guns and 150 fighters on board. After notable captures in the Gulf of Aden, he took off Socotra (Sep. 1695) the *Fath Muhammadi*, a richly laden ship of Abdul Ghafur, the prince of Surat merchants. A few days later he achieved his crowning feat, the capture of the *Ganj-i-sawai*. [*Ibid*, 16-25.]

§ 17. *Plunder of the Ganj-i-sawai*, 1695.

This ship belonged to the Mughal Emperor and was the largest vessel of the port of Surat. Every year it used to sail to Mokha and Jidda, carrying Indian pilgrims for Mecca and Indian goods for sale in Arabia. It had 80 guns and 400 muskets on board, but its captain, Muhammad Ibrāhim, was a coward.*

* This is the estimate formed by Khafi Khan, (ii. 422) whose description of the plunder of the ship has been used by all writers hitherto. But this captain's own description of the incident is given in I. O. L. MS., Persian No. 150 (Ethe 370) which I translate below. It has a Falstaffian ring and I have not been able to accept it. "We

He was returning from Mokhā, at the head of an Indian merchant fleet of 24 vessels, assembled for mutual defence against pirates. Approaching the Indian coast his consorts dispersed, each to its own destination, leaving the *Ganj-i-sawāi* alone. Between Bombay and Daman it was attacked by the *Fancy*, a second pirate ship and two boats. The artillery fire of the Europeans was most effective; in a short time the Mughal vessel had lost 25 soldiers killed and 20 wounded. A gun on board the *Ganj-i-sawāi* burst, setting the ship on fire and killing or burning several of the crew. While the Indians were distracted by the fire and engaged in putting it out, the pirates boarded the ship from all sides. No resistance was made by the crew. The Captain hid himself in a lower cabin, after placing swords in the hands of the Turkish slave-girls whom he had purchased at Mokhā and whom he now bade to fight like men! [K. K.]

For three days the pirates looted the ship at leisure, taking out of it five hundred thousand *rial* in cash, besides the property of the passengers and traders as well as the armament and instruments of the ship. As usual in such cases, the women on board, many of them belonging to the Sayyid and other respectable families, were outraged, and

arrived in safety between Bombay and Daman. Suddenly four ships appeared in the distance.....They arrived near us. Artillery and muskets were fired on both sides.....For five or six hours shots were showered. During that period.....the *mir-dah* of artillery andthe *mir-dah* of musketeers, and others, 25 men were slain and 20 wounded. I was hurt by two cannon balls on the back and the head. Many of the enemy were sent to hell or wounded. Just then a gun on the imperial ship burst and set the ship on fire. Some men were killed by the flying splinters of the gun and burnt. Our men were distracted in extinguishing the fire. Then the English, who numbered 1200 men, boarded our ship on four sides.....They kept the ship for three days, plundering it....." (*Folio* 19.)

several of these victims committed suicide. Then Evory left the unhappy ship which was carried by its crew to Surat on 12th September.

The first news of the outrage had been brought to Surat some days earlier, by a *huri* boat of the *Ganj-i-sawāi* in which nine of its sailors had escaped by cutting their ropes at the first attack of the pirates. Immediately on hearing of it, Itimad Khan, the governor of Surat, had sent out the small Mughal flotilla of the port with four boats borrowed from the Dutch and the French, to assist the *Ganj-i-sawai*. They had returned to Surat without being able to find out the unhappy vessel.*

When, on 12th September, the *Ganj-i-sawāi* itself reached Surat and its passengers, stripped of everything, unfolded the tale of plunder and rape, the people of that port were roused to uncontrollable indignation. The attack on the Mecca pilgrims and Sayyid women gave to the act of piracy the odious colour of an outrage on the Muslim faith. The sufferers ascribed the attack to Englishmen closely connected with Bombay.†

* Piracy on the *Ganj-i-sawai*, I.O.L. MS. 150, ff. 17b-19b, 21b-23b, (best); K. K. ii. 422; A. Wright, 160. Much new information on the European pirates is given in Martin's *Mémoires*.

† "All the passengers of the *Ganj-i-sawai*, as well as those of Mulla Abdul Ghafur's ship, agree in charging the English with the piracy, and some of them say that at the time of the plunder they recognised some Englishmen [previously known to them]" (Surat governor's letter to Court, I.O.L. No. 26.) "During the plundering the pirates kept saying—'We are thus avenging on you the injury that [Siddi] Yaqut and other imperialists had done to us at Bombay',—and they showed the wounds they had received at that time." (*Ibid*, f. 19, Captain's report.)

"The people publicly in the streets [of Surat] allege that they knew several Englishmen among the pirates whom they had seen

§ 18. *English factors at Surat imprisoned, 1695-1696.*

Itimad Khan, the governor of Surat (really collector of Customs), was a friend of the English and an officer of unrivalled uprightness and purity. Amidst the popular clamour he kept his head and by his judicious measures saved the local Englishmen from being lynched by the Muslim fanatics. An excited and daily increasing crowd assembled before the English factory, threatening death to the inmates. But the governor sent a party of regular troops under his lieutenant Ashur Beg to occupy the factory (14 Sep.), and confine the merchants there pending the receipt of the Emperor's orders. Thus 49 Englishmen,—including not only President Annesley and other members of the Surat Council, but also interlopers like John Vaux and Uphill (who had been expelled from the E. I. Co's service) were imprisoned there. The number of captives was increased by the arrival of the Captain and some eight sailors of the Company's ship *Benjamin* seized after landing at Swally. A similar fate overtook the English traders at Broach. The arms, including 18 brass guns, found in the factory, were taken away by the governor. [*Madras Diary.*] Iron fetters were put on the feet of the captives.* Their trade was totally stopped.

in Surat with their servants and two small vessels which they had used to see in Bombay.....and that the pirates sent to the Castle of Bombay that from thence they might receive orders.....The wiser sorts give no credit thereunto." [Surat news-letter received at Madras, *Mad. Diary*, 8 Nov.]

* When a rumour came of another ship of Abdul Ghafur having been captured by a pirate in the Persian Gulf, "the English flag was struck, and the whole of the English factory, with the exception of the President, the two members of the Council, and Captain Browne, were confined in irons." [Bruce, iii. 193.]

These harsh measures of Itimad Khan, however, saved the prisoners from a worse fate. As Annesley wrote, "We must confess our guard was no more than necessary to defend us from the rabble, for the whole mob was raised against us, demanding satisfaction of us even to our lives. The governor was very much in danger in contradicting the stream of their madness; and they once or twice entered into furious resolutions of assaulting his house. . . . The Muhammadans stick not to call the governor a *kāfir* (unbeliever) and say that the town is so defiled that no prayer can be offered up acceptable to God till justice is done." [A. Wright, 164, 169.]

During his captivity, Annesley with tireless activity sent off petitions to the Surat governor, to the agents and friends of the English in Aurangzib's camp, and to the Emperor himself and his ministers,—asserting the innocence of the Company's servants and demanding their release. Sir John Gayer, the governor of Bombay, was equally active; he wrote to Itimad Khan and to the Emperor, strongly protesting against the arrest of his countrymen and appealing for justice. "We are merchants and not pirates," he repeated, and he reminded the Mughal Government of its long and friendly protection of the English traders ever since the days of Jahangir.*

The life of the prisoners at Surat was troubled by internal quarrels and a conspiracy against Annesley and the Council formed by the interlopers and the discontented sailors of the *Benjamin*. But Ashur Beg's friendly aid, heavily paid for,

* All the original Persian letters in connection with this affair are preserved in the Surat factory's letter-book, (I.O.L. MS. 150). I have given a description and analysis of its contents in the *Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the Indian Historical Records Commission* (1923). The best account in English is A. Wright's *Annesley of Surat*, Ch. 8-11.

gave them relief. "By his connivance we had use of pen and paper, wine and provisions,—without which we should have died." [A. Wright, 180-187; Surat to Bombay, 9 Nov. 1696 in *Orme MSS.* 119.]

§ 19. *Aurangzib's policy towards European traders.*

Aurangzib deeply resented this flagrant offence against his flag and his religion by the foreign misbelievers. His first retaliatory measures were to confine the English factors and stop the trade of all the European nations throughout his dominions. But he was too wise a man to be swayed by his passions. He desired above all things to secure a regular escort of European war-vessels for the pilgrim-ships to Mecca, and this embargo on European trade was only an instrument for putting pressure on them to gain that end cheaply but effectually.* His order ran that so long as the three European races,—Dutch, French and English,—did not agree to this demand, their trade was to be stopped, their weapons taken away, none of them was to go out armed in the city or keep any gun or musket in their houses, they were to destroy the gun platforms and embrasures constructed in their factories, their buildings were to be

* As he wrote, though at a later date, "Let the *Mir Atish* (Chief of Artillery) ask the Feringis of the artillery department how the pirates can be chastised and the sea-route kept open for travellers to the Holy Cities and for traders.—whether by friendliness and conciliation or by force and fighting." And, again, "Write to Amanat Khan (the governor of Surat) to exert himself to the utmost to safeguard the way of pilgrims....and travellers to the Holy Cities. There is no union among the Feringis; many of them are without a head or chieftain. Try to secure the help of one tribe among them, such as the French, who, in return for being given a tenth of the custom duty [collected at Surat] may undertake to punish the hatmen pirates." (*Kalimat-i-T.* f. 133a and 81a.)

broken down to a low height, their flags were to be taken down, and no bell was to be rung in their churches. [I.O.L. MS. 7b, 1b.]

The Dutch offered to clear the Indian seas of the pirates and to be responsible for the safety of the pilgrims to Arabia if they were given the exclusive right of trading in the Mughal empire free of duty. This was declined by the Emperor. Then Sir John Gayer offered to send two armed English vessels annually to patrol the seas, if the Emperor would exclude the interlopers from his realm. Annesley wrote to the Mughal Government under-taking to supply convoy for the Indian vessels in the Arabian Sea or stand responsible for their safety, on condition of the English being granted the sum of four lakhs of Rupees which the Emperor annually paid to the Siddi for the same service, though the Siddi had clearly failed to do the work. [I.O.L. MS. 61b; Bruce, iii. 189-191.]

The Emperor refused to accept these proposals. He also higgled hard over the amount to be paid for each escorting ship,—the actual running cost for the double voyage being Rs. 40,000 for a large European ship and Rs. 30,000 for a smaller one, while the Emperor offered to pay only half of these amounts. At last on 6th January 1696, Annesley signed a bond for supplying escort, and after more delay due to red tape* the prisoners were set at liberty on 27th June.

* Isa Quli, (the Armenian Christian agent of the English in Aurangzib's camp), produced the Emperor's order for releasing the English; but it being procured by Yar Ali Beg, without Asad Khan's assistance, Asad Khan found a way to render it insignificant by letting it go without his seal. [*Madras Diary*, 31 Oct. 1696, quoting a letter from Bombay of 18 May.]

§ 20. *Piracy of Captain Kidd, 1697.*

But this relief was not destined to last long. In that very year appeared a more formidable scourge of the sea, "the grand villain Sivers (or Chivers)," a Dutchman, and next year a still more dangerous pirate William Kidd.

In 1696 a syndicate of English noblemen had fitted out the *Adventure*, a very strong 30-gun vessel, to act as a privateer against the French and at the same time destroy the pirates in the Indian Ocean, the cost being recovered from the profits of privateering. Its captain was William Kidd, "destined to blossom into the most redoubtable pirate who ever besmirched the honour of England." Arriving off Calicut early in 1697, he took to a life of piracy, shamelessly describing his robberies as legitimate acts of privateering authorised by the king of England. [A. Wright, 191-198.]

Kidd's success drew many restless English seamen into his party, including the mutinous crews of the E. I. Co.'s frigate *Mocha* and a smaller ship the *Josiah*. "Distributing his forces with the skill of a sea-strategist," Captain Kidd dominated the Indian Ocean, with his munitions and stores drawn from a base in Madagascar. "All told the pirate fleet mounted 120 guns, and was manned by not less than 300 Europeans, of whom the great majority were Englishmen. . . . A more formidable menace to peaceful shipping in the East could hardly have been created in that day." [Wright, 200-1.]

Besides taking many of the E. I. Co.'s ships, he captured on 2nd February 1698, the *Queda Merchant*, 400 tons,

Aurangzib would at first allow only Rs. 15,000 for the hire of a large convoying ship of the Europeans to Mokha and Rs. 10,000 for a small one. Later, he rose to Rs. 40,000 and 30,000 respectively, but the Surat Mughal governor would pay only half of these sums. [Bruce, iii. 212, 236.]

bound from Bengal to Surat with a rich cargo worth 4 lakhs of Rupees belonging to Mukhlis Khan, one of the great nobles of the empire. But, by bribing the news-writer of Surat, Annesley for a time averted the Emperor's wrath on account of this piracy. Late in 1698, Chivers captured a fine ship with a cargo worth 14 lakhs belonging to Hasan Hamidān, a merchant of Jiddā and Surat.

§ 21. *Englishmen at Surat again imprisoned, 1699.*

The English merchants of Surat could not escape any longer. The wise and upright collector of the port, Itimad Khan, had died in Feb. 1697 and had been succeeded (6 May) by Amānat Khan, an unscrupulous and rapacious tyrant. "It was useless to assert that the English were not to be identified with the pirates, when.....many English seamen of the piratical craft were actually recognised by reliable native sailors as former servants of the E. I. Co.; it was equally purposeless to maintain that the marauders were merely outlaws.....when the pirate commander [Kidd] sailed under the English colours and possessed authentic credentials" [from the Home Government.] (Wright, 209.)

The Mughal Government, therefore, again applied strict coercion to the Surat factory. On 23rd Dec. 1698, a force of five or six hundred soldiers sent by the governor surrounded the factory and gave Annesley the ultimatum either to yield to the Emperor's demand for giving a bond to guard the sea against pirates or to leave the country in ten days. The Dutch and the French were similarly treated. Meantime the factories were segregated, and Indians who tried to communicate with them were bound and flogged by order of the governor.

The *Queda Merchant* included in its cargo two lakhs of Rupees worth of goods, the private venture of the governor of Surat. Its capture naturally turned his heart against the English. In August 1698 came an imperial order that the English French and Dutch would be held responsible for all losses at sea and that the three nations should pay total damages amounting to 14 lakhs,—the English alone being charged two lakhs for the *Queda Merchant*.

“Sir John Gayer wrote to the governor of Surat, refusing to pay anything for the past piracies or to engage the English alone to make good all future losses caused by the robbers at sea. But he offered to furnish convoys for Mokhā ships as he had already done. The Dutch threatened to abandon the Surat trade rather than pay the damages.”

“Finally, the English French and Dutch agreed to act in concert to suppress piracy and signed bonds by which they *jointly* engaged to make good all future losses. . . .” On receiving the agreement, Aurangzib withdrew his embargo on European trade in the Mughal dominions, and he wrote to the Surat governor to settle the matter in his own way. In the terms of this agreement, “the Dutch convoyed the Mecca pilgrims and patrolled the entrance to the Red Sea, besides paying Rs. 70,000 to the governor of Surat, the English paid Rs. 30,000 and patrolled the South Indian seas, while the French made a similar payment and policed the Persian Gulf.” [*Madras Diary*, 25 Apr. 1699; Wright, 232—239; Anderson 311; Biddulph, 51-53.]

§ 22. *The New English Company and the embassy of Sir W. Norris.*

The cup of misery of the E. I. Co. was soon to be filled to overflowing. On 8th April 1699 a new English Company was established at Surat, with Sir Nicholas Waite as

President. The old Company's prestige with the local governor and trading class was lowered by the misrepresentations and unscrupulous intrigues of the agents of its rival, who stooped to every kind of meanness and dishonesty.

Sir William Norris was sent out from England as the English king's ambassador to the Mughal Court in the interests of the new Company, in the hope of his repeating the success of Sir Thomas Roe's celebrated visit to Jahangir in 1615. Norris visited Aurangzib in the siege camp before Panhala (April 1701); there was an exchange of presents between the two Governments, but nothing was secured by the ambassador in return for his very expensive mission* and waste of sixteen months (27 Jan. 1701—18 April 1702). Aurangzib had demanded, as the price of a *farman* for the new Company's factories, that the English should give an undertaking to clear the pirates from the seas, while Norris knew it to be an impossible task.

§23. *Confinement of Sir John Gayer, 1701-1707.*

Meantime, in February 1701, Sir John Gayer had been seized and imprisoned by Amanat Khan at Surat, through the machinations of Waite, who had procured an order from Aurangzib to that effect by bribing the Surat news-writer. Poor Gayer was kept in confinement for six years with only occasional intervals of liberty, and his enforced absence gained for Sir Nicholas Waite the governorship of Bombay of which he had been made the reversionary under orders from Home. "A return prepared in January 1702 showed that the captives numbered 109 persons, including 21 English officials of the Company.....and 15 seamen. Their imprisonment varied in rigour according to the caprice of

* Mission of Norris: Wright, 263-270; *Akhbarat*, 4 Apr., 28 May, 1 June, 1701; *Storia do Mogor*, iii. 298-307.

the governor.” [Wright, 260-282.] Gayer’s captivity ended only with his dismissal from the now united Company’s governorship after the death of Aurangzib. (*Ibid*, 293-297.)

On 28th August 1703 two ships of Surat, one belonging to Abdul Ghafur and another to Qasimbhai, when returning from Mokha were captured by the pirates off Surat. The news of the outrage reached Surat on the 31st, and the governor, Itibar Khan, seized all the Indian brokers of the European Companies, and blockaded their factories, cutting off their food supply and every kind of communication with outside. The brokers of the French and of the new English Company were released, but those of the old English Company (Vittal and Keshav Parekh) were barbarously tortured. Three lakhs of Rupees were extorted by the governor from these two men, and three lakhs more from the brokers of the Dutch.

In October 1703, seven Dutch ships arrived and blockaded the port, until February 1704, when the governor was glad to make an accommodation. The guards were withdrawn from the factories on 15th March.

In this the governor had merely enforced the indemnity-bond which his predecessor Amanat Khan had extorted from the Europeans in February 1699 to the effect that they would stand security for any losses caused to Indian shipping by the pirates. Aurangzib, on hearing of it, disapproved of Itibar Khan’s action and superseded him by Nejabat Khan. An imperial order was received on 8th March 1704, setting aside the agreement extorted in February 1699. A “letter by order” from the Court (dated February) closed the dispute, and the Indian merchants of Surat gave a written discharge of all their claims on the Europeans. [*Storia*, iii. 487-491.]

But in truth there was no peace for the Europeans. The captivity of Sir John Gayer and his Council continued with the usual relaxations, under fresh orders from the Mughal Court in July 1704. The Dutch made reprisals by capturing a rich vessel bringing Indian pilgrims back from Mecca. Among them were Nur-ul-Haq (a son of the late Chief Qāzi Abdul Wahāb) and Fakhr-ul-Islām (evidently his nephew). Both were held in high veneration by Aurangzib, the former being regarded as "a great saint." "Without ill-treating them, the captors sent a message to the governor of Surat calling on him to repay the money he had taken from them by force. On being paid, they would restore the ships." [*Storia*, iv. 62-63.]

Aurangzib at last realised how helpless he was at sea and that he must make an unconditional surrender to the Europeans if his subjects were ever to make pilgrimages to Mecca. He instructed Nejābat Khan to secure the release of these two holy men and the other captives on any terms that he could get and forbade him to take indemnity-bonds from the Europeans in future. [Inayetullah's *Ahkam*, 17a.]

APPENDIX C.

The legal rights secured by the English East India Company for trading in the Mughal Empire can be learnt clearly from the original Persian grants, copies of which have been now traced and translated into English in Foster's *English Factories in India 1655-1660*, pp. 109-112 and 411-416.

I. *Farmān of Shah Jahān*, dated 3 Nov. 1637 runs thus:—"As the English merchants of Surat and Broach pay there the customary duties and they hold a *farmān* from His Majesty to the effect that no one shall make any other demands in respect of their goods in any place, the officers of [Tājganj] Agra were forbidden to demand the same payments from them on their goods brought from and taken to Purab [*i.e.*, Bengal] as are paid by other merchants. They must be allowed to pass freely over the Jamunā ferry at Agra and other places."

II. *Farmān of Shah Jahān*, dated 11 August, 1650 runs thus:—"All officers in charge of roads between Agra and Bengal and between Agra and Surat are hereby ordered that the English, having paid the usual customs duty at Surat, Broach and Lari Bandar, are not to be troubled with any further demands. This injunction is to be considered as perpetual."

III. *Prince Shujā's nishān*, dated 13 August, 1651, was merely an executive order giving effect to the imperial *farmān* of the preceding year. Sir W. Foster rightly holds, "the obvious intention of the imperial *farmān* was merely to release the English from the payment of road-dues [? *rāhdāri*] on their goods collected in Oudh, Agra &c. and sent down to the West Coast for shipment; it could not have been intended at Delhi to excuse them from paying

the usual customs duties on goods shipped from the Bengal ports. Nevertheless, Bridgman succeeded by giving a present of Rs. 3,000, in obtaining a *nishān* from Sultan Shujā, which adopted the English contention that the imperial *farmān* had freed them from all demands in Bengal."

IV. Prince Shujā's *nishān*, dated 6 April, 1656, admitted the principle that the old imperial *farmān* exempted the goods of the English Company from duties throughout His Majesty's dominions. (This *nishān* is given in Streynsham Master's *Diaries*, ii. 21 and the Appendix to Stewart's *History of Bengal*, and in a new translation in Foster, this volume, p. 111.)

V. Mir Jumla (subahdār of Bengal)'s *parwānah*, dated 9 Feb. 1660, granted to J. Trevia states,—“The goods of the English Company are by imperial *farmān* free from all duties. [Therefore] all officials in Bengal and Orissa must refrain from demanding anything from the English on this account.”

CHAPTER LXI.

SOME PROVINCES DURING AURANGZIB'S REIGN.

It is neither necessary nor possible to give here the history of every *subah* of the Mughal empire during this reign. The historian is concerned with those provinces only whose affairs assumed an imperial importance by influencing the course of events in other parts of the country and thus modified the Emperor's policy and the destiny of the empire.

BENGAL

§ 1. *Bengal: its natural wealth and recuperative power.*

Among all the provinces of the Mughal empire, Bengal was the one most lavishly favoured by Nature. Its copious rainfall makes the labour of artificial irrigation unnecessary. The annual flood of its countless rivers not only waters its 'wet' crops, but also fertilises the fields by spreading over them every year a new layer of mud which dispenses with manuring. One may almost say of Bengal that here the peasant has merely to sow the seed, go away, and reappear on the scene only for reaping the harvest, while all the intervening agricultural processes are done for him by Nature. Its numberless rivers and tanks with their abundance of fish and its fruit-laden orchards spreading a green veil round its homesteads, richly supplement the corn-fields. The climate alone is vile and justifies Aurangzib's epigram that this province was "a hell full of bread."

Such a country only needed peace to be full of wealth and population. The most fearful ravages of war pestilence or natural calamity could be completely repaired in a single

generation of orderly beneficent government and uninterrupted growth. Such peace and good government were supplied to Bengal by the Mughal empire throughout the 17th century.

§ 2. *Mughal conquest and its benefit to Bengal.*

In the 16th century Bengal had been an unhappy scene of anarchy and desolation from the decay and dismemberment of its independent provincial sultanate. The misery of the people can be guessed not only from the bloody annals of the ruling houses of Gaur, but also and more vividly from the social back-ground on which the new religion of Chaitanya (1485-1533) appeared as a welcome healing balm to the stricken hearts of millions. The evil was aggravated by the Mughal conquest of Delhi and Jaunpur and the crowding of the defeated Pathans into Bengal. The middle 16th century was darkened by rapid changes of kings, disputed succession, local independence, and the annihilation of wealth and culture through political turmoil.

In the midst of this internal decay and exhaustion of the old order, its conquest by Akbar came as a blessing to the province. But it took twenty years to complete the change of masters, and therefore during Akbar's reign Mughal rule in Bengal was more like an armed occupation than a settled administration. His viceroys had to content themselves with the nominal submission of the old independent Afghan princelings and Hindu ruling zamindars, and to leave the actual government of the province to them. The Emperor's subahdars merely received the tribute, but did not establish direct imperial administration over the people, except in the district round the capital and the strategic cities held by their assistants, the faujdars. Over most of the country zamindars and humbled scions of ancient

sultans ruled as before, though not with the title and pomp of kings. The Mughal governor's writs did not run beyond the capital city and its environs. The huge though irregular armed forces under the various zamindars remained quiescent but undestroyed. They only waited for some weakening of the Emperor's power, some catastrophe at Delhi, to assert their independence once again. Such an explosion might occur any day. The Mubārak Shāhi, Iliyās Shāhi, Muhammad Shāhi, Abyssinian, Sharifi, Sur and Karrāni dynasties had each ruled over Bengal for its brief day and then gone. Who could say that the upstart Turki house of Bābur would last longer?

§ 3. *Mughal peace prevails in Bengal throughout the 17th century.*

The repeated victories of Mān Singh and, even more than these, his spirit of moderation in victory and natural desire to spare old houses, had maintained peace in Bengal during Akbar's last years. But with the accession of Jahāngir (1605) and the recall of Mān Singh from Bengal (1606) a change in the situation became inevitable. The change was, however, precipitated and intensified by the character of the Emperor's new viceroy, Islām Khan, who governed the province for full five years, (May 1608—11 August 1613). A most ambitious active and high-spirited noble, he gave himself royal airs and could not brook the least insubordination in any zamindar. By a series of campaigns, which have been most graphically described in the memoirs of his general Mirzā Nathan Shitāb Khan,—he crushed all the independent zamindars of Bengal, destroyed the last remnant of Afghan power in Mymensingh, Sylhet and Orissā, and imposed full Mughal peace and direct imperial administration upon all the parts of Bengal.

This revolutionary and beneficent change was completed by the year 1613. Thereafter Bengal enjoyed profound internal peace for nearly a century and a half, because the wars with Kuch Bihār, Kāmrup, and Assām were all outside the province, the rebellious incursion of Prince Shāh Jahān (1624) was a quickly passing blast, and the piratical raids from Chatgāon in the rivers of the Delta and the contest between Aurangzib and Shujā (1659-1660) touched only the southern and western fringes of the province.

Islām Khan's successors pushed back the frontiers of the independent Mongoloid Rajahs of the Kuch and Ahom families to the eastern bank of the Bar Nadi (by annexing Hājo) and thus protected Bengal from raids on that side. Under Mughal peace, as fully and finally imposed in 1614, Bengal recovered wealth and population, trade expanded by rapid strides, industries developed, and a great indigenous literature grew up in the hands of the Vaishnav sect.

The Arracanese, and subsequently their agents, the Portuguese pirates of Chatgāon, were a pest to the riverside districts of East Bengal; but this evil was removed early in Aurangzib's reign (1666) by Shāista Khan, and thereafter there was nothing to check Bengal's natural power of recuperation, except occasional calamities,* which were however purely local in their effect. This peace and prosperity, the gift of the Mughal empire, was fully utilised by the European merchants, especially the English and the Dutch, whose trade grew by leaps and bounds from the middle of the century onwards and whose factories and purchase-agencies stimulated production and wealth in the country.

* *E.g.*, a water-spout (*hati-shunra*) in August, 1668, [*M. A.* 74.]

§ 4. *Miserable condition of Bengal at Aurangzib's accession.*

Prince Muhammad Shujā, the second son of Shah Jahān, was governor of Bengal for 21 years, from Feb. 1639 to May 1660, out of which period he was absent from this province for two years. The vice-royalty of Orissa was added to his charge in 1648 and that of Bihar in 1658, and thus the single political unit of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa which held together from 1733 to 1911, first came into being though for a brief while only, under Shuja. During these twenty years Bengal enjoyed profound peace, because the subahdār's position as the Emperor's son awed intending rebels into submission and prevented his jealous rivals from obstructing him or intriguing at Court for his overthrow. This peace led to the growth of wealth, and trade and industry rapidly increased, especially the commerce of the Dutch and (to a much lesser extent that of the English) East India Companies.

Shujā himself lived at Rājmahal on the Bihār frontier, as the climate of Bengal did not agree with him, and his deputy at Dacca governed the province for him. His eyes were fixed on Delhi and his supreme object was to accumulate a large fortune in this rich province, which would help him in winning his father's throne. The administration was very well conducted by a number of highly cultured and efficient Persian officers, many of them emigrants through the port of Hughli, whom he gathered round himself and cherished by honourable treatment. Shujā's health was impaired by his twenty years' residence in Bengal; a peaceful life, constant devotion to pleasure, and the easy administration of a soft province like Bengal made him weak, indolent, incapable of sustained effort or vigorous action. The army

lost its efficiency through long peace and the navy (*nawwāra*) so necessary for the defence of the Bengal delta, at last fell into decay and disrepair through official parsimony or peculation.

When the head of the province threw himself into the war of succession with Aurangzib (Oct. 1658), the administration broke down and disorder again raised its head. The mischief continued during the viceroyalty of Mir Jumla (1660—1663) with his hopeless entanglement in Assam, and the interregnum between the death of Mir Jumla (31 March 1663) and the arrival of a substantive subahdār, Shāista Khan (8 March 1664), which we can best liken to the reign of mice in a neglected barn. The result was a great deal of popular misery, as the administration had grown slack and corrupt through the want of superior control and supervision and the absorption of the head of the province in war for years together. Disorder, oppression and illegal exaction had become widespread, and the sufferers could find no redress. This misery is graphically,—if also in a querulous and exaggerated form,—set forth in Shihāb-ud-din Tālīsh's memoirs, in the following language: "The mansabdars were given jagirs scattered over several *parganāhs*, and this multiplicity of partners [in the land revenue] led to the oppression of the peasants and the ruin of the villages. Large sums were wasted [in the cost of collection]..... It was not good for the same place to have two masters (*vis.*, the jāgirdār's and the Government collectors)..... Mir Jumla had confirmed in his own jāgirs many men celebrated for piety and some holding imperial *farmāns*, for the enjoyment of rent-free grants of land or pensions. All other men who had been enjoying such grants &c., in the Crownlands or the fiefs of the jagirdars,.....had their grants cancelled by the Sadr. It was ordered that these

aimadārs should take to cultivation and pay revenue for the lands they had been enjoying, [like ordinary peasants.] In enforcing this harsh order, these poor creatures were not given any respite So. the land has become waste, and the aimadars impoverished and distressed." [*Continuation*, f. 118.]

Another cause of popular suffering was the defenceless condition of the province on water. During the late interval of confusion and anarchy, the flotilla (*nawwāra*) of Bengal had been neglected. "During Prince Shujā's governorship, the extortion and violence of the collectors ruined the villages (yielding 14 lakhs a year) assigned for the support of the flotilla. Many naval officers and workmen holding jagir or cash stipend, were overcome by poverty and starvation. . . . Many naval officers and men perished in the Assam expedition of Mir Jumla; so that at that nobleman's death the *nawwara* was in utter ruin. . . . Its only remnants were a few broken and rotten boats." [*Ibid.* 112a.] This unprotected condition of the Bengal sea-board increased the audacity of the half-breed Portuguese pirates of Chatgāon, and the riverside tracts of Noākhāli and Barisāl, and even Dāccā, were ruthlessly devastated by them year after year.

§ 5. *Shaista Khan's achievements as governor of
Bengal.*

With the coming of Shāista Khan as governor the scene happily changed. His first viceroyalty of Bengal extended over 14 years (1664-1677). During this unusually long period of office in one province, he first ensured the safety of the Bengal rivers and sea-board by destroying the pirates' nest at Chatgāon, won over the Feringi pirates and settled them near Dacca, and pushed the imperial frontier south-

wards to Ramu, beyond Chatgāon fort, as we have seen in Chapter 32.

His internal administration was equally mild and beneficent. He immediately stopped the resumption by the State of the old rent-free lands which the local officers had begun during the interregnum. He ordered the new Sadr of the province to confirm all the charitable grants and stipends, lying in the Crownlands, for which documentary evidence could be produced. As for the rent-free lands in the fiefs of the jagirdars, they were asked to respect the rights of the grantees if the total land thus alienated did not exceed one-fortieth of the extent of the fief, this proportion being regarded as the charity-tax (*zakat*) enjoined by the Qurānic law. Within his own jagir he made many new gifts in charity. These orders were promptly carried out by his hard-working, honest and polite civil officers.*

Every day he held open Court for administering justice and redressed wrongs very promptly. This he regarded as his most important duty. In his own jagir he ordered that everything collected by the revenue officers above the fixed rent should be returned to the cultivators. Again, "the former governors of Bengal used to make monopolies of all articles of food and clothing and other things and sell them at fanciful rates, which the helpless people had to pay." Shāista Khan restored absolute freedom of buying and selling, and also abolished two illegal exactions of his predecessors, namely, a tax of one-fortieth (*zakat*) on the income of merchants and travellers, and an excise duty (*hāsil*) from every class of artificers and tradesmen "from the rose-vendor down to the clay-seller, from the weaver of fine linen down to that of coarse stuff." Aurangzib had issued orders for

* Described fully in Talish's *Continuation*, ff. 118a—121a. Translated in my *Studies in Aur. Reign*, 165—171.

abolishing the *zakat* and *hāsil* in the Crownlands, and left to the jagirdars free choice in respect of them within their fiefs. "But this just, God-fearing, benevolent subahdar abolished the *hāsil*, yielding 15 lakhs of Rupees a year, which used to be collected in his own jagirs. . . . Thus, the peasants and the merchants were freed from oppression and fiscal innovations Shāista Khan's profuse charity so thoroughly removed poverty and need from Bengal that few labourers or workmen could be had for hire to do any work." [*Continuation*, as tr. in my *Studies*, 170-177.]

In foreign affairs, too, his term was prosperous. In 1669 he suppressed the rising of a bogus Shujā in Morang (a hill State north of the Purniā district), and conquered it in 1676. [*M.A.* 84, 150.] In the latter year the province of Orissā was added to his charge. The long interval of peace thus secured to Bengal was employed by him in adorning his capital Dacca with many fine buildings (especially the *Kātra*), as well as in constructing bridges and sarais all over the country. On the whole, he was a generous nobleman of the grand old style. The English, Dutch and French greatly improved their trade in his time.

After the short regimes of Fidāi Khan entitled Azam Khan Kokāh, a grasping tyrant, (less than a year) and Prince Muhammad Azam (one year), Shāista Khan was sent back to Bengal again, and reached Dacca in January 1680. His second term covered the nine years from 1680 to 1688; the most noticeable event of this period was the war with the English E. I. Co. which has been described in Ch. 60.* The popular tradition is that during his governor-

* Shaista Khan in Bengal: Talish, as translated in my *Studies in Aur. Reign*, (best); *Riyaz-us-Salatīn*, tr. 227-228 (very meagre); Stewart's *Bengal*, sec. vi; Martin's *Mémoires*, ii. 483, dates in *M.A.* His bogus will is given in the *Proceedings of the Ind.*

ship rice sold in Bengal at the incredibly cheap rate of eight maunds to the Rupee or 658 lbs. for 2s. 3d. He repeatedly sent rich presents, including the rare products of Bengal, to the Emperor. [*M.A.* 109, 167; *Storia* ii. 117.]

He was the first subahdār of Bengal to send a tribute (five lakhs) regularly *every year* to the imperial treasury, and he paid his master, in addition, very large sums as a loyal gift at the end of his term. His family and court at Dacca lived in a style of luxury and splendour surpassing that of the puritanical Aurangzib. Such extravagance could be maintained only by squeezing the people. His subordinates were left free to raise money for him by every means that they could think of: merchandise was stopped at every outpost and ferry and custom duty charged over and over again, in disregard of official permits; cesses (*ābwābs*) abolished by imperial decree continued to be levied in practice. In addition, the Nawāb conducted a monopoly of the sale of salt, betel nut and some other prime necessities of life. Thus by grinding the masses, he amassed a vast treasure, besides building costly edifices at Dacca, the memory of which still lingers.

The English merchant W. Clavell wrote in Dec. 1674, "Shāista Khan obtained Hughli as part of his jāgir. His officers oppress the people, monopolise most commodities, even as low as grass for beasts, canes (*i.e.*, bamboo), fire-wood, thatch &c. Nor do they want ways to oppress those people of all sorts who trade whether natives or strangers,

Hist. Records Commission, 1923. Fidai Khan died at Dacca on 25 May 1678. Azam entered Dacca on 29 July 1678 and left it on 6 Oct. 1679; his only achievement was the recapture of Gauhati, [Ch. 32 § 4.] Shāista Kh. died at Agra in April 1694, aged 92 lunar years. (*Storia*, ii 322.) For details, *History of Bengal* (Dacca University), vol. ii.

since whatever they do (at Hughli) when complained of to Dacca, is palliated under the name and colour of the Nawāb's interest." S. Master, the English agent, reported his *daily* income as two lakhs of rupees and the *Maāsir-ul-umarā* (ii. 705) tells some marvellous stories about his accumulated stores. F. Martin, the French governor of Pondicherry, in his *Mémoires* (ii. 483) records examples of the cruelty and exactions of Shāista Khan's local agents, against which appeals to him were of no avail. The high praise given by the historian Shihābuddin Tālish to Shāista Khan for abolishing the trade monopolies of his predecessors and ābwābs in his charge, is true only of the early years of his first viceroyalty, because this historian left his book incomplete in 1666 and the European testimony to Shāista Khan's covetousness and extortions (especially after 1680) is unassailable. Foster's *English Factories in India 1661-64*, p. 396 testifies to his "covetous griping disposition" even in Sep. 1664.

Shāista Khan was already 63 when he first came to Bengal, and his 22 years' residence in this climate as well as his life of lordly ease completely sapped his health and vigour. In Bengal he was a tired old man, who left campaigning to his subordinates. In 1683, the English merchant W. Hedges described him as old and very feeble. But his viceroyalty showed no weakness or neglect in the administration; he ruled the province and extended his power along the frontiers through his four exceptionally gifted sons, who held the military and administrative charge (*faujdāri*) of the main divisions of the country. The crowning act of his tenure was the conquest of Chātgaon by his eldest son.

§ 6. *Ibrahim Khan's supine rule.*

Shāista Khan was succeeded by Khan Jahan Bahadur (a brother of Azam Khan Kokāh) for a few months (1688-1689), and then came Ibrāhim Khan in June 1689, as permanent subahdar. He was an old man of mild disposition and sedentary habits and a great lover of books. Without strength of purpose or capacity for action, he let matters drift, till the administration of the province entirely broke down, and every one did what he liked. But Ibrāhim Khan's character had some redeeming features too; the English traders call him "the most famously just and good nabob," and the Muslim historian records that 'he did not allow even an ant to be oppressed.' He personally administered justice, was free from venality and caprice, and promoted agriculture and commerce. [*Riyaz*. text 223.] His first act after coming to Bengal was to make terms with the English and invite them to settle in Bengal again. [Letter dated 2 July 1689, in *Madras Diary*, 7 Oct.]

But Bengal in the late 17th century was no place for a bookworm. During the closing years of Aurangzib's reign, as reports came of the Emperor's increasing difficulties in the Deccan and of disasters to his arms here and there in that far-flung battle line, the lawless elements in Bengal, as elsewhere, seized the opportunity presented by Ibrāhim Khan's supine administration and slothful unmartial character. The many Afghans settled in North Orissa brooded over their lost empire in Hindustan and were ever ready for a rising. The storm burst in 1696 and for the first time broke the deep peace which Bengal had enjoyed ever since the days of Jahangir.

§7. *Rebellion of Shova Singh and Rahim Khan.*

Shovā Singh, the zamindar of Cheto-Bārda* in the Medinipur district, rebelled, and in alliance with Rahim Khan, the chief of the Orissā Afghans, began to plunder the lands of his neighbour Rajah Krishna Rām, a Panjabi Khatri settled in Bengal and then serving as the farmer-general of the revenue of the Bardwān district. Krishna Rām advanced against them with a small force, but was defeated and slain (Jan. 1696), and his wife, daughters and entire property and the town of Bardwān itself were captured by the rebels, while his son Jagat Ray fled to Dacca.

Ibrāhim Khan at first underrated and neglected the danger. He merely ordered Nurullah Khan, the faujdar of West Bengal and the imperial officer nearest to the scene of disturbance, to march against Shovā Singh. But their initial success had greatly swelled the rebels' ranks and heightened the terror of their arms. Nurullah, whose prin-

* Shova Singh's rebellion: Salimullah's *Tarikh-i-Bangala*, I. O. L. MS. 2995, Eng. tr. by Gladwin as *Transactions in Bengal* (full); Kaepelin, 339 (best); *Riyaz* (derivative); Stewarts' *Bengal* (useful addition from Eng. factory records); *Orme MSS.* 119, Surat to Bombay 23 Oct. 1696, Sutanati to Bombay, 3 Sep. 1696 and 24 Nov. 1697 (most authentic); *Akhbarat* year 42. *Cheto* is a mistake for *Jatra*, 27 m. n. e. of Medinipur and 40 m. s. w. of Bardwan. *Burdah* is 9 m. e. of Jatra and 5 m. w. of Ghatal. *Chandrakona* is 5 m. w. of Jatra, and 25 m. n. of Medinipur. [Rennell's *Bengal Atlas*, sh. 7.] These three places are close to Radhanagar and Ghatal. The last battle took place not in the environs of Bardwan (as Salimullah implies), but near Chandrakona (as we learn from the victor's despatches.) Chandrakona continued as a rebel centre for some time longer, as Murshid Qulī Khan had to conduct an expedition against it about 1702-3. [Inayet's *Ahkam*, 221b.] *History of Bengal*, pub. by the Dacca University, ii. 393-395 (best.)

cial business had been money-making by private trade, timidly shut himself up in the fort of Hughli, where the rebels soon blockaded him. He slipped out of it at night with his bare life, but all his wealth and the fort (including its commandant) fell into Shovā Singh's hands. (22 July.)

On the outbreak of the rebellion, the three European nations in Bengal had enlisted Indian soldiers to guard their property and obtained the subahdar's permission to put their factories in a state of defence. This was the origin of the forts round the three commercial settlements of Calcuttā, Chandernagar and Chinsurā, and these were the first defended places which the Mughal Government had suffered foreigners to build on the Indian soil. These places at once became the only havens of refuge amidst the general disturbance in Bengal.

The rout of the imperial faujdār and the capture of Hughli fort crowned the rebels' success. They now lost every check or fear, and boldly sent out parties to plunder the rich. All who could, fled to the European settlements for shelter. After some time the newly arrived Bakhshi of the province entreated the Dutch of Chinsurā to help the Government. They sent 300 European soldiers and Malays to attack Hughli on the land side, while two of their ships bombarded the ramparts from the river. At this the rebel garrison (200 horse and two to three hundred foot) escaped by the back door, c. 31 July, 1696. [Sutanati to Bombay, 3 Sep. 1696 in *Orme MSS.* 119.]

§ 8. *Rahim Khan's war with the Mughal
Government.*

Shovā Singh's next step was to detach Rahim Khan with the main part of his army to take the rich cities of Nadiā and Murshidabād, while he returned to his head-

quarters at Bardwān. Here he was popularly believed to have been stabbed to death by a daughter of Rajah Krishna Rām, upon whose honour he had tried to make an attempt. His brother Himmat Singh succeeded him. But the rebel army chose Rahim as their chief, and he now crowned himself with the title of Rahim Shah. By this time all Bengal west of the Ganges had passed into the hands of these men, while Ibrāhim Khan lay inactive at Dacca, vainly hoping that the enemy would soon disperse of themselves when gorged with plunder.

Rahim's army had now increased to 10,000 horse and 60,000 infantry,—a vast medley of vagabonds and adventurers of all kinds. Near Murshidabad he was attacked singlehanded by Niamat Khan, a small jagirdar, who was slain and his property plundered. Then, defeating a Government force of 5,000, the rebels plundered Makhsusabad (Sept.) The neighbouring city of Qāsimbāzār escaped this fate in consequence of its merchants paying a blackmail. [Surat to Bombay, 23 Oct. 1696, in *Orme MSS.* 119.] Smaller bands spread all over the country, looting, burning and forcing people to join them. By March 1697 Rahim had taken Rājmahal and Māldā.

Immediately on hearing details of this rising and Ibrāhim Khan's negligence, the Emperor dismissed him from the viceroyalty of Bengal and appointed his grandson, Azim-ush-shān to the post (middle of 1697, *M.A.* 387.) The prince was then in the Deccan, and pending his arrival Zabardast Khan (the son of Ibrāhim and faujdār of Bardwān) was ordered to take the field against the rebels, with all the available imperial forces in those parts. Equipping an army as quickly as the previous neglect and administrative derangement of his father's rule would permit, Zabardast marched from Dacca with his artillery and in-

fantry against Rahim, who issued from Murshidabad and formed an entrenched camp on the Ganges at Bhagwān-golā. Detachments of Zabardast Khan's cavalry made a rapid detour and recovered Rājmahal and Māldā.

At Bhagwān-golā Zabardast attacked the rebel position by land and water. His artillery, well served by Feringis, made havoc in their crowded ranks and silenced their guns. After a two days' fight the Afghans were routed and their camp captured (May 1697). But the victors were too exhausted and too much encumbered with their wounded to give chase immediately. After a short stay he resumed his march and drove Rahim successively out of Murshidabad and Bardwān into the woods.*

Shortly afterwards, Prince Azim-ush-shān reached Patnā and, envying the martial fame already gained by Zabardast Khan, sent him positive orders not to engage the rebels again before his own arrival. The rainy season (June—Sept.) now put an end to the operations; Zabardast Khan's army encamped at Bardwān and the prince's at Monghyr for this period of enforced inactivity.

In November 1697 the prince arrived near Bardwān. Zabardast welcomed him on the way, but was received with so much coldness and slight after all his great services that he resigned his command in disgust and left Bengal with his father for the imperial camp in the Deccan (January, 1698.) The prince halted at Bardwān for many months. Zabardast's defection weakened the Mughal forces in Bengal by 8,000 choice cavalry and a great general. The rebels, who had gone into hiding in the woods after their late defeat, now reappeared and renewed their activity on all sides.

*¹Rennell's *Bengal Atlas*, sh. 7, marks the country north-west of Medinipur as "impenetrable woods."

Rahim, after plundering the Nadiā and Hughli districts, arrived near Bardwān to confront the imperial army. Here he treacherously slew Khwājah Anwār, the prince's chief minister, at an interview, and then delivered an impetuous attack on the imperial army, but was killed.* Their leader being gone, the rebel army melted away. The prince gave a general amnesty; some of Rahim's soldiers were taken into Mughal service and the rest dispersed to their homes and returned to tillage.

After a long stay at Bardwān, Azim-ush-shān went to Dacca, the environs of which city he caused to be cleared and beautifully laid out.

§ 9. *Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan.*

Murshid Quli Khan was born a Brāhman. As a boy he was sold to Hāji Shafi Isfahāni, who made him a Muslim with the name of Md. Hādi and brought him up like a son. This Shafi rose to be diwan of the Deccan and Diwān-i-tan of the Empire, and under him Md. Hādi received the best training in financial management. After his patron's death (about 1696), Md. Hādi attracted Aurangzib's notice by his extraordinary ability and integrity and was appointed (in 1698) diwān of Haidarabad under the Emperor's own eyes. In this post he further enhanced his reputation, so that when the Emperor was in

* *Akhbarat*, 11 Sep. 1698, records that on that day a despatch was received from Prince Azim stating "Rahim Afghan and Shova Singh, rebels, were living in fort Chandrakona and robbing the imperial dominions. I took horse against them, arrived there, fought, and defeated them. The Afghan was slain." This contemporary official record proves that the story of Shova Singh having been stabbed to death in 1696 cannot be true, at least as regards its date. Salimullah (1763) is the only authority for it.

sore need of a highly capable officer for reforming the revenue administration of Bengal, he sent Md. Hādi there as diwān, raising him to the peerage with the title of Kār Talb Khan (Nov. 1700). In Bengal the new diwān rapidly forced himself upwards by sheer merit and defeated all the plots of his jealous rivals and the obstruction of refractory subordinates by the unbounded trust of the Emperor which he justly enjoyed. In addition to the Bengal diwāni, he was given the diwāni of Orissa in August 1701 and the subahdāri of that province in January, 1703, with the title of Murshid Quli Khan. In Bengal his offices were multiplied in an amazing manner; besides being provincial diwān, he was also magistrate and commander (*faujdār*) of its most important divisions (*sarkār*), and manager of the estates of the subahdār, Prince Muhammad Azim-ush-shān. Finally, in 1704 even the diwāni of Bihār was added to his charge. Thus he became the one supreme financial authority of three provinces and also the civil governor of two of them. It was however, only after Aurangzib's death that he became the deputy subahdār of Bengal (1707 and 1713) and full subahdār of Bengal and Orissa in 1717,—with the official title of Jafar Khan Nasiri, Nāsir Jang.

Aurangzib's admiration for Murshid Quli's ability was boundless. He wrote in 1704, "One and the same man is diwān of Bengal and Bihār and nāzim and diwān of Orissa, with undivided authority, I myself have not the capacity for doing so much work; perhaps only a God's Elect is gifted with the ability necessary for it."

Murshid Quli, conscious of his own ability, power, and dignity, refused to let Azim-ush-shān interfere with revenue matters in any way. The foolish prince instigated a plot of some troopers to mutiny and murder the diwan. The conspiracy was defeated by Murshid Quli Khan's presence

of mind courage and tact. But, to guard against further attempts on his life, he removed the revenue office from Dacca, where the prince lived as governor, to a more centrally situated village on the bank of the Ganges, whose name of Maqsudabad he changed to Murshidabad in honour of himself. Here a city sprang up round his newly built mansion, which was destined to be the capital of Bengal for half the 18th century.

Aurangzib, on hearing of the incident, grew very angry, and ordered the prince to remove to Bihar, which had been added to his charge in January 1703. For the next three years (1704-1707) Azim lived at Patna, which he was permitted by the Emperor to name Azimabad after his own name. [Ināyet's *Akham*, 116b.] His son, the boy Farrukhsiyar, remained behind at Dacca as his deputy in Bengal.

Murshid Quli Khan repeatedly sent to the Emperor large sums as the surplus revenue of the province;—the amount in one year being 2 krór 33 lakhs in Rupees and 16848 gold coins, and 90 lakhs of Rupees in another. [Ināyet's *Akham*, 220b, 219a.] The money came most opportunely to Aurangzib, whose other resources had been exhausted by the endless war with the Marathas. The faithful diwan of Bengal was highly rewarded, and the Emperor assured him in writing that all his prayers would be readily granted and nobody's complaints against him would be heard. [Ināyet's *Akham*, 217b-222b.]

In fear of Murshid Quli, the ruling chiefs on the frontiers of Bengal began to pay their due tributes punctually. They all felt that a strong master had come to the province. He collected the revenue by his own agents directly and thus saved the profits which middlemen or zamindars used to make. "He did not go to the expense of maintaining a

provincial militia or [large] regular army. Two thousand cavalry and five thousand infantry were sufficient for all his purposes. . . . The orders of Murshid Quli Khan were so absolute that the most refractory men trembled in his presence, and his commands were so implicitly obeyed that it was sufficient to send a footman to sequester an estate or to punish an offender at a distance. He did not allow the inferior zamindars even public audience, nor permit the Rajahs to be seated in his presence. Two days in the week he administered justice in person, and was so impartial in his decisions and rigid in their execution that no one dared to commit oppression. . . . He did not place absolute confidence in his accountants, but himself examined the daily accounts of the receipts expenditure and balances and then signed them." Defaulting zamindars were put to unspeakable kinds of torture in order to make them pay the Government dues. [Gladwin.]

Murshid Quli's revenue system.

When Murshid Quli first came to Bengal, he found that the Government itself received no income from the land revenue of the province as all the country was allotted to the officers as *jāgīr* in lieu of pay. He adopted a two-fold plan for increasing his master's income: First, to turn all the officers' *jāgīrs* in Bengal into *Khālṣa*, directly under the Crown collectors, and to give the dispossessed officers in exchange *jagirs* in the wild unsubdued province of Orissa. Secondly, to give contracts for the collection of the land revenue on a commission basis, instead of getting it from the old hereditary zamindārs who paid only a fixed sum. His system was called *māl-zāmini* or *ijārā*. He also planted new zamindārs in the uncivilised frontier areas, such as north Pābna and Mymensingh on the two banks of the

Brahmaputra, where population, civilisation and revenue were created in consequence, and the State's gain went on increasing from generation to generation, till a new class of hereditary zamindārs arose, who gained permanence under Lord Cornwallis. His method of work is thus described by Salimullah,—“The prudent management of the new diwān soon raised Bengal to the highest degree of prosperity. Particularly careful in the choice of his officers, he obtained through their means complete information about the actual capacity of the lands and the amount of custom duties.....The diwān took the collection into his own hands, and by preventing the embezzlements of the zamindārs and jāgirdārs, augmented the annual revenue.” [*Tārīkh-i-Bangāla*, tr. by Gladwin.]

Under him Bengal entered on a career of peace and marvellous material prosperity, which was interrupted only by the follies and crimes of his unworthy successors. [Full study of his career and references, in *History of Bengal* published by the Dacca University, vol. II. 397-421.]

MALWA

§ 10. *Malwa: races forming its population; its importance in Mughal times.*

The Mughal province of Malwa* extended from Garhā-Mandlā to Bānswara and from Chanderi to Nandurbār, or roughly speaking north to south between the Jamunā and the Narmadā rivers. West of it, across the Chambal, lies Rajputana, and east of it Bundelkhand, from which the river Betwā separates it. The most notable element of its population are the Rajputs, divided

* The best and most detailed account in Dr. Raghuvir Sinh's *Malwa in Transition*.

into an immense number of petty clans or minor branches of famous clans, and not organised in compact tribal States as in Rajputana proper. But their number and importance were not so preponderant as to throw into insignificance other races of inhabitants, such as the Jats who were spread over the northern side, and the Gonds concentrated in full strength in the south and the south-east,—besides a strong infusion of Muhammadan immigrants (mostly Afghans) settled in definite centres. The undeveloped primitive races which had taken refuge in out of the way corners and among the hills and jungles, were too uncivilised and too much divided to count for anything, though in mere number they formed the largest substratum of the population.

Uniformity of administration, the regular advance of civilisation, and the effective and easy maintenance of order were impossible in a province with such a diversified population. But Malwa was rich in agricultural wealth,—producing large quantities of the higher crops, such as opium, sugar-cane, grapes, musk-melons and betel-leaf, besides sheltering large herds of elephants in its forest tracts. In industries it occupied the first rank among the Mughal subahs after Gujrat. “Cloth of the best texture was woven here,” notably the chintz and white muslim of Sironj, which commanded a ready market throughout India and even beyond seas in the 17th century. [*Ain* ii. 195-202; Tavernier, ii. 5.]

Malwa had been the foremost centre of Indian culture from before the age of Chirst. In Mughal times its importance was enhanced by the fact that all the great military roads from the northern capitals, Agra and Delhi, to the Deccan passed through this province. Mughal armies had

to cross some part of Malwa in order to be able to strike at Rajputana or the Gond country, Berar or Gujrat. Any disturbance in Berar or Gondwana, Bundelkhand or the Eastern Rajput States would immediately spread by contagion to Malwa. While Aurangzib's attention and forces were occupied in holding the Maratha land in the closing years of his reign, Berar and Khandesh became the happy hunting ground of roving Maratha bands, and these penetrated into Malwa almost as a matter of course, in concert with the rebel Bundelā and Gond chieftains of the neighbourhood.

A preponderantly Hindu province with a sturdy Rajput population, was not likely to take Aurangzib's policy of temple destruction and poll-tax on the Hindus with tame submissiveness. They often fought the agents of Islam in defence of the seats of their religion, as we have seen in vol. iii. ch. 34, Appendix V. Again, in January 1703, when a Muslim tax-collector visited the zamindari of Devi Singh (son of Brahma-dev Sisodiā) to demand the *jaziya*, the men of the zamindar turned him back after plucking out his beard and moustaches. [*Akhbarat*, 28 Jan.]

But, on the whole, the disturbances in Malwa during the first half of this reign were all on a small scale and confined to a few localities, (see Ch. 26 § 7.) The raids of Chhatra Sāl Bundelā, Bakht Buland Gond and others touched only the north-eastern and south-eastern fringes of the province. With these few exceptions, Malwa continued to enjoy peace and uneventful administration till near the end of the 17th century. But after Rajaram's return home from Jinji began a movement which was destined in less than fifty years to completely change the political geography of the province.

§ 11. *First Maratha incursion into Malwa, 1699.*

In November 1699, a Maratha band crossed the Narmadā and raided Malwa up to the environment of Dhāmuni. It was led by Krishna Sāvānt, of whom we have no other mention in the Persian or Marathi sources.* Bhimsen alone mentions the event, and he describes it thus: "When Aurangzib set out to conquer Satara, Krishna Sāvānt, a Maratha general, at the head of 15,000 cavalry, crossed the Narmadā and ravaged some places near Dhāmuni and returned. Since the time of the early Sultans the Marathas had never crossed the Narmadā till now. He plundered and returned to his home unmolested." [*Dil.* ii. 129*a*, 142*a*.]

The path thus opened was never again closed, till at last in the middle of the 18th century Malwa passed into regular Maratha possession. In January 1703, as soon as the Emperor became involved in the siege of Kondānā, "the Marathas crossed the Narmadā again, and caused disturbances up to the environs of Ujjain. Some Afghans of that district also engaged in lawlessness. Nasrat Jang was sent to punish them. Some months later another band, after plundering the environs of Burhanpur, looted the city of Khargon, 52 miles north-west of it and a part of the subah of Malwa lying south of the Narmadā. [*Dil.* ii. 144*b*, *Akh.* 11 Feb. 1703.]

§ 12. *Nimaji Sindhia's raid into Malwa, 1703.*

When the campaigning season opened in October 1703, Nimā Sindhiā† burst into berār, defeated and captured

* Except that Bakht Buland, the Rajah of Deogarh, captured him in April 1699 [*Akhbarat.*]

† "Who did not co-operate with Dhana and other Maratha generals, being prompted by self-will" &c. [*Dil.* ii. 148*b*.] Manucci

Rustam Khan the deputy governor of the province (on behalf of Firuz Jang); and then raiding the Hushangabad district and crossing the Narmadā he advanced into Malwa at the invitation of Chhatra Sāl. After plundering many villages and towns, he laid siege to Sironj, but the chaudhuri of the place gallantly held out. The Emperor had (on 31st October) sent orders to Bidār Bakht, then in Aurangabad, to go out against these raiders. The prince was too distant from the threatened place, and could not begin his march in time. Then Firuz Jang, who had entered Berār in pursuit of another Maratha force, was given this duty. Leaving the frontier of Berār on 12th Nov. and depositing his heavy baggage and camp at Burhānpur, he hastened with light equipment on the track of the raiders, overtook them near Sironj, and immediately delivered his attack. Scattering the Maratha vanguard, he forced his way to the elephant ridden by Nimā, who leaped down and fled away on horseback. Many of the Marathas and their local Rajput

says (iii. 426) that the Marathas plundered Sironj most fearfully, having crossed the Narmada in two bodies, totalling 50,000 horse. And again (iii. 501), "In January 1704, the Marathas crossed the Narmada, penetrated the forests of Mandu, plundering and ravaging several provinces, as well as the town of Sironj. They went further and going through the hill-passes of Narwar, they entered the province of Calabad (? Kalpi), close to Gwalior, a three days' journey from Agra." The two accounts seem to refer to one and the same raid. The unhappy Rustam Khan,—this being his second capture by the Marathas—was suspected by the Emperor of cowardice and collusion with the enemy, and degraded by a *hazar zat* (7 Jan. 1704.) But on 7 Feb. the general's Court-agent submitted to the Emperor that in the fight with Nima in Berar, Rustam had 2000 men (including his son-in-law) slain on his side, and that the spy's report charging him with cowardice was false. The Emperor ordered an enquiry, after which Rustam was reinstated. [*Akh.*] Bhimsen also charges him with shirking battles. [*Dil.* ii. 146*b.*]

and Afghan allies were slain or wounded; the flags, kettle-drums, elephants, camel-swivels &c. plundered from Rustam Khan were seized by the imperialists. The followers and cattle of Rustam, whom Nimā was dragging along with himself, were released. The broken enemy fled eastwards into Bundelkhand, wishing to reach home by way of the Gond principality of Garhā. Firuz Jang kept up the pursuit. [*Akh.* 11 March 1704.]

The general's despatch of victory, following the spy's report by three days, reached the Emperor, then sitting down before Tornā, on 13th March, 1704, and he rewarded Firuz Jang by an increase of 2,000 troopers in his *mansab* and the title of commander-in-chief (*sipah-sālār*),—to the intense disgust of his rival Nasrat Jang.* All the officers of this army were highly favoured and promoted. The brave Chaudhuri of Sironj was also rewarded.

On 10th February 1704 Firuz Jang, following up his success, set out from Bhāmgarh against Chhatra Sāl, by way of Chanderi and Dhāmuni, towards Garhā. After marching 24 miles he halted in the jungle of Dhāmuni. His vanguard under Khanjar Khan issued from the jungle and surprised Nimā's army, which was off its guard, slaying many and recovering much booty. There were heavy losses on the Mughal side too. This victory removed famine from Firuz Jang's camp, where grain began again to sell at 20 seers a Rupee, against 1½ seers during the height of the raid.

* *M. A.* 481; *Akhbarat*, 14, 20, and 24 March 1704. It is amusing to read how Bhimsen, the literary champion of Firuz Jang's rival, tries to prove that this victory was mythical, [*Dil.* ii. 148b]:—"Reaching Sironj quickly, he reported to the Emperor details of his victory, without having fought any battle....When the Emperor learnt the truth, he ordered that the title and favours granted should be withheld."

The victorious general reached Burhanpur on his return on 8th April.*

It was a great deliverance for the Mughals. The Maratha activities in Berar had held up the reports of news-writers, official letters and baskets of fruits sent for the Emperor by the governors of Kabul and Kashmir, for 3 or 4 months on the bank of the Narmada, as the couriers durst not proceed further south and the faujdars on the road could not supply them with sufficiently strong escorts. We read that early in March 1704, some 355 bags of letters and 55 baskets of fruits, liberated by Firuz Jang's victory, at last reached the Emperor. [*Akh.* 8 March.]

Meantime, the discomfiture of Rustam Khan at the hands of Nimā Sindhiā had struck such terror among the imperialists that the governor of Malwa (Abu Nasar Khan, a son of Shāista Khan) lay sheltering himself in the fort of Ujjain, without venturing to take the field against the invaders. Similarly, Nawāzish Khan, the faujdar of Māndu, a very important fort guarding the Deccan highway, had run away from that fort and taken refuge in Dhār. The result was that Firuz Jang in campaigning against Nimā in Malwa received no support from the local officers. The Emperor issued stern reprimands† followed by orders of dismissal to the two officers.

* *Akh.* 16 March. The date of his return is given as 14 *shahar-i-Shawal*, which I correct into *shahar-i-hal* (i.e., Zihijja) [*Akh.* 24 April 1704.]

† A letter "by order" of the Emperor was sent to the subahdar of Malwa: "In spite of the going of Firuz Jang, rightly so named, in pursuit of the thieves [*i.e.*, Marathas], why are you sitting down in your fort gazing at the show? If you wish to remain in my service, then, now that Firuz Jang, after defeating Nima near Sironj, is chasing him and the latter is fleeing towards Bundelkhand and Garha [Mandla], you should issue forth, take the militia, assemble

§ 13. *Prince Bidar Bakht as governor of Malwa,
1704—1706.*

Nawāzish Khan was at once dismissed from the faujdari of Māndu (Jan. 1704), and sent to Khāndesh. A month later he was reinstated, but Dhār was taken away from his charge, and in August Mandu also. [*Akh.* 3 Feb., 28 Mar., 8 Aug 1704.] Abu Nasar was judged too weak to hold a province like Malwa. The danger from which Malwa had just escaped, through Firuz Jang's courage and activity, brought home to Aurangzib's mind the gravity of the situation. He felt that a subahdar of the highest rank and armed strength must be posted in Central India if the Maratha peril was to be kept out of Northern India. Prince Bidār Bakht, a brave and skilful general, then acting as governor of Aurangabad and Khāndesh, was appointed viceroy of Malwa in addition to Khāndesh, on 3rd August, 1704. A year later his task was lightened by withdrawing Khāndesh from his charge. He continued to govern Malwa till March 1706, when he received urgent orders to go to Gujrat and take charge of its defence, as that province had been exposed to Maratha attack by reason of his father's journey from it to the Emperor's side and the delay in the

the faujdars and the captains posted there, and attack expel slay and bind the scattered bands of the enemy roving without leaders and the rebel Afghans,—who, seeing the field empty [of imperial troops], are molesting the peasantry. Send Nawazish Khan to Burhanpur. Take Mandu as your own jagir and entrust Dhar to the [new] *qiladar* appointed."

Nawazish Khan was addressed thus, "At the request of Nasrat Jang (the imperial Paymaster), you have been retained in service, but you have not been your own self. What do you mean by vacating Mandu and hiding your self in Dhar? Come to Burhanpur and serve under Bidar Bakht. I shall give you jagirs in the Deccan or an annual stipend of Rs. 20,000." [*Kalimat T. f. 44a—45a.*]

arrival of his successor. Khan-i-Alam was appointed subahdar of Malwa *vice* the prince, in April 1706. [*M.A.* 483, 496, 498, 512; *Akhbarat*, 3 Aug. 1704.]

A large number of letters written by Aurangzib to Bidār Bakht during his nineteen month's government of Malwa have been preserved. They cover folios 27 to 116 in Ināyetullah's *Akhām* (Rampur MS.) The prince's favourite lieutenant was the young gallant Jai Singh,* the new Rajah of Jaipur, who had gained his good opinion by his conspicuous services when both of them were posted together outside the Konkani gate of Khelnā in April 1702, and also later as his subordinate in Khāndesh (1703-4.) When the prince was about to march from Malwa to Khāndesh he proposed to leave Jai Singh there as his deputy governor; but Aurangzib vetoed the proposal, as he had made a rule that no Rajput should be appointed subahdar or even faujdar. [*Inayet*, 68*a*, 72*b*.]† Khan-i-Alam was appointed deputy governor and became full subahdar in 1706, when the prince was transferred to Gujrat. [*M.A.* 512.]

§ 14. *Effect of disturbances on the condition of the country.*

In October 1704, Nimā Sindhiā was reported to be again advancing towards Malwa, and Bidār Bakht was warned to be ready for the danger. [*Akh.* 20 Oct.] In

* In 1704 Bidar Bakht recommended Jai Singh for the grant of kettledrums and the parganahs of Chatsu, Deosa, Muizzabad and Rewari, on condition of his keeping a strong contingent. But the Emperor demurred to it on the ground of the Rajah being too young and dependent on others. [*Inayetullah's Akham*, 29*a*].

† Jai Singh was further ordered to hold office sitting on a cloth (*suzani*) spread on the ground and not on an elevated pillow (*gadi*.)

February 1700 Nasiri Afghan was out with 2000 followers. In this year and the next Gopāl Singh Chandrāwat's rebellion disturbed some parts of the province. [*Akhbarat.*] Another rebel was Gopāl Chaudhuri of Sironj. [Ch. 59 § 6.] Nawāzish Khan, faujdar of Māndu from about 1700 to 1704, had to conduct many small campaigns against local rebels and Maratha bands from beyond the Narmadā, as we learn from his letter-book.* Abbās Afghan was reported as raiding the highways and stopping the mails. Umar (another Pathan) broke out of his prison in Sholāpur and reached Kotri Parāyā to take to plundering again. [*Akh.* 5 July 1699.]

In fact, the local disturbers of peace in Malwa in the closing years of the reign were too many to be counted. An official report states, "Marathas, Bundelas, and Afghans out of employment are creating disturbances in the province" (1704.) And, again, "It has been repeatedly reported to the Emperor that from Burhānpur to Sironj by way of Handia and up to Ujjain by the Akbarpur route, the infidels have desolated the villages and very little habitation is now left." The result is summed up in Aurangzib's own words: "The province of Khāndesh has been totally desolated.... Malwa too is ruined." [Inayet, 15a, 61a.]

BUNDELKHAND

§ 15. *Chhatra Sal Bundela's early life: as a Mughal captain.*

When the rebel and general robber Champat Rao Bundelā was hunted down by order of Aurangzib (1661), he left five sons behind him. The fourth of these, named

* A MS. of this work was purchased by me in Lahor in 1914. No other copy of it is known to exist.

Chhatra Sāl,* was then a boy of eleven only, but he lived to defy the imperial Government with success for half a century, keep his own province in constant turmoil, invade Malwa, and finally to carve out an independent principality with its capital at Panna. His long life of 81 years ended in 1731 with the complete effacement of Mughal rule from Bundelkhand.

For some years before his death, Champat had robbed the territories of other Bundelā chiefs as freely as the Mughal dominion. His orphans were, therefore, left utterly friendless and found no honourable career open to them anywhere. Chhatra Sāl and his elder brother Angad repeatedly entreated Mirzā Rajah Jai Singh to befriend them and give them employment and the chance of distinction in the Emperor's service by taking them with him to the war against Shivaji (1665). Jai Singh moved cautiously and first employed the two brothers in his own contingent, promising to recommend them for enlistment in the imperial army only if they did good service. The two youths did distinguish them-

* Chhatra Sal: (*M.U.* ii. 510—512 useless and incorrect); service with Jai Singh (*H.A.* Paris MS. 111, Ben. MS. 64a, 73a); *Chhatraprakash*, cantos 10 (Deogarh expedition), 11 (interviews with Shivaji and Sujan Singh), 12 (meeting with Ratan Shah, 13 *et seq* (war against the Mughals.) In *M.U.* Chhatra Sal Bundela has been confounded with the founder of the Ratlam State, namely Chhatra Sal Rathor (son of Ratan Singh), a loyal servant of Aurangzib and qiladar in the Deccan, who rose to be a commander of 1500 in 1703. The mistake originated in the news-writers of the imperial Court, in their hurry, giving the latter's title as *Bundela* in some places (and *Rathor* in others), though his father's name is given as Ratan Singh Rathor. *M.A.* using one such wrong *Akhbarat* called the qiladar C.S. Bundela; *M.U.* and Irvine's *Later Mughals* repeated the error, from *M.A.* It is only the study of the mass of original *Akhbarat* that has enabled me to detect and rectify this mistake. C.S. *Bundela* never served under Aurangzib between 1670 and 1704.

selves at the siege of Purandhar, and Jai Singh kept his promise by getting (3rd Aug. 1665) for Angad and Chhatra Sāl the mansabs of *hazāri* and 3-*sadi* respectively.

They also followed him in his invasion of Bijapur (Dec. 1665—Feb. 1666). Chhatra Sāl was next employed in the Mughal attack on Deogarh by Dilir Khan.* Here he fought heroically and was severely wounded, but we must reject his Court-poet's hyperbole that the Mughal victory was solely due to a charge made by Chhatra Sāl single-handed, while the rest of the army hung back in fear! Whatever grain of truth the story may have contained, the young Bundelā prince felt that he was not being rewarded as he deserved, and that a subaltern's career in the Mughal army did not offer full scope to his soaring ambition. He dreamt of taking to a life of adventure and independence in imitation of Shivaji, which meant a defiance of the Mughal Government.

§ 16. *Chhatra Sāl aims at independence.*

Young Chhātra Sāl with his wife left the Mughal army under the pretext of hunting, and made a perilous journey to the Court of Shivaji, under whom he begged for employment. But the Maratha king advised him to return to his own country and use his local influence to promote risings

* Here the *Chhatraprakash* (canto 10) presents several difficulties: (1) The Mughal general is called Bahadur Khan (*Kokah* or foster-brother of Aurangzib); but we know from official records that both in 1667 and 1669 it was Dilir Kh. who commanded the Mughal forces in Deogarh, (2) Chhatra Sāl is said to have been detached to Deogarh by Jai Singh, though the latter died on 28th Aug. 1667. (3) The Mughals are said to have fought a severe battle before the Deogarh Rajah was compelled to submit; but we know from the *Alamgirnamah* that the expedition of 1667 resulted in no fighting, as the Deogarh Rajah submitted in fear. In 1669 there was some fighting, but that was long after Jai Singh's death.

against Aurangzib, so as to distract the 'Mughal forces. Meeting with disappointment at the Maratha Court, Chhatra Sāl next paid a visit to Subh-karn Bundelā, a loyal officer and favourite of the Emperor, then serving in the Deccan at the head of a large contingent of his clansmen. This general held Chhatra Sāl's plan of a national rising against the Mughals to be a wild and futile dream; his own loyalty could not be shaken, he was contented with Mughal service, and merely offered to beg the Emperor for a high command for Chhatra Sāl. The latter refused it and returned home.

It seemed to all that Chhatra Sāl, without troops treasure stronghold or even country, could not attack the mighty Mughal empire with success. But just at this time Aurangzib's blind fanaticism played into the hands of the young Bundelā patriot. The policy of temple destruction on which Aurangzib launched in 1670, created an opening which Chhatra Sāl at once improved. The Hindu population of Bundelkhand and the adjoining province of Malwa took up arms in defence of the altars of their gods. An attempt of Fidāi Khan, the governor of Gwalior (1670) to demolish the famous temple of Urchha led to his defeat and repulse by the Bundelās under Dharmāngad. The feelings of the entire clan were outraged by this wanton attack on their religion, and even those Bundelā chiefs, who had been so long loyally serving the ungrateful Mughal Government, now gave their secret sympathies to their rebel brethren, and could not be ordered out against them.

The people in Bundelkhand sighed for a bold leader who would repeat Champat's spirited defiance of the Mughal Emperor and protect their religion. Chhatra Sāl was, therefore, hailed as the champion of the Hindu faith and Kshatriya honour. Even Sujan Singh, the loyal Bundelā

Rajah of Urchhā, sent him a secret message of praise and good wishes.

But an attack on the great Mughal power required long and careful preparation. And therefore Chhatra Sāl next set about to find allies. He first visited Baldev (called in the poem, the *diwān*) at Aurangabad, and induced him to be his partner in the projected war with the Mughals. Baldev agreed and held himself ready to join the movement when the time for action would come.

§ 17. *Chhatra Sāl's early war with Mughal Government.*

Then crossing the Narmadā, Chhatra Sāl re-entered Bundelkhand (1671) to fight the greatest monarch of the age. He was a youth of 21, with only five horsemen and 25 foot-soldiers at his back! His own brother, Ratan Shah (of Bijauri*) though entreated for 18 days to join him, shrank from a contest with Aurangzib as a hopeless task.

After leaving Bijauri, Chhatra Sāl was joined by Baldev with his men at Bichhuré, and then they began the war. "The news of Chhatra Sāl's advance was grateful to Bundelā ears." He was joined by Bāqi Khan, who is called a Bundelā in the Hindī poem, but whom I take to be an Afghan brigand chief settled in the district and a natural enemy of the Mughal, and indeed of every orderly Government. The rebels elected Chhatra Sāl as their leader and the king of all the Bundelās, with a right to 55 per cent of the booty, while Baldev was to get the remaining 45 per cent. The new monarch's army mustered 35 horse and 300 foot at this time.

But he soon received large reinforcements. The hope of plunder drew vast numbers of recruits from this martial

* *Bijaur*, 20 m. south of Chhatrapur (*Ind. Atlas*, 70 N.E.)

tribe. Champat, during his lifetime, had been the captain of a numerous band of brigands and soldiers of fortune, and these men had so long remained without work; they now hastened from all sides to the standard of his son. Hindus in general flocked to join the enemy of Aurangzib. Many petty chiefs, living along the path of the advancing rebel, could offer no resistance and saved themselves by joining him. The few who opposed were easily routed and their lands plundered.

In the earlier part of his career, Chhatra Sāl's raiding activities were mostly directed against the Dhāmuni district, which barred the path of his advance south-westwards, and against the rich city of Sironj which lay 65 miles west of it. He looted the villages of these two regions year after year. Successive Mughal faujdars of Dhāmuni resisted him with indifferent results; they were usually defeated by him and could boast of victory only on rare occasions.*

In a short time Chhatra Sāl's repeated successes decided the waverers. His brother Ratan Singh and many other

* Among these local officers, Khaliq was captured in battle and held to ransom for Rs. 30,000; Kesho Rai Bundela, the collector of revenue in Bansa, was killed in single combat; Randaulah Kh. (probably a mistake of Lal Kavi for Ruhullah Kh., the faujdar of Dhamuni in 1673) with a loyal Bundela contingent (evidently the troops of Rajah Jaswant Singh of Uchhha, who was ordered against the rebels in Sep. 1678), could effect nothing; nor could Mukhtar Khan (the subahdar of Malwa from 1697 to 1701) with his Turkish (Rumi) retainers gain better success. The names of the other vanquished opponents of Chhatra Sal are given in *Chhatraprakash*, cantos 13—23. Several of them were faujdars of Dhamuni, Mandesor, Dhar or Mandu in Aurangzib's closing years, as we know from Persian sources. In July 1688, Dilawwar Khan, the faujdar of Dhamuni, was reported to have defeated "the sons of Champat" with heavy slaughter. (*Akhbarat*, 9 Aug.) The letters of Hamid-ud-din refer to raids by Chhatra Sal c. 1677.

petty chiefs joined him, and even Durjan Sāl, the Hādā usurper of Bundi, allied himself with the rebels of Bundelkhand. Chhatra Sāl followed the Maratha system of sparing the places that paid him a blackmail of one-fourth of their standard revenue (*chauth*) and plundering those that refused or resisted.

Years passed on, and he remained still unsubdued. Then, as Aurangzib became more and more deeply entangled in the Deccan, his local agents in Northern and Central India grew weaker and more helpless, and Chhatra Sāl achieved more brilliant triumphs, including the capture of Kālinjar and Dhāmuni and the loot of Bhilsā. The range of his raids was greatly extended and reached Narwar in the north-west and even beyond it, while southwards he joined forces with Nimā Sindhiā who periodically invaded Berār. The whole of Malwa from the Jamuna to the Rajput border and the Narmadā was his happy hunting ground, and he became a nucleus round which all lawless men of this region assembled.

§ 18. *Chhatra Sal's later career and success.*

Leaving out of consideration the exaggerated and jumbled account of his career given in the epic of his Court-poet Lāl Kavi, we can reconstruct Chhatra Sāl's history during the last years of Aurangzib's reign on the safe basis of the information supplied by the Court news-letters, though with many gaps caused by the loss of records.

In March 1699, Sher Afkan Khan, the faujdar of Rānod (70 m.n. of Sironj), marched against him, and attacked him near Suraj-Mau* where he was then living. After a severe battle, Chhatra Sāl fled into the fort, which

* There is a *Mau*, 36 m.e. of Jhansi, and another *Mau* 26 m.s.e. of the former *Mau*, and 10 m. n.w. of Chhatrapur.

the Khan besieged, but the Bundelā chief escaped from it. In this campaign the Khan lost 700 men besides exhausting his private means in keeping up a contingent of 6,000 troopers and 8,000 infantry. Soon afterwards, Chhatra Sāl's follower Chhatra-Mukut Bundelā went over to the Mughals. [*Akh.* 21 and 25 Apr., 28 June, 1699.] Sher Afkan next conquered the pargana of Gāgron, which had been held for 20 years by Chhatra Sāl's son Gharibdās, and he was highly rewarded by the Emperor for these successes, being appointed faujdar of Dhāmuni, Rānod, etc., and given the above pargana as well as a large cash reward. [*Akh.* 26 July.]

But Chhatra Sāl had his revenge next year. On 24th April 1700 Sher Afkan Khan attacked him near Jhunā and Barna, slew about 700 of his men, and dispersed the rest after wounding Chhatra Sāl himself. But the Khan was mortally wounded by a musket-shot and carried off by Chhatra Sāl. The latter very chivalrously wrote to Jafar Ali, the son of the Khan, "Your father has a little life left. Send your servants to take him away." The son sent a *palki*, but it arrived too late. [*Akh.* 12 and 21 May, 1700.]

Another son of the deceased, named Ali Quli had evacuated the fort of Shahabad (in his father's jurisdiction) and it was seized by Devī Sing, son of Shāhman Dhamdherā. But in October the faujdar of Gwalior recovered it from the rebel. [*Akh.* 11 June, 23 Oct. 1700.]

The campaign against Chhatra Sāl after Sher Afkan's death had been entrusted to Khairāndesh Khan, the faujdar of Rānod and Dhāmuni. In April 1701 he laid siege to Kalinjar, where Chhatra Sāl's family was then living. But the attack evidently failed.

In 1705 Firuz Jang induced the Emperor to make terms with the irrepressible Bundelā. Chhatra Sāl was created a 4-*hazari* in the Mughal peerage and induced to visit the

Emperor in the Deccan. Here he lived in peace for a year and a half, and then, on Aurangzib's death, returned home to renew his career of independence, as the fullest success was now assured by the decay of the imperial power under the unworthy successors of Aurangzib.*

GONDWANA

§ 19. *The Gond people and their mediæval kingdoms.*

The old highway from Agrā to Khāndesh and Berār passed through the country of the Gonds, a primitive people of nomadic habits and predatory instincts. This land of Gondwānā covers much of the modern Central Provinces, and stretches from Bhopāl in the west to Sambalpur in the east, and from Bundelkhand to the Paingangā (the northern frontier of the Nizam's dominions), on both sides of the Vindhya range and its eastern prolongation. In the northern half of this region a great kingdom had been established in the 16th century by the Gond Rajah of Garhā. But Akbar's generals dismembered the kingdom and sacked its capitals Garhā and Chaurāgarh. The later Rajahs made submission to the Mughal Emperor and reigned at Chaurāgarh, with diminished power and territory. Here Prem Narayan, the ruling chief, was killed and his treasure plundered by Jhujhār Singh Būndelā, in 1634; but the Rajah's son Hardeo Shah killed Jhujhār and recovered his capital, with Mughal help (1635), as we have seen in vol. i. ch. 2.

The dynasty now rapidly declined, petty intrigues divided the royal house and weakened its power, and the

* *Dil.* 157*b*; *M. U.* ii. 512. The full history of Chhatra Sal's later career, based upon original Persian and Marathi sources, is given in my edition of Irvine's *Later Mughals*, ii. 227—241.

succeeding chiefs confined themselves to an obscure life within the narrow limits of Mandlā and a small territory round it. The country north of the Narmadā ceased to have any strong Gond power.

The predominance among the Gonds now passed to the chiefs of Deogarh, in the centre of Gondwānā and south of the Narmadā river. This city stood on the southern slopes of the Sātpurā range, some 60 miles north of Nāgpur, and faced the plain country stretching southwards to the Deccan plateau. But its territory was extended by vigorous rulers in the late 17th century far to the right and left. Eighty-five miles south of Nāgpur lay Chāndā, the seat of another Gond Rajah, who was the constant enemy and rival of the house of Deogarh. These were the only Gond States that counted for anything in the reign of Aurangzib, and their accumulated treasure, herds of elephants, and collection of gems locally quarried, made them objects of cupidity to the Mughal Government.

§ 20. *Early Mughal relations with Gond Rajahs.*

A ready excuse for invasion was supplied by the fact that they had not sent any present to the Delhi Emperor. In 1637 a Mughal army, released from operations in the Deccan, entered Gondwānā, levying contributions from the local chiefs. It stormed Nāgpur, the seat of the Deogarh Rajah Kukiā, who had refused to pay any tribute. The fort was restored to him on his agreeing to pay a large cash indemnity and an annual tribute of one and one-third lakhs of Rupees.

But the tribute fell into arrears, and in 1655 a Mughal army marched into Deogarh territory and forced the Rajah (Kesari Singh) to make an abject submission. He joined the imperial army in the Deccan with a body of his retainers

and did excellent service in the war against Golkondā and Bijapur.

The tribute was withheld during the disorder caused by the war of succession; the arrears amounted to 15 lakhs at the end of 1666. But Aurangzib was now firmly settled on his throne, and had just become free from his wars with Shivaji and Bijapur.

§ 21. *Invasion of Deogarh and Chanda by Aurangzib.*

So, an army under Dilir Khan marched into Gondwānā in January 1667. Manji Malār,* the Rajah of Chāndā, had been refractory and done some acts of lawlessness. But on the arrival of the Mughal army at Mandurā on his frontier (Feb. 1667), he offered submission through his wazir Nāgiā, and then waited on the Khan, appearing before him like a captive, unarmed and with a chain tying his neck to his waist. He presented Dilir Khan with a thousand gold coins, Rs. 2000, two horses, and an elephant for his own sake, and paid a fine of 7,000 *mohars* and 5 lakhs of Rupees to the imperial Government, and also promised a war contribution of one krór of Rupees payable within two months, partly in cash and partly in kind (especially in the form of gems and elephants), besides five lakhs of Rupees payable to Dilir Khan as fee for his mediation! The annual

* His name according to *Alamgirnāmā*, p. 1022. In the list given in the *C. P. Gazetteer* (p. 142), *Bir Shah* reigned over Chanda from 1647 to 1672. *Malar* may be a copyist's error for *Ballal*, which was affixed to the names of several Chanda Rajahs. *Mandura* is probably *Pandhurna*, 26 miles south of Deogarh, and in the Chhindwara district. *Nandura*, 20 m. e. of Malkapur in Berar, is unlikely. *Manikdurg*, now Manikgarh, 24 miles south of Chanda, and in the Nizam's territory. *Bhanauli* is probably Maniali, 35 m. e. of Amraoti.

tribute was fixed at 2 lakhs. The Rajah further agreed to destroy the forts of Mānik-durg (his strongest place) and Bhanāuli (on the Deogarh frontier). Dilir Khan stayed there for two months, during which he realised 77 lakhs of Rupees out of the promised contribution. But as the peasantry had fled away and the land turned desolate from the residence of the invaders, so that the collection of more money out of the country became impossible, Dilir Khan was induced to move (29 April 1667) from Chāndā territory into Deogarh. [*Alamgirnāmāh*, 1022—1027.]

Kuk Singh,* the Rajah of Deogarh, was frightened by the fate of the Chāndā chieftain. He came to the Mughal camp and humbly waited on Dilir Khan, agreeing to pay three lakhs as fine, and deliver 18 lakhs within a fixed period, out of which six lakhs were to be paid in two months. He further promised to pay his annual tribute (of one lakh of Rupees) regularly without delay. But before the money could be collected, Dilir, under urgent orders from the Emperor, left the country (on 17th September) and marched to Aurangabad to join Prince Muazzam in an attack on Adil Shah. In the meantime the Chāndā Rajah had paid 8 lakhs more. [*Alamgirnāmāh*, 1027—1030.]

The Deogarh Rajah, however, did not keep his promise, and in August 1669 Dilir Khan had to repeat his invasion. The Mughals overran Deogarh, the Rajah fled, and was captured after an arduous chase. The conquerors occupied the country, wishing to annex it and bring it under the direct rule of the imperial Government. Mughal garrisons were placed in Nāgpur (now renamed *Bhāgpur*), Katanjhar, and Deogarh (renamed *Islāmgarh*). A *qāzi*,

* The name given in *Alamgirnāmāh*, p. 1027. He was a different person from the Kukia Gond who was reigning in 1637 and who had been succeeded by his son Kesari Singh in 1640.

mufti, sadar, mir adil, clerks of the *chabutra* of justice, and other officers of a regular province of the empire were ordered to be sent to Deogarh from the Deccan. As for the land revenue, Aurangzib wisely ordered that first the ravages of war should be healed, cultivation restored, and the peasants conciliated, and then the old assessment of the Gond times enforced. The campaign had been a severe one; large numbers of horses had perished of hardship. The Emperor promoted the chief officers and presented 200 horses to this force. [*Akhbarat*, 4 and 5 Sep. 1669.]*

Early next year Dilir Khan received urgent orders to settle the business of Deogarh quickly on some satisfactory basis and hasten to the viceregal camp at Aurangabad, as Shivaji had again raised his head in the Deccan [*Akh.* 26 Jan., 1670.] The Gond Rajah with his entire family (two brothers and one sister) embraced Islām,† as the price of restoration to his kingdom, and on 29th March Dilir Khan left Nagpur for the south. [*Akh.* 20 April 1670; *M. A.* 102.]

But the attitude of the Gond Rajah was not changed with this change of religion under temptation. He continued refractory; and at the end of the year Khan-i-Zamān had to make a rapid march to Deogarh and warn its ruler to be more loyal or he would be punished. [*Akh.* 10 Jan. 1671.]

A petty Gond chieftain, Bhupāl Singh, who held Chauki-garh (40 miles s. s. e. of Bhilsā) rose in 1669, and gathering together some 8,000 horse and foot defeated Rāi-bhān the

* *Chatraprakash*, canto 10, describes this campaign, but calls the Mughal general Bahadur Khan and attributes his victory solely to a single charge made by Chhatra Sal Bundela alone!

† According to *Akhbarat*, 9 May 1670, he took the name of Islam-yar on conversion, and Deogarh was ordered to be designated in future as *Islamgarh*. He was a different man from Bakht Buland, who was made Rajah of Deogarh in March 1686. [*M. A.* 273.]

faujdar of Bhilsā-Chaukigarh, and began to plunder. We find him still in rebellion in January 1671. The Emperor tried to weaken his power by offering the zamindari of Chaukigarh to his brother Murārdās (Jan. 1670) and later on to Pur-zor Singh and Shyām Singh (Jan. 1671) on condition of their turning Muslim. [*Akh.*]*

In March 1686, one claimant to the State of Deogarh was converted to Islam with the title of Rajah Bakht Buland and given the throne. (*M. A.* 273.) He lived to extend the area, power and prosperity of his kingdom very largely, and to give the greatest trouble to Aurangzib in the last years of his reign.

§ 22. *Later history of Chāndā, 1667-1701.*

We now resume the history of Chāndā from 1667. Bir Shah, the Rajah who had made peace with Dilir Khan in 1667, was killed by a Rajput retainer in a private brawl, probably in 1680, as we find his successor Rām Singh visiting the Emperor on 30 Nov. 1681. This Rām Singh was deposed in October 1683 and the throne given to Kishan Singh. But the old Rajah refused to yield possession to his rival. So, a Mughal force under Itiqād Khan invaded Chāndā, and defeated Rām Singh, who fled to the hills with 200 horsemen, leaving his family behind. The Mughals entered his capital on 2nd Nov. 1684, and installed Kishan Singh. On 19th November Rām Singh returned with three men

* Chaukigarh henceforth continued in the hands of Muslim Gond chieftains, *e.g.*, on 9 July 1694, Talamand (originally named Nawal Gond) succeeded his brother Daulatmand on its *gadi*. His brother Husain, is reported on 27 May 1695 as raiding villages in Hushangabad. [*Akhbarat.*]

and tried to force his way into the palace, but was killed by the guards. [*M. A.* 216, 239, 250.]*

Rajah Kishan Singh continued to serve in the imperial army with his contingent for many years, and loyally assisted the Mughal forces in their operations against the rebel chief of Deogarh. [*Akh.* 12 Jan. 1693, 12 May 1695, 9 April 1696.] He died in July 1696, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Bir Singh, then 20 years old, on the same annual tribute as before. [*Akh.* 22 Aug. 1696.] In August 1700 Bir Singh was summoned to the Emperor's camp as his tribute had fallen into arrears. A civil officer named Brindaban, who was sent to Chāndā to realise the imperial dues, took bribes from the Rajah and neglected his duty. So, Aurangzib ordered Bir Singh to be arrested (27 Nov. 1700) and sent to him. The arrest was effected by the governor of Berār in January or February 1701. [*Akh.* 16 Mar. 1701.] He reached the Emperor's camp on 27 April 1701 and paid one lakh into the Berār treasury.

§ 23. *Bakht Buland of Deogarh asserts his independence.*

In June 1691, Bakht Buland was deposed by the Emperor, and the throne of Deogarh was given to another Muslim Gond named Dindār, who was in the imperial camp at the time (*M. A.* 340). For some years after, Bakht Buland was kept under surveillance, first in charge of the imperial Paymaster (1693), and later in that of the provost (*kotwāl*) of the camp, on a daily allowance of two Rupees (1694). On 25th August 1695, he had audience of the

* Hari Singh, the brother of Chhatra Singh, the zamindar of Garha-Mandla, visited the Emperor on 9 May 1683, and a robe was sent to him on 3rd Dec. 1684, when he is designated as zamindar of the place, evidently in succession to his brother.

Emperor and recovered his freedom by giving security for his future conduct, though the Emperor remarked "He will run away; keep a watch on him." The guard round his tent was removed and we find him serving in the Emperor's army in the Deccan as late as April 1696. His son, Muhammad Ali, came from Deogarh, and was presented to the Emperor on 23rd March of that year.

At this time trouble began again in Deogarh. Dindār proved defiant, and a Mughal force under Sadr-ud-din (the faujdar of Punār, 42 m. s. w. of Nagpur) with the help of the Chāndā Rajah Kishan Singh, captured Deogarh and drove Dindār into flight (March 1696). Kān Singh, the second son of Kishan Singh, secured the throne of Deogarh by turning Muslim (under the name of Rajah Nekkām) and promising to pay up Dindār's arrears of tribute, besides a present of 17 lakhs of Rupees. [*Akh.* 15 April 1696.] We find Nekkām welcomed at the imperial Court in November 1700 and married to a captive daughter of Rajaram, the late Maratha king, in January, 1704, [*Akh.*] by order of Aurangzib.

Bakht Buland now lost all hope of his restoration. The time was opportune for a bold stroke, to test fortune by a throw of the dice, as Deogarh and Chāndā had both changed their rulers in the same year (1696), and their new Rajahs were mere lads. Besides, the old Gond nobility of Deogarh were not likely to take kindly to the junior prince of the rival house of Chāndā placed by the Emperor on their throne.

Bakht Buland, therefore, slipped away from the imperial army, returned to Deogarh, and raised the standard of rebellion with remarkable pertinacity, resourcefulness and success. The Emperor, in impotent anger, ordered his name

to be changed from *Bakht Buland* ('Fortunate') to *Nagun Bakht* ('Luckless'). [K. K. ii. 461; *Akhbarat*.]

The rebel's activity spread over a wide area. In October 1698 we find him roving and levying blackmail in Berār, his nearest hunting ground,—and writing to the zamindars of Hushangabad (who were Mughal vassals) to pay him revenue, otherwise he would raid that district. In April 1699 he was reported to have captured a rival raider named Krishna Sāvānt in Berār.

Firuz Jang was ordered to move from Berār and punish the rebel. A detachment from his army under his brother Hamid Khan Bahadur defeated Bakht Buland and captured Deogarh (June). Rajah Bir Singh of Chāndā was ordered to go to Deogarh with his retainers and re-establish his younger brother Neknam on the throne. [*Akhbarat*, 5 and 6 July, 1699, *M.A.* 404.] The rebel escaped from his doomed capital and entered Malwa with a vast force. Passing through the Dhamuni district, he marched to Garhā, whose Rajah Narendra Shah (the great-grandson of the murdered Prem Nārāyān) had been dispossessed by his Afghan vassal Abdul Hādi. Bakht Buland routed Hādi's forces, slaying 500 of the Afghans, captured his son, occupied the kingdom, and restored Narendra Shah to his ancestral throne at Garha. [*Akh.* 2, 6, and 12 July, 5 Aug. 1699.]

But the Mughals kept up the pursuit. [*Akh.* 5 Aug.] In July the governor of Khāndesh seized the family of Bakht Buland's supporter, Sādat Afghan, and thus forced the last-named to submit. In November 3,700 of the Gond rebel's troopers came over to the Mughal service. [*Akh.* 5 Aug., 4 Dec. 1699.]

Meantime Bakht Buland had been trying to repair his losses. In July he sent Rs. 30,000 to Chhatra Sāl with a

request to recruit a body of the famous Bundela musketeers for him. In October, he sent two envoys to Rajaram in Satara fort, to invite him to Deogarh, in order to create a diversion in Aurangzib's rear; but the Maratha king declined under the advice of his generals. [*Akh.* 18 Aug., 25 Oct.] In January 1701 Aladād, who is described as a deposed zamindar of Deogarh, fled from confinement in Punār and joined Bakht Buland, by whom he was lodged in his capital. [*Akh.* 12 Feb.] Early in the following March, Bakht Buland and his uncle Nawal Shah, the zamindar of Jāmgarh, in concert with the Marathas assembled a force of 4,000 troopers and 12,000 infantry, and attacked Ali Mardān Khan, the governor of Berār. They were defeated with great slaughter, Nawal Shah being killed and Bakht Buland wounded, while the Mughals lost 200 killed. [*Akh.* 16 March.] The subahdar took up the pursuit of the rebels by way of Kolāpur (16 m. west of Amrāoti), and fought another sharp battle defeating the Maratha allies of the enemy near Dariāpur, 28 miles west of Amrāoti. [*Akh.* 5 May, 1701.] Risings by Bakht Buland's Muslim allies are reported in February 1703 (near Ujjain under Abbās) and January 1704 (under Sayyid Abdul Qādir).

§ 24. *Growth of Deogarh under Bakht Buland.*

"During Bakht Buland's reign the rich lands to the south of Deogarh, between the Waingangā and Kānhan rivers, were steadily developed. Hindu and Muhammadan cultivators were encouraged to settle in them on equal terms with Gonds, until this region became most prosperous." [Eyre Chatterton, *Story of Gondwana*, 46.] "He employed indiscriminately Muslims and Hindus of ability to introduce order and regularity into his immediate domain. Industrious settlers from all quarters were attracted to Gōndwānā, many

towns and villages were founded, and agriculture, manufactures, and even commerce made considerable advances." [C. P. Gaz. lxxxiv. and 68.]

Aurangzib could not subdue him, and still less could that Emperor's degenerate successors. On the death of Aurangzib, the Deogarh chief extended his kingdom; the Seoni district was ceded to him by Narendra Shah as the price of his aid against the latter's cousins who had called the Marathas in. He also annexed the ancient historical Gond principality of Kherlā. [C. P. Gaz. 284, 302.] The glory of Deogarh departed on the death of his successor Chānd Sultān (1739), and the Maratha house of Nāgpur secured the kingdom.

KASHMIR

§ 25. *How the Mughal Emperors regarded Kashmir.*

The province of Kashmir had been conquered by Akbar in 1586. Its delightful climate and romantic scenery attracted him and his successors for three generations. Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan paid repeated visits to this country and Aurangzib one (in 1663) after his recovery from a severe fever at Delhi. To the ladies of the palace, a journey to the Happy Valley on richly caparisoned elephants, with all the comforts of royalty, and a succession of pleasure-parties in gardens and pavilions near charming fountains,—was the finest of all recreations. But such journeys did not always end in pleasure. Sometimes an elephant would take fright and stampede down the narrow and rough path, killing the attendants and porters and causing indescribable confusion and alarm on the way. Sometimes unexpected rough weather and the breakdown of transport arrangements would force the queens to walk on foot over

the snow to some shelter. The descendants of Timur and Bābur had so far degenerated in the Indian plains that at last the hardships of mountain travel and the cold of Kashmir excited only their fear and repulsion. After his first and only visit early in his reign, Aurangzib vowed never to go to Kashmir again; and none of his successors visited it even once.*

The Emperors treated Kashmir merely as a pleasure resort. They did not try to improve the face of the land or the condition of the people. The cultivation of saffron was known there before the Mughal conquest, and it became a source of profit to them afterwards. Of the shawl industry the wool (and sometimes the yarn) were supplied by this province; but shawl-weaving was successfully transplanted from it to other centres, such as Lahor.

§ 26. *Ignorance and poverty of the Kashmir people.*

The common people of Kashmir were sunk in the deepest ignorance and poverty; many of the villagers lived in primitive simplicity and went about almost naked for want of clothing; they merely wrapped a blanket round their bodies for warmth. Long distances and lack of roads made it impossible to import grain from outside and every valley had to be self-contained in the matter of its food supply; and when a natural calamity like flood or heavy snowfall†

* My account of Kashmir in Aurangzib's reign is almost entirely based on *Tarikh-i-Azami*, I. o. L. MS. 1429.

† *E.g.*, in the reign of the Hindu Rajah Tunjin, "When the fields were covered with the autumnal rice crop....unexpectedly there fell heavy snow. Under this snow, which resembled the grim laughter of Death....there sank the rice crops, together with the people's hope of existence. Then came a terrible famine.. While the routes over the mountains were closed by impassable snow-drifts, the people were

cut off communications, the inhabitants perished helplessly of famine in thousands. They had no savings, no economic staying power. The province was off the routes of the civilised world; difficulty of transport raised the cost of marketing its produce. Hence, even in the case of its most valuable products, such as saffron and fine woollen yarn, their high sale price was mostly swallowed up by the middleman and the grasping landlord, while the feeble peasant or shepherd, though their actual producer, gained only a remuneration as poor as that of the cultivator of the commonest crops of the plains, and much less than that of the grower of opium or indigo. The province had no local industry. Even shawl-weaving was mostly a Government monopoly, and the people earned from it only the wages of daily labour at the State factories. The fine Kashmiri paper was consumed only by the Court, and made to order.

So backward were the people in civilisation that even the upper classes of Kashmiris were deemed unfit to be employed in the imperial service as mansabdars, till near the end of Aurangzib's reign. We learn that it was only in 1699 that the Emperor was first induced by the then *subahdar* to appoint people of Kashmir as mansabdars in any appreciable number.

True, there were some Muslim scholars and saints in Kashmir who enjoyed the patronage of the Mughal nobility,—but this was not the class from which civil servants and army captains were recruited. No Kashmir Hindu gained any office under the Mughal empire, and as for the common Muslims of the province, if they were villagers, they were despised as ignorant savages, and if townsmen, as lying flatterers and cowardly cheats. In this universal closing of

helpless like birds when the opening in their nest is closed." [*Raj-tarangini*, ii. 18—38.)

honourable and responsible careers to talent, the intellectual cleverness of certain classes of the natives developed into glibness of tongue, low cunning, and skill in treacherous intrigue,—so that, in Mughal India a Kashmiri came to be a by-word for a smooth-spoken rogue, as the Græculus was in the early days of the Roman empire. Ignorance, poverty, and the feudal organisation of society,—which kept the masses in a servile condition, also accounted for their Mongoloid disregard for the chastity of their wives and daughters.

§ 27. *Popular superstition and fights between sects.*

The ignorance of the people was only equalled by their superstitiousness. A huge parasite class of Muslim saints and their disciples flourished in this charming climate and exploited the credulity of the people. Renowned Shaikhs and Pirs from outside also paid periodical visits to the Happy Valley and reaped a golden harvest by initiating the people into the circle of their disciples. Many of the local holy men (*bābās*) were illiterate; but it did not matter at all. They had the power of falling into mystic trances and working miracles, and could compose Sufi verses extempore, which brought them immense popularity.

In the cities of Kashmir, the sectarian bitterness between the Shias and the Sunnis often led to fierce rioting and even civil war, and the strong arm of the governor (when he did not happen to be the partisan of either sect) could only maintain an armed truce among the local population. The Shias, who were a minority, naturally congregated in wards of their own in the cities. But the two sects could not help coming together in the course of business travel or litigation. Any conflict of material interests between them was quickly turned into a theological quarrel. The disputants abused each other's religion; the Shia was accused

of having reviled the first three Khalifs, the Sunni qāzi condemned him to death for blasphemy, and the orthodox Aurangzib confirmed the sentence on the heretic.

Quarrels between individual members of the rival sects quickly passed into mass conflicts; the Sunni mob of the capital, roused by the qāzi's harangues, plundered and burnt the Shia quarter, in defiance of the governor's authority, and massacred every Shia whom they could catch. Sometimes there were pitched battles in the streets between the armed rioters and the governor's troops. Even the viceroy's residence was not safe from the Sunni mob and soldiery, if he was suspected of harbouring any Shia whom they wanted to lynch.

§ 28. *Miserable life of the people of Srinagar.*

The villagers were half-naked boors, living in abject poverty, ignorance, and filth. The townsmen, too, had not a much happier lot, though for a different reason. The sudden and dangerous floods to which the lake is subject, forced them to build their homes in the cramped high ground above the edge of the river or the lake. The frequency of earthquakes made it necessary for their houses to be light wooden structures. The intense cold of the climate made fires necessary in every household day and night for several months. The natural consequence of this chain of causes was that conflagrations were frequent, and when they broke out they spread from one end of the city to another, making a clean sweep of these crowded human warrens of timber and grass. To its inhabitants Kashmir was often a very unhappy valley, and their utterly degraded condition would be the standing disgrace of the Mughal administration if we were to judge it by modern standards of the duties of the State.

§ 29. *Aurangzib's viceroys and their doings in Kashmir.*

In Aurangzib's reign, there were twelve subahdars in Kashmir during 48 years. None of them governed the country for more than eight years at a time. Ibrāhim Khan, a son of the famous Ali Mardān Khan of Shah Jahān's Court, served there thrice for a total of 14 years, but most others governed it for a year or two only.

The life of the province varied as the characters of its successive governors varied. Some of them, like Itimād Khan and Fāzil Khan administered justice with great diligence and honoured learning. Others, like Saif Khan, introduced innovations in the form of new exactions such as (a) assessing the revenue by the actual measurement of the land, in the place of the old practice of making a rough eye-estimate of it based on guess, (b) taxing the people to make good any loss or damage to things ordered from the province by the Emperors (*qasur-i-farmaish*), and (c) change in or deduction from men's salaries due.

On 20th January 1696, the Emperor received complaints from the peasants of Kashmir to the effect that the high grandees who had been granted jagirs in that province had farmed their revenue collection to traders, who were making oppressive exactions and had thus ruined the cultivators. Aurangzib immediately ordered all the jagirs in Kashmir to be resumed and made Crownland. At this the traders pleaded that they had advanced heavy loans to the nobles and they would not get back a penny out of them if the jagirs were resumed. The Emperor angrily replied, "Ask your money back from those to whom you have lent it." [*Akhbarat.*]

Under Mubāriz Khan (1668—1669) who was a good-natured but indolent man, his Uzbek retainers shamelessly

oppressed and ill-treated the people, wounding and killing all who resisted them.

Muzaffar Khan and his brother Abu Nasar Khan (1690—1697), both sons of Shāista Khan, enriched themselves by levying illegal cesses, in addition to realising their legitimate fees with the utmost rigour. A story is told that when a copy of the *Qurān* was included among the assets of a certain disputed property, they, after decreeing the shares of the estate to the different heirs, tore up the sacred volume and took one-fourth of its leaves as the magistrate's lawful fee!

Fāzil Khan (1697—1701), in addition to being a patron of scholars and holy men, built many mosques schools pavilions sarais embankments and gardens &c. He was the first to introduce the Kashmiris to the Emperor's service, and he also remitted many cesses of former times.*

Saif Khan during his second viceroyalty (1669—1671) promoted agriculture by planting colonies and building a city. Nearly all the governors who were long enough in the province built mosques and sarais and laid out new gardens.

The long roll of natural calamities during the half century of Aurangzib's reign includes two earthquakes (June 1669 and 1681), two conflagrations of the capital (1672 and 1678), one flood (1681), and a famine (1688). The most notable events of this period in the history of Kashmir were Aurangzib's royal progress through it (1663),† of which

* They are named as *hasil-i-ghalak* (tax on earthen jars for storing things ; or is it a mistake for *nimak* i.e., salt duty) and *damdari* (tax on bird-catchers, musicians &c.)

† V. A. Smith in his *Oxford History of India*, p. 425 footnote, is severe upon other scholars for their supposed error in placing this visit in 1663 instead of 1665 as stated by Bernier, while he is himself

Bernier has left a graphic account, and the conquest of Greater Tibet (1666) whose ruler, styled Daldal Namjal in the Persian chronicles, bowed to Islam, caused coins to be struck and the *khutba* read in the Emperor's name, and built a mosque in his capital. In 1683 when the Black Qālmaqs invaded his country he begged the aid of his suzerain. An imperial force sent from Kābul under Fidāi Khan (the son of the Kashmir subahdar Ibrāhim Khan) drove the Qālmaqs out, reinstated the Lāmā, and returned in triumph with much booty. [Ch. 26 § 6.]*

§ 30. *Civil war between Shias and Sunnis, 1684.*

In the same year took place what was probably the worst fight between the Shias and the Sunnis. The Hasana-bad quarter of Srinagar was a Shia stronghold. A resident of it named Abdus Shakur and his sons had done some injury to a Sunni named Sādiq. Their enmity grew into a long-standing quarrel. In the course of it these Shias publicly did some acts and made some remarks designed to insult the memory of the first three Khalifs (who were usurpers, according to Shia theology.) When Sādiq lodged a complaint of blasphemy against these men in the ecclesiastical court, they took refuge with Ibrahim Khan. The qāzi Muhammad Yusuf, in pious frenzy, roused the mob of the

blissfully ignorant of the fact that Bernier was wrong in his date and this mistake was pointed out by his contemporary Manucci in such a standard work as the *Storia do Mogor* (ii. 66; also 72 for other blunders of Bernier.) My date is based upon the official history *Alamgirnamah*, which cannot possibly be wrong about the Emperor's movements.

* An expedition was sent against the Rajah of Jamu, which was kept busy there for two years (1686-1688.) About 1705 the Rajah of Rajaur and his son were converted to Islam.

city and created a great tumult. As the accused were being harboured in the governor's house, the Sunni mob set fire to the Hasanabad quarter. During the riot, Fidāi Khan came out to support the men of Hasanabad, while the mob strengthened by the Kabul officers just returned from Tibet and some local mansabdars, opposed him. Many were slain and wounded on both sides, the mob rioted with terrible fury, and the qazi lost control over them.

Ibrāhim Khan, finding himself worsted in the contest, at last handed Abdus Shakur and other accused Shias over to the qazi, by whom Shakur and his two sons and one son-in-law were put to death under canonical sentence. After this the qazi gave up visiting the subahdar, though it was his official duty, and he did not leave his own house, in spite of the latter begging for forgiveness. The *mufti* (Muhammad Tāhir), however, acted in exactly the opposite manner, and therefore the mob sacked and destroyed his house. The Sunni rioters were masters of the city. Bābā Qāsim, the preceptor of the Shias, was seized on the road and put to death with disgrace. Fidāi Khan rode out in force to punish the mob. The fight took place before the house of Mirzā Salim Kashghari, a local leader of the Sunnis, and the latter was slain with many of the mob. But in the meantime, Shaikh Baqā Bābā had assembled another crowd, and set fire to Ibrāhim Khan's mansion! That governor then arrested and imprisoned Baqā Bābā, the qazi, news-writer, and bakhshi of the province, and the leading men of the capital. This strong action cowed the people into submission.

Aurangzib, on hearing of these occurrences, removed Ibrāhim Khan from the viceroyalty and ordered the Sunni captives to be released. [*Azami*, 131b—132b.]

§ 31. *The Prophet's relics brought to Kashmir.*

About 1698—99 an event happened which roused the religious fervour of the Muslims to the point of overflowing. This was the bringing into the country of the reputed hair of the Prophet Muhammad which Khwājah Nuruddin had secured in Bijapur, and which was sent after his death to Kashmir along with his corpse. The entire Muslim population poured out into the streets and open spaces, to behold the blessed relic, chanting the praises of God and His Prophet. "Men and women flocked together in perfect amity as if a flood of human beings was sweeping through every lane and bazar, rendering them hard to cross. A great noise filled the air. Scholars, saints, theologians and religious mendicants vied with one another, in passionate earnestness, to get a turn in placing on their shoulders the poles of the litter in which the relic casket was carried," and they considered themselves blessed when with the greatest effort and difficulty they could once touch it. [*Azami*, 140a.]

§ 32. *Example of popular credulity.*

Another incident, illustrating the gross credulity of the people of Kashmir, took place in May 1692, which in that year was the Muslim month of fasting (Ramzān). A stranger of some position (*sardār*) named Mir Husain had come to Kashmir and taken up his residence near the Takht-i-Sulaimān hill, where he set up his hermitage. Gradually the local people began to visit him freely. In the month of Ramzān he prepared a grand illumination in honour of the season. Most of the people of Srinagar turned it into an occasion for excursion and sight-seeing. Many boats went there, forming a vast crowd, and all were free from care. In the third quarter of the day such a violent storm of wind rain thunder and lightning burst upon the place

that the whole city was darkened as in the darkest night. It continued so for some time, and then the people, believing that the Sun had set, broke their day's fast. But after 2 or 3 hours the tempest ceased, the Sun reappeared, and all felt themselves befooled and disgraced, for a Muslim can hardly commit a greater sin than to eat anything in the day-time of the month of Ramzān.

It is characteristic of the intelligence and education of the people of the capital city of Kashmir that they ascribed this abnormal phenomenon to the magic art of that heretic hermit. High and low, the vulgar and the wise, drew up a jury report (*mahazar*) fixing the blame for the temporary obscurity of the Sun,—and the consequent sin of their breaking the Ramzān fast in the daytime,—on Mir Husain, and sent it to Aurangzib. The historian Azam gravely tells us that that "faith-defending, truth-knowing" Emperor believed the charge and ordered the magician to be expelled, which was immediately done by his viceroy. At this the historian exclaims in admiration, "Great God! what an act of devotion to goodness! What passion for doing justice! What intense attention to the enforcement of the decrees of Canon Law!" [*Azami*, 139a.]

GUJRAT

§ 33. *Gujrat, its advantageous position.*

Of all the provinces of India, Gujrat possesses the most complete and copious authentic records from ancient times down to the British period. A band of scholars have made much of this material available in English. Two of the longer Persian histories of the province have been translated down to the end of the 16th century by E. C. Bayley and J. Bird. As for the 17th century, we have a summary narrative of

the chief events compiled by Col. Watson from the invaluable *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, in the the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, part 1, pages 273-282,* while the mediæval history of the adjoining peninsula of Kathiawad is given in Forbes's *Rās-Mālā* from purely Hindu sources. I, therefore, propose to deal here with only the broad features of this province's history during Aurangzib's reign, without going into details.

The economic and social condition of Gujrat, its poor soil, its liability to disturbances, have been described in Vol. I. Ch. 4 of this work. Its wealth was mainly due to its handicrafts and commerce. The former could flourish only in walled cities and in the villages nestling in their shelter. In commerce not only did its people, both Hindus and Muhanmadans, possess a natural capacity surpassing that of other natives of India, but Gujrat enjoyed a position of exceptional advantage. All the merchandise of the rich inland districts of Khāndesh, Berār, Mālwa and even Upper India had to cross Gujrat for shipment abroad. On the coast of this province stand the greatest ports of India,—Broach in Hindu times and Surat in Muslim, while the ports of Konkan, further south afforded an outlet for the produce of the Deccan plateau.

Gujrat was, therefore, pre-eminently the gate of India in Mughal times, in respect of the outer Muslim world. Though a small stream of immigrants and traders filtered in through the Afghan passes, yet Surat and Broach were the most convenient and most frequented entrances to India for Southern Asia and Eastern Africa. Through Surat passed the enormous volume of Muslim pilgrims to the holy cities of Arabia and of Shia votaries to the shrines of Najaf and Karbālā. Travellers, merchants, scholars, fortune-hunters,

* With gross mistakes of dates and wrong translation in places.

and political refugees from Persia, Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Zanzibar and even Khurāsān and Barbary used to enter India through the Gujrat ports by the short comfortable cheap and usually safe ocean highway, while the land route across the Sulaimān and Hindu Kush ranges fell into growing neglect from the early 16th century onwards.

§ 34. *Diversified population; Lawless tribes.*

This geographical advantage had given Gujrat a very composite population and a large foreign strain from very early times. In this province the fire-worshipping Persians fleeing before the Muslim advance into Iran had found a new home, and today with all their contact with Europe Gujrati has not ceased to be the language of their homes. Here was the chief seat of that branch of the Ismailiā heretics of Islam who are popularly known as Bohrās. Another unorthodox Muslim sect, the Mahdavis, muster strong in certain of its localities, such as Pālanpur. Isolated Arab, Turkish Persian and Afghan families and even sections of clans have settled here, and these, along with the remnants of the Muslim tribes that had held sway over the land before the coming of the Mughals, have given an unparalleled diversity to the racial complexion of the province. On the Hindu side the population is even less homogeneous. Leaving aside the foreign immigrants of forgotten antiquity who have been completely absorbed into Hindu society,—like the Nāgar Brahmans, the Guhilots, the Hunas and Indo-Scythians,—there were in the fringe areas of Gujrat in the 17th century many primitive races not yet broken to civilization and orderly political life. Such were the Kolis in the broken jungly country of Dang (in the south), the Bhils in Baglānā (south-east), the wild Rajputs and pseudo-Rajputs in the eastern frontier and the predatory Grāsīās

scattered throughout the province, besides the Kāthis of the west.

These were an ever-present menace to the peace of the country. To them were added in Aurangzib's reign another race of disturbers who soon surpassed the others in the range and vigour of their power, the superiority of their organisation and persistence, and the frequency and success of their raids, till at last they swept Mughal rule out of the province under Aurangzib's unworthy descendants, and established a Maratha kingdom there.

Surat was thoroughly sacked by Shivaji in 1664, and again in 1670; and the country of Kolvan, to within 60 miles of this city, was brought under Maratha sway in 1672 by their annexation of the Jawhar and Rāmnagar (modern Dharampur) States. Thus a thorn was permanently planted in the side of the Mughal Government of Surat. Thereafter, from this safe and convenient base, Maratha bands used to harry or menace some part of Gujrat almost every year. These raids and alarms of raids, even when the latter were false, most effectually ruined the economic life of the province. The trade of Surat, the richest port of India, was practically destroyed by them, as has been shown in Ch. 43 § 5.

§ 35. *Governors of Gujrat under Aurangzib.*

During Aurangzib's reign of 50 years Gujrat was governed for him by twelve viceroys, of whom Mahābat Khan (6 years, 1662—1668), Md. Amin Khan (10 years, 1672—1682), Shujāet Khan (17 years, 1684—1701), and Prince Md. Azam (4 years, 1701—1705) ruled the province longest. In the remaining 13 years there were as many as eight subahdars. Md. Amin Khan's love of ease and aristocratic temperament made his tenure a period of peace,

if also of supineness. The strenuous rule of Shujāet Khan and his tact and enterprising spirit have been already noticed in connection with his administration of Marwar in addition to that of Gujrat (Ch. 58). This exceptionally able officer kept the Marathas out of Gujrat and at the same time enforced peace in Marwar for many years.

Of Prince Md. Azam's viceroyalty we possess copiously detailed accounts in the daily news-letters of his Court of which two volumes are extant in the library of the Royal Asiatic Society of London (Tod MS.), and also in the mass of Aurangzib's letters to him included in Ināyetullah's *Ahkām* and *Kalimāt-i-Tayyibāt*. On the whole he succeeded in keeping order in his charge, though his difficulties were aggravated by a fresh rupture with Durgādās due to imperial orders, as we have seen in Ch. 58, § 8 and 9.

Gujrat had an evil reputation for famines in the middle ages, and the reign of Aurangzib was no happier in this respect. We read of famines in 1681, 1684, 1690-91, 1695-96 and 1698. In 1681 there were bread-riots in the capital. The drought of 1696 was so terrible that "from Patan to Jodhpur no water nor blade of grass could be seen." [*Mirat*, i. 300, 330, 336.] In addition to these natural calamities, pestilence desolated many of the cities, lingering for years together in them. [*Mirat* i. 325, Eng. *F. R.*]

Among the noteworthy public disturbances were the overflow of the Rajput war across the north-eastern frontier of Gujrat (1680) when Bhim Singh the son of Maharana Raj Singh raided Vadnagar, Vishālnagar and some other rich cities of Gujrat and returned with much booty, and the recovery of Idar by its Rathor chief, who was subsequently defeated and slain by the Mughals. [Ch. 26 § 7. *Mirat* i. 294.] A Beluch adventurer falsely personated Dārā Shukoh, and assembling a band of desperadoes in the

Viramgaon subdivision (1663) and rousing the Kolis, who were ever ready for mischief, plundered the country for some time, until he was put down by the viceroy Mahābat Khan [*Mirat*, i. 255.] Highway robberies by the predatory tribe of Grāsiās is mentioned. [*Mirat*, i. 304; *Akh.*]

§ 36. *Maratha invasion of 1706.*

The earlier Maratha disturbances in the province have been noticed in Ch. 43. The greatest disaster that they inflicted on the Emperor's troops occurred early in 1706, during the interval between the departure of Prince Azam from Ahmadabad (25 Nov. 1705) and the arrival of Bidār Bakht there (30 July 1706). The Marathas under Dhana Jādav took prompt advantage of this defenceless condition of the province for the time being. They had been hovering on the southern frontier of Gujrat and now entered it in a vast body which rumour increased to nearly 80,000 men. The deputy governor of the province detached a force against the raiders, but the Mughal commanders quarrelled with one another, and lay inactive on the bank of the Narmadā near the Bāba Piārā ford for a month and a half. Then, under sharp orders from head-quarters, they advanced to Ratanpur (in Rajpiplā), and halted there in two widely separated bodies, which were signally defeated one after the other by Dhana. Two of their chiefs, Safdar Khan Bābi and Nazar Ali Khan, were captured and held to ransom; their camps were looted, and large numbers of Musalmans fell in the field, perished in the Narmadā, or were taken captive, (15 March, 1706).

When Abdul Hamid Khan (the deputy governor) himself arrived with another army, his small force was surrounded by the exultant victors near the Bāba Piārā ford, all the chiefs including the deputy governor himself were

taken prisoner, and their entire camp and baggage plundered. Then the Marathas levied *chauth* on the surrounding country and retired after plundering the towns and villages that failed to pay it. The Kolis had taken advantage of these disorders to rise and sack the rich trading centre of Baroda for two days. [*Mirat*, i. 359-368; *Dil.* ii. 165*a*, *Storia* iv. 246; see Ch. 57 § 11.]

§ 37 *Religious persecution of the Bohra sect.*

Aurangbiz's policy of religious persecution had full play in Gujrat too, with its usual baneful consequences. We have seen how in the reign of his father he had as *subahdar* of Gujrat destroyed the Chintāman temple in Ahmadabad and several other Hindu shrines elsewhere [Ch. 34 § 9 and App. 5.] Throughout his reign, and more especially after 1669, when his iconoclastic zeal bubbled forth anew, he frequently sent out orders to the local officers of Gujrat to demolish particular temples, the most notable of them being the Somnāth on the sea-coast and the Hateshwar Mahādev of Vadnagar. [*Mirat*, i. 260, 353, and 328; Ināyet 10*a*.]

It will be enough if we briefly refer here to his treatment of the Ismailiā sect,* the Bohrā branch of which supplied the best oversea traders and retail dealers in his western realm. Their spiritual guide Qutb had been put to death by order of Aurangzib early in his reign, and the sect was driven into secret ways in practising its faith. Later, many of their leading men were arrested and kept in prison on a charge of teaching heresy. In 1705 Isā and Tāj, two silk-vendors of the Sulaimāni branch of the Bohrās, were bound down in security not to collect money from the people by threat and accusation nor to teach heretical opinions. A

* *Bombay Gaz.* vol. ix, pt. 2, pp. 24-57. But *Dabistan* 227-238 and *Encyclo. Islam* ii. 549 refer to the sect outside India.

little later they were sent to Court in chains. In the same year, the Emperor learnt that Khānji, the head of the Ismailia sect and successor to Qutb, had sent twelve emissaries (*dais*) who were secretly perverting Muslims to this heresy and had collected Rs. 1,14,000 from the members of this creed in Ahmadabad for procuring the release of their brethren then confined by Aurangzib. The Emperor on hearing of it ordered the twelve men and certain other members of this community to be arrested quietly without the knowledge of the rest of the sect, and sent to him under careful guard, with the money collected and the sixty and odd holy books of their faith. This was done. At the same time orthodox teachers were appointed by the State to educate the children and illiterate people of the Bohrās in every village and city in Sunni doctrines and practices. Their mosques had been converted to Sunni usage earlier in the reign [*Mirat*, i. 358, 263; Ināyēt's *Ahkam*, 271b.]

§ 38. *Rising of the Khoja sect in Broach, 1685.*

Another branch of these sectaries, called *Khojas* in Kathiawad and *Mumins* (or Mehtas) in Gujrat, consisted mostly of Hindus converted to Islam by a saint named Sayyid Imam-ud-din, whose tomb at Karmātah (9 miles outside Ahmadabad) was their chief shrine. They paid idolatrous adoration to their spiritual guide, kissing his toes and heaping up gold and silver on his feet, while he sat in royal splendour behind a screen. They supported their spiritual guide by a regular voluntary tax of one-tenth of their annual income, (including the market-price of one of their children when they had ten!)

In the general persecution of heretics, some Khojas had been arrested and imprisoned in Gujrat, and one of them revealed the secret practices of the sect. Aurangzib at once ordered the Sadr and Qāzi of the province to arrest their

spiritual head, Sayyid Shahji by name, and send him to Court. The man killed himself by poison on the way, but his son, a boy of twelve, was sent to Aurangzib. At this all his followers in Gujrat, old and young, set out for Ahmadabad, saying that the subahdar had killed their guide and they must secure the punishment of the murderer. Near Broach, as they were crossing the Narmadā, the local faujdar opposed them ; a battle was fought ; they killed him and captured the walled city of Broach. They held it in a body 4,000 strong and set to improving its fortifications, without molesting the citizens in any way, (Oct. 1685.) At the news of their success, others came to join them. The imperial faujdar of Barodā arrived there for expelling them, but soon retired in fear of their superior strength.

Then an army sent by Shujāet Khan, the subahdar, opened regular siege operations against Broach. The garrison fought long and well, making frequent sorties. At last one day, at broad noon, when the defenders overconfident of the strength of the walls used mostly to vacate the ramparts, and even the few sentinels had retired to the shade, the Mughals suddenly scaled the walls by means of ladders, slew the sleeping guards and opened the gate to their comrades. The rest was mere butchery. The fanatics fought desperately, openly courting death as martyrdom. Even the captives begged their conquerors to slay them quickly that they might join their brethren in Paradise. Many of their men and women wilfully drowned themselves in the river. Thus a bloody stop was put to the movement. [*Mirat*, i. 320—324; *F. R. Surat* 92, Surat to J. King. 30 Oct. 1685.]

CHAPTER LXII.

THE CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE.

§ 1. *The rapid decline of the Mughal empire.*

To all outer observers the Mughal empire seemed to have attained to its highest splendour and power when Aurangzib ascended the throne of Delhi. His tried ability and known character promised to the country undiminished prosperity if only he was spared to rule long enough over it; and he ruled over it for 50 years. The native genius of Akbar, the genial moderation of Jahangir, the sagacity, energy and refined taste of Shah Jahan, had left the Mughal empire without a rival throughout Northern India and much of the Deccan too, and given peace, prosperity and culture to millions. "The Wealth of India" had become proverbial in far off countries, and the magnificence of the Court of the Great Mughal had "dazzled even eyes which were accustomed to the pomp of Versailles." And when a trained administrator and experienced general, who was also a puritan in the simplicity and purity of his private life, succeeded to the guidance of this rich heritage in the fulness of his physical and mental powers, all people hoped that he would carry the empire to unimaginable heights of glory. And yet the result of Aurangzib's long and strenuous reign was utter dissolution and misery. The causes of this strange phenomenon it is the duty of the historian to investigate.

§ 2. *Internal peace the root cause of India's prosperity.*

In a warm moist and fertile country like India,—where the lavish bounty of Nature speedily repairs the ravages of hostile man and beast, of inclement Sun and rain—order is

the root of national life, in an even greater degree than in other lands. Given peace without and the spirit of progress within, the Indian people can advance in wealth, strength and civilization with a rapidity rivalled only by the marvellous growth of their vegetation after the first monsoon showers.

A century of strong and wise government under Akbar and his son and grandson had given to the richer and more populous half of India such peace and impulse to improvement. A hundred victories since the second Panipat had taught the Indian world to believe that Mughal arms were invincible and Mughal territory inviolable. Shivaji broke this spell. And his destructive work was carried to undreamt-of lengths by his successors in the second half of Aurangzib's reign. Mughal peace—the sole justification of the Mughal empire—no longer existed in India at Aurangzib's death.

In a predominantly agricultural country like India, the tillers of the soil are the only source of national wealth. They produce the food and raw materials of clothing for the entire population. Directly or indirectly, the land alone adds to the "annual national stock." Even the craftsmen depend on the peasants and on the men enriched with the land revenue, for the sale of their goods, and if the latter have not enough foodstuff to spare, they cannot buy any handicraft. Hence, the ruin of the peasants means in India the ruin of the non-agricultural classes too. *Pauvres paysans pauvre royaume*, is even truer of India than of France. Public peace and security of property are necessary not only for the peasant and the artisan, but also for the trader, who has to carry his goods over wide distances and give long credits before he can find a profitable market. Political unrest and insecure roads prevent the quick and

cheap transport of grain from a district of bumper crops to one where the harvest has failed, and this circumstance makes famine relief slow and difficult.

Wealth, in the last resort, can accumulate only from savings out of the peasant's production. Whatever lowers the peasant's productive power or destroys his spirit of thrift by creating insecurity about his property, thereby prevents the growth of national capital and impairs the economic staying power of the country. Such are the universal and lasting effects of disorder and public insecurity in India. And the failure of Aurangzib affords the most striking illustration of this truth.

§ 3. *Economic drain of Aurangzib's ceaseless warfare.*

The economic drain caused by Aurangzib's quarter century of warfare in the Deccan was appalling in its character and most far-reaching and durable in its effect. The operations of the imperial armies, especially their numerous sieges, led to a total destruction of forests and grass. The huge Mughal forces, totalling 1,70,000 troops according to the official records, with perhaps ten times that number of non-combatants, soon ate up everything green wherever they moved. In addition, the Maratha raiders destroyed whatever they could not carry off,—feeding their horses on the standing crops, and burning the houses and property too heavy to be removed. At the siege of Satara, the Marathas had prepared for defence by burning the grass for twenty miles round the fort; while the Mughals in their turn, in building a raised battery opposite the fort tower “had left not a single tree standing within a range of 60 or 80 miles from the place.” [*M.A.* 414.] The mischief was multiplied by the immense number of sieges in which

the Mughals engaged in that land of the mountain and the flood. Hence, it is no wonder that when at last in 1705 Aurangzib retired after his last campaign, the country presented a scene of utter desolation. "He left behind him the fields of these provinces devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the bones of men and beasts." [*Storia*, iv. 252.]

This total and extensive deforestation had a most injurious effect on agriculture. At the same time, herds of cattle became extinct through robbery and lack of fodder. The pastoral tribes were ruined, and meat and milk supply ceased over much of Maharashtra.

The financial exhaustion of the empire in these endless wars left Government and private owners alike too poor to repair buildings and roads worn out by the lapse of time. Indeed, in Aurangzib's last years, we read of urgent appeals from his officers for funds to make the most necessary repairs in important fortifications, which the Emperor has to reject owing to lack of money! Civil buildings, water-works, *sarais* and roads could not expect any better treatment in such a state of things.

The labouring population suffered not only from violent capture, forced labour, and starvation, but also from epidemics which were very frequent during these campaigns. Even in the imperial camp, where greater comfort, security and civilisation might have been expected, the annual wastage of the Deccan wars was one lakh of men, and three lakhs of horses, oxen, camels and elephants. [*Storia*, iv. 96.] At the siege of Golkonda (1687) "a famine broke out. In Haidarabad city the houses river and plain were filled with the dead. The same was the condition of the imperial camp. . . . Kos after kos the eye fell only on mounds of corpses. The incessant rain melted away the flesh and

skin....After some months when the rains ceased, the white ridges of bones looked from a distance like hills of snow." [M.A. 292.] The same desolation overtook tracts which had hitherto enjoyed peace and prosperity. The acute observer Bhimsen writes about the Eastern Karnātak, "During the rule of the Bijapur Golkondā and Telingā [dynasties] the country was extensively cultivated. But now many places have been turned into wildernesses on account of the passage of the imperial armies, which has inflicted hardship and oppression on the people." [Dil. ii. 114*a*, also 136*b* about Berār.] The depopulation and impoverishment of the Madras Coast in the closing decade of the 17th century is repeatedly noticed in the Madras Factory *Diary* and F. Martin's *Mémoires*.

§ 4. *Pestilence and natural calamities.*

In 1688, Bijapur was visited by a desolating epidemic of bubonic plague, which is estimated to have carried off a hundred thousand lives in three months. [M.A. 318.] So, too, we read of a plague in Prince Azam's camp in Aug. 1694. [Akh. 29 Aug.] The English factors at Surat report similar devastating epidemics throughout Western India in 1694 and 1696 (95,000 men perished.)* To take one example only, the drought and plague of 1702—04 killed two millions of men. [Storia, iv. 96.] Thus, war and its constant attendant pestilence broke the placid repose of rural life in the Deccan and disturbed the old distribution of economic resources and activities.

The waste of army horses was terrible. In the newsletters, we constantly read of commanding officers begging for the grant of horses, as their troopers had lost their

* Surat to Bom. 6 Oct. 1694; *Madras Diary* 31 Dec. 1696; Karwar to Bom. 18 Nov. 28 Dec. 1696.

animals in the campaigns. Bhimsen describes how Nasrat Jang's cavalry had mostly to march on foot after a long chase of the Marathas. [*Dil.* ii. 135*b*.] This loss had to be made good by the Government every year purchasing remounts in Afghanistan through its subahdar, and in Surat from Persian and Arab importers, as well as by sending an agent of its "Purchase Officer" stationed at Surat to Persia for buying horses there and sending them to India. [*Akhbarat.*]

In addition to disease, great natural calamities like flood, drought and excessive and unseasonable rainfall were frequent in the Deccan at the beginning of the 18th century, which aggravated the sufferings of invaders and natives alike and still further reduced the population. The state of war, spread over nearly a generation of time, had left no savings, no power of resistance in the common people; everything they produced or had stored up was swept away by the hordes on both sides, so that when famine or drought came, the peasants and landless labourers perished helplessly like flies. Scarcity was chronic in the imperial camp and often deepened into famine. The former remarkable cheapness of grain in many parts of Khāndesh, Berār and Konkan now became a forgotten myth; and even in the best years, in no place south of the Narmadā did grain sell cheaper than six seers a Rupee [*Dil.* ii. 146*a*], while in Multan and Bengal a bumper crop still brought prices down to two or even eight maunds a Rupee. The Mughal army at last found life intolerable.

§ 5. *Injury to trade and industry by war, disorder,
and official exactions.*

There being no peace or safety for tillage, the starving and exasperated peasantry took to highway robbery as the

only means of living. In many villages of the Deccan they gathered arms and horses and used to join the Marathas in their raids, and also sheltered enemy Maratha families in their houses while the men-folk were out roving. Raiding bands were, also, locally formed, which gave employment to many and chances of glory and wealth to the more spirited among the villagers.

Trade almost ceased in the Deccan during this unhappy quarter century. Caravans could travel south of the Narmadā only under strong escort; hence they had to wait in the fortified towns, sometimes for four or five months, before they could get an opportunity of advancing further towards their destination in safety. We even read of the royal mail and baskets of fruits for the Emperor's table being held up for five months at the Narmadā by Maratha disturbances in the roads beyond it. A time came when even the Emperor's letters could be carried to distant places only by spies who travelled in disguise,—no escort being available for the regular couriers. Government stores and the personal effects of the nobles were all that could be transported under such conditions; the movement of tradesmen's goods was impossible.

Even where war was not raging (as in Bengal), the weakening of the central Government emboldened provincial governors to disregard imperial prohibitions, and to make money by forcing goods from traders at absurdly low prices and then selling them in the public marts, and also by exacting forbidden *abwabs* from craftsmen and merchants. [*Mughal Administration, Ch. 5.*]

In the absence of security at home and the impossibility of making purchases at distances, arts and crafts ceased to be practised except in the walled cities. Village industries and industrial classes together died out. The Madras coast,

for instance, with its teeming weaving population, was so unsettled by the Mughal-Maratha struggle for the Karnātak (1690—1698) that the English found it difficult to get enough cloths for loading their Europe-going ships. [Ch. 51 § 5.] As early as 1688, Francois Martin had foreseen the war between the Mughals and the Marathas and the consequent ruin of the textile industry of the Karnatak. [Kaep. 259, also 293. Martin, *Mém.* ii. 546, 552.] Thus ensued a great economic impoverishment of India,—not only a decrease of the “national stock”, but also a rapid lowering of mechanical skill and standard of civilisation, a disappearance of art and culture over wide tracts of the country.

§ 6. *Other oppressors of the cultivators.*

In Southern India, with many parts of it harried by more than a century of warfare, the peasantry had many enemies to dread besides the regular fighters on both sides. The Mughal soldiers on their march often trod down the crops, and though the Emperor had a special body of officers for compensating the peasants for this loss (*paimali-i-zarait*), his financial difficulties led to the neglect of this humane rule. The worst oppressors of the peasants, however, were the tail of the army—the vast nondescript horde of servants, day labourers, *darvishes* and other vagrants who followed Aurangzib’s “moving city of tents” in the hope of picking up crumbs where such a crowd had gathered. Particularly the Beluchi camel-owners who hired out their animals to the army, and unattached Afghans searching for employment, plundered and beat the country people most mercilessly. The *banjārās* or wandering grain dealer tribe, who moved in bodies, sometimes of 5000 men, each with his couple of bullocks loaded with grain, were so strong in their strength of numbers and contempt for the petty officers of

Government, that they sometimes looted the people on the wayside and fed their cattle on the crops in the fields, with impunity. Even the royal messengers (called *mewrahs* in Gujrat) who carried Government letters, reports of spies, baskets of fruits for presentation to the Emperor, used to rob the people of the villages they passed by sometimes under the pretext of making good the losses in the fruits they carried. [My *Mughal Adm.* Ch. 5.] The Emperor's repeated orders against this kind of iniquity were of no avail. [*Mirat* i. 291.]

In the trail of the Maratha soldiers appeared the Berads and even the Pindāries—who were brigands pure and simple, without even the pretence of belonging to any army or carrying out the orders of any Government.

Then, there were the land-stewards of rival jagirdars,—the incoming and the outgoing—of the same village. Under the plea of the never-to-be satisfied arrears of revenue, the late jagirdar's collector tried to squeeze everything out of the peasantry before he left, and even continued to stay in the village for some months after the arrival of his successor. And the new-comer, in order not to starve himself, passed the half-dead peasants through his fiscal grinding-mill.

§ 7. *Bankruptcy of Mughal Government.*

The English conquest of India was of a pulsatory character, it was achieved not by an uninterrupted succession of advances, but each aggressive governor-general was followed by a pacific economical non-interventionist. A Warren Hastings filled the financial void created by the wars of Clive and Vansittart, and laid the basis for the military expansion of a Wellesley, while the bankruptcy caused by Wellesley's frenzy of conquest was repaired by

the recuperation of a sober plodding Barlow or Minto. The pacific Bentinck undid the ravages in the Treasury made by the bellicose Marquis of Hastings and Earl of Amherst.

Not so Aurangzib. Ever since 1679, when he embarked on the spoliation of the kingdom of Marwar, his reign was one long warfare. He did not realise the necessity of intervals of peace and retrenchment, which would give breathing time to his subjects, recoup the losses of war, and lay by a reserve for future wars. He soon ran through his current revenue and the new tax (*jaziya*) imposed on the Hindus in 1679 and vigorously enforced by specially selected "pious" collectors. [K. K. ii. 278, 378.] Then he ordered the accumulated treasures of his ancestors, from Akbar downwards, to be taken out of the vaults of Agra and Delhi forts and sent to him in the Deccan. [K. K. 411; *Storia* ii. 255.]

Thus, the last reserve of the empire was exhausted, and public bankruptcy became inevitable. The salaries of the soldiers and civil officers alike fell into arrears for three years. The men starving from lack of pay and the exhaustion of their credit with the local grocers, sometimes created scenes in the Emperor's Court, sometimes abused and hustled their general's business manager,—some, driven to desperation, beat to death the paymaster of their contingent.

The imperial Government made reckless promise of money grant and high command to every enemy captain who was induced to desert and every enemy *qiladar* who was persuaded to surrender his fort. It was not humanly possible to keep all of these promises. The Mughal army, too, was immensely expanded in order to cope with the growing strength of the Marathas and their allies. The result was that the entire land in the empire proved insufficient for the

total amount of *jagir* needed to satisfy the dues of all the officers included in the swollen army-list. As the imperial diwan Inayetullah Khan, on being urged by Aurangzib to grant *jagirs* to every one and leave no claim unsatisfied, remarked in despair, "The contingents of the officers who are daily passed in review before your Majesty are unlimited in number, while the land available for granting as *jagir* is limited (in area.) How can a limited figure be made to equal an unlimited one?" [Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam*, § 57.]

Even when the grants of land in lieu of salary were drawn up by the Pay Office, they remained for years as mere orders on paper, the actual delivery of the villages to the grantees being impossible. At last the Emperor used to cry out in bitterness of spirit to his Paymasters, 'How often have I told you that I do not need any retainers? Why do you not dismiss them? You do not realise the badness of your action, but refuse to listen to your master's words!' [K. K. ii. 411—412.] The interval between the order and the actual possession of the *jagir*, it was sarcastically said, was long enough to turn a boy into a grey-beard. [*Ibid.* 379.]

How impossible of realisation were the promises of bribes made by the Government to enemy captains and ministers and how ruinous was the price at which forts were bought by Aurangzib is strikingly illustrated by the case of Matabar Khan, the wise and able governor of Kaliān. He had secured the capture of some forts in the Nāsik and Thana districts by spending Rs. 1,20,000 out of his own pocket in bribes to their commandants and his own army expenses; but the Emperor in return granted him only Rs. 30,000 or a quarter of his outlay, and even this small sum remained unpaid for years afterwards. If a minor Maratha hill-fort cost on an average Rs. 45,000 in cash to take it peacefully,

the Emperor might well despair of taking all of them at this rate. And yet he obstinately went on capturing fort after fort by heavy bribery or by regular sieges which were ten times more costly. As Khāfi Khan tells us, "Most of Aurangzib's generals, whether posted in far-off provinces or conducting sieges under his eyes, after some fighting used in the end to secure the capitulation of the forts by bribing the qiladars. The Emperor was informed of it by his spies, and used to pay to the officer who had thus contrived the surrender the exact amount of the bribe (neither more, nor less), under the name of reward"! [ii. 503.]

The spirit of the Mughal army in the Deccan was at last utterly broken. The soldiers grew sick of the endless and futile war,* but Aurangzib would listen to no protest or friendly advice. Even his grand wazir Asad Khan, who had ventured to suggest that now that Bijapur and Golkondā had been conquered he had no more work to do and might as well return to Delhi, received a sharp reprimand, "I wonder that a wise old servant like you has made such a request. .So long as a single breath remains to this mortal life, there is no release from labour." [Hamid-uddin's *Ahkam* § 46.]

A generation of imperial soldiers and servants grew up in the Deccan who had never seen a city or house of brick or stone, but passed all their lives in tents, marching from one encampment to another. [*Dil.* ii. 141*a*; see Ch. 57 § 2.] The Rajput soldiers complained that their race would not be able to serve the empire in the next generation, as they had to pass their lifetime in the Deccan campaigns, without getting any respite for going home and rearing up children. One home-sick noble offered the Emperor a bribe of one lakh of

* "Owing to my marching through deserts and forests, my officers long for my death." Aurangzib to Muazzam in *Anecdotes*, § 11.

Rupees for transferring him to Delhi! [*M. U.* i. 457. *Akh.* 31 May 1695.]

§ 8. *Administrative decline and public disturbances
in N. India.*

The inflated expenditure and incessant warfare in the Deccan adversely reacted on the situation in Northern India. The older, and more settled peaceful and prosperous provinces of the empire were drained of their manhood, wealth, and talent. The best soldiers, the highest officers, and all the collected revenue were sent to the Deccan, while the subahs of Hindustan were henceforth left to minor officers with small contingents and incomes quite inadequate for maintaining viceregal authority. All classes of lawless men began to raise their heads in the north as well as the south, though later and more fitfully in Hindustan than in the Deccan. The new class of subahdars and faujdars were too low in rank and armed strength to repress them. The proud zamindars, whose grand-fathers had been ruling princes before the coming of the Mughals, the Afghan families settled in various districts (especially Jaunpur, Malwa, Allahabad and North Orissa) and still dreaming of their lost empire in India, claimants to principalities dispossessed by order of Aurangzib, predatory tribes like the Jat peasantry west of Agra and the Mewatis south-west of Delhi, and turbulent Rajput peasantry like the Baises of Oudh and the Ujjainiās of South Bihar,—all rose in defiance of the Government and began to lay hands on their weaker neighbours. The local viceroys could not cope with them with their normal contingents (*zābita*); they could hope to suppress the rebels only if they engaged troops in excess of the number for which their salary was fixed. And such extra retainers meant increased expenditure. [*Dil.* ii. 139a-140a.]

§ 9. *Poverty and powerlessness of governors.*

But, at the same time, their income, inadequate even on paper for their heavy duties, was actually dwindling very fast. The general unrest naturally caused a falling off in the rent collection from the peasants. Then, the frequent changes of officers and transfers of their jājirs prevented them from gaining knowledge of the tenantry, establishing relations with them, and spreading the inevitable arrears of a lean year gently over a number of fat years. It is difficult to imagine a system more ruinous to the peasants and therefore in the long run more harmful to the State also, than the actual administration of Mughal jājirs. It ended in a mad looting of the peasants by rival jagirdars' agents or successive agents of the same jājirdār. The former I have described a few pages back. As for the latter, Bhimsen gives a lurid picture of it: "There is no hope of a jagir being left with the same officer next year. When a jājirdār sends a collector to his jagir, he first takes an advance from the latter by way of loan. This collector, on arriving in the village, fearing lest a second man who had given a larger loan to the jagirdar was following (to supplant him), does not hesitate to collect the rent with every oppression.... The ryots have given up cultivation; the jagirdars do not get a penny." [*Dil.* ii. 139a-140a.] The same ruinous policy was followed in revenue-collection in the Crownlands, as we learn from the despatches of the subahdar of Orissa. [J. Sarkar's *Studies in Aur. Reign*, 243.]

The result of this policy was that the imperial officers, whether holding jājirs in the older or the newly conquered provinces, all alike starved on account of the rent collection of their fiefs always falling into arrears. Thus, a vicious circle was formed: political disorder (to which we must add a wrong

system of land administration) led to less and less money coming from the jāgirs; this diminished income forced the governors to keep fewer and fewer men* in their pay; the decrease in their armed strength encouraged greater lawlessness among the people, from which followed a further impoverishment of the peasants and falling off in the land revenue. The evil was universal throughout the Deccan, and also very noticeable in Bundelkhand, Malwa, and parts of Allahabad and Oudh.

War was the only occupation of the Rajputs and indeed of all the Hindus who claimed to belong to the Kshatriya caste. The Mughal peace established in northern India had left to them chances of employment only in the trans-frontier regions on the west or in the still unsubdued parts of the Deccan. Rajputs had fought under the imperial banner in Central Asia and Qandahār. But in Aurangzib's reign Mughal military activity was contracted within the frontiers, though Kābul was still a part of his empire. His annexation of the remaining Deccan principalities caused unemployment among the Rajputs in two ways,—first because he was under the necessity of giving employment to the masterless local troops of the subverted monarchies, and secondly because fewer territories were now left for him to conquer. In these circumstances aspiring scions of Rajput houses could only fight with their kinsfolk for their ancestral "homes," take to robbery, or apostatize in order to get grants of estates from Aurangzib.

* *Dil.* ii. 140*b*. "Except these three men who have ancestral estates, *viz.*, Rao Dalpat, Ram Singh Hada, and Jai Singh Kachhwah, I have not seen a single noble who kept even a thousand troopers in his contingent." The *Akhbarat* give reports of hazaris and 2-hazaris not keeping a single soldier under them.

This situation was changed by the huge waste of life through pestilence and famine, even more than by actual slaughter, in the last years of the Emperor's reign. The Hindu manhood of the North therefore continued to be drained for the Deccan war, but without any corresponding gain to Aurangzib; because the Rajputs with all their bravery were proverbially unfit for siege operations and hill-fighting, and at the same time his Deccani auxiliaries were untrustworthy. [*Dil.* ii. 146*b*.]

§ 10. *Decay of Indian civilisation under Aurangzib, its causes and signs.*

The retrogression of mediæval Indian civilisation under Aurangzib is noitceable not only in the fine arts,—the decay of which was only the outward manifestation of it,—but still more in the low intellectual type of the new generation. As the 17th century wore on, the older nobility nourished on the manly traditions of Akbar and Shah Jahan, gifted with greater independence of spirit, and trained with greater resources and responsibility,—gradually died out, and their places in camp and Court were taken by smaller men, supplied with poorer resources by the suspicious Aurangzib, afraid to exercise responsibility and initiative, but seeking to advance themselves by sycophancy. [*Dil.* ii. 150*b*.] The exceptionally prolonged life of Aurangzib with its ever increasing store of experience and information made him intellectually dwarf the younger generation. His self-sufficiency and obstinacy increased with age; till at last none dared to contradict him, none could give him honest advice or impart unpleasant truth. With the lack of leisure amidst the incessant warfare and rough camp-life in the far-off South, the culture of the aristocracy decayed, and, as the nobles set the tone to society, the whole of the intellectual classes of India

slowly fell back to a lower level. A Jafar Zatalli took the place of Faizi for their delectation.

§ 11. *Gloomy outlook for India in the 18th century.*

The growing pessimism of the older men, which we find reflected in the letters and anecdotes of the time and even in the works of thoughtful historians, bears witness to the moral decay of the governing classes. It was too deep and too sincere to be passed over as an example of the familiar oriental habit of imagining a golden age in the past and looking down upon the present generation as the degenerate successors of their glorious ancestors. It finds utterance as early as the latter years of Shah Jahan, as we learn from the sayings of that monarch quoted in Aurangzib's letters. [*Ruqaāt*, Nos. 41, 55; Irvine MS. 350, No. 218.]

The historians Bhimsen and Khāfi Khan were struck by the hopeless change for the worse that had seized the Indian world and looked wistfully back at the virtues and glories of the men of the times of Akbar and Shah Jahan. [*Dil.* ii. 139*a*, 146*a*, esp. 157*a*; K.K. ii. 550.] We find the aged Aurangzib himself dolefully shaking his head over the prospect of the future and predicting a deluge after his death. [*Anecdotes* § 11.] It is true, as Sadullah remarked in reply to a pessimist, that "No age is without men of ability. What is needed is a wise master to find them out, cherish them, get his work done by them, and never lend his ears to the whispers of selfish men against such officers." [*Ruq.* No. 46.] But this wise principle was not followed in Aurangzib's latter years, and it was altogether discarded by his successors. Career was not freely opened to talent. The public service was not looked upon as a sacred trust, but as a means of gratifying the apostate, the sycophant, the well-groomed dandy, the great man's kinsmen, and the sons

of old official families. Bigotry and narrowness of outlook under Aurangzib and vice and sloth under the later Mughals, ruined the administration of the empire and dragged down the Indian people along with the falling empire.

§ 12. *Moral degeneration of the Mughal aristocracy.*

The moral decay was most noticeable among the nobility and it produced the greatest mischief. The character of the older nobility in the late 17th century was deplorable. In a mean spirit of jealousy they insulted and thwarted "new men" drawn from the ranks* and ennobled for the most brilliant public services, and yet they themselves had grown utterly worthless. Aurangzib himself remarked in 1701, "My nobles had opposed me in giving suitable rewards to Shaikh Nizām for the capture of Shambhu. So, too, they are now belittling the achievements of Md. Murād." [K.K. ii. 489.]

We have a significant example of the moral degeneration of the Mughal peerage. The prime-minister's grandson, Mirzā Tafākhkhur used to sally forth from his mansion in Delhi with his ruffians, plunder the shops in the bazar, kidnap Hindu women passing through the public streets in litters or going to the river, and dishonour them; and yet there was no judge to punish him, no police to prevent such crimes. "Everytime such an occurrence was brought to the Emperor's notice by the news-letters or official reports, he referred it to the prime-minister, and did nothing more." At last after a Hindu artilleryman's wife had been forcibly abducted and his comrades threatened to mutiny, Aurangzib merely ordered the licentious youth to be prevented from

* Similarly the old effete French nobility of birth objected to the victor of Fontenoy being raised to the peerage by his grateful master.

coming out of his mansion. [Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkam* § 48; another in *M. U.* i. 320.]

All the surplus produce of a fertile land under a most bounteous Providence was swept into the the coffers of the Mughal nobility and pampered them in a degree of luxury not dreamt of even by kings in Persia or Central Asia; as the Court historian of Shah Jahan scornfully remarks, the revenue of the king of Balkh was less than the income of a third-grade peer of the Mughal empire. [Abd. Hamid, ii. 542.]

§ 13. *Evil education of the children of nobles.*

Hence, in the houses of the Delhi nobility luxury was carried to an excess. The harems of many of them were filled with immense numbers* of women, of an infinite variety of races intellect and character. Under Muslim law the sons of concubines are entitled to their patrimony equally with sons born in wedlock, and they occupy no inferior position in society. Even the sons of lawfully married wives became, at a precocious age, familiar with vice from what they saw and heard in the harem, while their mothers were insulted by the higher splendour and influence enjoyed in the same household by younger and fairer rivals of servile origin or easier virtue. The lofty spirit and majestic dignity of a Cornelia are impossible in the crowded harem of a polygamist; and without Cornelias among the mothers there cannot be Gracchi among the sons.

There was no good education, no practical training, of the sons of the nobility. They were too much petted by

* Hindu nobles and rich men were often as licentious, but they kept their mistresses in a separate establishment and not in their homes. Moreover, the children of such irregular unions among the Hindus formed a lower caste (*golak*), occupying a depressed rank in society.

eunuchs and maid-servants and passed through a sheltered life from birth to manhood, every thorn being removed from their path by attendants. Early familiarised with vice, softened in their fibres by pleasure, they were yet taught to have an inordinately high opinion of their own wealth and importance in the scale of creation. Their domestic tutors were an unhappy class, powerless to do any good except by leave of their pupils, brow-beaten by the eunuchs (with the support of the ladies of the harem), disobeyed by the lads themselves, and forced to cultivate the arts of the courtier or the sneak, unless they were prepared to throw up their thankless office. The free give and take life in a public school (which hardens character and at the same time removes its angularities), the salutary discipline of training as subalterns in an orderly army, were unknown to the sons of the Mughal aristocracy. Hence their moral decline was astonishingly rapid and unchecked. Most of them, and even sons of Aurangzib like Shah Alam and Kām Bakhsh, were beyond correction. As Aurangzib, worn out with giving them unheeded counsels, cries out in despair, "I have become garrulous by talking and talking; but none of you have taken heed from my words." [*Ruqaat* No. 2.]

§ 14. *Vices of Society.*

In addition to unbridled sexual license and secret drinking, many members of the nobility and the middle class were tainted by pederasty. This vice was most prevalent among the Mongoloids of Central Asia, and there is reason to believe that even some of the so-called saints were not free from it. All Aurangzib's prohibitions and all the activity of his Censors of Public Morals failed to hold the Mughal aristocracy back from drink. Manucci notices it [*Storia*, ii. 6, 157, 393; iv. 131.] The news-letters of Aurangzib's

Court contain many reports of wine-selling and wine-drinking in the camp-bazars and houses of his nobles, and among the garrisons of forts. On 22 Sep. 1698 the English governor of Madras presented one hundred bottles of Canary to Nasrat Jang. [*Madras Diary*.] A similar present was made to his successor Dāud Khan in Nov. 1706. The drunken frolics of this Dāud Khan are described in Wilkes's *Mysoor*, [2nd ed., i. 133 and 149n.] The freak pleasures and queer fancies of some of the nobles are noticed in the contemporary accounts. [*E.g.*, *Storia*, iv. 254-6, 262.]

§ 15. *Popular superstitions.*

All classes alike were sunk in the densest superstition. Astrology governed every act of life, among rich and poor alike. Every king and nobleman maintained and always carried with himself a staff of star-gazers to point out the auspicious and evil days for his marches, entrance into cities or houses, receiving or making visits, besides domestic ceremonies. The planets hung like a lowering cloud over all men's lives. Relic worship was universal among Hindus and Muhammadans alike. Even the orthodox Aurangzib adored and walked devoutly round the pretended footprints and hair of the Prophet Muhammad (*āsār-i-sharīf*), as if these were representations of the Deity. It is difficult to distinguish between his attitude towards them and a Hindu's worship of Vishnu's footmarks on stone. The universal and tumultuous exultation of the Muslim population of Srinagar when these bogus relics went to Kashmir, has been described in Ch. 61 § 31. Trade in false relics was very brisk and highly profitable.

Man-worship of the grossest form degraded the character of the masses. Besides the adoration of *gurus* and *mohants* by Hindus and Sikhs, the Muslims, equally with

the members of those two creeds, venerated saints and religious mendicants, and besought them to work miracles, and give them amulets spells or marvellous medicines.* Pretended magicians did a roaring trade in these things, as well as in the philosopher's stone,—being patronised by the nobles as well as the common people. Alchemy was believed to be a science and men of the highest status and education supported and encouraged the professors of this art, even undertaking to introduce them to the Emperor.

The darker aspect of the subject was not wanting, and we read of human sacrifice being performed to aid the quest for gold and the *elixir vitæ*, though it was criminal in law and punished whenever detected. [K.K. ii. 542.] A lurid light is thrown on the medical art and beliefs of the age by Manucci's evidence that some Muhammadan doctors used human fat to cure their patients. [*Storia*, ii. 210.] Hindu superstition is further illustrated by the worship of long-armed men as incarnations of the monkey-god Hanumān. There was a Portuguese of St. Thome whose hands reached below his knees, and whenever any Hindus met him they prostrated themselves, worshipping him like a god. When another long-armed Portuguese visited Jagannāth-Puri in Orissā, "the Hindu priests and the people of the town conducted him to the temple with great veneration and made over to him the idols and all the wealth of the temple. He led a joyous life, regaling himself with delicate dishes and requisitioning young girls whenever he pleased, they imagining he did them a great honour." He afterwards departed secretly, with the wealth of the temple. [*Storia*, iii. 140.]

* *E.g.*, the religious delusion of Sahibji's son-in-law, as described in *Siyar-ul-mutakharin*.

As a natural consequence of their ignorance and pride, all classes felt contempt for foreigners. European gun-founders, artilleryists and doctors (a few) were no doubt patronised by the wealthy, because their superior efficiency had been demonstrated before the public; and European objects of luxury were eagerly bought. But no attempt was made by any Indian noble or scholar to learn European languages,* arts or military system. A modern Indian nationalist will best realise how blindly selfish and autocratic the Mughal Emperors and the Indian aristocracy of the 16th and 17th centuries were, if he considers that while they spent lakhs every year in buying European objects of luxury or art, not a single printing press, not even a lithographic stone was imported, either for popular education or public business.

The moral and intellectual tone of Indian society was greatly lowered by the abundance of slaves. In addition to captives of war and vanquished families reduced to bondage, men and women were sold by their parents for money in famine times, or in discharge of debts. A defaulting debtor could himself be sold with his family at the demand of his creditor. This was an ancient legal practice of the Hindus and Muhammadans alike. [Cf. the Sanskrit story of Harishchandra.] One way of punishing criminals of certain

* At the Mughal Court interpretation was done for European visitors by Armenians or by Europeans who knew Persian. Only one Muhammadan (Mutamad Khan, c. 1703) is spoken of in Aurangzib's letters as knowing the English language. A few Shenvi Brahmans of Goa territory, who knew Portuguese, translated Marathi documents into the former language for the benefit of the English at Bombay. In Madras, the English and French factories employed Brahman interpreters who knew these languages besides "Moor" (i.e., Persian.)

classes was to turn them into slaves and sell them to the public; the sale of female-slaves of this class is noticed in the "Peshwas' Diaries." Slavery lingered down to the first quarter of the 19th century even in the British district of Purnia. [Martin's *Eastern India*.] People often made eunuchs of their children and sold them; Orissā and Sylhet were notorious for this offence, which was strongly condemned by Aurangzib. [Ch. 38 § 4; esp. ref. in footnote.]

§ 16. *Official bribery, its forms and causes.*

The educated middle class was composed entirely of officials, if we except the handful of physicians and superior priestly families. Among the traders and lesser land-owners there were many who ranked with the middle class in wealth, but not in education, nor did they ever cultivate literature. The Mughal administration, both civil and military, could be carried on only with the help of a vast army of clerks and accountants. Every department, every Government store or factory, every subah and even faujdari, every field-army, had a complete set of them. Their official pay was very low (like that of the East India Company's factory 'writers' in the early 17th century.)*

But the exaction of official perquisites or gratuities from men who had to get business pushed through the public offices, was the universal and admitted practice, as in Tudor and Stuart England. In addition, many officials from the highest to the lowest took bribes for doing undeserved favours, or deflecting the course of justice. Official corruption was, however, admitted in society to be immoral, and was practised only in secrecy. There were many officers above corruption even in Aurangzib's reign [K.K. ii. 261, 374-82.] But the receiving and even demanding of presents

* For examples, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Supplement, 172 *et seq.*

by men in power was the universal rule and publicly acknowledged.* Even the Emperor was not exempt from it. Aurangzib asked an aspirant to a title, "Your father gave to Shah Jahan one lakh of Rupees for adding *alif* to his name and making him *Amir* Khan. How much will you pay me for the title I am giving you?" [*M.A.* 489.] Manohar-das (qiladar of Sholapur) gave him Rs. 50,000 in return for the title of Rajah. Officers weary of the life in the Deccan, used to present him with large sums to induce him to transfer them to Northern India, especially Delhi.

The ministers and influential courtiers round the Emperor's person had the opportunity of reaping a golden harvest, by selling to suitors their good offices in speaking for them to the sovereign when in private attendance on him (*taqarrub*). Thus, Qābil in 2½ years of personal attendance on Aurangzib amassed 12 lakhs of Rupees in cash, besides articles of value and a new house [*M.A.* 191.]†

* Nur Jahan's father, when prime-minister under Jahangir was shameless in demanding presents. So also was Jafar Khan, one of the early wazirs of Aurangzib. Jai Singh offered a purse of Rs. 30,000 to the wazir for inducing the Emperor to retain him in the Deccan command. [*Haft Anjuman*, Ben. MS. 195b.] Bhimsen's disgust at having to pay everybody at Court in order to get or retain a common civil office [*Dil.* i. 194.] On official bribery, see my *Mughal Administration*, Ch. v. § 4 and 5.

† Abdun Nabi, faujdar of Mathura, left a fortune of 13 lakhs of Rupees, 93,000 *mohars* (worth Rs. 14 each), and articles jewels, etc. worth 4½ lakhs more; Azam Khan Kokah (Fidai Kh.), governor of Bengal, 22 lakhs in Rupees and 1,12,000 *mohars*; Hafiz Md. Amin Kh., subahdar of Gujrat, 70 lakhs of Rs., 1,35,000 *mohars*, 76 elephants, 432 horses, 117 camels, and 10 chests of China-ware; Abdul Wahhab, Chief Qazi for 16 years, 33 lakhs of Rs. besides jewellery. [*M. A.* 83, 169, 226; *M. U.* i. 235-41.]

They were besought and bribed with presents and money to yield their protection to officers, to conceal the shortcomings (*ghaib-pushi*) of the latter, to intercede for them with the Emperor (*wasila*), and in general to watch over their interests at Court during their absence.

This pressure was passed from the Emperor downwards to the peasant; each social grade trying to squeeze out of the class below itself what it had to pay to the rank above it, the cultivator of the soil and the trader being the victim in the last resort.

§17. *Lower official world, its life and character.*

The drink habit was widely prevalent among the clerks, both of the Kayastha* and Khatri castes,— as well as among the Rajput soldiers. In spite of the prohibition of the *Qurān*, the Muslim nobles and officers, both military and civil, were in many cases addicted to it. The Turks were specially notorious for their violation of this precept of their religion.

The lower official class, on account of their having to do their work far away from their homes, kept small harems of local concubines. This was the case with the Hindus no less than with the Muslims. The evil lingered on in British India till the middle of the 19th century. It was only the annihilation of distance by railways and the moral reform effected by English education and theistic religious movements in the sixties of the last century, that put an end to this general immorality.

The clerks, both Hindus and Muhammadans, formed a brotherhood bound together by community of duties and interests, education and ideals, social life and even vices.

* Several of Bhimsen's relatives, civil officers in the imperial army, died of drink.

We find in the memoirs of one of them, Bhimsen of Burhānpur, a pleasing picture of the clerkly world, with its mutual dancing parties, dinners, aid in trouble, consolation in sorrow, and union at sittings of Sufi devotional exuberance. The official world was marked by its hatred and contempt for intruders into its preserves. Offices were expected to be reserved for old families of clerks and accountants. Any official who was not a 'hereditary servant' (*khānahzād*) of State but had sprung from the ranks, was despised as a *novum homo* was in the official world of the dying republic of Rome. The speedy ruin of the State from the employment of such interlopers and upstarts was predicted. [*Dil.* ii. 140*b*.] This attitude was universal, from the higher nobility to the petty clerks.

§ 18. *The purity and delights of the life of the masses.*

The above picture of social life in Mughal India appears very dark, and must be declared incomplete and therefore untrue if we do not consider certain other aspects of it. When we turn our gaze from the crowded harems of the rich and the lax morals of the Mongoloid and some other frontier tribes,—we are bound to admit that among the teeming millions of the Indian people domestic life was pure and not without its simple colour and joy. This virtue alone saved the people from the doom of extinction which overtook the degenerate Romans of the later empire. We had many popular songs, ballads and stories, which assuaged the stricken human soul, taught heroic patience, and infused tenderness into the most unlettered hearts. The epic of Tulsidas, which is even now acted annually in every centre of population and recited in every Hindu home in the Hindi-speaking provinces, filled millions of people with love of

duty, manliness, the spirit of self-sacrifice, and taught them wisdom in public and private life.

In Bengal, Tirhut, Orissā and Assam and certain other parts, the Vaishnavism taught by Shankardev and Chaitanya introduced an unwonted gentleness and fervour, and tamed the rude if manly savagery of the Tantric worship and animism that used to prevail there before. The 17th century was the great period of the expansion of this new Vaishnavism—which was marked by enthusiastic personal devotion (as in the Christian revival movement), tenderness to children and the weak, the cultivation of literature (both Sanskrit and the current speech of the people), and the infusion of song and dance and a delicate romantic sentiment into the everyday life even of the poorest. It also bridged social gulfs and established a democracy of the spirit. Apart from this new popular religious literature, the masses* in different parts had their folk-songs, like the ballad of Ranjhā and Hir (in the Panjab), which went to their very hearts and relieved for a time the dead weight of labour and political tyranny which pressed them down. The *kirtan* or chanting of religious narratives in verse with ecstatic chorus singing, was the popular substitute for the sermon, the lecture, and literature throughout India—in the south as much as in the north,—e.g., Shivaji doted on the *kirtan* and once risked his life and liberty in his passion to attend one. The common people were equally fond of these. [For a graphic description of such popular recitation among the Maratha villagers, see Acworth's *Ballads*, xxvii.]

* I have spoken of popular romance and religious poetry in the vernacular. But a vernacular literature for the *upper* classes was just missed by Aurangzib. It came into being under Wali of Aurangabad only ten years after his death.

The Muhammadans of that age (except the Hindi-speaking portion) had no vernacular religious poetry for the masses. But they had the annual celebrations of different saints (*urs*) at their tombs, which were attended by tens of thousands of pilgrims from distances, and where fairs were held which attracted men and women of all creeds. In addition, both sexes dwelling in cities, had their usual weekly outing to the garden-tombs of saints in the suburbs. The opportunity was utilised for pleasure rather than piety, and the spread of immorality that it caused led Aurangzib to issue an order for stopping the practice. But it was too popular to be put down. [*Storia*, iv. 205; *ante* Ch. 28 § 3.]

Visits to these periodical fairs and seats of pilgrimage were the sole joy of the Indian village population, and men and women were passionately eager to undertake them. Pilgrim-centres like Ajmir, Gulbargā, Nizām-ud-din Auliya, and Burhānpur for the Muslims, and Mathurā, Allahabad, Benares, Nāsik, Madurā and Tanjore for the Hindus, served also to diffuse culture and to break down provincial isolation and narrowness of mental horizon.

CHAPTER LXIII.

AURANGZIB AND INDIAN NATIONALITY

§ 1. *Character of Aurangzib: courage and coolness.*

In the mediæval world, and nowhere more so than in India, the king was held responsible for the happiness of his people,* and with good reason. He was regarded as a superman, as an incarnation of the Deity or at least God's representative on earth; he was invested with unlimited, unquestioned authority and the entire property in the land; he was, except in Catholic Europe, the head of Church and State alike.

Therefore, when towards the close of Aurangzib's reign all things began to go wrong, the contemporary historians,—Bhimsen and Khāfi Khan,—turned to examine their Emperor's character. And yet, to all outer seeming, he had no moral defect which might account for the destruction of the empire and of public peace.

Aurangzib was brave in an unusual degree. All the Timurids, till the days of his unworthy greatgrandsons, had personal courage; but in him this virtue was combined with a coldness of temperament and a calculating spirit which we have been taught to believe as the special heritage of the races of Northern Europe. Of his personal fearlessness he had given ample evidence from the age of fifteen, when he faced a furious elephant unattended, to his 87th year, when he stood in the siege trenches before Wāgingerā. And further testimony was borne to it by the fact that two of

* Cf. Upon the king! Let our lives, our souls,
Our debts, our careful wives,
Our children and our sins lay on the king!

(Shakespeare's *Henry V.*)

his sons fell on the battle-field, which were the first examples of such death among the descendants of Bābur. [*Dil.* ii. 166*b*. Character sketch 159*a*-160*b*; K. K. ii. 550; *A. N.* 1070—1096; *M.A.* 525—533.] His calm self-possession, his cheering words amidst the thickest danger, and his open defiance of death at Dharmat and Khajwā have passed into the famous things of Indian history.

§ 2. *Aurangzib's learning and self-preparation.*

In addition to possessing constitutional courage and coolness, he had early in life chosen the perils and labour of kingship as his vocation and prepared himself for this sovereign office by self-reverence, self-knowledge, and self-control. Unlike other sons of monarchs, Aurangzib was a widely read and accurate scholar, and he kept up his love of books to his dying day. Even if we pass over the many copies of the *Qurān* which he wrote with his own hand, as the mechanical industry of a zealot, we cannot forget that he loved to devote the scanty leisure of a very busy ruler to reading Arabic works on jurisprudence and theology, and hunted for MSS. of rare old books like the *Nehāyya*, the *Ahiya-ul-ulum*, and the *Divān-i-Sāib* with the passion of an idle bibliophile. His extensive correspondence proves his mastery of Persian poetry and Arabic sacred literature, as he is ever ready with apt quotations for embellishing almost every one of his letters. In addition to Arabic and Persian, he could speak Turki and Hindi freely. To his initiative and patronage we owe the greatest digest of Muslim law made in India, which rightly bears his name,—the *Fatawa-i-Alamgiri** and which simplified and defined Islamic justice in India ever after.

* Printed in Calcutta in six volumes. For its composition, *A. N.* 1086-'87, *M. A.* 530.

Besides book-learning, Aurangzib had from his boyhood cultivated control of speech and action, and tact in dealing with others; and even the dizzy eminence of the Peacock Throne and lordship over "nine hundred thousand horsemen" did not intoxicate him into losing the curb over his tongue, temper and heart for a single day during an exceptionally long life. As a prince, his tact sagacity and humility made the highest nobles of his father's Court his friends; and as Emperor he displayed the same qualities in a degree which would have been remarkable even in a subject. No wonder his contemporaries called him "the *darvish* in the purple." [*M.A.* 334.]

§ 3. *Aurangzib's industry, moral purity, and simplicity of life.*

His private life,—dress, food and recreations,—were all extremely simple, but well-ordered. He was absolutely free from vice and even from the more innocent pleasures of the idle rich. The number of his wives fell short even of the Quranic allowance of four,* and he was scrupulously faithful to wedded love. The only delicacies he relished,—the reader will smile to hear,—were the acid fruit *corinda* (*Carissa carandas*) and a sort of chewing gum called *khardali*.

His industry in administration was marvellous. In addition to regularly holding daily Courts (sometimes twice a day) and Wednesday trials, he wrote orders on

* Dilras Banu died in 1657; Nawab Bai was relegated to a retired life at Delhi after 1660; Aurangabadi seems to have stayed with him till her death in 1686, so that Udaipuri (married about 1660) was his only companion (after Aurangabadi) for the last half of his life.

letters and petitions with his own hand and dictated the very language of official replies. Four volumes of these, relating only to his last four years, are still extant and testify to his prodigious working capacity. The Italian physician Gemeli Careri thus describes the Emperor giving public audience (21 March 1695): "He was of a low stature, with a large nose, slender and stooping with age. The whiteness of his round beard was more visible on his olive-coloured skin. . . I admired to see him endorse the petitions [of those who had business] with his own hand, without spectacles, and by his cheerful smiling countenance seem to be pleased with the employment." [Churchill's *Voyages*, iv. 222.]

Historians have observed that though he died in his 90th year, he retained to the last almost all his faculties unimpaired. His memory was wonderful: "he never forgot a face he had once seen or a word that he had once heard." All his physical powers retained their vigour to the end, if we except a slight deafness of the ear, which afflicted him in old age, and a lameness of the right leg, which was due to his doctor's unskilful treatment of an accidental dislocation.

§ 4. *His besetting sin of over-centralisation: its disastrous effects on the administration.*

But all this long self-preparation and splendid vitality, in one sense proved his undoing, as they naturally begot in him a self-confidence and distrust of others, a passion for seeing everything carried to the highest perfection according to his own idea of it,—which urged him to order and supervise every minute detail of administration and warfare personally. This excessive interference of the head of the State kept his viceroys and commanders and even "the men on the

spot" in far-off districts in perpetual tutelage; their sense of responsibility was destroyed, initiative and rapid adaptability to a changing environment could not be developed in them, and they tended to sink into lifeless puppets moved to action by the master pulling their strings from the capital. No surer means than this could have been devised for causing administrative degeneration in an extensive and diversified empire like India. High-spirited, talented and energetic officers found themselves checked, discouraged and driven to sullen inactivity. With the death of the older nobility, outspoken responsible advisers disappeared from his council, and Aurangzib in his latter years, like Napoleon I, after the climax of Tilsit, could bear no contradiction, could hear no unpalatable truth, but surrounded himself with smooth-tongued sycophants and pompous echoes of his own voice. His ministers became no better than clerks passively registering his edicts.

Such a king cannot be called a political or even administrative genius. He had merely honesty and plodding industry. He was fit to be an excellent departmental head, not a statesman initiating a new policy and legislating with prophetic foresight for moulding the life and thought of unborn generations in advance. That genius, though unlettered and often hot-blooded, was Akbar alone among the Mughals of India.

Obsessed by his narrow ideal of duty and supremely ignorant of the real limitations of his character,—and not out of political cunning, as Manucci suggests,—Aurangzib cultivated saintly austerities and self-abasement and went regularly and even ostentatiously through all the observances of his religion. He thus became an ideal character to the Muslim portion of his subjects. They believed him to be a miracle-working saint (*Alamgir, zinda pir!*) and he him-

self favoured this idea by his acts.*

Politically, therefore, Aurangzib with all his virtues was a complete failure. But the cause of the failure of his reign lay deeper than his personal character. Though it is not true that he alone caused the fall of the Mughal empire, yet he did nothing to avert it, but rather quickened the destructive forces already in operation in the land. And these I shall examine now.

§ 5. *True character and aim of the Mughal Government.*

The Mughal empire did much for India in many ways. [See *Mughal Administration*, Ch. 15.] But it failed to weld the people into a nation, or to create a strong and enduring State.

The glitter of gems and gold in the Taj Mahal or the Peacock Throne, ought not to blind us to the fact that in Mughal India man was considered vile;—the mass of the people had no economic liberty, no indefeasible right to justice or personal freedom, when their oppressor was a noble or high official or land-owner; political rights were not dreamt of. While the nation at large was no better than human sheep, the status of the nobles was hardly any higher under a strong and cunning king; they had no assured constitutional position, because a constitution did not exist in the scheme of government, nor even had they full right to their material acquisitions. All depended upon the will of the autocrat on the throne. The Government was in effect despotism tempered by revolution or the fear of revolution. [*Mughal Adm.* Ch. 9.]

* *Storia*, ii. 19, iii. 259; he writes spells on a paper and throws it into flooded rivers to still them! (*Dil.* ii. 159a, also *Akh.*)

The most exact parallel to the Mughal Government is supplied by the mediæval Italian kingdoms, as described by the great German historian Ranke: "We here see the whole character of the Italian principality, as it existed in the 15th century: based on judiciously-calculated political relations, it was absolute and unlimited in the power of its internal administration, surrounded by splendour, closely connected with literature, and jealous even of the very appearance of power. . . The whole power and all the resources of a country produce a Court,—the centre of the Court is the prince; finally, then, the ultimate product of all this gathered life is the self-sufficiency of the sovereign." [*Hist. of Popes*, Bohn's ed., ii. 66.]

In Mughal India, as in all other absolute monarchies, popular happiness even under the best of sovereigns was unstable, because it depended upon the character of one man. "The Mughal system of education and training entirely failed to maintain a line of promising heirs-apparent. . . As the princes grew up, the jealousy of rival queens forbade their taking a leading part in the politics of the capital. . . A prince who took his proper part in the council of the State was suspected of intriguing against the monarch. . . Hereditary succession is only tolerable under a system where the responsibility falls on a ministry, which screens the viciousness or incompetence of the occupant of the throne."

"Such a ministry the Mughals were never able to organise. The monarch was obliged to fall back on the mob of adventurers who crowded round his *darbar*. . . whose function was more to amuse their master than to act as a modern Cabinet. . . It was never the Mughal policy to foster the growth of a hereditary aristocracy. [Crooke's *North-Western Provinces*, 102-104.]

By its theory, Islamic Government is military rule—the people are the faithful soldiers of Islam, the Emperor (*Khalifa*) is their commander in war and in peace, (which is only another name for the unending preparation for war with infidels.) In an army it is not for the officers, any more than for the privates, to reason why or to seek reply from the supreme leader. The Khalifa-Emperor is the silhouette of God (*zill-i-subhāni*), and in God's Court there is no "why or how." No more could there be in the Padi-shah's administration, which was a sample of God's Court (*namuna-i-darbār-i-ilāhi*). By the basic principle of Islamic Government, the Hindus and other unbelievers were admittedly outside the pale of the nation. But even the dominant sect, the Muslims, did not form a nation; they constituted a military brotherhood, a perpetual camp of soldiers.

§ 6. *Difference in life and ideal makes fusion of Hindus and Muhammadans impossible.*

According to the root principles of Muslim polity, there can be no political rights for minorities, the nation must be merged in the dominant sect, and a community homogeneous in creed and social life must be created by crushing out all divergent forms of faith opinion and life. The nation as a purely political creation was inconceivable and impossible in such a state of things. The evil was aggravated by the fact that in India the politically depressed class or "official minority" was a numerical majority, outnumbering the dominant sect as three to one, and at the same time economically better qualified, stronger in capital and wealth-producing power, and not inferior in intellect or physical vigour.

No fusion between the two classes was possible even with the passage of centuries, as they differed like poles in ideal and life. The Hindu is solitary, passive, other-worldly; his highest aim is self-realisation, the attainment of personal salvation by individual effort private devotions and lonely austerities. To him birth is a misfortune and his fellow-beings so many sources of distraction from his one goal. Not by enjoyment of God's gifts but by renunciation, not by joyous expansion but by repression of emotion, is he to attain to bliss.

The Muslim, on the other hand, is taught to feel that he is nothing if not a soldier of the militant force of Islām; he must pray in congregation; he must give proof of the sincerity of his faith by undertaking *jihād* or active exertion for the spread of his religion and the destruction of unbelief among other men. He is a missionary, and cannot be indifferent to the welfare of his neighbours' souls; nay, he must be ever alive to his duty of promoting the salvation of others by all means at his command, physical as much as spiritual. Then, again, Islām boldly avows that it is good for us to be here, that God has given the world to the faithful as an inheritance for their enjoyment.

The ancient Socratic ideal that "he who has the fewest wants is most like the gods", is peculiarly the Hindu's. No doubt, Islam too has its ascetics; no doubt Muslim theology recognises abstinence (*parhez*) as good for the soul even of the householder. But in practice the immense body of Islamites loved to enjoy and considered it as nowise wrong to enjoy the good things of the world.*

* Persian poetry is not lacking in melancholy musings on the mutability of things (like what we find in Chaucer and Spenser). We are told that the world is a caravan sarai, a goblet of gold now

The practical outlook and social solidarity of the Muslims have made them develop the arts and civilisation (excepting literature) in a much higher degree than the Hindus; their pleasures are of a more varied and elegant kind, and the Hindu aristocracy in Mughal times were only clumsy imitators of the Muslim peers. The general type of the Muhammadan population (excepting beggars and menial labourers) are accustomed to a costlier mode of life and more refined, while Hindus of the corresponding classes, even when rich, are grosser and less cultured.† The lower classes of the Hindus, however, are distinctly cleaner and more intellectual than Muslims of the same grades of life.

§ 7. *Hindus politically depressed and degraded under Aurangzib.*

Apart from the restrictions about food, difference of religious doctrine and ritual, rules forbidding inter-marriage, filled with sweet drink and now with a bitter draught,—the steed of death ever stands ready saddled, &c.

But it was a literary fashion handed down from the middle ages, and did not influence life in India in the 17th century.

† Col. T. D. Pearse wrote to Warren Hastings in 1781 from Ellore: "The Hindus [of N. India] are nine out of ten in the numbers composing this army;but 29 Hindus have deserted for one Musalman. The cause is but too evident: an Hindu can live on Rs. 2 a month, and save 5 after paying for necessaries,—whereas the Musalman will live well whilst he can; is seldom worth a Rupee, and therefore has a tie upon the service that the other has not: for the Hindu with Rs. 100, returning to his home, can stock a farm, and live happily for the rest of his days." [*Br. Ind. Mil. Repository*, vol. ii. (1823) p. 19.] H. C. Irwin, *Garden of India*, 58-60 (best.)

Mrs. A. Deane wrote in 1805, "It is computed that one rupee and a half will furnish a Hindu with food and raiment for a month; whereas three rupees are barely sufficient for the maintenance of a Musalman of the same rank and station, for the same space of time." (*Tour through the Upper Provinces of Hindostan*, p. 41.)

etc., this polar difference in their outlook upon life made a fusion between Hindus and Muslims impossible. In addition to these, the Quranic polity made life intolerable for the Hindus under orthodox Muhammadan rule. Aurangzib furnishes the best example of the effects of that polity when carried to its logical conclusions by a king of exemplary morality and religious zeal, without fear or favour in discharging what he held to be his duty as the first servant of God. Schools of Hindu learning were broken up by him, Hindu places of worship were demolished, Hindu fairs were forbidden, the Hindu population was subjected to special fiscal burdens in addition to being made to bear a public badge of inferiority; and the service of the State was closed to them, as we have seen in Ch. 34.

Thus, the only life that the Hindus could lead under Aurangzib was a life deprived of the light of knowledge, deprived of the consolations of religion, deprived of social union and public rejoicing, of wealth and the self-confidence that is begotten by the free exercise of natural activities and use of opportunities,—in short, a life exposed to constant public humiliation and political disabilities.

Heaven and earth alike were closed to him as long as he remained a Hindu. Hence, the effect of Aurangzib's reign was not only to goad the Hindus into constant revolt and disturbances, but also to make them deteriorate in intellect, organisation, and economic resources, and thereby weaken the State of which they formed more than two-thirds.

§ 8. *Decline of the Muslims in India; its causes.*

The Muslim portion of the population, too, did not prosper under such a polity, though for a different reason in their case. The Turks are soldiers and nothing else; their manhood is a naturally embodied army, and war is their only profession. A standing army is necessarily prevented from

cultivating continuous domestic life. The ruling race among the so-called Mughals were really Turks. Hence, Muslim society in the Mughal period, in many of its civilian ranks also, frequently displayed garrison manners, as the organisation of their Government was of a military type and the soldiers set the tone to society.

The intellectual decline of the Muslims was hastened by the peculiar position of the faithful in India: They had made India their permanent home; many of them were Indians by race; and all had become so in their personal appearance, thoughts, manners and customs. And yet their religious teachers urged them to look back to ancient Arabia and draw their mental sustenance from the far-off age of the Prophet. The language of their religion must be Arabic, which not one in a hundred fully understood; their cultural language was Persian, which a few more learnt with difficulty and used with an impurity that excited the laughter and scorn of the Persian born. The greatest Indo-Persian poet was Amir Khusrau, but even he was ranked with third-class poets among the natives of Persia. Faizi, our second best, was held to be still inferior. Witness the scorn poured by Babur and Shaikh Ali Hazin alike on the Persian style of the Indian Muslims.

The Indian Muslim considered it beneath his dignity (till well into the 18th century) to use the vernacular for literary purposes. Hence, the immense majority of this sect were without any literature of their own; their education was hampered and their private life, (except in the case of the few who could use Persian freely), was deprived of intellectual joys. They could not have even a *living* growing religious literature. Hindustani amatory or devotional songs and Sufi verses in Persian were not adequate instruments

for the diffusion of culture or the removal of general ignorance among a whole community.

Thus, the orthodox Muslim ever felt that he was in India, but not of it. He durst not, for peril to his soul,—so he was taught,—strike his roots deep into his native soil. He must not take to his heart its traditions language and cultural products; he must import these from Persia and Arabia. Even his civil and criminal law must be derived from the writings of jurists and the decisions of judges in Baghdad or Cairo. [*Mughal Administration*, Ch. 6.] The Muslim in India was an intellectual exotic; he could not like Antæus replenish his strength by coming in contact with his mother earth. He must not adapt himself to his environment. The Quranic precepts for the guidance of civil society and the regulation of human conduct and relations, were framed in a far-off age for a nomadic people. It was absurd, as a rationalist like Akbar argued, that they should be considered binding on men of the 16th or 17th century living in a country that had nothing in common with Arabia.

The intellectual vacuity caused by this unnatural straining after a foreign and impracticable ideal, not only arrested the mental and social progress of the Indian Muslims, but also made their hearts a fertile soil for noxious weeds. The eternal human craving for a personal religion, for a living faith, could not be satisfied by repeating an Arabic book by rote (*hifz-i-kalām-ullah*), or by going through one monotonous physical drill five times a day in a public gathering (*jamait*). The thirsty soul turned to every fabled living saint in its neighbourhood and to the successors in attendance at the tombs of famous saints of the past,—both of whom were believed to be capable of working miracles.

The racial character of the Semitic peoples who created the Quran and Sunni Canon Law was essentially different

from that of the Indians, and the mere fact of a body of the latter race having accepted the religion of the Arabs could not obliterate this ethnic difference. These were insurmountable handicaps to Indian Islām.

§ 9. *Deterioration and inherent weakness of Hindu Society.*

The Hindus of mediæval India presented an equally unhappy spectacle. They could not possibly form a nation, or even one compact sect. A social solidarity like that of the Muhammadans was inconceivable among a people divided into countless mutually exclusive castes, with their rancorous disputes about rights to the sacred thread and the Vedic chant, access to public water-supplies, besides *touchability*, and in Southern India also *approachability*. And time and prosperity seemed only to aggravate these differences. "Caste grows by fission," and the multiplication of new sub-castes was in active progress through the operation of internal forces during Muhammadan rule, dividing and weakening Hindu society still further. A Hindu revival like the empire of the Peshwas, instead of uniting them only embittered caste bickerings by intensifying orthodoxy, leading to a stricter repression of the lower castes by the forces of the State, and provoking more wide-spread and organised caste feuds, like those between the different subdivisions of the Deccani Brahmans or between the only two literate and well-to-do castes of Maharashtra, *viz.*, the Brahmans and the Prabhus.

No enlightened or patriotic priesthood arose to save the Hindu peoples. The separatist tendency is as strong in their religion as in their society; and, indeed, an organised priesthood or State Church is opposed to the root principles of the Hindu scheme of salvation. Stray sheep

running after stray shepherds fall easy victims to the quack and the voluptuary. Even if we pass over the degrading forms of man-worship that marked the religious practices of the Vallabhacharya, Kartabhaja and other sects of *guru*-adorers, or the licentiousness promoted by temple dances (*devadasis* or *muralis*) and small prurient esoteric sects, and turn our eyes to the ordinary idol-worship of the millions, we find the priesthood bringing their worshippers down to the lowest intellectual level by holding up to their adoration a god who eats, sleeps, falls ill of fever (as Jagannath does for a week every year), or pursues amorous dalliances which a Nawab of Oudh might envy or a Qutb Shah imitate in his own harem. Reform was possible only outside the regular Hindu Church followed by the masses,—*i.e.*, among the small non-conforming sects, where men were prepared to leave all things and follow truth; but even there only during the first generation or two after their foundation, before they too sank into gross *guru*-worship.

§ 10. *How Hindus and Muslims lived together in India; occasional union, latent danger of fight.*

In spite of what has been said before, the Hindu and Muhammadan societies often touched each other at certain points. The true ideals of both creeds were the same, namely, the worship of one Supreme Being, abstinence from earthly joys, tenderness to all creatures. But bigots and the mass of ordinary people could not rise to such a high plane of thought. The holy men of each sect recognised the general truths underlying all sincere creeds; witness the delighted cry of Shaikh Nizām-ud-din Auliya on looking at a Hindu bathing festival, "Every sect has its own mode

of adoration and centre of faith!" Muslim saints, famous for striking acts of self-mortification or miracle-working power, were often adored by Hindu princes and people.

Similarly, the cult of Sufism brought members of the two sects together in friendly communion. Sufism, however, was not so much a living creed as an emotional-intellectual enjoyment,—a "fashion" of polished society like atheism in the France of Louis XV or Brahmoism in Bengal in the seventies and eighties of the 19th century. It affected the select few, being confined to the educated and official classes of the 17th century.

The masses could not appreciate such lofty ideas as mystic pantheism and the universal brotherhood of man. Fanatics had greater sway over their hearts than philosophers. The lower classes, after some fighting between Hindus and Muslims or Shias and Sunnis, (the forces of Government being always on the side of the orthodox creed).—at last came to a settlement in every locality, recognising the boundaries rights and limitations of each creed on a basis which acquired the sacredness of custom with the passage of time. Thus they lived amicably within their own narrow limits. But this religious truce held good only so long as the local society was static. With the least change in the relative strength of the two sects or in their temper, with the visit of an active orthodox preacher from outside or the accession of a bigot to the throne, the sleeping volcano of mob-passions would again wake to fury. Examples of it are furnished by the massacre of the Shias at Srinagar in 1685, the destruction and pollution of Hindu temples by Aurangzib, the plucking of the *jaiziya*-collector's beard by Rajputs in Malwa, and retaliation on mosques by

some Rathor and Maratha princes of high spirit.* Indian society was, therefore, in a state of unstable equilibrium in every centre of mixed population in Aurangzib's reign.

§ 11. *Indian peoples lack the spirit of progress;
hence their decline.*

Finally, the Indian people of the Mughal age, both Hindus and Muslims, were stationary, prone to venerate the wisdom of their ancestors and look down upon the latest age as the worst. Experiment and free thought are hence apt to be condemned as an impious questioning of sacred authority and an insolent setting up of our own puny intellect against that of the sages of yore. The progressive spirit died out of India at the death of Akbar. Then followed a stationary civilisation, and such a civilisation is bound to decay as it finds improvement impossible.

"The rigidity of Islam has enabled its followers in all lands to succeed up to a certain point. But there they have stopped, while progress is the law of life in the living world. While Europe has been steadily advancing, the stationary East has been relatively falling back, and every year that passes increases the distance between Europe and Asia in knowledge, organization, accumulated resources, and acquired capacity, and makes it increasingly difficult for the Asiatics to compete with the Europeans. The English conquest of the Mughal empire is only a part of the inevitable domination of all Africa and Asia by the European nations,—which is only another way of saying that the progressive races are supplanting the conservative ones, just as enterprising families are constantly replacing sleepy self-satisfied

* *E.g.*, complaint of Abdullah (a merchant of Alamgirpur) against Rajrup and Rustam Bhonslé, great-grandsons of Maloji's brother Vitoji, in the 40th year of Aurangzib. [Dhar papers.]

ones in the leadership of our own society." [My *Mughal Administration*, Ch. 15 § 11.]

§ 12. *The significance of Aurangzib's reign: how an Indian nationality can be formed.*

The detailed study of this long and strenuous reign of fifty years that we have pursued through five volumes, therefore, drives one truth home into our minds. If India is ever to be the home of a nation able to keep peace within and guard the frontiers, develop the economic resources of the country and promote art and science, then both Hinduism and Islam must die and be born again. Each of these creeds must pass through a rigorous vigil and penance, each must be purified and rejuvenated under the sway of reason and science. That such a rebirth of Islam is not impossible, has been demonstrated in our own days by the conqueror of Smyrna. Ghazi Mustafa Kamal Pasha has proved that the greatest Muslim State of the age can secularise its constitution, abolish polygamy and the servile seclusion of women, grant political equality to all creeds, and yet not cease to be a land of Islam.

But Aurangzib did not attempt such an ideal, even though his subjects formed a very composite population, even though the Indian world lay at his feet and he had no European rivals hungrily watching to destroy his kingdom. On the contrary, he deliberately undid the beginnings of such a national and rational policy which Akbar had set on foot.

History when rightly read is a justification of Providence, the revelation of a great purpose fulfilled in time. The failure of an ideal Muslim king like Aurangzib with all the advantages he possessed at his accession and his high moral character and training,—is, therefore, the clearest proof the

world can afford of the eternal truth that there cannot be a great or lasting empire without a great *people*, that no people can be great unless it learns to form a compact *nation* with equal rights and opportunities for all,—a nation the component parts of which are homogeneous, agreeing in all essential points of life and thought, but freely tolerating individual differences in minor points and private life, recognising individual liberty as the basis of communal liberty,—a nation whose administration is solely bent upon promoting national, as opposed to provincial or sectarian interests,—and a society which pursues knowledge without fear, without cessation, without bounds. It is only in that full light of goodness and truth that an Indian nationality can grow to the full height of its being.

CHAPTER LXIV.

THE EMPIRE OF AURANGZIB: ITS RESOURCES, TRADE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.

§ 1. *The Empire: its extent and revenue.*

At the death of Aurangzib (1707), his empire consisted of 21 *subahs* or separate provinces, of which 14 were situated in Hindustan or Northern India, six in the Deccan, and one (namely, Kabul) in what now forms Afghanistan. Their names are:

(i) *Subahs of Hindustan*—Agra, Ajmir, Allahabad, Bengal, Bihar, Delhi, Gujrat, Kashmir, Lahor, Malwa, Multan, Orissa, Oudh, and Tatta (or Sindh).

(ii) *Subahs of the Deccan*—Khandesh, Berar, Aurangabad (old Ahmadnagar), Bidar (old Telingana), Bijapur, and Haidarabad.

A century earlier, *i.e.*, at the end of Akbar's reign (1605), the Mughal empire had embraced all the fourteen subahs of Hindustan and only the first two of the above provinces of the Deccan,—the annexation of Ahmadnagar by Akbar being nominal. Qandahar of South Afghanistan was long entered in the official records as a subah of the Mughal empire, but it was in name only, as it frequently changed hands between the kings of Persia and Delhi and was finally lost by the Mughals in 1649; it was even at the best of times a barren possession and a very losing concern. Kabul or North Afghanistan, though held by the Mughal Emperors till its annexation by Nadir Shah (1739), had a revenue of only 20 lakhs of Rupees in Akbar's time and 40 lakhs in Aurangzib's reign, much of which was often unrealized. So, we shall leave these two provinces of Afghanistan out of our consideration in this chapter.

The Mughal empire under Aurangzib included in the north Kashmir and all Afghanistan south of the Hindukush; on the south-west a line 36 miles south of Ghazni separated it from the Persian kingdom. On the west coast it stretched in theory up to the northern frontier of Goa and inland to Belgaon (in the Bombay Karnatak or Kanara) and the Tungabhadra river. Thereafter the boundary passed west to east in a disputed and ever shifting line through the centre of Mysore, dipping south-eastwards to the Kolerun river (north of Tanjore). In the extreme north-east, the river Monas (west of Gauhati) divided the empire from the independent kingdom of Assam. But it should be always borne in mind that in the south-west, south and south-east, *i.e.*, throughout Maharashtra, Kanara, Mysore and the Eastern Karnatak, the Emperor's rule was disputed and most places had to obey a double set of masters or spoliators (*do-amli*),—as the English and French factory records painfully illustrate.

Excluding Afghanistan, the Mughal empire had a revenue of Rupees 13 *krores* and 21 lakhs under Akbar, and 33 *krores* and 25 *lakhs* under Aurangzib. This was the standard or maximum State demand from land, but this amount was never fully realized and the actual collection often fell very short of it. This figure stood for the land revenue alone and did not include the proceeds of taxes like the *zakat* (one-fortieth of the annual income of Muslims, to be spent solely in religious charity) and *jaziya*. A rough idea of the proportion of the different sources of State-income can be formed from the figures for Gujrat in Aurangzib's reign:—land revenue Rs. 113 lakhs, *jaziya* 5 lakhs, custom-duties of Surat port alone 12 lakhs per annum. (The other ports did negligible trade, except Masulipatam and Hughli towards the end of the reign). The amounts

of land held as military fief (*jagir*) and Crownland (*khalsa sharifa*) can be judged from the following figures (*circa* 1690) : land revenue assessed on *jagirs* 27·64 krores and on *khalsa* 5·81 krores of Rupees (for the whole empire).

§ 2. *The Official peerage.*

The government both civil and military was conducted by means of officials entered in the army-list and graded in successive ranks (*mansab*) from commanders of (nominal) twenty thousand horse down to commanders of twenty [in Akbar's reign ten] men only. Of these, all who held any grade from 3 *hazari* upwards were called grantees (*umara-i-azam* or *umdat-ul-mulk*), those between 500 and 2500 as *umara* and commanders below 500 were styled simply *mansabdars*.

	c. 1596	c. 1620	1647	c. 1690	
<i>Number of</i>					
Grantees (<i>i.e.</i> , 3- <i>hazari</i> and upwards including the princes)	..	63	112	99	—
Total, including both <i>umara</i> and <i>mansabdars</i>	..	1,803	2,945	8,000	14,449

From the above we can see the enormous inflation of the army-list under Aurangzib and the heavy financial burden that it produced.

Out of the 14,449 *mansabdars* under Aurangzib, about 7,000 were *jagirdars* and 7,450 were *naqdi* (or paid in cash), *i.e.*, nearly half and half. The annual salary and allowances of the *mansabdars*, including the pay of their troops (who, under Shah Jahan's rule, had to be actually

at least one-fourth of the nominal number of their grade) were as follows, for the first class in each grade:

7-hazari....3·5 lakhs of Rs.

5-hazari....2·5 ,, ,,

Hazari.....half a lakh ,,

Commander of twenty....Rs. 1,000.

The actual armed strength of the empire in 1647 was
2 lakhs of troopers brought to the muster and
branding,

8 thousand *mansabdars*,

1,85,000 *tabinan* or additional troopers of the
princes, *umara* and *mansabdars*,—and

40,000 foot-musketeers, gunners and rocket-men.

These numbers underwent a still further increase with Aurangzib's fresh warfare and annexations in the Deccan, till at last his finances hopelessly broke down under the army bill.

In the Mughal empire there prevailed what Bernier calls "the barbarous and ancient custom" of the sovereign confiscating the property of every one who died in his service. In other words, there was no hereditary property among the nobility, but the Emperor always took possession of the treasures and houses of his noblemen on their death and made a gift to their children of only what he pleased; the heirs had no legal right to their fathers' legacy. The result was very harmful to the State and to Indian civilization. The nobles lived extravagantly and squandered their all on luxury, as they knew that they could leave nothing to their family and that the Emperor alone would profit by their frugality. Again, the insecurity of the nobles' fortunes prevented the accumulation of private capital and the economic growth of the country which depends on capital.

The general level of civilization and culture, too, was lowered, because each generation had to work from the bottom upwards, instead of benefiting by the acquisitions and progress achieved by its predecessor.

The political effect of this escheat system was most disastrous; it prevented India from having one of the strongest checks on royal autocracy, namely, an independent hereditary peerage, whose position and wealth did not depend on the king's favour in every generation and who could therefore afford to be bold in their opposition to royal tyranny. It also made the Mughal nobility a selfish band, prompt in deserting to the winning side in every war of succession or foreign invasion, because they knew that their lands and even personal property were not legally assured to them, but depended solely on the pleasure of the *de facto* king. Mediaeval India had no independent nobility or powerful trading class to act as a barrier between the omnipotent Emperor at the top and the countless poor peasants and labourers at the bottom. Such a Government is most unstable and unsound.

§ 3. *Manufactures and trade.*

The Mughal Government was its own manufacturer, in State factories called *kar-khanahs*, for large quantities and an immense variety of articles. These have been described in detail in my book *Mughal Administration*, Ch. X ("State Industries".) The private industries of the various provinces are enumerated separately in my *India of Aurangzib*. Foreign trade, however, occupied a negligible position in the economics of the Mughal empire, on account of its small volume,—the total yield of the import duty being probably less than 30 lakhs of Rupees a year, while the land revenue brought to the State one hundred and eleven times that

amount. As Bernier acutely observes: "Nor can the commerce of a country so governed be conducted with the activity and success that we witness in Europe..... In case, indeed, where the merchant is protected by a military man of rank, he may be induced to embark in commercial enterprises; but still he must be the slave of his patron, who will exact whatever terms he pleases as the price of his protection."

The value of the Indian products exported by the English E. I. Company during the first sixty years of its trade (1612-1672), did not average more than a hundred thousand pounds (or eight lakhs of Rupees) per annum. [In 1681 it rose to £2,30,000 for Bengal alone.] While the trade of the Dutch Company with India was at this time probably at least as large as that of the English Company, the trade of the Portuguese was certainly smaller. There is no evidence to show that any very considerable volume of trade by sea was in the hands of native merchants, but a small amount of traffic continued to be carried on by the overland route to Persia and Turkey [and also Tibet]. The fact is that the people of India at that time obtained little by international exchange except precious metals together with a few articles of luxury enjoyed by the rich. These imports were in the main paid for by her export of cotton goods, supplemented by a small variety of raw produce such as pepper, indigo, and saltpetre. India was thus economically almost self-supporting. [C. J. Hamilton, 32-33].

The low range of import duties [namely, $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem*, of which 1 p. c. was for the *jaziya*] imposed by the Mughal Emperors proves that there was a general desire to encourage foreign trade. There was no question of an attempt to protect native manufactures [by prohibi-

tive import duties]. The export trade seems to have been approved [by the Delhi Government] as the recognized means for obtaining a supply of the precious metals and of articles of luxury consumed at the Court. [C. J. Hamilton, 20.]

The English E. I. Co.'s trade with the East during the first half of the 17th century was to a large extent confined to dealings in five classes of goods. In the English market the products most sought for were the *spices* from the Archipelago and the Spice Islands, the raw *silk* of Persia, and the *saltpetre* and *indigo* of India. No doubt a fair quantity of the finer *cotton* cloths, as also a small quantity of manufactured silk goods, was imported into England. But, for the most part the Company's purchases of cotton goods were made not for import into England, but for the markets of the Further East and of Persia. India, indeed, possessed almost a monopoly in the manufacture of cotton goods, in foreign markets, but she had not even a considerable export trade in silk goods. Raw silk came [to England] chiefly from Persia and from China, while even in the first half of the 17th century, China supplied the greater part of the manufactured silk articles imported into England. [C. J. Hamilton, 31-32].

The chief imports into India in the Mughal times were *silver* and *gold* (in specie), and to a lesser extent *copper* and *lead*. We were practically dependent upon foreign countries for these metals, though not for iron and steel,—which last were, however, imported as cheaper. For high class woollen clothing Europe (notably France) was our sole supplier, and large quantities of imported broadcloths and other woollen fabrics (Arabic *sagarlat*, scarlet) were consumed in India by the Court and the rich. Next in value were horses, of which large numbers came by ship from the

Persian Gulf and by the land-route from Khurasan Central Asia and Kabul through the north-western passes. Hill ponies (called *tangan* or *gunt*) were imported from the Eastern Himalayan States, Tibet and Bhutan, through Bengal, Kuch Bihar, Morang and Oudh. Large quantities of fruits—fresh in winter and dry all the year round, were consumed in Upper India, and came from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Persia. Spices (such as cloves, nutmegs, cinnamon and cardamom) were supplied by the Dutch from the Spice Islands, which had a monopoly of these commodities. Articles of luxury like musk and porcelain came from China, pearls from Bahrain (Persian Gulf) and Ceylon, elephants from Pegu and Ceylon, superior brands of tobacco from America, glass-ware wine and curiosities from Europe, and slaves from Abyssinia; but the quantity of these was very small, as befitted their high price and limited consumption. The European Companies very occasionally sold artillery and munitions (in small quantities) to our local rulers, in their sudden need, but there was no regular trade in these things and, indeed, the transactions were mostly done in secret as unlawful. A thin stream of traffic entered India from the Himalayan regions by way of Oudh (and later through Patna), they brought to us, loaded on ponies and sheep (!), small quantities of gold, copper, musk and the tail of the yak cow (for use as fans or fly-whiskers), and also spare hill-ponies; and after selling them took back salt, cotton, glass-ware, etc. European paper, imported by the Portuguese and later by the Dutch (but still popularly called 'Portugal paper'), was largely consumed by the independent Sultans of the Deccan. But the Mughal Emperors had their own factories for very fine paper (now known in Europe as 'India paper') in Kashmir and a few other places, while the needs of ordinary office work and

private persons were supplied by a class of Muslim manufacturers (called *kaghazis*) who plied their industry in every town, with a special suburb (*pura*) of their own near the capitals.

Our most important exports in those days were common cotton cloth (called *calicoes*), either plain or printed (*chintz*), which were largely consumed in the Indian Archipelago, and towards the close of the 17th century in England also,—muslin or very fine cotton fabrics,—and raw products like saltpetre, indigo silk and pepper (besides certain other cooking spices). Small quantities of white sugar were exported from Hughli, diamonds and rubies *via* Masulipatam, slaves from Bengal and Madras, and also cotton yarn for making candle-wicks in England. Towards the end of the century silk *taffetas* and brocades began to be exported in larger quantities, and a distinct improvement in the dyeing and weaving of silk was effected in Bengal by the English Company. The whole Madras coast from Masulipatam to Pondicherry, (and next, but far behind it, Kanara or the country from Hubli to Karwar) were the seats of the most productive cotton industry in India; but the wars following the overthrow of the Golkonda sultanate and the rise of the Marathas, completely ruined these regions and the primacy in cotton manufacture passed on to Bengal at the beginning of the 18th century.

§ 4. *The administrative system.*

The Muslim State was essentially a military Government and depended for its very existence on the absolute authority of the monarch, who was also the supreme Commander of the Faithful in war. He had no regular council of ministers. The *wazir* or *diwan* was the highest officer below the Emperor, and the other ministers were in no sense

his colleagues but admittedly inferior to him. Many important questions were decided by the Emperor and the wazir alone without the knowledge of the other ministers. But none of the ministers, not even the wazir himself, could serve as a check on the royal will; their office depended entirely on his caprice. They, therefore, could not form a Cabinet in the modern sense of the term. Every Muslim sovereign is, in strict theory, the head of the Church and the State alike; he is the *Khalifa of the age* to his subjects.

The chief departments of the Mughal administration were:

1. The Exchequer and Revenue (under the *Diwan* or Chancellor).

2. The Imperial Household (under the *Khan-i-saman* or High Steward).

3. The Pay and Accounts office (under the *Bakhshi* or Paymaster).

4. Canon Law (under the *Qazi of Qazis*.)

5. Religious endowments and charity (under the *Sadr of Sadrs*).

6. Censorship of Public Morals (under the *Muhtasib*).

Inferior to these, but ranking almost like departments, were—

7. The Artillery (under the *Mir Atish*), and

8. Intelligence and Posts (under the *Darogha* of *Dakchauki*).

The Imperial Diwan received all revenue papers and despatches from the provinces and field armies, and decided all questions connected with the collection or assessment of the revenue. He also appointed and controlled the diwans of all the provinces. All orders of payment had to be signed by him. He wrote letters “by order” (*hasb-ul-hukm*) in his own person to communicate the Emperor’s

wishes, and often drafted royal letters to important persons and foreign rulers.

The salary bills of all officers—both civil and military (because both were alike *mansabdars*)—had to be calculated and passed by the Bakhshi, and in the case of a field army the payment also was made through his department. At the end of Aurangzib's reign, owing to the great expansion of the empire, there were one Chief Bakhshi (called the First Bakhshi) and three assistants, called the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Bakhshis. Each field army was placed under a general appointed for the occasion. Though at several periods we find officers invested with the title of *sipah salar* or 'chief of the army, it was only a title of honour and these officers did not really command the entire Mughal army. The Emperor alone was the commander-in-chief.

The Khan-i-saman or High Steward was the head of the Emperor's household department; he controlled all the personal servants of the Emperor, supervised his daily expenditure, meals, stores, &c., and accompanied him during his journeys. The State factories or *karkhanahs* were managed and paid by him.

The Emperor was theoretically the highest judge in the realm, and used to try cases personally every Wednesday. But the court held by him was a tribunal of the highest appeal rather than a court of first instance. The Qazi was the chief judge in all criminal suits under the Quranic law and the civil cases of the Muslims and tried them according to Muslim law, assisted by a *mufti*, who stated the abstract law bearing on the case after consulting Arabic books on jurisprudence, while the Qazi pronounced the sentence.

The imperial Qazi, called the *Qazi-ul-quzat*, always accompanied the Emperor, and appointed and dismissed the local qazis of the cities and large villages in every province.

The Chief Sadr (called the *Sadr-us-sadur*) was judge and supervisor of the endowments of land made by the Emperor and the princes for the support of pious men, scholars and monks. It was his duty to see that such grants were applied to their proper purpose and also to scrutinise fresh applications for grants. He was also the Emperor's almoner and had the distribution of the charity fund of the State. The provincial sadrs were appointed and supervised by him.

It was the duty of the *Muhtasib* to regulate the lives of the people in strict accordance with the Quranic rules, and to enforce the Prophet's commands by putting down the drinking of distilled spirits, *bhang* and other liquid intoxicants, gambling and the practice of immorality as a profession or in public. The punishment of heretical opinions, blasphemy against the Prophet, and neglect of the five daily prayers or of the fast during the month of Ramzan, also lay within his province. The demolition of newly built temples was entrusted to him.

The administrative agency in the provinces of the Mughal empire was an exact miniature of the Central Government. There were the governor (officially styled *nazim* and popularly *subahdar*), the *diwan*, *bakhshi*, *qazi*, *sadr*, *buyutat* (keeper of Government property and official trustee), and the *muhtasib*, but no *Khan-i-saman*. Each *subahdar* tried to play the Emperor within his own jurisdiction.

The provincial administration was concentrated in its chief town. At important centres or sub-divisions there were *faujdars* to maintain order, punish rebels and wrongdoers, and assist in the collection of revenue when opposed. The villages were neglected and, either contemptuously or through insufficiency of official staff, left to live their own

lives, often as small self-governing units or "village communities."

In the big cities the *kotwal* or prefect of police not only enforced law and order, but had also to discharge many functions of a modern municipality, control the markets (weights and prices), and maintain the Quranic rules of morality.

The Central Government kept itself informed of the occurrences in all parts of the country by means of spies and news-reporters, both public and secret. These agents formed four classes: *waqai-navis*, *sawanih-nigar*, *khufia-navis* (secret letter-writer), and *harkarah* (spy and courier). They had to send reports at regular intervals. Every public office had an open reporter or diarist attached to it. All the reports reached the Emperor through the Postmaster-General (*Darogha-i-Dakchauki*).

In spite of the repeated prohibitions of the Emperors, many local officials (and even subahdars) used to exact illegal cesses (called *abwabs*) under an immense variety of heads and from all classes of artisans, traders, labourers, and people in general. A list of 67 such *abwabs* is given with explanatory notes in my *Mughal Administration*, ch. 5. A further source of oppression was the practice of some subahdars to seize the goods of merchants in transit, pay an inadequate price or no price at all for them, and then sell these goods in the open market for their own profit (what the English traders called "the forcing of goods") or appropriate the choice articles to their own use. Only a strong and vigilant Emperor could stop it.

Author's thanks

The history of Aurangzib which I began twenty years ago, is now complete. The task has been ceaselessly pursued in the midst of exacting professional duties and private cares that have only grown with age.

That it has been possible to use in this book all the known original sources is due solely to the generous rule of the India Office, London, and the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain for lending their MSS. to students outside,—the enlightened liberality of the Nawab of Rampur (U. P.) and the Jaipur State (Rajputana) in permitting me to take copies of their Persian documents,—the unfailing kindness of Sir Edward Gait, who secured for me a loan of the Assam Buranjis and access to the Jaipur archives,—and the constant help of many friends in India, notably Thakur Narendra Singh of Jobner (State Councillor) and the officers of the Mahakuma Khas of Jaipur, and Govind Sakharam Sardesai, the greatest living historian of Maharashtra.

For proof-reading from the 3rd volume onwards I have been indebted to the tireless industry and minute accuracy of Brojendra Nath Banerji, a very promising and devoted investigator of history at Calcutta.

PATNA,
14th December, 1924.

JADUNATH SARKAR

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